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FOREWORD 
Russia has always been a fascinating country for me. When I decided to travel 
to Novosibirsk State University during my masters’ studies in order to do some 
research, many of my friends and relatives considered this a rather peculiar 
thing to do, as not too many Estonians have travelled to Siberia voluntarily. 
However, my experiences were most heartwarming and inspiring.  
My specific interest in the human rights situation in Russia began during the 
turbulent wave of protests that took place in 2011 and 2012. During this exciting 
period of sudden events, and following legislative changes, I found myself 
constantly reading news and analyses and contemplating the situation of civil 
and political rights in Russia. Eventually my interest grew into a PhD project, 
took me to learn Russian approaches to human rights law at the Faculty of Law 
of St Petersburg State University, enabled me to engage in heated discussions 
on human rights issues with renowned Russian professors as well as with a new 
generation of Russian lawyers, which often left me puzzled, but provided me 
with interesting food for thought. Living in Russia also enabled me to gain a 
sense of understanding of this society, which would be impossible from a 
distance. While standing up with all the other students when the professors 
entered or left the classroom; while standing in endless lines in various adminis-
trative offices to fill in a document or in a dormitory in order to collect my 
laundry at the specifically designated time once a week; while watching local 
media and having discussions with Russian people and hearing them say that 
they have never been outside Russia, but they are afraid of all the horrible 
things happening in the West, they are afraid of war and are thankful that for 
some time everything has been “all right” in Russia; while seeing how merrily 
people participate in the parades on 9 of May and other patriotic holidays and 
how truly proud they are of their history, I experienced how norms and values 
function in Russia and understood how widespread the influence of the Russian 
media truly is on the national mindset. My shorter and longer travels to Russia 
have allowed me to enjoy Russia’s rich culture and the hospitality of people 
with highly diverse attitudes. All of these unique experiences have contributed 
to this study.  
My personal experiences in Russia obviously have influenced me as a 
researcher. This inevitably raises questions about the objectivity or neutrality of 
my research. I acknowledge that a certain subjective element is present in my 
study. However, I think it is nearly impossible to erase the subjective element 
from any qualitative study, or maybe even from any quantitative study. Every 
researcher interprets the sources of research through a subjective lens and in my 
view this is inescapable. Thus, the subjectivity of my interpretations is one of 
the limitations of my research. Acknowledging the element of subjectivity, 
I have tried to gather the material for my research from a wide range of sources 
and to present the viewpoints of very different scholars and other authorities.  
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I was lucky to be able to do research in many wonderful places during my 
PhD studies and I am very grateful for this. Whereas experiences gained at St 
Petersburg State University were the most central, visiting Uppsala Centre for 
Russian and Eurasian Studies, Göttingen University Law Faculty and Tbilisi 
University Law Faculty also provided me with an opportunity to learn from the 
best experts, to broaden my horizons and to make great friends.  
I am most thankful to my supervisor, Professor Lauri Mälksoo, for his 
patience, support and valuable feedback. I also thank Dr. Merilin Kiviorg and 
Capt. William (Bill) Michael Combes for carefully reading the draft of this 
study and offering valuable suggestions for improvement. I would like to express 
my sincere gratitude to Professor Bill Bowring and Dr. Anton Burkov for 
carefully reviewing my research and providing most useful comments. It has 
been an honour to learn from such distinguished colleagues.  
I thank the University of Tartu, my alma mater that in many ways has made 
me the person I am. Research for this study has been supported by institutional 
grant IUT20-50 funded by the Estonian Research Council.  
Above all I would like to express my gratitude to my family and friends, 
particularly to Martin whose help and support has been invaluable throughout 
all these years. I now promise to spend less time behind my laptop and to 
devote more time and attention to all my loved ones.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Setting the scene and explaining the aim of this research1 
Russia is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma 
(Winston Churchill) 
 
This study examines the mechanisms and the limits of the CoE in facilitating 
compliance with international human rights treaties in its member states, 
focusing on Russia’s interaction with the normative system of the CoE and 
ECHR. I scrutinize how the factors facilitating or hindering compliance are 
manifested in the Russian legal order, aiming to determine the major obstacles 
that underlie Russia’s complex relationship with the CoE and its standards. In 
order to attain this objective, I firstly examine whether and under what 
conditions we can expect international frameworks such as the CoE to have an 
influence on state practice. On the basis of previous scholarship I determine the 
factors contributing to the power of international human rights law in having an 
effect. I then use this theoretical framework to scrutinize the construal and 
implementation of human rights in Russia. I explore the manifestation of the 
major impact factors in the context of the Russian institutional framework; the 
interplay of Russian domestic legislation and the ECHR; construal and the role 
of human rights in the Russian political and social context; and in legislation 
regulating implementation of the right to freedom of expression; the right to 
freedom of association and the right to freedom of assembly in Russia. As a 
result, it will be revealed how the strategy of the CoE to “tame” Russia into 
compliance with its norms and standards has worked in practice, what have 
been the main obstacles hindering compliance and what conclusions can be 
drawn about the future interaction of the CoE and Russia.  
In this study it is argued that the CoE can have a meaningful influence on 
compliance with the ECHR and its other instruments only when domestic cir-
cumstances support compliance with international human rights law, otherwise 
the influence remains very limited. It is my view that normative theories 
explaining compliance with international human rights law have ignored the 
limits of external actors to influence the behaviour of states and the specific 
circumstances, especially the domestic political and social contexts that can 
facilitate or inhibit the implementation of human rights. Thus, “taming” Russia 
into compliance by external actors is unrealistic, unless certain preconditions 
are met. When Russian domestic institutions do not support compliance with 
international human rights law; when norms of international human rights law 
                                                                          
1  In this study I rely on my previously published articles. See: Kerttu Mäger, ‘Russia’s 
Illiberal Ideology and Its Influences on the Legislation in the Sphere of Civil and Political 
Rights’ (2016) 15 Baltic Yearbook of International Law Online 148–168; Kerttu Mäger, 
‘Enforcing the Judgments of the ECtHR in Russia in Light of the Amendments to the Law 
on the Constitutional Court’ (2016) 24 Juridica International 14–22. 
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are not effectively incorporated into the Russian legal order; when human rights 
are not valued and respected in the Russian political and social climate and 
when Russian legislation hinders the opportunities of Russian people to protect 
and demand their rights to be guaranteed under the ECHR, effective compliance 
with the normative system of the CoE is unrealistic.  
Human rights were attributed a key role in advancing the lives of people in 
the post-Cold War world2 and “globalization was welcomed as the flowering of 
human rights and global peace”3. It seemed for many that Kant’s aspirations for 
world government and perpetual peace could truly become a model of a global 
civil society.4 Francis Fukuyama predicted that humankind was witnessing the 
unabashed victory of liberalism, “the end point of mankind’s ideological 
evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government.”5 Post-Soviet Russia was no longer perceived as a 
threat. Instead it was presumed that Russia’s “ideological otherness” had dis-
appeared and that Russia would learn from the West and return to Europe in 
terms of values and norms.6 In keeping with the Zeitgeist of the era, Russia and 
other former Soviet republics were expected to gallop towards democracy, rule 
of law and protection of human rights with a little help from the Council of 
Europe (CoE) and other external actors.7  
The driving idea of the CoE has been to preserve peace and unity in Europe 
through cooperation and integration between liberal and democratic countries 
sharing similar principles: rule of law, democracy and human rights.8 The CoE 
became an important forum for political dialogue between the “Western world” 
and Soviet countries during perestroika, a period when Central-and Eastern-
European countries began their transition from human rights-abusive pasts. After 
the turbulent collapse of the Soviet Union, a large number of newly independent 
countries, including Russia, started to prepare for membership in the CoE that 
was widely viewed as a “door to Europe”. Acceding to the CoE became a 
crucial foreign policy goal for post-Soviet countries.9 On 28 February 1996 the 
Russian Federation acceded to the Statute of CoE and on 30 March 1998 Russia 
                                                                          
2  Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge University Press 2009) 349. 
3  M. Christian Green and John Witte, Jr., ‘Religion’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford Hand-
book of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 2013) 100. 
4  Ibid.  
5  Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’ (1989) 3 The national interest 3–18. 
6  Lauri Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (Oxford University Press, USA 
2015) 8. 
7  Anna Jonsson Cornell, ‘Processes of International and Constitutional Socialization in 
Russia: Misconceptions and Overestimations’ (2014) 14, 16. 
8  Jonsson Cornell (n 7); Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (n 6).  
9  Jonsson Cornell (n 7); Angelika Nußberger, ‘The Reception Process in Russia and Ukraine’ 
in Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights: the impact of the ECHR on 
national legal systems (Oxford University Press, USA 2008). 
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ratified the European Convention on Human Rights10 (ECHR)11, which entered 
into force in Russia on 1 November 1998.  
The relationship between Russia and the CoE has been “marked by a pro-
found contradiction” since Russia’s accession, as noted by Jean-Pierre Massias.12 
The accession process that started in 1992 was difficult and prolonged. At the 
time of accession, Russian legislation and institutions did not meet all the 
requirements. Russia was taken on board on the condition of twelve assurances 
and twenty-five commitments listed in a 1996 opinion of the PACE.13 
“Accession was deemed not to be the end, but rather the beginning of a long and 
difficult process” as voiced by Angelika Nußberger, a German scholar and 
currently a judge at the ECtHR.14 Russia’s undertakings included reforming its 
criminal justice system; passing a number of laws, such as the Criminal Code, 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Proce-
dure. Russia also undertook to abolish the death penalty; to ratify the ECHR, its 
protocols, and other treaties of the CoE and to recognize the right of individual 
application to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR.  
Russia’s application to the CoE in 1992 directly affected the drafting process 
of the Russian 1993 Constitution – resulting among other influences – in Article 
46(3) of the Constitution, allowing citizens to complain to international judicial 
bodies for the protection of human rights and freedoms, after exhausting all 
domestic remedies.15 When joining the CoE, Russia agreed to defend common 
values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Most importantly, 
subjecting Russia to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR was a rather radical step, 
because Russia now allowed an international court to intervene in Russia’s 
internal matters.16 This step “counteracted the traditional autarky of the Russian 
judicial system, for the first time acknowledging the possibility of external 
redress for individuals and subsequently bringing jurisprudence of the European 
                                                                          
10  European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe, CETS No. 5. 
11  Federal’nyy zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 30.03.1998 No 54-FZ “O ratifikatsii Kon-
ventsii o zashchite prav cheloveka i osnovnykh svobod i Protokolov k ney”. 
12  Jean-Pierre Massias, ‘Russia and the Council of Europe: Ten Years Wasted?’ (2007) 
Understanding Russia and the New Independent States, IFRI, Paris 103–119. 
13 Bill Bowring, ‘Russia’s Accession to the Council of Europe and Human Rights: Com-
pliance or Cross-Purposes?’ (1997) European Human Rights Law Review; Bill Bowring, 
‘Russia’s Accession to the Council of Europe and Human Rights: Four Years On’ (2000) 
European Human Rights Law Review; Anton Burkov, ‘The Impact of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights on Russian Law’ (Stuttgart: ibidemVerlag 2007); Jane Henderson, 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation: A Contextual Analysis (Bloomsbury Publishing 
2011) 248; Pamela A Jordan, ‘Russia’s Accession to the Council of Europe and Compliance 
with European Human Rights Norms’ (2003) 11 Demokratizatsiya 281–296; Nußberger (n 9). 
14  Nußberger (n 9) 603–610. 
15  Alexei Trochev, ‘All Appeals Lead to Strasbourg? Unpacking the Impact of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights on Russia’ (2009) 17(2) Demokratizatsiya 145–178; 147. 
16  Petr Preclik, ‘Culture Re-Introduced: Contestation of Human Rights in Contemporary 
Russia’ (2012) 37 Review of Central and East European Law 173–230; 174. 
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Court of Human rights directly into the Russian legal system”, as opined by 
Jane Henderson.17 When Russia joined the CoE, its geopolitical goal of uniting 
Europe in terms of territory was considered achieved and the goal of uniting 
Europe in terms of values was considered to be about to happen very soon. The 
Soviet Union had collapsed and Russia had to face bitter loss. Consequently, 
Russia was expected to learn Western values, to take the role of the “pupil” of 
its Western teachers.  
Whereas a realist school of thought having little enthusiasm towards the 
ability of international law to have an effect on domestic processes dominated 
during the Cold War, attitudes since perestroika have shifted towards a value-
dominated approach. In the 90s, hopes were very high about the role and ability 
of international law and international organisations to influence domestic prac-
tices. The idea that external actors such as the CoE can socialize states into 
embracing norms and values, including human rights, rule of law and demo-
cracy, became the leading approach. International relations scholars argued that 
transnational socialization of human rights followed the logic of appropriateness. 
This means that international human rights norms demonstrate appropriate 
behaviour in an international community of liberal states.18 Scholars claimed 
that if states want to gain international approval and recognition, if they want to 
“belong to the club”, they are motivated and influenced by international human 
rights norms and change their national practices because they are convinced that 
this is an appropriate thing to do.19 For example, Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp 
and Kathryn Sikkink proposed a “five-stage spiral model” to explain the human 
rights socialization of state actors in their 1999 classic book “The Power of 
Human Rights”. They assumed that a group of advanced democracies com-
mitted to human rights can “legitimately socialize norm-violating regimes such 
as Russia towards “proper” behaviour”.20  
International rule of law was viewed as the primary basis of international 
order and Russia, among other post-Soviet countries, was expected to gradually 
come to “embrace Western-style democracy at home and liberal norms abroad”.21 
Accordingly, while preparing for enlargement, the decision-makers in the CoE 
assumed that international frameworks such as the CoE itself were empowered 
to facilitate compliance with international human rights norms on the national 
level and the limits were rarely discussed, at least not in the public eye. 
                                                                          
17  Henderson (n 13). 
18  See for one of the most influential theories in this regard: Thomas Risse-Kappen and 
others, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge 
University Press 1999) vol 66. 
19 Thomas Risse and Stephen C. Ropp, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in Thomas Risse and 
others (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance 
(Cambridge University Press 2013).  
20 Ibid 9. 
21  Alexander Lukin, ‘What the Kremlin Is Thinking: Putin’s Vision for Eurasia’ (2014) 93 
Foreign Aff. 
15 
The optimistic scenario of the 90s was based on the premise that inter-
national law, including international human rights law, was universal and that 
gradually all states would successfully implement human rights norms: reform 
their legal systems and change their domestic practices in accordance with 
international standards. Another premise was that external actors such as the 
CoE can socialize states into new values, can teach and motivate states to inter-
nalize new values. States to be “socialized” were considered to be in a student 
role, eager to learn. Moreover, this scenario also presumed that states in general 
are motivated to comply with international standards and want to belong to the 
group of states sharing similar norms and values. This study scrutinizes how the 
approach of the CoE to “taming” Russia has held up in reality.  
The role of transactional actors such as the CoE in assisting countries 
emerging from authoritarian rule towards better human rights compliance, rule 
of law and democracy has received a considerable amount of scholarly atten-
tion.22 However, the role of transnational actors in the implementation of human 
rights has been overestimated and processes on a domestic level need more 
attention, claims Beth Simmons, a renowned professor of international affairs at 
Harvard University. She argues that “presenting transnational actors as white 
kings that make demands for those who are not often credited with the ability to 
speak, strategize, litigate, and mobilise for themselves and their society” is not 
justified.23 International human rights institutions are simply not capable of 
facilitating compliance from the top down. Domestic, not international, insti-
tutions are the “linchpin to securing human rights”, argues Courtney Hille-
brecht, a political scientist and an Associate Professor at the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.24  
It derives from the nature of human rights law that governments, not inter-
national institutions, are primarily responsible for implementing human rights. 
“It is through action at the national level that international human-rights obli-
gations can be translated into reality”25 as pointed out by Kofi Atta Annan, the 
seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations. Therefore, understanding 
“motivations, institutions, capacities, and politics at the local level”26 is vital for 
understanding how countries construe and implement human rights the way 
                                                                          
22  Antoine Buyse and Michael Hamilton, Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: 
Justice, Politics and Rights (Cambridge University Press 2011); Helen Keller and Alec 
Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems 
(Oxford University Press, USA 2008).  
23  Simmons (n 2) 356. 
24  Courtney Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The 
Problem of Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2014) vol 104, 19; Courtney Hille-
brecht, ‘Implementing International Human Rights Law at Home: Domestic Politics and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 13 Human Rights Review 279–301; 284.  
25 Kofi Atta Annan, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights for All’ [2005]. UN doc. A/59/2005/Add.3, para 22. 
26  Simmons (n 2) 372.  
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they do, and why. Whereas the main idea of international human rights law is 
“to bring human rights home”27, local circumstances facilitating or hindering 
implementation of human rights law have not been sufficiently acknowledged in 
human rights research. Assuming the universality of international law, regional 
origins in international law and the role of cultural and civilizational factors 
have largely been ignored by the global discourse of international law, claims 
Lauri Mälksoo.28 As a result, the linkage between international human rights 
norms and domestic practices has been studied insufficiently.29 Most studies 
addressing compliance with international human rights treaties focus on 
analysing the effects of international treaties on the domestic human rights prac-
tices of certain states. However, there is a lack of research addressing other 
dimensions of compliance, including changes in domestic legislation, policies 
and other local conditions.30 My research contributes to filling this gap by 
providing an in-depth analysis of Russian domestic factors that inevitably 
influence various aspects of compliance with international human rights law.  
Russian approaches to international human rights law is a significant field of 
research for many reasons. It is undeniable that Russia plays an important role 
in determining the development or regression of human rights, democracy and 
rule of law in the CoE as well as globally. Notably, Russia’s role in influencing 
the construal of human rights in the international arena has grown compared to 
the beginning of the 90s, when Russia was expected to occupy the role of 
student. It cannot be ignored that countries like Russia, but also China, India, 
Brazil, Japan and other non-Western countries are changing from “norm-takers 
to shapers of the international legal order”.31 Russia has a substantial amount of 
“ideological energy” to influence the future of international law, to challenge 
the spread of human rights and other “Western normative projects” and Russia’s 
global bargaining power is unlikely to decline.32 Russia’s construal of human 
rights in the domestic arena has important implications for Russia’s conduct in 
its surrounding region and for Russia’s policies globally.33 Despite Russia’s 
                                                                          
27  Kevin Boyle, ‘National Implementation of Human Rights Commitments’. Lecture given 
at the General Seminar on International Human Rights Law, LL.M programme, University 
of Essex, England, 2003–2004. Cited in Burkov (n 13) 20. 
28  See, for example: Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (n 6) 13, 146. 
29  See, for example: Dia Anagnostou and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Domestic Implementation 
of Human Rights Judgments in Europe: Legal Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness 
Matter’ (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 205–227; Simmons (n 2) 4.  
30  Linda Camp Keith, ‘Human Rights Instruments’ in Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (OUP Oxford 2012) 354. 
31  Anne Peters, ‘After Trump: China and Russia Move from Norm-Takers to Shapers of the 
International Legal Order’ November 2016) EJIL: Talk! <https://www.ejiltalk.org/after-
trump-china-and-russia-move-from-norm-takers-to-shapers-of-the-international-legal-
order/> accessed on 29 November 2017. 
32  Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (n 6) 11. 
33  See further: Section 1.2.3 of this study.  
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important role and considerable influence, there is little in-depth knowledge of 
Russia’s domestic practices, construal of human rights and the factors under-
lying Russia’s human rights interpretation practices. At the end of the Cold 
War, Western universities and research institutions lost some of their active 
interest towards Russia.34 Consequently, Russia’s specific circumstances gained 
less attention. Ignorance of conflicting normative and legal standards and 
approaches between Western countries and Russia surely does not help to better 
predict and understand Russia’s conduct.35 Whereas in recent years some 
valuable research has been published36 the scholarship, especially the scholar-
ship available in English language, is still rather scarce.  
My research provides an important input into enhancing our knowledge 
about the construal and implementation of human rights in Russia, particularly 
about the underlying mechanisms explaining patterns of human rights imple-
mentation in Russia. My dissertation combines the theoretical framework of 
human rights compliance with Russian legal reality, focusing mainly on the 
period of Russia’s membership in the CoE. I provide a thorough analysis based 
on recent legislative amendments and Russian case law, particularly in the 
sphere of constitutional law and in the sphere of freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly and freedom of association. In addition to legislative 
amendments and the case law, I also extensively analyse various facets of 
Russian legal culture and the role of human rights in it. As a result of the 
detailed analysis covering various aspects of Russian legal order and legal 
culture that influence Russia’s compliance with the ECHR, I determine the 
major obstacles that underlie Russia’s complex relationship with the CoE and 
its standards, which is an original contribution to the existing scholarship.  
According to a popular stereotype, Russia is a country that is difficult to 
make sense of rationally. Russia is described as mystical or incomprehensible; it 
is often idealized or demonized in the international media, in the political arena 
as well as in academia. Умом Россию не понять, Аршином общим не изме-
рить: У ней особенная стать – В Россию можно только верить (Who 
would grasp Russia with the mind? /For her no yardstick was created:/Her soul 
is of a special kind/ By faith alone appreciated)37 as put by Fyodor Ivanovich 
Tyutchev, a Russian Pan-Slavist poet and diplomat. The idea of this well-known 
poem is that it is impossible to grasp the “true” meaning or knowledge of 
                                                                          
34  Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (n 6)7–8.  
35  See: Roy Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention (OUP Oxford 2013); 
Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (n 6). 
36  See, for example: Lauri Mälksoo and Benedek Wolfgang (eds), Russia and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights: The Strasbourg Effect (Cambridge University Press 2017); 
Bill Bowring, Law, Rights and Ideology in Russia: Landmarks in the Destiny of a Great 
Power (Routledge 2013). 
37  Who would grasp Russia with the mind?/For her no yardstick was created:/Her soul is of 
a special kind/ By faith alone appreciated. Fyodor Tyutchev, ‘Who would grasp Russia with 
the mind’, Selected Poems (Brimstone Press, 2014, translated by John Dewey).  
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Russia through the intellect: “the only true, valuable knowledge is localized in 
the soul or heart, but not in the head”.38 During the past few years, Russia’s 
conduct has been unexpected in many regards. In the 90s it was expected that 
Russia could be socialized into the norms and values of the CoE, including 
human rights. Russia has been a full member state of the CoE, the world’s most 
advanced international human rights protection system, for twenty-one years. 
On the one hand, having Russia and other post-Soviet countries as members has 
enabled the CoE to broaden its geographical scope, to spread its underlying 
values and to encourage legal reforms across post-Soviet space, thus increasing 
the impact of the organisation in the region. However, Russia’s membership is 
also viewed as an impediment to the development of the CoE.39  
Russia has slid back towards authoritarianism and an increasingly hostile 
and unpredictable foreign policy. Instead of global respect towards the inter-
national rule of law, democracy and human rights, the dusk of these principles 
is on the horizon in Russia.40 Shrinking the space for public dissent, pressure on 
the independent media and NGOs through censorship, prosecution, intimidation 
and harassment, attacks on freedom of expression on the internet – all have been 
identified as acute problems by the CoE, international human rights NGOs as 
well as members of Russian academia. Combined with increased state control 
over the media landscape and an overall restrictive political climate, these 
processes have reduced meaningful political dialogue in Russia to a minimum.41 
According to Freedom House, the press status of Russia is not free. In 2015 
Russia ranked 180 out of 199 countries along with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia.42 
Despite noticeable progress in several areas, overall the human rights record and 
reforms to the legal system have remained inadequate.43 Russia has serious 
problems with implementation of judgments of the ECtHR. Russia is one of ten 
                                                                          
38  Irina B. Levontina and Anna A. Zalizniak, ‘Human emotions viewed through the Russian 
language’ in Jean Harkins, Anna Wierzbicka (eds) Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective 
(Mouton de Gruyter Berlin, New York 2001) 295.  
39  Preclik (n 16) 174. 
40  See, for example a book by Andrei A. Kovalev, a former Russian diplomat and a member 
of the Secretariat of president M. Gorbachev and administrations of presidents B. Yeltsin 
and V. Putin: Andrei A Kovalev, Russia’s Dead End: An Insider’s Testimony from Gor-
bachev to Putin (University of Nebraska Press 2017). 
41 Gleb Bogush, ‘Criminalisation of Free Speech in Russia’ (2017) 69(8) Europe-Asia 
Studies 1242–1256; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, The Honouring of Obli-
gations and Commitments by the Russian Federation (Strasbourg 2012) Doc 13018 para 281 
<http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=18998&lang=en> 
accessed 29 November 2017; Press Freedom in 2013: Media Freedom Hits Decade Low 
(Freedom House, Washington and New York 2014); Yulia Gorbunova and Konstantin 
Baranov, Laws of Attrition: Crackdown on Russia’s Civil Society after Putin’s Return to the 
Presidency (Human Rights Watch 2013). 
42  Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2015: Harsh Laws and Violence Drive Global 
Decline (Freedom House 2015). 
43  Nußberger (n 9) 604.  
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CoE member states highlighted in the report of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (hereinafter: PACE) with the highest number of non-
implemented judgments, reflecting serious structural problems in the country’s 
legal system.44 As of 31 December 2016, Russia had as many as 1,573 cases 
pending. 45 On average it takes 7.9 years to implement a judgment of the ECtHR 
in Russia.46 The number of cases not fully executed after more than five years 
has been continuously growing.47 The sharpest implementation problems have 
been identified in cases related to poor conditions and excessive length of 
remand detention; torture and ill-treatment during custody; secret extraditions to 
the former Soviet republics of Central Asia; LGBT rights, particularly freedom 
of expression and assembly; and violations resulting from actions of the security 
forces in the North Caucasus.48 There are some judgments whose execution 
raises particularly complex political issues. For example, the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation has declared the judgment in the case of 
Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia49 and the judgment in the case of OAO 
Neftyanaya Kompaniya YUKOS v Russian Federation50 impossible to enforce51, 
thus rejecting the binding force of ECtHR judgments. This rather bleak picture 
is not something that political leaders, experts and scholars expected during the 
“honeymoon period” of the 90s.  
Scholars and experts from various disciplines have fallen under criticism for 
not been able to understand why Russia has strayed from the path it was expected 
                                                                          
44  These countries include Italy, the Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, 
Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova and Poland. See further: Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly. Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Imple-
mentation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: 9th report (Strasbourg 
2017). <http://website-pace.net/documents/19838/3115031/AS-JUR-2017-15-EN.pdf/ 
18891586-7d6c-4297-b5f7-4077636db28e> accessed 29 November 2017.  
45  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the Execution of Judgments 
and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights:10th Annual Report of the Com-
mittee of Ministers (Strasbourg 2016). < https://rm.coe.int/prems 021117-gbr-2001-10e-
rapport-annuel-2016-web-16x24/168072800b> accessed 29 November 2017.  
46  Ibid.  
47  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and 
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: 6th Annual Report of the Committee of 
Ministers (Strasbourg 2012) <https://rm.coe.int/1680592ac8> accessed 29 November 2017.  
48  Parliamentary Assembly. Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Implemen-
tation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (n 27) para 10.  
49  Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia (Apps 11157/04 and 15162/05) ECtHR 4 July 2013.  
50  OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya YUKOS v Russia (App 14902/04) ECtHR 20 September 
2011 (merits) and 31 July 2014 (just satisfaction). 
51 See: Russian Constitutional Court, No. 12-P/2016 (19 April 2016). English translation 
available at http://www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/Judgments/Documents/2016_April_19_12-P.pdf 
(accessed on 29 November 2017) and Russian Constitutional Court, No 1-P/2017 (19 
January 2017). English translation available:  
http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision258613.pdf (accessed on 29 November 2017).  
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to take and for fuelling ungrounded optimism with their expert opinions. Russia 
is still a puzzle, mesmerizing the majority of the Western audience. Whereas 
Russia’s inability to adhere to its obligations and the presence of widespread 
human rights violations is well-documented, substantially less scholarship covers 
the underlying mechanisms hindering Russia’s compliance with international 
human rights law. With my research I aim to move beyond what has become 
customary criticism of Russia’s inability to adhere to international standards. 
This study enables a better apprehension of how human rights are construed in 
Russia and to explain the underlying mechanisms of Russian patterns of 
compliance with and implementation of international human rights law. 
Whereas the focus of this study is on Russia, I do not want to argue that 
Russia stands out as the worst human rights violator or that other countries do 
not have their problems. They surely do and their situations must be studied too, 
but these problems fall out of the scope of this research. However, Russia 
differs from many non-Western countries in one very important aspect: Russia 
is a member of the CoE. Russia voluntarily ratified the ECHR, establishing high 
standards for the protection of civil and political rights and a binding control 
mechanism. Russia has assumed obligations that China or Brazil have not. 
Thus, the level of scrutiny to be imposed on Russia would inevitably be dif-
ferent. It is also not my intention to argue that Russia is the black sheep of the 
CoE. Several countries in the CoE are struggling with timely execution of the 
judgments of the ECtHR and are for other reasons blameworthy for poor 
compliance with CoE standards. Whereas I tackle these issues briefly in Section 
1.2.1 of this study, the scope of my research does not allow extensive focus on 
all members of the CoE. However, I find that the factors influencing compliance 
identified in this study are not Russia-specific and provide a useful framework 
that could be applicable to all CoE member states. 
 
 
Research questions  
Following the research aims described above, the main research questions 
raised in this study are the following:  
1)  What are the mechanisms and limits of the CoE to facilitate compliance with 
and implementation of human rights law in its member states?  
2)  How does Russia’s institutional framework influence compliance with 
international human rights treaties?  
3)  How is international human rights law incorporated in the Russian legal 
order? 
4)  What features characterize construal and the role of human rights in the 
Russian political and social context?  
5)  How are core civil and political rights – particularly the right to freedom of 
expression, the right to freedom of assembly and the right to freedom of 
association – implemented in Russia and what influence do these processes 
have on Russian civil society?  
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This study consists of seven chapters and the structure of the study follows the 
logic of the research questions presented. 
I explore my first research question in Chapter I. In order to answer the first 
research question, I scrutinize various theories focusing on the impact of 
international law on domestic practices, norms and standards. I will ascertain 
what mechanisms of social influence are presumed to facilitate human rights 
compliance and implementation and critically analyse whether the mechanisms 
proposed by various scholars are applicable to human rights compliance and 
implementation in the contemporary world. From the perspective of the current 
study it is important to understand how international human rights law, espe-
cially the instruments of the Council of Europe, can affect governmental human 
rights practices and what other factors contribute to the process of implementing 
human rights on a national level. Thus, it is of particular interest to establish 
what approaches to human rights compliance and implementation have guided 
the strategy deployed by the CoE to facilitate compliance with international 
human rights standards in its member states. I aim to explore the factors that 
contribute to the success or failure of compliance with and implementation of 
human rights law on a domestic level and explain whether and under what 
conditions we can expect countries to comply with international human rights 
norms. I place the preconditions for compliance with human rights treaties – 
explained in my theory chapter – in the context of Russian state practice in 
forthcoming chapters.  
I will then deal with the second research question, focusing on the Russian 
institutional framework (Chapter II). I begin with analysing the concept of rule 
of law, with the aim of determining whether the Russian Constitution provides 
the necessary framework for developing a law-bound state and whether the 
provisions of the Constitution are adhered to in practice. The principle of the 
rule of law is intimately connected to the separation of powers and the indepen-
dence of the judiciary, the latter being a crucial component of the separation of 
powers and of vital importance for implementing the rights and freedoms 
enacted in the ECHR and enforcing the judgments of the ECtHR. Accordingly, 
I will analyse the issue of separation of powers in Russia with particular focus 
on the independence of the Russian judiciary. Finally, I will contemplate the 
consequences of the characteristics of the Russian constitutional institutional 
framework on compliance with and implementation of human rights law in 
Russia. I rely in my analysis mostly on relevant Russian legislation, on the 
academic works of both Russian and international scholars and reports and 
studies published by the Council of Europe and other authoritative institutions.  
Chapter III of this study focuses on the third research question. In this 
chapter I examine how international human rights law is incorporated into the 
Russian legal order. I scrutinize Russian state practice and analyse the construal 
and domestic treatment of human rights – in legislation, in the practice of the 
Constitutional Court and in Russian legal scholarship. I analyse the position of 
international law in the Russian legal system, particularly focusing on the 
interplay between international human rights law and the Russian Constitution, 
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relying on relevant legislation and the case law of the Constitutional Court as 
well as the interpretations of Russian constitutional-law scholars. I will mainly 
focus on the issue of how the ECHR and the judgments of ECtHR are situated 
within the larger rights context of Russia. I will scrutinize the role of funda-
mental rights and freedoms in the Russian Constitution and explain how the 
interpretation of fundamental rights and freedoms has changed in post-Soviet 
Russia. 
I will then continue with explaining the features characterizing the construal 
and the role of human rights in the Russian socio-political context (Chapter IV). 
Overall this chapter deals with the conceptual understanding of human rights in 
Russia. In order to make sense of state practice in the field of human rights, it is 
pertinent to understand the domestic context that has tailored the human rights 
agenda in Russia. It is impossible to reduce human rights practices to a single 
factor and “multiple social, cultural, political and transnational influences” must 
be taken into account, as highlighted by Beth Simmons.52 International human 
rights law is built on the principles of human dignity, equality and non-discrimi-
nation. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, as 
enshrined in Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
and everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the UDHR 
without distinction of any kind, as established in Article II of the Declaration. 
Inevitably, human rights can thrive and develop in societies that accept the 
ideological underpinnings of human rights. Ideas and ideology shape the 
decisions and actions of governments in both the domestic and international 
arenas as well as shaping the decisions and actions of citizens. Hence, it is 
pertinent to focus on the domestic context, the social milieu where human rights 
are actually implemented.  
The last three chapters deal with the fifth research question, investigating 
how civil and political rights – respectively the right to freedom of expression, 
the right to freedom of association and the right to freedom of assembly – are 
implemented in Russia. Civil society can flourish and demand rights only when 
fundamental civil and political rights are guaranteed in a country. Thus, basic 
guarantees for exercising civil and political rights are an essential prerequisite 
for the development of civil society. An intensely dynamic interaction occurs 
between the development of civil society and the ECHR. Civil society represen-
tatives such as NGOs and individual activists play a crucial role in the 
implementation and development of human rights law in Europe.53 Each of the 
last three chapters of this study focuses on the implementation of one central 
right guaranteed under the ECHR. While determining whether implementation 
of human rights has been successful or not, the defining factor is whether and to 
                                                                          
52  Simmons (n 2) 5. 
53  Rachel A. Cichowski, ‘Civil Society and the European Court of Human Rights’ in Jonas 
Christoffersen and Mikael Rask Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human Rights 
between Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011) 78–79.  
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what extent international standards of human rights law are or are not incorpo-
rated into domestic regulations and implemented in practice. In order to 
understand the true approach to human rights in a certain country, it is vital to 
understand the “reality on the ground”, because official rhetoric can be unre-
liable, deceptive or misleading.54 Thus, in Chapters V, VI and VII, focusing on 
civil and political rights, I rely on legal material derived from relevant Russian 
legislation and court practice, mostly focusing on the case law of the Consti-
tutional Court. For comparative purposes I also use the case law of the ECtHR 
and analyses and reports conducted by various bodies of the CoE.  
At the very end I wrap up the whole study and set out the main conclusions.  
 
 
Discussion of methods 
Compliance with international treaties can mean many different things: com-
plying with procedural obligations such as conducting effective investigations 
or guaranteeing adequate domestic remedies; complying with substantive 
obligations enacted in the treaty; or complying with the overall “spirit of the 
treaty”.55 In this study I mostly focus on the substantive obligations that Russia 
has undertaken with the ECHR. I examine how the rights and freedoms enacted 
in the ECHR are implemented in Russia and whether the basic measures needed 
for full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed have been adopted. For this purpose 
I focus on the Russian institutional framework, the role of international human 
rights law in the Russian legal order and state practice in the field of civil and 
political rights. However I also scrutinize how Russia is complying with the 
overall spirit of the ECHR: how are the underlying values of the ECHR con-
strued and followed in Russia. In this sense, I will look beyond compliance in 
individual cases of the ECtHR in the narrower sense. 
This study is embedded in the field of international human rights law, but 
touches upon Russian constitutional law and a substantial amount of the legal 
material is derived from other Russian domestic law. I also draw on theories at 
the intersection of international law and international relations, in order to 
determine the mechanisms and boundaries of international law in facilitating 
compliance with human rights law on the domestic level. Thus, this study has 
links to various inter-connected disciplines, while the methods used are also 
interdisciplinary.  
In terms of research methods, this study uses both external and internal 
perspectives56 on human rights law. By external perspective, I mean first of all 
                                                                          
54  Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (n 6) 24.  
55  Edith Brown Weiss and Harold Karan Jacobson, Engaging Countries: Strengthening 
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24 
taking into account insights from the social sciences, especially political 
science, on how international law, in particular international human rights law, 
works in its political context and how compliance can be ensured (Chapter I). 
The usefulness of the external perspective for legal analysis seems obvious. In 
order to grasp the value of individual prominent cases and institutions or even to 
plan steps for their reform in the future, we need to take an external perspective 
on the law in order to see how successfully it has worked (or not). This cannot 
be achieved only by traditional internal legal methods of analysis, e.g. by using 
the legal dogmatic method in the context of human rights law. Inevitably, what 
is necessary in order to answer the research questions raised in this study is to 
study the politics of human rights law, conditions for compliance with it and 
circumstances of resistance to it, using the case of Russia as an illustration. 
Of international relations theories, this study is perhaps most influenced by 
rational choice theories. Understanding what motivates states to comply with 
international law and to change their norms and practices is pivotal for assessing 
the impact of international law on the behaviour of states. I would like to clarify 
that as states (governments) are the primary actors in international human rights 
law – states ratify treaties and states are obliged to comply with obligations 
undertaken – the focus of this study is on the conduct of states (particularly 
Russia). It is not my intention to put an equal sign between “state” and 
“society”. I acknowledge the diversity present in every society and that in many 
societies the people have little influence on the conduct of their governments 
and that in many cases the beliefs and wishes prevalent in society can be miles 
away from the conduct of the government. However, I am of the view that the 
state has various means to influence the processes and attitudes prevalent in 
society, particularly through its institutions and legal system, which means that 
these two concepts cannot be completely separated.  
Major causal mechanisms of compliance have been addressed from very 
different viewpoints and scholars of various disciplines have increasingly been 
integrating the respective scholarship of international relations and international 
law in order to best tackle these issues. Mutual awareness and exchange between 
social science scholarship on human rights and legal scholarship on human 
rights is visible in various noteworthy studies that I deploy in my research.57 
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The majority of existing scholarship explaining why governments commit to 
and comply with human rights treaties derives from two broad theoretical 
perspectives: the rational actor and the normative (ideational, socialization-
based) approaches.58 In this study, I label the two broad approaches taken by 
scholars as “rational choice models/theories” and “normative models/theories”. 
Rational choice theories suggest that states make rational choices based on 
utility maximization: states want to gain more than they lose when participating 
in international frameworks and local incentives and costs related to respecting 
international law determine whether states comply or not. Normative models 
stem from the idea that states genuinely change their behaviour when they are 
persuaded that a certain norm or behaviour is valuable and as a result, states 
internalize those norms and values.59 Whereas in Chapter I provide an overview 
of various theoretical approaches, this study is guided by the idea that inter-
national frameworks can have an influence on the domestic level, when certain 
preconditions are met. Having analysed numerous theoretical approaches, it is 
my view that rational choice models focusing on specific conditions of com-
pliance explain the conduct of states in complying with international treaties in 
a more plausible way than normative models. I will focus on these issues in 
further detail in Chapter I and develop this idea throughout the text.  
Nevertheless, in the framework of the dominant external perspective on 
human rights law, I also use classical methods of legal research in this study, 
which touches upon both European human rights law as well as, to a lesser 
extent, Russian constitutional law. In particular the analytical method is used, 
starting with general notions such as the understanding of rule of law in Russia 
and the question how international law, including international human rights 
law, has been implemented in the Russian constitutional system. Furthermore, 
relevant judgments of different courts, including the ECtHR and the Russian 
Constitutional Court and acts of Russian legislation are analysed and interpreted 
in their legal, political and ideological context. This is the law in a political 
context approach rather than focusing merely on legal texts or pronouncements, 
as they should be outside any political context. When studying the values under-
pinning the legal tradition in Russia (Chapter IV), the analytical method is used 
to examine the ideological foundations and interpretations relevant for human 
rights law. 
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The political context approach enables me to take a generalized look at how 
certain rights are implemented in Russia and the underlying legal policy in 
domestic legislation – in the context of freedom of expression (Chapter V), 
freedom of association (Chapter VI) and freedom of assembly (Chapter VII). 
Rather than approaching these rights from a legal dogmatic viewpoint, I offer a 
legal policy analysis on how these rights are implemented in Russia. A sub-
stantial part of the legal material I use in this study derives from Russian 
legislation in the field of civil and political rights adopted from 2011 to 2017 
and the case law of the Russian Constitutional Court from the same time period. 
From December 2011 to May 2012, Russian civil society started to fiercely 
demand changes in the country. During this period Russia saw the biggest wave 
of protests since the turbulent 1990s. Demonstrations and meetings took place 
in Moscow and in other areas gathering tens of thousands of participants. The 
crowds were singing Viktor Tsoi’s song “Peremen” (Changes), a famous 
perestroika anthem. Russian civil society demanded respect for their civil and 
political rights. People’s discontent with politics sharply increased when Dmitry 
Medvedev refused to participate in presidential elections and supported 
Vladimir Putin as new president. So-called “rokirovka” (castling) insulted many 
people and disappointed hopes of change. Disappointment increased after the 
elections to the Duma, where massive electoral fraud took place. Protest 
activities continued throughout the winter and spring.60  
I have chosen to set the focus of this study on the period starting with 
Vladimir Putin’s third term as president and the following wave of legislative 
amendments, because during the period 2011 to 2017 certain patterns in law-
making, judging and overall attitude towards human rights law in Russia gained 
prominence, patterns that are useful for explaining Russian compliance with 
CoE standards. Mass demonstrations calling for change were rebuffed by the 
authorities and were followed by adoption of a series of legislative amendments 
limiting the options of civil society to participate in politics, to express their 
position and to put forward demands. Quickly after re-gaining the position of 
president, Vladimir Putin initiated a series of changes in laws regulating free-
dom of assembly. A series of legislative amendments restricting freedom of 
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association followed. I decided 
to focus on the implementation of those three central civil and political rights, 
because during my chosen time period the legislative amendments and the court 
practice in these areas have been particularly plentiful, controversial and 
influential. The Constitutional Court and also the Supreme Court have hade an 
active role in providing their interpretations and assessments to the laws, which 
in many cases have directly contradicted their previous positions. Freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly are of central 
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importance in the ECHR. They are intimately connected to democracy, rule of 
law and many other rights and freedoms and they are also a prerequisite for the 
development and the adequate functioning of the civil society.  
It could be argued that the steps taken by the government since 2012 do not 
represent a radical departure from Russia’s past behaviour. Control over the 
media has been increasing and civil society has long been under duress, with an 
escalation in the wake of the “colour revolutions” in Georgia (2003) and 
Ukraine (2004). Besides, anti-Western rhetoric was deployed to divert attention 
from problems in Russian society and to foster patriotism prior to this period.61 
However, as I demonstrate in the last three chapters of this research, since 2011 
substantial changes occurred in the Russian domestic legal order in a relatively 
short period of time and these changes extensively influence the interplay 
between Russia and the CoE.  
Since Russia has already been under the jurisdiction of the ECtHR for twenty 
years, covering this period inevitably means dealing with international legal and 
constitutional history as well. Thus the legal historical method is also relevant 
for this study. However, this study does not employ specific methods of legal 
historical research, such as archival materials or discovering previously unknown 
sources. The history of human rights law and constitutional law employed here 
focuses mostly on legal texts in their historical-political context. There is also a 
certain minor role for the comparative method of legal research in this study, at 
least in the background. I deploy the comparative method to compare Russia’s 
state practice to the standards of the CoE and occasionally draw comparisons 
with other countries. However, this has not been the aim in itself, as the focus of 
the study is Russia’s interplay with the CoE. 
Bringing together social science, policy and legal perspectives on Russia and 
European human rights law and institutions allows the generalization that 
neither of these perspectives taken alone will be able to deliver. The literature 
contains a multitude of theories and historical or empirical studies on how 
international human rights law works in different contexts. However, perhaps 
for linguistic reasons and because Russia remains distant for the Westerners 
who dominate in global scholarship, Russia is not a major example used in the 
theoretical literature on human rights socialization. In my view it is worthwhile 
to bring the case of Russia closer to this literature. But the other way around, 
too: the relatively small legal scholarly community that closely follows the 
interaction between Russia and Strasbourg can probably still benefit from 
further insights from theoretical perspectives and attempts to critically interpret 
the “big picture” of the evolution of human rights law in Russia. This is what 
the combination of various research methods, legal and non-legal, in this study 
can ideally accomplish.  
                                                                          
61 See further: Freedom House, ‘Contending with Putin’s Russia: A Call for American 
Leadership’ [2013] <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Contending%20with% 
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I MECHANISMS AND LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORKS  FACILITATING COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  
And will you, nill you, I will marry you 
(William Shakespeare, “The Taming of the Shrew”) 
 
This chapter discusses different theoretical approaches to explaining compliance 
with international human rights law. I begin with normative approaches, discuss 
their underlying premises and assess how successfully they have been able to 
explain compliance with international human rights law. I then move on to 
rational choice models and focus on the conditions underlying successful comp-
liance with human rights treaties on the domestic level. Having determined the 
main preconditions for compliance, I use this theoretical framework in the 
forthcoming chapters to explain Russia’s compliance with the ECHR.  
 
 
1.1. Normative theories:  
the Council of Europe’s approach to facilitating  
compliance with international human rights law 
In the second half of the 20th century, revolutionary developments in the sphere 
of human rights took place. After the horrors of the Second World War, “human 
rights had seeped into the consciousness of governments and individuals around 
the world as one of the most pressing issues of the new international order”, as 
voiced by Beth Simmons.62 Since the 1950s, human rights have been presumed 
to be universal for all. Belief in the universality of human rights and overall 
optimism towards spreading rule of law, democracy and human rights was 
characteristic of the period following the end of the Cold War. In this period, 
normative socialization theories claiming that membership in international 
organisations would guide political behaviour and gradually change the values 
of the countries joining them enjoyed popular support. It was widely expected 
that integrating post-Soviet countries, including Russia, into international 
organisations with liberal values would eventually make these countries become 
liberal.63  
The framework of the CoE also aims to set universal standards of human 
rights in all of its member states. The major function of the ECtHR is to ensure 
                                                                          
62  See Simmons (n 2) 3, 41. However, it must be remembered that seven countries 
abstained: the USSR along with Ukraine, Belarus, Yugoslavia, Poland, South Africa and 
Saudi Arabia. 
63  Jonsson Cornell (n 7) 6; Henderson (n 13) 249.  
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uniform interpretation of the ECHR assess state compliance with it.64 The CoE 
has undeniably been a key player in advancing protection of human rights in 
Europe. During the past sixty years its institutions, most notably the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have incrementally transformed human rights 
in Europe.65 The ECtHR has been praised as the strongest and most efficient 
oversight system in international human rights law66, “a crown jewel” for 
protecting civil and political liberties.67  
The CoE has always aimed to integrate Europe in terms of geography and 
values. The CoE quickly moved beyond “traditional geography” in defining 
Europe, being the first European intergovernmental organization to expand 
towards Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. Since its establishment 
in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Coe’s central objectives have 
been to unite Europe (the geopolitical goal) and protect the central pillars of the 
CoE: rule of law, democracy and human rights (the value-driven goal).68 “There 
can be no democracy without the rule of law and respect for human rights; there 
can be no rule of law without democracy and respect for human rights, and no 
respect for human rights without democracy and the rule of law”, as emphasized 
by the Committee of Ministers.69 These three concepts are inevitably interde-
pendent. Government under law, the core of rule of law, is a fundamental 
precondition for democracy as well as for implementing human rights. If human 
rights are not protected, rule of law is a mere empty shell and on the other hand, 
human rights can be realized in practice only when the rule of law is 
respected.70  
                                                                          
64  Cichowski (n 53) 84.  
65  Ibid 78.  
66  Alec Stone Sweet, ‘A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights 
Adjudication in Europe’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 53–90. 
67  Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalisation of the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of 
Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments’ [2009] 9 Human Rights Law Review 397–453; 
400.  
68 See: Pamela A Jordan, ‘Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council 
of Europe and Compliance with Human Rights Norms’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 
660–688; 661; Jonsson Cornell (n 7) 12; ‘Declaration of the Council of Europe’s First 
Summit (Vienna, 9 October 1993)’ <https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/declaration_of_the_ 
council_of_europe_s_first_summit_vienna_9_october_1993-en-d7c530b5-a7c9-43f9-95af-
c28b3c8b50d3.html> accessed 28 November 2017. 
69  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, The Council of Europe and the Rule of Law: 
an Overview (21 November 2008) CM (2008)170; para 27.  
70  Jeffrey Kahn, Federalism, Democratization, and the Rule of Law in Russia (OUP Oxford 
2002); Jeffrey Kahn, ‘Russian Compliance with Articles Five and Six of the European 
Convention of Human Rights as a Barometer of Legal Reform and Human Rights in Russia’ 
(2001) 35 U Mich JL Reform 641–694. 
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When Russia joined the CoE, the geopolitical goal of uniting Europe was 
considered accomplished. The CoE became a “pan-European organization”71 In 
line with the Zeitgeist of the 1990s, the enlargement process of the CoE was 
based on an inclusive strategy aiming at triggering political, legislative and 
constitutional reforms in member states through various political and legal means 
such as political dialogue, monitoring, assistance and exchange of best practices. 
The organization is built on the assumption that all member states are com-
mitted to its constituent values and reform their institutions and legal system 
accordingly. This is the precondition for accession to the CoE, as established in 
the Vienna Declaration (1993). Member states are obliged to “accept the prin-
ciples of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its juris-
diction of human rights and fundamental freedoms” highlights the Statute of the 
CoE.72  
Instead of expecting Russia and other Central and Eastern European 
countries to adhere to the basic values and standards of the CoE at the time of 
admission, it was expected that the new members could be “socialized” into 
European institutions and values through a strategy of “dialogue, engagement 
and inclusion”.73 It was assumed that countries would be motivated to follow 
human rights standards out of mutual interest in developing liberal democracy 
and out of a common understanding of an expanded European identity.74 The 
idea was that “integration is better than isolation; cooperation is better than con-
frontation.”75 The leadership of the CoE: Secretary Generals Catherine Lamulière 
(1989–1994) and Daniel Tarschys (1994–1999) were strongly convinced that “it 
was better to include than exclude”.76 It was expected to be easier to persuade 
new members to adhere to human rights standards when they belonged to CoE 
than to leave them with the status of potential pariah states and tackle human 
rights issues from the outside.77 Hence, the main justifications for accepting 
Russia, despite that country’s shortcomings, were geopolitical pragmatism and 
democratic hope: “Russia was admitted in the name of an “up-and-coming” 
                                                                          
71  Jonsson Cornell (n 7).  
72  See Article 3(1) the Statute of the CoE (Statute of the Council of Europe. ETS 1, 
London, 5.V.1949). In the Strasbourg Final Declaration and Action Plan (1997) and in the 
Warsaw Declaration (2005) member states reaffirmed their attachment to these basic 
principles of the Council of Europe. In the Warsaw Declaration the states expressed their 
commitment to “strengthening the rule of law throughout the continent, building on the 
standard-setting potential of the Council of Europe and on its contribution to the 
development of international law.” See further: Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, 
The Council of Europe and the Rule of Law: an Overview paras 8–13.  
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74  Jordan (n 68) 665, 686.  
75  Ernst Muehlemann, ‘Report on Russia’s Request for Membership of the Council of 
Europe’ [1996] 17 Human Rights Law Journal 3.  
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77  Jordan (n 68) 688.  
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democracy and the risks entailed in its possible isolation, even if the decision 
was made without any real enthusiasm”.78 It was expected that even if many 
post-Soviet countries that became members of the CoE were not already liberal 
and democratic, then surely they were “on their way”. It was rarely questioned 
what happens when some member states do not “get there” and fail to become 
liberal and democratic. 79 
Thus, normative models provided inspiration for enlargement of the CoE. 
All normative approaches emphasize the “transformative power of normative 
moral discourse”.80 They view persuasion,81 repeated interactions, argumen-
tation, and exposure to norms82 as the most important factors facilitating com-
pliance with international norms. They argue that transnational socialization of 
human rights follows “the logic of appropriateness”: international human rights 
norms demonstrate appropriate behaviour among the international community 
of liberal states. States wanting international approval and recognition are moti-
vated and influenced by these norms and change their national practices not out 
of an obligation to comply, but because they are convinced that this is an appro-
priate thing to do and it is in their self-interest to comply.83 True compliance is 
the result of “internally felt norms” rather than “externally imposed sanctions”, 
as put by Harold Hongju Koh.84 Socialization: “a process of inducting actors 
into the norms and rules of a given community”85 is expected to lead to com-
pliance through internalization of new norms and values into the domestic value 
system and legal framework when domestic actors adopt new roles, interests 
and identities.86  
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Normative models underline the importance of ideas and norms and their 
influence on state behaviour. However “how and why ideas matter… remains a 
source of disagreement.”87 Normative theories have proposed two main causal 
mechanisms for changing norms and preferences and influencing compliance 
with human rights: one of them is based on educating, empowering and mobi-
lizing local communities, especially NGOs, to pressurize their governments88 
and the other mechanism relies on social learning and persuasion that leads to 
internalizing new norms and redefining interests.89 This approach presumes 
active assessment of norms, values and practices by decision-makers who can 
“change their minds” during this process.90 However, some normative scholars 
admit that domestic politics, institutional and historical factors can delimit the 
impact of persuasion and social learning.91  
 
 
1.2. Limits of the Council of Europe in facilitating 
compliance with international human rights law  
1.2.1. Misconstrued assumptions and need for alternative  
approaches to human rights compliance 
After former Soviet-bloc states joined the CoE, the organisation became more 
diverse and heterogeneous than ever. The CoE was built on like-mindedness, 
and a common heritage of political traditions and values of its members, as also 
highlighted in the preamble of the ECHR. On that basis, the CoE was founded 
in 1949 by ten countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.92 At that 
time it truly was a club of relatively like-minded countries sharing a similar 
value-system and political culture. However, as a result of the enlargement 
process the CoE grew to forty-seven members extending to more than 800 
million people “stretching… from Azerbaijan to Iceland and from Gibraltar to 
                                                                          
87  Oona A Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ [2002] 111 The 
Yale Law Journal 1995.  
88 See, for example: Koh (n 81); Harold Hongju Koh, ‘How is International Human Rights 
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89  See, for example: Goodman and Jinks (n 57) 635; Jeffrey T Checkel, ‘Norms, Institu-
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92  For an overview of the Council of Europe see, for example: Dinah Shelton and Paolo G 
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Vladivostok”.93 The character of the CoE changed from a club of democratic 
states to a “school of democracy”, rule of law and human rights, aiming to solve 
systemic deficiencies within the legal systems of newcomers.94  
In spite of initial hopes and aspirations, it soon became clear that not all of 
the new member states were committed to the constituent values of the CoE.95 
Russia is certainly not the only black sheep in the CoE. For example, Turkey, a 
country that ratified the ECHR as long ago as 195496 declared a derogation from 
the ECHR on 21 July 2016, six days after an attempted coup d’état. Increased 
torture and ill-treatment in police detention, dismissals and prosecutions in 
connection with the coup have followed.97 Poland has adopted legislation that 
significantly weakens the checks and balances on the executive, obstructs the 
work and the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal and the judiciary in 
general, gives excessive powers to the security service and curbs freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly. Hungary has extended the use of anti-
terror legislation, curbed the powers of the Constitutional Court, shut down 
independent media outlets, harassed NGOs and educational institutions and 
severely restricted exercise of the right to freedom of assembly.98 The premise 
that all states behave in a largely similar way when they become members of the 
CoE: that they gradually come to share the same values and respect for human 
rights has been proven erroneous. Liberal democracy has not become the uni-
versal and final form of human government, as Francis Fukuyama99 famously 
suggested. It is increasingly questionable whether, to what extent and for how 
long the ECtHR will remain the “crown jewel” of human rights protection.  
International human rights law can have a great influence on constitutions 
and other domestic law, on institutions, the judiciary and in some cases on 
people’s values and expectations. On the one hand, formal commitment to 
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major international human rights instruments is nearly universal.100 Nevertheless, 
a wide discrepancy stands between ratification of treaties and implementing 
those treaties in practice. Whereas the idea of universality of human rights is a 
powerful one, the claim of universality of human rights is essentially meaning-
less when human rights are not implemented effectively on the local level, when 
human rights law does not “matter” close to home, as acknowledged by Eleanor 
Roosevelt, the first chair of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
which played an instrumental role in drafting the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights:  
 
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to 
home – so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. 
Yet they are the world of the individual person; the neighbourhood he lives in; 
the school or college he attends; the factory, farm, or office where he works. 
Such are the places where every man, woman, and child seeks equal justice, 
equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights 
have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without concerted 
citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress 
in the larger world.101 
  
The level of protection granted to individuals under international human rights 
treaties diverges largely among states. Italy, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, 
Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova and Poland are all strug-
gling with implementing the judgments of the ECtHR.102 Turkey, as well as 
Poland and Hungary, has recently adopted legislation that significantly harms 
the rule of law and endangers protection of the rights and freedoms established 
in the ECHR.  
Thus, human rights are still not universally upheld close to home in many 
countries either globally or regionally in the member states of the CoE. The 
CoE has not been able to motivate all of its member states to respect its under-
lying values and to comply with obligations undertaken, as initially expected, 
relying on normative approaches to human rights compliance. The ability of 
international law to influence domestic legal developments is obviously 
limited.103 Several distinctive features that pose undeniably great challenges to 
implementing international human rights treaties characterize the field of human 
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rights. Often scholars and practitioners alike have overlooked these challenges, 
maybe partly because they do not fit with the much-praised narrative of uni-
versality. However, this “mantra of universalism” can be counterproductive, as 
it does not enable a realistic analysis and understanding of the differences that 
inevitably exist in different countries. The idea that international law is uni-
versally applicable everywhere “has blurred our sense of reality” of how inter-
national human rights law operates outside the West. Besides, international 
human rights law is not implemented in an abstract vacuum but in concrete 
circumstances shaped by various domestic factors.104 Thus, it is important to 
refocus attention on the limits of international (human rights) law if the aim is 
to understand what obstacles have impeded compliance with international 
human rights in many countries globally.  
 
 
1.2.2. Are human rights universal globally “appropriate”  
standards as presumed by normative theories?  
The normative approaches that guided the decisions of the CoE in the 90s 
presume that the idea of human rights is a universal and globally “appropriate” 
idea, so that states are motivated to ratify human rights treaties, reform their 
legal systems and change their human rights practices. Global and regional 
human rights protection frameworks have for more than seventy years aimed at 
ensuring universal protection of human rights in all corners of the world. 
Human rights protection has been an inalienable part of the value system and 
world vision of democratic countries. As explained by Onuma Yasuaki, 
Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo: “postwar international human 
rights law developed with the aim of overcoming the limitations of domestic 
human rights protection”.105  
Whereas some norms are indeed widely approved by different cultures, 
nevertheless judgments concerning what is moral and what is just diverge to a 
great extent. Human rights as a field is highly normative and deeply intercon-
nected to debates on morality, dignity and justice. Roy Allison explains that 
norms are “inter-subjective standards of appropriate behaviour”.106 Norms define 
what is appropriate and what is not; they form shared assessments on a wide 
range of issues, while many norms are not shared on a global level. Issues of 
normativity and legitimacy, including with regard to human rights law, are 
interpreted in every country in the context of the specific circumstances of that 
country. As explained by Onuma Yasuaki:  
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The interpretation of international law is thus influenced by various cultural 
and civilizational factors. They include understandings of the self and others, a 
sense and perception of history and the world, memories of past experiences 
such as those of military victories over neighbours, being under colonial rule, 
victimization in terms of wars and massive suppressions, racial or gender 
discrimination, and many others.107 
 
Roy Allison emphasizes the existence of a strong regional component in inter-
preting norms, including human rights law, and key players in defining and 
enforcing norms are regional hegemons. Regional norms are “promoted, defined, 
and interpreted for that region by a regionally preponderant or hegemonic 
power”, argues Allison.108 He claims that hegemonic states define the “rules of 
the game” in their regional realm and enforce their specific construal of norms. 
Hegemons socialize other countries within their sphere of influence to view 
their interpretation of norms as legitimate.109 In similar vein, Lauri Mälksoo 
emphasizes that “civilizational centres” construe their own “subjective truths”.110 
These subjective truths might not make sense at all or be considered false in 
regions that are not in the sphere of influence of a certain civilizational centre.  
In Mälksoo’s view, understanding Russia’s civilizational distinctiveness 
from the West is of crucial importance for understanding Russia’s approaches to 
international law, human rights law and geopolitics. He posits that Russia’s 
“Byzantine” views such as pursuing a unique “Russian idea” that is used to 
legitimize Russia’s role as a guardian of its neighbourhood and refusal to “bow 
to the West” influence the present and the future of international law and 
Russia’s geopolitics.111 Whether one agrees with the claim of Russia’s civili-
zational distinctiveness or not, it is inevitable that Russia as a regional hegemon 
has a substantial impact on the countries in its sphere of influence, including on 
issues related to human rights. Despite earlier hopes that all members of the 
CoE would adopt similar standards, regional hegemonic states such as Russia 
still aim to enforce their construal of human rights norms and attempt to socialize 
countries within their sphere of influence to consider their interpretation as 
legitimate and to consider other interpretations as illegitimate. 
Although all major international human rights frameworks have been 
spreading the idea of the universality of human rights since the 1950s, it remains 
a reality that almost seventy years later human rights norms are still not accepted 
and implemented universally in all corners of the world. In every country, 
human rights are interpreted in the context of cultural and historical charac-
teristics and narratives that are highly diverse. It must be acknowledged that 
whereas most national constitutions and fundamental laws echo international 
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human rights documents, in practice the premise of the global “appropriateness” 
of human rights is still not universally accepted. Not even the right to life enjoys 
universal recognition and protection, whereas some rights, especially certain 
civil and political rights, raise culturally highly sensitive questions concerning 
appropriate relationships between the individual, society and the state.112 
Although most constitutions enshrine civil and political rights or establish 
similar principles, the role of civil and political rights in national human rights 
agendas and factual implementation of civil and political rights deviate sub-
stantially. After World War II, the “West”, led by the USA, and the “East”, led 
by the Soviet Union, sparred over the role of civil and political rights and on the 
other hand, of the role of social and cultural rights. Even today, civil and human 
rights are often dismissed as “Western” by non-Western states.113 Thus, although 
some rights and freedoms enjoy more support in the global arena – for example, 
prohibition of torture and genocide or the rights of the child – other rights, such 
as civil and political rights or rights and freedoms related to questions like 
abortion or sexual self-determination, which are closely connected to the issue 
of morals, do not enjoy widespread support in many countries. This applies both 
on the level of governments as well as societies and is the case in some Western 
countries as well as non-Western countries.  
In some cases, governments – particularly when implementing some rights 
and freedoms is particularly costly for them – use the idea of cultural specifics 
to consciously avoid implementing international human rights standards and 
instead use arguments based on cultural or religious specifics to implement 
violent or discriminatory practices that their people might not approve. It is my 
view that arguments based on cultural specifics are rarely convincing when they 
are used to justify infringements of basic human rights. However, it is inevitable 
that as international human rights law imposes obligations on governments to 
act in certain ways or to refrain from certain actions in order to protect human 
rights in their countries, the attitude of governments towards international human 
rights standards is of key importance. Otherwise, implementation of rights and 
freedoms would not be possible. Thus, when governments do not acknowledge 
the idea of certain human rights and freedoms as universal globally “appro-
priate” standards, it is difficult for international frameworks to influence them to 
comply with such standards.  
Moreover, not all regional or cultural influences should be considered per se 
wrong or harmful. As suggested by Onuma Yasuaki: 
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Learning from different cultures and civilizations is key to producing ideas that 
may be widely learned by others and become universal. Hybridity is inevitable 
for any culture; society or civilization… one should deliberately take advantage 
of such hybridity in intellectual undertakings, including the study of inter-
national law.114  
 
It is my view that international human rights law cannot be claimed to be a 
purely Western concept: for example the UDHR, the most universally accepted 
human rights document, was created as a result of collective work by many 
countries, both Western and non-Western. Mutual cooperation on human rights 
matters is ongoing in various global and regional human rights frameworks. 
However, the UDHR as well as the ECHR are to a great extent based on the 
constitutions and legal traditions of Western states and reflect the attitudes and 
beliefs that developed in the West more than it reflects the attitudes and beliefs 
of Arab, Asian or African countries. I am of the position that the claim of 
universal acceptance of the idea of human rights can only become true once it 
encompasses more diverse ideas and interpretations from different cultures and 
civilizations. Inevitably, many states as well as cultures struggle to accept the 
premise of universality, at least as it has been construed so far.  
 
 
1.2.3. Norm-takers and norm-shapers: changing roles  
The United States and Europe, with their liberal democratic systems, have been 
the leaders and rule-makers of the international legal system since the end of 
World War II. However, this transatlantic momentum is in decline. The role of 
countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS 
countries) included in the sphere of international law and human rights law is 
rising. It is widely speculated that these developments make international law 
move closer to its Westphalian origins, with a primary focus on sovereignty and 
a lesser focus on human rights.115 Until very recently, the scholarship on inter-
national law was very West-centred. By the late 20th century, major publishing 
houses such as Cambridge University Press or Oxford University Press had not 
published a single treatise or textbook on international law written by an Asian 
international lawyer in Asia, whereas Asians make up more than half of 
humankind. In the 21st century some Asian countries are likely to catch up or 
supersede leading Western nations and this will inevitably have an influence on 
the construal of international law.116 As a result, international law as a whole is 
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moving from West-centric to multi-centric and multi-civilizational, argues 
Onuma Yasuaki.117  
For example in 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
passed a resolution118 calling for reinterpretation of human rights on the basis of 
the role of traditional values, proposed by Russia and the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference. In 2014, the UNHRC passed another resolution119 on the 
protection of the family tabled by a group of thirteen countries including Russia, 
China, Egypt and Uganda. Both resolutions marginalize the concept of equality 
and non-discrimination, the cornerstones of human rights. However, whether 
Western countries like it or not, it cannot be denied that the impact of non-
Western countries on the development of international human rights is going to 
steadily increase.  
The idea of spreading values related to Western liberal democracies – 
including protection of fundamental and inalienable human rights – is proble-
matic for several other reasons. The concept of socialization of human rights 
pictures Western democratic states and organisations as sincere defenders of 
democracy and human rights. It also places efforts to socialize or coerce 
countries into compliance with these values into a narrative of “doing good”. At 
the same time, the rather ugly parts of these processes are forgotten, claims 
Ause Zarakol.120 The majority of international relations theories presume that 
established democracies and international institutions have made and are still 
spearheading efforts to enforce human rights and to incentivize others to join, 
forgetting that, for example, during the Cold War years many established 
democracies opposed binding human rights instruments, as indeed many still 
do.121 Most of these theories stem from the idea that non-compliance is endo-
genously driven, whereas compliance is a result of external stimuli, thus under-
mining the agency of non-Western states. Non-Western states have agency only 
when they commit “bad” deeds, whereas “good” deeds – or which read “com-
pliance with norms supported by the West” – are a result of Western influence, 
notes Zarakol. She suggests that much of what these theories consider to be 
endogenous to particular states can rather be explained by the effects of 
modernity and pressures from the international system.122  
Zarakol posits that modern international society was built on a dynamic of 
stigmatization, not on friendly persuasion or the stubbornness of some countries 
                                                                          
117  Yasuaki (n 105).  
118  Human Rights Council, ‘Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a 
Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind’ (A/HRC/RES/16/3; 8 April 2011).  
119  Human Rights Council, ‘Protection of the Family’ (A/HRC/26/L.20/Rev.1; 25 June 2014). 
120  Ayşe Zarakol, ‘What Made the Modern World Hang Together: Socialisation or Stigmati-
sation?’ [2014] 6 International Theory 311–332; 328. 
121  Moravcsik (n 58) 225.  
122 Zarakol, ‘What Made the Modern World Hang Together: Socialisation or Stigmati-
sation?’ (n 120) 311–312, 328. 
40 
in understanding “the better, more rational, or humane course of action”.123 
Non-Western people have been characterized as “backward”, “atavistic”; “bar-
barous”, “uncivilised”, “hard-to-socialise”, as not “modern, developed or indus-
trialized or secular or civilized or Christian or democratic enough”.124 Zarakol’s 
view, treating such labels as objective assessments, has led to stigmatization of 
non-Western countries and to dehumanizing non-Western peoples by so-called 
“normals” (Westerners).125  
Zarakol considers, similarly to several scholars representing rational choice 
approaches, that the primary motivators in the international system are status, 
respect and acceptance, a wish to belong to the “same club”.126 Most com-
munities in the world are in a “constant state of identity struggle”, as living up 
to Western standards of modernity can be extremely difficult without feeling 
inauthentic, Zarakol notes.127 Being stigmatized as an outsider involves serious 
costs for a country and “leaves a permanent mark on the national habitus” 
Zarakol suggests.128 In order to gain international respect or acceptance, stig-
matization might lead to externally forced compliance, meaning that states 
comply, at least to some extent, because they are forced to do so due to external 
pressures. However, this does not mean that new norms are internalized. 
Instead, stigmatization might lead to strengthening of local practices and clear 
rejection of human rights.  
Thus, even when countries make efforts to comply with international human 
rights standards but are in the role of “student” and experience stigmatization, 
the reforms they make do not necessarily say anything about true human rights 
practices on the ground. In some cases the response to the identity struggle 
related to living up to Western standards is to strengthen certain practices that 
directly oppose international human rights standards. Many societies are 
experiencing a revival of conservative values emphasizing the role of religious 
traditions and morality and downgrading individual rights and freedoms in 
deciding how to lead one’s life. The West-centric ideational power structure – 
implying that the ideational products of the West are more advanced and should 
be adopted by non-Western nations – has not been adopted by many non-
Western states and instead, has caused frustration and motivated them to 
challenge the current international legal order, claims Onuma Yasuaki. It should 
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also be considered that such ideational power structure imposed on non-Western 
nations no longer reflects the changing power situation and the overall state of 
play, observes Yasuaki.129  
The point made by Zarakol – that the concept of socialization places efforts 
by Western states and international frameworks to socialize or coerce countries 
into compliance with international human rights law into a narrative of “doing 
good”, whereas problematic aspects related to the socialization process are 
downplayed – seems justified. However, in my view some of Zarakol’s argu-
ments are too black-and-white. She blames all the negative consequences on 
Western states and places non-Western states into a narrative of voiceless 
victims freed from responsibility, which seems just as unbalanced as uncriti-
cally praising the activities of Western states. Nevertheless, as pointed out by 
Yasuaki, construal of international human rights law has indeed been very 
West-centred for most of the time and Western states have been in the role of 
teachers of human rights law. On the one hand, this is natural, because 
inevitably the institutions, norms and legislation of Western countries have 
influenced the birth of international human rights law. However, international 
human rights law is increasingly multi-centric and multi-civilizational and the 
dynamics of roles of norm-takers and norm-shapers has changed. Many non-
Western countries are no longer willing to accept Western states and internatio-
nal frameworks as teachers and have started to defend their own approaches to 
international human rights law domestically, regionally and globally. One 
reason for this may be stigmatization, as pointed out by Zarakol, but surely this 
is not the only cause. In any case it cannot be denied that such processes have 
changed the rules of the game, while the ability of Western states and inter-
national frameworks such as the CoE to influence compliance with international 
human rights law in countries that no longer accept them as authorities has 
decreased.  
 
 
1.2.4. The arrangement of the CoE: a limited toolbox  
The ECHR as an international human rights treaty is an unusual type of law. 
International human rights treaties are negotiated internationally and enact obli-
gations under international law, but “create stakeholders almost exclusively 
domestically”.130 Whereas human rights norms enacted in the ECHR are supra-
national, the CoE itself as an umbrella organization is an international organi-
zation.131 Hence, cooperation within the Council of Europe, following its goals 
and standards and implementing the Convention rights and the decisions of the 
ECtHR remain the duty and opportunity of governments operating in their 
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domestic arenas. The CoE system relies for effectiveness “ultimately on the good 
will of nation-states whose commitment to the ECHR system is based on tradi-
tional, international-law type of obligations”.132 It is characteristic of international 
human rights norms that they are not self-executing: they cannot directly address 
many of the root causes of rights violations and their effect on the domestic 
level depends on the priorities and actions of domestic governments. Inevitably, 
interpretation and implementation of international human rights takes place on 
the domestic level and can be effective only when international human rights 
norms are incorporated into the national legal order. 133 
Whereas the ECtHR has had a profound impact on law and practice in its 
member states, it can never substitute national protection of human rights. The 
mechanism “was always meant to play a subsidiary or “back-up” role”.134 In 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the primary responsibility for 
enforcing the ECHR lies with national institutions. The CoE member states have 
agreed to execute the judgments of the ECtHR. Moreover, they are required to 
take all necessary measures to advance implementation of human rights on the 
domestic level.135 However, fulfilling obligations under the ECHR does not 
mean an obligation to execute strict black and white orders from Strasbourg. 
For example, the ECtHR has worked out a concept of “margin of appreciation” 
referring to the space for manoeuvre available to national authorities in ful-
filling their obligations under the ECHR. Considering the great diversity of 
cultural and legal traditions among member states and that in many areas there 
is even no European consensus, the concept of margin of appreciation allows 
member states to balance their sovereignty with their obligations under the 
ECHR.136 The margin of appreciation is also necessary because inevitably local 
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actors are closely linked with local circumstances and should also be able to 
evaluate those circumstances. “By reason of their direct and continuous contact 
with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a 
better position than the international judge” to interpret the content of certain 
concepts, such as morals, in a specific domestic context.137The margin of 
appreciation “is given both to the domestic legislator (prescribed by law) and to 
the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and apply 
the laws in force”.138 The importance of the principle of subsidiarity and the 
margin of appreciation in the CoE system clearly indicate states’ primacy of 
place in defending human rights and acknowledge that implementation of 
human rights law is an inherently domestic issue.139  
Although the CoE is the most effective international human rights protection 
system in the world, its mechanisms to improve implementation are mainly 
limited to “soft power of pressure, shaming, and the threat of expulsion”140, 
notes Pamela A. Jordan. Political means or “soft power” include expert opinions 
of the Venice Commission and various country missions. There are also legal 
means, which include the ECHR and its control mechanism, most importantly 
the European Court of Human Rights.141 The department for execution of ECtHR 
judgments advises and assists the Committee of Ministers in supervising the 
execution of judgments and supports the member states in their efforts to 
achieve full, effective and prompt execution of judgments. 142 However, the CoE 
does not have injunctive power to oblige member states to reform their legis-
lation or to take specific action to improve human rights implementation. The 
main mechanism for punishment is “naming and shaming”. A member state 
may theoretically be suspended or expelled. For example, when a state categori-
cally and persistently refuses to execute an ECtHR judgment, exclusion from 
the CoE is one possible response under Article 8 of the Statute.143 Whereas 
                                                                          
137 Handyside v The United Kingdom (App 5493/72) ECtHR 7 December 1976, para 48. 
138 Ibid. 
139  Hillebrecht, ‘Implementing International Human Rights Law at Home: Domestic Politics 
and the European Court of Human Rights’ (n 24) 284.  
140  Jordan (n 68) 686. 
141  Jonsson Cornell (n 7) 23. 
142  Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the Execution of Judgments 
and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: 9th Annual Report of the Committee 
of Ministers (Strasbourg 2015) 19. <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/ 
DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168062fe2d> accessed on 29 November 2017.  
143  In accordance with Article 8 of the Statute “[a]ny member of the Council of Europe 
which has seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended from its rights of representation 
and requested by the Committee of Ministers to withdraw under Article 7. If such member 
does not comply with this request, the Committee may decide that it has ceased to be a 
member of the Council as from such date as the Committee may determine.” (Statute of the 
Council of Europe. ETS 1, London, 5.V.1949)  
44 
several states have been temporarily suspended from the Parliamentary 
Assembly144, none have been permanently excluded from the CoE in its history.  
Human rights are a difficult policy area to address because so few good tools 
are at the disposal of the international community to influence internal 
practices.145 Due to a rather weak set of enforcement mechanisms available to 
put human rights norms into operation at the international level “the first port of 
call… for effective implementation of these international norms is to be at the 
domestic level”.146As the “enforcement toolbox” of the ECtHR is limited, 
implementation of ECtHR judgments is an inherently political process, 
depending on domestic capacity and political will, argues Courtney Hillebrecht, 
Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln.147 Hillebrecht firmly criticizes the perspective according to 
which membership in international institutions is a pathway to successful imple-
mentation of human rights. In her view, compliance with the rulings of inter-
national human rights tribunals is an inherently domestic affair and any 
approach to compliance that does not focus on the role of domestic institutions 
is simply “dummy socialization”. 148 Beth Simmons also emphasizes the impor-
tance of domestic actors in shaping human rights practices. She suggests that, 
although transnational actors have an important influence on compliance, they 
are too often presented as the “white kings” that make demands for domestic 
actors who are credited with an inability to decide, act and affect human rights 
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compliance.149 Local actors are agents capable of choosing tools and achieving 
their aims, not “voiceless victims to be rescued by altruistic external political 
actors”.150 In her view, changes in practices related to human rights depend on 
the nature of domestic demands, institutions, and capacities, so that it is vital to 
understand local circumstances and motivators.151  
Thus, it derives from the literature analysed above that due to the arrange-
ment of the CoE the organisation can have only a subsidiary role in influencing 
compliance with the ECHR. The toolbox of the CoE in influencing compliance 
is inevitably limited and the primary responsibility as well as the mechanisms to 
guarantee compliance with human rights standards rests with governments and 
depends on local circumstances. 
The CoE’s limited toolbox also has some other important implications. 
Whereas normative theories assume that states behave in an altruistic way and 
by ratifying treaties, states gradually internalize new norms and values, in 
reality not all countries have sincere motives for ratifying treaties such as the 
ECHR. International treaties create binding law (instrumental role), but they 
also declare and express the positions of ratifying countries (expressive role), 
notes Oona Hathaway, Professor of International Law at Yale Law School.152 
When a country genuinely intends to comply with a treaty it has ratified, the 
instrumental and expressive functions of the treaty “work in tandem”. However, 
states may view ratification as an expressive tool and have no true intention to 
abide by the treaty. Ratification provides quick reputational benefits and can 
offset pressure by other countries. Membership in international organisations, 
ratification of human rights treaties or making some reforms such as including 
human rights norms in constitutions can suffice for gaining reputational bene-
fits. Ratification itself is also not very costly for governments, whereas com-
pliance is.153 Thus, especially when effective monitoring and enforcement is 
weak, when serious sanctioning for failure to comply is unlikely or otherwise 
the costs related to non-compliance are low, a country can enjoy the benefits 
related to expressing commitment to human rights even when it fails to comply 
with the treaty.154 Oona Hathaway claims: “There is arguably no area of 
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international law in which the disjuncture between the expressive and instru-
mental aspects of a treaty is more evident than human rights”.155  
Developing Hathaway’s approach, Beth Simmons differentiates between 
“sincere” and “strategic” ratifiers. In the case of sincere ratifiers, the political 
goals of governments and the obligations undertaken with an international treaty 
do not diverge diametrically, whereas strategic ratifiers lack strong value com-
mitment and their primary incentive for ratification is avoiding the costs related 
to social and political pressures, e.g. avoiding being an “outsider”.156 Strategic 
ratifiers unwilling to align domestic political goals with obligations undertaken 
can easily abuse human rights treaties.  
Hence, it is my view that, considering that the primary responsibility for 
ensuring compliance with the ECHR rests with governments – as is also ref-
lected in the arrangement of the CoE based on the principle of subsidiarity – and 
considering that the enforcement and control mechanisms of the ECHR are not 
very strong, when a country has been a strategic, rather than a sincere ratifier, 
the CoE has very limited means to influence the country into compliance.  
 
 
 1.3. Rational choice approaches to human rights:  
costs and benefits of compliance 
Scholars representing the rationalist school of thought and scholars mixing 
rational choice and normative approaches have criticized purely normative 
models for over-emphasizing the altruistic motives of countries in implementing 
human rights as well as the role and ability of international actors in creating 
changes on the domestic level. Moravcsik argues:  
 
Surely some domestic support for democratic governance may be ideological, 
even idealistic, in origin. But if we can learn a single lesson from the formation 
of the world’s most successful formal arrangement for international human 
rights enforcement, it is that in world politics pure idealism begets pure 
idealism in the form of parliamentary assemblies and international decla-
rations.157  
 
Frank Schimmelfennig warns that the role of international institutions in creating 
changes in human rights practices should not be overestimated as in many cases 
they only reinforce previously existing domestic consensus.158 
                                                                          
155  Hathaway (n 87) 2007. 
156  Simmons (n 2) 12–13, 58, 113.  
157  Moravcsik (n 58) 248–49.  
158  Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Member-
ship Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern 
Europe’ (2005) 59 International Organization 827–860; 856.  
47 
Rational choice models stem from the idea that states are rational actors 
motivated by self-interest. When states decide whether to ratify or to comply 
with international treaties such as the ECHR, they calculate the costs and 
benefits of various alternatives. Countries comply with human rights treaties 
when this is in line with domestic interests: when it helps to achieve strategic 
goals, to gain material or social benefits or to avoid costs such as sanctions or 
loss of reputation. Compliance is realistic when incentives outbalance the costs 
of compliance.159 Rational choice theories explain compliance with international 
treaties mainly by coercion (influencing the behaviour of states by rewarding 
conformity and avoiding non-conformity through material rewards and punish-
ments),160 hegemony, sanctions, incentives, material self-interest and reputational 
concerns.161 Rational choice scholars take institutions seriously and analyse how 
international institutions and power relations influence the pursuit of fixed 
interests.162 Rational theories stress the role of law in creating institutions 
enabling domestic audiences to hold their governments accountable through 
indirect pathways such as providing domestic actors with relevant information 
and legitimizing their rights demands.163  
Andrew Moravcsik views enforcement of human rights norms and rule of 
law as a self-interested tactical step for governments to “lock in” democratic rule 
and provide safeguards against threatening undemocratic political alternatives 
such as military officers, communists, fascists, or religious fundamentalists. In 
Moravcsik’s view, implementation of human rights and rule of law helps to 
constrain such nondemocratic groups.164 He suggests that voluntarily joining 
and complying with human rights treaties is of greatest use for new demo-
cracies, because their interest in stabilizing the political situation against non-
democratic threats is the highest. In non-democratic countries and in established 
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democracies the treaties are not able to provide enough benefits to outweigh the 
high sovereignty costs such as changing domestic legislation and adjudication.165  
In line with Moravcsik, Frank Schimmelfennig suggests that compliance 
with international treaties and successful socialization166 can be expected when 
benefits related to socialization are higher than costs for governments. He stresses 
that target states must receive tangible incentives that motivate the country to 
make changes.167 Requirements of international organisations such as free and 
fair elections, division of powers, protecting civil and political rights and rights 
of the opposition and minorities entail various costs for governments. Costs 
need to be balanced by positive incentives such as international legitimacy, 
political power and reputation, economic assistance, the security and welfare of 
the country, and the like.168  
However, in some cases the costs related to implementing human rights law 
are too high for states. Especially when the legitimacy of governments is based 
on anti-liberal, nationalist, populist, or communist ideologies and the ruling elite 
is using authoritarian practices for preserving its power, the costs for the 
government are usually higher than benefits. Whereas some “cosmetic changes 
or tactical concessions” can be made in order to gain some political benefits, 
true adaptation to liberal norms is unlikely, as this would undermine the govern-
ment’s rule. Besides, for some countries, none of the incentives provided by 
international frameworks is high enough. Schimmelfennig stresses that when a 
country is very powerful, incentives such as political legitimacy or economic 
assistance are not high enough motivators, so that socialization of human rights 
in these countries is unlikely.169  
In the context of her domestic politics theory of treaty compliance, Beth 
Simmons argues that governments engage in cost-benefit analyses in the 
context of their values, region, national institutions, and time horizons and are 
willing to undertake treaty commitments when they expect the costs related to 
compliance to be reasonable. She claims that the key to compliance is a 
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combination of domestic demands, democratic institutions supporting rights 
demands and domestic context favourable to human rights. 170 She suggests: 
“The more a treaty addresses issues clearly related to the ability of the governm-
ent to achieve its central political goals, the weaker we should expect the treaty’s 
effect to be”.171 Governments are often motivated to abuse civil and political 
rights rather than rights of children, because the costs are higher in the case of 
civil and political rights. Exercising them might be potentially dangerous for the 
ruling elite. Simmons found in her study that nondemocratic governments are 
especially reluctant to commit themselves to treaties focusing on civil and 
political rights.172  
It is noteworthy to point out that, in the case of human rights law, other 
countries often have low incentives to “police non-compliance”. Whereas in 
some areas of international law, such as trade agreements, “competitive market 
forces” exist that motivate compliance173, such incentives simply do not work in 
the case of human rights law.174 For human rights law, the costs of non-com-
pliance on behalf of one country tend to be low for other countries, because 
what a government does with its own citizens in its own territory does not 
usually pose a direct threat of harm to other states.175 
So, what costs are related to compliance with the ECHR? Human rights law 
is a specific branch of international law in the sense that it focuses on the 
vertical relationship between states and citizens instead of the classic horizontal 
relationship between states, as is the case with other branches of international 
law.176 It is a distinctive feature of international human rights treaties that they 
empower individuals to go vis-à-vis their governments.177 Human rights law is 
designed “to hold governments accountable for purely internal activities”.178 
Thus, international human rights treaties can “have a potentially dramatic 
impact on the relationship between citizens and their own government”.179 Costs 
related to losing sovereignty – in the shape of “the right of each state to deter-
mine its own domestic, social, legal and political arrangements free from 
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outside interference”180 – and costs related to bringing national legal systems 
into accordance with treaties have a significant impact on the decision to ratify 
and/or to comply with international human rights treaties.181 The ECHR has a 
strong impact on the sovereignty of its member states, which in turn has an 
influence on compliance with the ECHR. The primary focus of the ECtHR is on 
the relationship, on disputes between the citizen and the state. The supranational 
enforcement mechanism, which enables citizens to enforce their rights at the 
international level, is regarded as a major strength of the ECHR. Surely, from 
the perspective of human rights protection the supranational enforcement 
mechanism of the ECHR is a major strength as it enables “bridging the gap” 
between human rights as enshrined in human rights treaties and imperfect 
execution on the domestic level.182 However, enabling individual constituents to 
sue their governments and obliging governments to execute judgments clearly 
has an impact on exercising sovereignty.183  
However, in my view it cannot be argued that the framework of the CoE 
inherently threatens the sovereignty of its member states. First of all, all member 
states have voluntarily joined the CoE and have voluntarily undertaken the obli-
gations that this step involves. Entering into international agreements is also 
part of exercising sovereignty. Moreover, the framework of the CoE is built on 
the principle of subsidiarity and the concept of margin of appreciation is aimed 
at balancing the right to sovereignty and the need to ensure a uniform level of 
protection of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR in different member states.184 
Nevertheless, for some states these mechanisms built into the CoE system do 
not provide enough comfort. This is especially evident in cases where member 
states are reluctant to enforce ECtHR judgments due to conflict with their 
national constitutions and thus, in essence, their national sovereignty. According 
to Alec Stone Sweet, Leitner Professor of Law, Politics, and International Studies 
at Yale Law School, the ECHR has evolved into a transnational constitutional 
regime185 and not all members are happy with such developments. It is well 
documented that countries are less motivated to comply with obligations that 
interfere more with their national sovereignty. For example, data concerning 
compliance with judgments of the ECtHR reveal that countries are more willing 
to comply with financial reparations than general measures or any of the other 
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types of obligation. According to Hillebrecht, this tendency refers to a reluct-
ance to address structural problems, thus resulting in continual violations of the 
ECHR.186  
The requirements of human rights treaties can be quite “uncomfortable” for 
many states. They require reforms that might have widespread implications on 
the internal arrangements of the country. The obligation to hold free and fair 
elections, to respect the rule of law, to protect civil and political rights of all the 
people regardless of their political views, religion, race, sex or sexual orien-
tation entails costs that are simply too high for some governments. This is parti-
cularly the case when the government promotes anti-liberal, nationalist, 
populist, or communist ideologies and the ruling elite remains in power due to 
authoritarian practices. Making true changes towards better implementation of 
human rights would undermine the government’s rule. Accordingly, such 
governments tend to engage in cosmetic amendments, but largely refuse to 
change the status quo. Although the CoE does respect the sovereignty of its 
member states and the principle of subsidiarity, and although the concept of 
margin of appreciation should provide enough comfort for member states, in 
some cases the costs for sovereignty are still too high and states choose not to 
comply. 
 
 
 1.4. Preconditions of compliance with human rights 
treaties: making a difference when domestic  
opportunities present themselves 
In my view, the normative socialization theories introduced in Section 1.1 of 
this study have not turned enough attention to specific domestic circumstances 
that can facilitate or inhibit implementation of human rights. I agree with Frank 
Schimmelfennig that it is naïve to think that international organisations can 
“create and consolidate democratic systems on their own… however, they are 
able to make a difference when domestic opportunities present themselves.”187 
Thus, international institutions, including the CoE, can have an influence on 
domestic practices when certain preconditions are met. Subsequently I introduce 
the conditions underlying successful implementation of human rights treaties on 
the domestic level, as identified by scholars influenced by the rational choice 
approach to compliance with international human rights law.  
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1.4.1. Well-functioning domestic institutions and  
constitutional framework  
Various scholars scrutinizing the preconditions for successful compliance with 
international human rights law emphasize the pivotal role of domestic insti-
tutions. Beth Simmons argues that the effects greatly depend on the domestic 
political context into which the treaties are inserted: “Treaties alter politics; they 
do not cause miracles. They supplement and interact with domestic political and 
legal institutions; they do not replace them”.188  
A functioning constitutional framework, in the shape of “an enforceable 
constitution, courts and other institutions with the power and legitimacy to ensure 
that the constitution is respected and adhered to, in combination with a social 
and political context respecting the constitution and the values expressed 
therein”,189 is a crucial factor underlying successful implementation of inter-
national norms in the socialization process, argues Anna Jonsson Cornell, 
Associate Professor and senior lecturer in comparative constitutional law at 
Uppsala University. Constitutional socialization (reforming constitutional rules 
in order to foster a liberal society) is an important factor in determining whether 
compliance with international human rights can be expected or not.190 
Tonya Putnam, a lawyer and Associate Professor of Political Science at 
Colombia University, highlights that in the long run “domestic institutions and 
domestic arrangements will determine the degree of protection afforded to the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms”.191 Underlining the role of constitu-
tions, she stresses that these domestic institutions and arrangements are formally 
expressed “first and foremost in constitutions.”192  
The role of domestic institutions as well as the practices and values prevalent 
in those institutions as key factors for influencing change in human rights 
practices is also of key importance in the theory of Oona Hathaway. She 
emphasizes that, in order to improve implementation of human rights in domestic 
contexts, it is vital to reform domestic institutions: to develop institutional capa-
city and to overcome “the institutional inertia” that largely contributes to slow 
transformation of human rights practices in countries with authoritarian pasts.193 
When a majority of government officials used to repressive means and other 
human rights violations remain in their posts, this considerably hinders effective 
reforms. In Hathaway’s view, “repressive behaviour lingers long after the initial 
                                                                          
188  Simmons (n 2) 16. 
189  Ibid 6.  
190  Jonsson Cornell (n 7) 4.  
191  Tonya L. Putnam, ‘Human rights and sustanable peace’ in Stephen John Stedman and 
others (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers 2002) 246.  
192  Ibid. 
193  Hathaway (n 87) 2003, 2025. 
53 
impetus for it disappears… governments and the individuals who make decisions 
within them become habituated to engaging in human rights violations, and this 
behaviour takes time and continued conscious effort to change”.194 Hathaway 
also highlights the need to increase costs related to human rights violations. She 
proposes that in order to stop countries from using ratification “as a symbolic 
substitute for real improvements” more effort is needed to improve the moni-
toring and enforcement of treaty obligations.195 
Pro-compliance partnerships – including executives, judges, legislatures, and 
civil society actors – take responsibility for the compliance process and can hold 
governments accountable. Overall, domestic institutions are the main facilitators 
of human rights compliance, claims Courtney Hillebrecht.196 Hillebrecht 
emphasizes, “The stronger the domestic institutional constraints, the more likely 
governments are to comply with the rulings”.197 When executive power is strong 
and other institutions are weak, countries tend to engage in “à la carte 
compliance”: they comply partially, select what suits them and what does not.198 
Pamela A. Jordan, Assistant Professor of Politics and Global Affairs at 
Southern New Hampshire University and at the Davis Center for Russian and 
Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, stresses the central role of domestic 
institutions. Her research has demonstrated that in former Soviet bloc countries 
executive agencies and law enforcement officials play a great role in imple-
menting international human rights standards and determining whether these 
standards are complied with. She also emphasizes the role of civil society, 
especially the impact of NGOs on human rights implementation, as NGOs can 
pressurize leaders to internalize international standards.199 
The characteristics of human rights implementation structures that influence 
the state’s capacity to implement human rights law are also of key importance, 
according to Dia Anagnosto and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. Human rights pro-
tection has a crosscutting nature, in that it “permeates nearly the entirety of state 
policies and spheres of action, and therefore implicates a broad range of insti-
tutions and actors with distinct competences”.200 Domestic arrangements for 
implementing the case law of the ECtHR “are closely linked to the broader 
policy-making processes in the legislative, administrative, and executive spheres. 
Therefore they both reflect and in turn reinforce the quality of legal infrastructure 
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capacity of the state more broadly, namely, the capacity to enact and enforce 
laws and policies predictably and impartially.”201 
The overall ability to enact laws and deliver policies is closely linked to 
pursuing necessary reforms and to effective human rights implementation in 
general. Legal infrastructure capacity and the government effectiveness of a 
state are closely tied to effective implementation of human rights in the CoE, as 
demonstrated by Dia Anagnostou and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. “When such 
capacity and effectiveness are high and diffused, the adverse judgments of the 
Strasbourg Court are unlikely to be obstructed or ignored, even when the govern-
ment, political elites, or other actors are reluctant and not in favour of sub-
stantive remedies” they note.202. Besides, specific domestic execution arrange-
ments developed by CoE countries considered to be successful implementers 
are markedly different from those of weak performers, as research has demon-
strated. In the former case, implementation structures are capable of influencing 
legislative and policy processes as they are empowered with both legal capacity 
and political weight. However, institutions in weak implementers “lack the 
political clout and resources to influence policy formulation and enforcement.” 
203 Successful implementers also have efficient review and control mechanisms 
in place regarding all branches of powers that weak implementers tend to lack. 
Weak implementation arrangements also result in lengthy implementation 
periods and failure to tackle the root causes of violations.204  
From the perspective of the CoE, the status of the ECHR in the domestic 
legal hierarchy matters greatly: whether other legislation is in accordance with it 
and whether the courts interpret fundamental rights and freedoms in the light of 
the case law of the ECtHR. Moreover, it is of crucial importance how well 
international human rights provisions and judgments of international courts are 
situated within the larger rights context of the state. Countries with a more 
advanced rights policy are also more successful implementers, as derives from 
research by Hillebrecht.205 The mechanisms for individual complaints and 
enforceability of the judgments of the ECtHR depend on relevant domestic 
legislation and the work of domestic institutions. When countries fail to enforce 
judgments on the domestic level, it makes it de facto impossible to grant 
citizens the protection of the Convention. 206  
Implementation of human rights requires efficient work by various insti-
tutions such as courts, legislatures, governments, and civil society actors; 
however, the process of implementation predominantly relies on the govern-
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ment.207 Whereas the primary responsibility for executing judgments of the 
ECtHR lies with governments, parliaments may have to adopt changes in 
legislation; moreover, they can pressure governments to implement, hold them 
accountable for failure to do so and ensure compliance of domestic legislation 
with the judgments of the ECtHR.208 National courts also have a pivotal role in 
improving the embeddedness of the ECHR on the domestic level through 
remedying violations and participating in dialogue with the ECtHR.209 Besides, 
free media and civil society organizations can constrain the executive branch 
and facilitate implementation of ECtHR judgments.210 The Brighton Declaration 
of 2012 emphasized three measures for improving execution of judgments: 
developing domestic capacities and mechanisms to ensure prompt execution of 
judgments; improving the accessibility of action plans for the execution of 
judgments; and facilitating role of national parliaments in improving imple-
mentation.211  
It has been found that democratic governments tend to commit themselves 
more to external scrutiny than nondemocratic governments and also tend to 
comply better. An important factor is that their institutions are based on rule of 
law, which limits the arbitrary will of the government. Additionally, free elections 
and freedom of the press enable citizens to hold their governments accountable 
for their actions, thus contributing to better compliance.212  
Accordingly, the role of domestic institutions as well as practices and values 
prevalent in those institutions as key factors is of key importance for facilitating 
compliance with international human rights law. Enforceable constitutions and 
independent courts having the power and legitimacy to ensure that the consti-
tution as well as obligations deriving from international human rights instruments 
are adhered to play a crucial role in successful compliance with international 
human rights standards. Moreover, as the CoE occupies only a subsidiary role, 
it is of key importance how well the ECHR is incorporated into the national 
legal order.  
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1.4.2. Construal and the role of human rights  
in a country’s socio-political context 
Another key factor influencing compliance that emerges from studies is the 
value system prevalent in a country. The role of human rights in a given society 
matters greatly, as does whether the overall political and social context of a 
country is supportive towards human rights.  
In their elaborated five-stage “spiral model” presented in “The Persistent 
Power of Human Rights”, Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink 
propose that states comply with human rights when respect towards human 
rights is institutionalized in domestic processes.213 The more a state cares about 
its social reputation and wants to be an accepted member of a community, the 
more it is motivated to avoid naming and shaming and is more likely to be 
influenced by the logics of arguing and of appropriateness. Thus, social vulner-
ability is an important factor influencing implementation of human rights.214 
When a value system prevalent in a country is supportive towards human rights, 
when the citizens demand that their governments also support human rights in 
the international arena, when a country’s international reputation is connected to 
human rights, then that country is likely to be influenced by normative mecha-
nisms such as persuasion, naming, and shaming. Mostly these mechanisms are 
effective in stable democratic regimes, as “respect for human rights constitutes 
an institutionalized logic of appropriateness in such systems” claim Risse, Ropp 
and Sikkink.215 However, in the case of autocratic regimes the logic of appro-
priateness is not institutionally embedded, human rights are not respected and 
protected and consequently these countries are difficult to persuade or shame 
into compliance by external actors.  
To critically consider the theory of Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, it should be 
recalled that not all democratic countries want to base their international repu-
tation on protection of human rights and not all democratic countries are influ-
enced by mechanisms such as naming and shaming. For example, the USA has 
not ratified the majority of international human rights treaties and is not 
susceptible to naming and shaming. Additionally, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
admit that powerful states with vast economic and/or military resources are less 
vulnerable to all kinds of external pressure.216 Countries or regions with enough 
international legitimacy have been able to present powerful counter-discourses 
to classic human rights discourse based on universality – and have done so 
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without becoming socially vulnerable.217 This is reflected in the rising popu-
larity of the “Asian values” debate or the “traditional values” debate initiated by 
Russia. “Even if China or Russia were to be exposed to material sanctions by 
Western states or the international community as a whole, such sanctions alone 
would probably not be able to move their governments from commitment to 
compliance”, claim Thomas Risse and Tanja A. Börzel. 218  
According to Schimmelfennig’s approach, a wish to belong to the same “club” 
with the socializing agent, such as the CoE, is a key incentive for changing 
human rights practices. This also presumes high legitimacy of the CoE in the 
eyes of member states and structural asymmetry between the CoE and the 
member states socialized into its value system.219 Supporting Schimmelfennig’s 
line of argumentation, Michael Zürn, Director at WZB and Professor of Inter-
national Relations, Free University Berlin and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Professor of 
International Studies at the Simon Fraser University in Vancouver suggest that 
only when a country “sees itself as a student in a teacher-student relationship” 
and when there is weak opposition to change, can we expect changes in human 
rights implementation.220  
The incentive of the socialized state to belong to the “club” is also of key 
importance in the approach of Ryan Goodman, Professor of Law at New York 
University and Derek Jinks, Professor of Law at the University of Texas. They 
argue that acculturation, expressed as “the general process by which actors 
adopt the beliefs and behavioural patterns of the surrounding culture”,221 is the 
mechanism that best explains the influence of international law on state beha-
viour. Acculturation highlights the relationship of the actor (e.g. a state) to a 
reference group or wider cultural environment. When states want to identify 
with a certain group or community, they are incentivized to behave in accord-
ance with the social rules and expectations of that group or community, to 
maintain an “in-group” with a shared identity, claim Goodman and Jinks.222 Thus, 
ideological, normative, cultural and other characteristics of the reference group 
(a region, a regional or international organization) vastly influence the outcomes 
of the acculturation. The acculturation process on the international level 
involving converging human-rights practices between countries is related to 
domestic political struggles and can empower domestic actors to demand changes 
from their government.223 In the context of the CoE, this mechanism suggests 
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that, in order to facilitate compliance with the ECHR and other instruments, the 
CoE should have a high reputation and that new member states would be 
incentivized to learn and to behave in accordance with the rules and to make 
changes in their national institutions and practices.  
Good implementers are characterized by a “diffused embeddedness of human 
rights awareness” – a substantial mainstreaming of human rights awareness, 
monitoring, and related expertise across the state administration, the legislature, 
and branches of the government – whereas worse-performing countries demon-
strate a deep lack of such awareness and expertise, as shown by Dia Anagnostou 
and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi.224 At the same time, weak implementers are charac-
terized by the “absence of diffused human rights awareness and the limited 
involvement of parliamentary and civil society actors in the process of defining 
and instituting appropriate and effective remedies in response to ECtHR 
rulings.”225 
Snyder and Vinjamuri explain that norms can shape behaviour and outcomes 
only when they are supported by the dominant political coalition in the specific 
social milieu where these norms are applied. When there is such a political 
coalition, the next step consists in establishing and sustaining institutions for 
monitoring and sanctioning compliance with norms. They claim that “strategies 
that underrate the logic of consequences – and thus hinder the creation of 
effective coalitions and institutions – undermine normative change”.226  
Apart from a value system supported by the state and its institutions, the 
attitude towards human rights in society at large is also of key importance. 
“Freedom is never granted; it is won. Justice is never given; it is exacted”, as 
put by A. Philip Randolph, a leader of the civil rights movement in the USA.227  
The presence of a strong civil society capable and willing to demand and 
realize human rights and compliance with international human rights norms are 
interrelated to a great extent. Citizens must play a central role in the process of 
spreading and defending the values underlying human rights, because human 
rights treaties fundamentally influence their welfare, suggests Beth Simmons. 
No external or transnational actor has as much incentive to demand compliance 
from governments, as do local people.228 Local people are the ones who “carry 
the ball and take the risks”; know local culture and other domestic factors.229  
Simmons suggests that ratifying international human rights treaties contri-
butes to better compliance mainly via enhanced political mobilization because it 
stimulates membership in NGOs and other civil society organisations, allowing 
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civil society to draw more attention to violations by governments in the area of 
civil and political rights and to demand compliance from their governments. 
Empowering political mobilization works through changed values and beliefs of 
local people.230 However, empowerment does not work in every country and it 
greatly depends on “state-society relations”. Whether people become 
empowered in a particular country depends on the perceived value of the rights 
in question as well as on the probability of being successful in their demands: 
domestic actors must have a strong motive and effective means. 231  
Accordingly, people are likely to mobilize when a wide “rights gap” exists: 
potentially there is much to be gained and at the same time the political and 
social environment is relatively tolerant and the government respects civil and 
political rights and freedoms. In contrast, people are not likely to mobilize and 
demand rights when the perceived value of the right is low or/and civil and the 
environment is not supportive, especially when political rights are denied, 
repressed and delegitimized. In such circumstances, people are afraid of the 
consequences of rights demands and the probability of successful demands is 
very low. This is the case with authoritarian governments, where usually 
citizens are identified rather as “subjects of the state than as individuals with an 
autonomous right to participate in the political and social life of the country”.232 
Simmons argues that treaty effects tend to be higher in less stable, transitional 
societies than in stable democracies or autocracies, especially regarding civil 
and political rights. In these countries, people “have the motive and the means 
realistically to press their governments to take international human rights 
treaties seriously”.233  
Simmons proposes that international human rights treaties can help to mo-
bilize people in two ways. Firstly, they can increase the perceived value of human 
rights: offer persuasive information, raise rights consciousness and change the 
values and beliefs of society. Treaties can empower local people to identify 
themselves as rights bearers and change how they relate to their government and 
to each other.234 For example, some groups, such as gay or disabled people, are 
often stigmatized in countries that do not have a long history of human rights 
protection. International legal standards can help to break such stigmas, as they 
offer oppressed people useful alternative frameworks to gain a sense of political 
identity, legitimacy, and efficacy.235 Secondly, international treaty law can 
increase the likelihood of success in realizing rights demands. International 
treaties offer new political, legal and social resources to local groups and indi-
viduals to pressurize domestic governments and demand compliance with human 
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rights. It helps local actors to bargain from a position of strength.236 However, it 
matters whether domestic actors have enough means and motivation: “In stable 
autocracies, citizens have the motive to mobilize, but not the means. In stable 
democracies, they have the means but generally lack a motive. Where 
institutions are most fluid, however, the expected value of importing external 
political rights agreements is quite high”, explains Simmons.237 In stable 
democracies the human rights situation might already be so satisfactory that 
international treaties do not provide enough extra. However, in stable 
autocracies the legal and political institutions do not support demands for rights – 
the risks can be too high for local people – and thus the power of international 
treaties remains limited.  
Frank Schimmelfennig argues that mechanisms of political mobilization can 
be efficient only when civil society is strong and able to influence the govern-
ment and when the potential gains related to pressurizing the government are 
higher than the costs for civil society.238 When civil society is weak and when 
the government is so repressive that the cost of pressurizing the government is 
very high, the mechanism of transnational mobilization is unlikely to have a 
great impact on implementation of human rights treaties.  
In the context of the CoE, it can be concluded that in order to facilitate 
compliance with the ECHR and other instruments the prevalent value system in 
the country should share the value system of the CoE, while the CoE and the 
idea of human rights should have a high reputation in the country; the political 
elite as well as society as a whole should be reform-minded and willing to make 
changes in their national institutions and practices. Such conditions are mostly 
present in democratic states, because in most democratic states respect for 
human rights is embedded in domestic systems (e.g. government institutions, 
the legal and educational systems), whereas such conditions are mostly lacking in 
authoritarian states, where respect for human rights is not embedded in domestic 
systems and people generally have little contact with human rights.  
International agreements are not a magic tool. International law can influence 
domestic rights policies and practices when law can be used as a “legitimizing 
political resource’” to make rights demands on the domestic level.239 As 
explained by Simmons: “International law matters most where domestic insti-
tutions raise the expected value of mobilization, that is, where domestic groups 
have the motive and the means to demand the protection of their rights as 
reflected in ratified treaties”.240 When domestic actors have little incentive to 
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organize, when they do not “take up the torch for themselves”, international law 
has little effect on domestic practices.241 
 
 
1.5. Analysis and concluding remarks on the mechanisms 
and limits of international frameworks  
in facilitating compliance 
During the period of human rights enthusiasm in the 1990s, scholars and 
politicians alike believed in the ability of international frameworks to influence 
the behaviour of states. In line with the Zeitgeist of the 1990s, the CoE chose an 
inclusive strategy based on political dialogue, monitoring, assistance and 
exchange of best practices for integrating new members into its value system. 
The CoE built its enlargement strategy on normative approaches and accordingly, 
it was expected that new member states were soon to become liberal and 
democratic and comply with obligations undertaken while acceding to the CoE. 
This has not been the case with several member states, it can be concluded now, 
when more than twenty years have passed since Russia and the majority of 
Central-and Eastern European countries joined the CoE.  
The strategy chosen by the CoE should be critically examined because 
although the CoE has contributed to establishing uniform standards of human 
rights protection in its many member states, several member states seem to be 
moving in the opposite direction. It has become evident that normative theories 
have overlooked various pertinent factors influencing compliance with human 
rights law, particularly the limits of international frameworks to influence the 
behaviour of states, and have not paid enough attention to the reality on the 
ground in new member states. Beth Simmons argues that the logic of appro-
priateness underlying normative theories fails to take into account the role of 
domestic political and social contexts and “privileges the global in ways that 
may not be fully justified”.242 The logic of appropriateness emphasizes the 
homogenizing influence of dominant Western values, assumes that countries are 
embedded in the structures of international society and want to identify them-
selves as “members in good standing of the modern society of states.”243 Besides, 
the CoE is built on the assumption that all member states are committed to its 
constituent values: the framework of the CoE aims to set universal human rights 
standards in its member states. Whereas many CoE member states are indeed 
committed to its constituent values, this is not applicable to all members.  
It should be acknowledged that the premises of normative approaches are not 
axioms that can be taken to be true by default. In my view the presumptions of 
normative theories – that human rights are universally accepted normative 
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standards; that external actors can teach and motivate states to comply with 
international human rights and to internalize these norms; that new members 
want to belong to the “club” of liberal democratic states and are eager to learn 
and to change their legislation and human rights practices – have not proven to 
work well in practice.  
Due to the nature of international human rights law, it is inevitable that the 
norms of the ECHR as well as other international human rights treaties are not 
self-enforcing; they need to be implemented on the national level. Implemen-
tation and interpretation of international human rights takes place on the 
domestic level and can be effective only when international human rights norms 
are incorporated into the national legal order. Thus, the citizens of CoE member 
states can rely on the mechanisms provided in the ECHR when their govern-
ments are incentivized to effectively implement the Convention and to enforce 
the judgments of the ECtHR. The primary responsibility for enforcing the ECHR 
and the mechanisms that guarantee compliance with human rights standards rest 
with governments, so that success or failure depends on local circumstances. 
The CoE can only play a subsidiary, a back-up, role.  
However, normative theories have overestimated the role of external actors 
and underestimated the agency of domestic actors.244 Normative theories mostly 
present international human rights frameworks as “white kings” making demands 
on domestic actors, whereas domestic actors are construed as “voiceless victims”, 
claims Beth Simmons.245 Normative approaches tend to attribute changes in 
human rights compliance to elites and transnational actors rather than to domestic 
actors and civil society246 which seems highly counterproductive, considering 
the pivotal role of civil society in demanding compliance with international 
human rights standards. The overall idea – that external actors can legitimately 
socialize norm-violating countries into proper behaviour – raises many doubts 
and is increasingly contested within the CoE as well as globally.  
Although the CoE is the most effective international human rights protection 
system in the world, its toolbox for influencing implementation of human rights 
in its member states is limited. When governments are not motivated to comply 
with obligations undertaken and when they do not want to address the root 
causes of rights violations, the CoE does not have effective mechanisms to 
influence states into compliance. The CoE has no injunctive power to oblige 
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member states to take specific action. Whereas theoretically member states could 
be suspended or expelled, the CoE’s main mechanism for punishing member 
states who fail to comply with obligations undertaken is “naming and shaming”: 
this is not the most effective tool, particularly when states do not aim to be 
perceived and respected as human rights-abiding countries.  
The idea of universality of human rights is constantly under question in 
international for a, while culture-specific approaches to human rights are being 
raised in the CoE as well as the UN. Several non-Western countries have trans-
formed from norm-takers to norm-shapers. As explained by Roy Allison,247 all 
norms have a strong local and regional component and local hegemons can have 
substantial impact on the normative standards in their sphere of influence. 
Whereas advocating a culture-specific approach to human rights might be 
problematic for several reasons, it undoubtedly demonstrates that the idea of 
human rights as universal appropriate norms has not been accepted by all states. 
It follows that when governments do not acknowledge the idea of certain human 
rights and freedoms as universal globally “appropriate” standards, they also have 
little incentive to comply with such standards. 
Human rights law is very much a normative field and deeply interconnected 
to how concepts like morality, equality, dignity and justice are interpreted in a 
given society. Whereas initially the CoE was relatively homogeneous, now the 
organisation encompasses culturally, historically and geographically extremely 
diverse countries. That same diversity inevitably influences the construal and 
implementation of human rights in different member states. The enlargement 
process changed the character of the CoE from a club of democratic states to a 
“school” of democracy, rule of law and human rights aiming to solve systemic 
deficiencies within the legal systems of newcomers.  
An educational process is usually successful when students are motivated to 
learn and when the teacher has good means and enough authority in the eyes of 
the student. However, several member states of the CoE have not been eager 
students. Not all states want to take the role of the student and perceive the CoE 
as a teacher of human rights. Several member states have been reluctant to make 
necessary reforms and to implement the judgments of the ECtHR. As discussed 
in the introduction to this study, countries such as Italy, the Russian Federation, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova 
and Poland have the highest number of non-implemented judgments, reflecting 
serious structural problems in their legal systems.  
In my view, normative theories have not been able to explain why some 
countries have successfully integrated into the CoE and comply with its 
standards, whereas others do not. I suggest that some useful explanations derive 
from the arrangement of the CoE itself and its encoded limitations to facilitating 
human rights compliance, particularly when states are not eager to incorporate 
international human rights law into their national legal orders; when states do 
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not accept the CoE’s underlying values and are not motivated to cooperate with 
the organisation. 
Rational choice theories provide an alternative approach to explaining com-
pliance with international human rights law. Rational models stress that the role 
of international institutions in ensuring compliance should not be overestimated, 
as often compliance is the result of previously existing domestic consensus, not 
the result of external influence. Rational choice approaches stem from the idea 
that compliance with international human rights treaties is likely to be success-
ful when domestic actors expect to win more than they lose from the process. 
Compliance with international human rights treaties entails various costs for 
governments. Those costs must be balanced by incentives; otherwise countries 
are reluctant to comply.  
Another feature of the CoE is that it requires member states to make reforms 
towards better implementation of human rights law. These reforms can have 
widespread implications on the internal arrangements of member states and they 
can be politically very costly for governments, particularly when the govern-
ment’s ideology is not in line with human rights protection. When a government 
promotes anti-liberal ideologies and the ruling elite remains in power due to 
authoritarian practices, reforms ensuring compliance with international human 
rights law would undermine the government’s rule. Thus, in these cases govern-
ments are reluctant to comply with obligations undertaken broadly and refuse to 
change the status quo but instead engage in some cosmetic amendments. Besides, 
when countries are very powerful, they are less vulnerable to external pressures 
and can more easily choose non-compliance, notes Schimmelfennig.248 Overall, 
the incentives at the disposal of the CoE include mostly intangible (social or 
symbolic) rewards and punishments based on persuasion and social influence. 
As these incentives are often not high enough, compared to the costs, the role of 
the CoE in fostering implementation of the ECHR and other norms and values 
on a national level is rather low, predicts Schimmelfennig.249  
It is quite easy to gain reputational benefits by ratifying international human 
rights treaties, at least in the short run. Ratification is viewed as a statement 
about the norms and values a country advocates. Whereas treaties such as the 
ECHR also have an instrumental role, in that treaties create binding law, overall 
there is not enough knowledge of the “reality on the ground”. It is difficult to 
check whether countries truly comply with their obligations, so that it is quite 
easy for countries to “cheat”.250 Not all countries are “sincere ratifiers”: they can 
ratify a treaty, but refuse to comply with obligations undertaken. The risk of 
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insincere ratifiers is especially high for human rights treaties, as at least at the 
beginning it is quite easy to convince others of one’s sincere intentions. More-
over, the toolbox of the CoE is rather limited and widespread problems with 
compliance remain an important issue. Thus, the hands of the CoE are tied 
when some member states turn out to be insincere ratifiers.251 The CoE is built 
on the premise that countries are motivated to respect human rights and that 
such logic of appropriateness is embedded into domestic institutions. When this 
is not the case, the CoE is in a difficult situation, because it has very limited 
means to influence its member states to comply.  
The majority of modern theories explaining compliance with international 
human rights law are rather pessimistic about the role and impact of inter-
national frameworks to influence compliance on the domestic level. However, 
they agree that when certain “domestic opportunities” present themselves, human 
rights treaties are able to make a difference. Based on the theories and studies 
presented in this chapter, I found that three main preconditions underlie success-
ful implementation of human rights treaties on the domestic level. 
Firstly, domestic institutions – dedicated, endowed with power, able and 
willing to implement human rights on the domestic level predictably and 
impartially – are of key importance for human rights implementation, as several 
authors have demonstrated.252 Robust institutions “that can predictably enforce 
the law” are a vital precondition for a norm-governed political order.253 Insti-
tutional capacity is inevitably closely related to the principle of rule of law. In 
order to prevail as a law-based state, the government must establish “meaning-
ful mechanisms designed to ensure that no branch of government – executive, 
legislative, or judicial – can act arbitrarily and at will”.254 Essentially, a 
balanced constitution and its enforcement on the national level is a prerequisite 
for functional institutions facilitating and safeguarding implementation of human 
rights. Anna Jonsson Cornell argues that the failure of international sociali-
zation of human rights can in part be explained by “misconceptions and over-
estimations regarding processes of constitutional socialization.”255  
Secondly, it is of crucial importance whether international human rights norms 
are effectively incorporated into the national legal order. It matters how inter-
national human rights norms and judgments of international courts are situated 
within the larger rights context of a particular state. The mechanism for indi-
vidual complaints and enforceability of the judgments of the ECtHR completely 
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depend on relevant domestic legislation and the work of domestic institutions. 
When countries fail to enforce judgments on the domestic level, this makes it de 
facto impossible to grant citizens the protection of the Convention. 
The third important factor is construal of human rights and their place in the 
social and political context of a country. International human rights law can 
shape actions and outcomes in the domestic arena only when human rights are 
supported by a dominant political coalition in the specific social milieu where 
those norms are applied. When such a political coalition exists, it is possible to 
establish and sustain institutions for monitoring and sanctioning compliance with 
norms, as explained by Snyder and Vinjamuri.256 Successful compliance with 
international human rights treaties is realistic when a country wants to belong to 
the “same club” as other member states. Only then is the country motivated to 
identify itself with the values of the organization, to learn and to make necessary 
reforms on the national level. However, when protection of human rights is not 
institutionally embedded in a country, when human rights are not respected on 
the level of the state and particularly when the official rhetoric is anti-liberal 
and anti-human rights, it is difficult for external actors to persuade or shame a 
country into compliance.  
Apart from the official political context, the broader social context is also of 
key importance. It matters how a society perceives human rights and whether 
the underlying values of human rights are in accordance with the prevalent values 
in that society. As suggested by Beth Simmons: citizens are the ones whose 
welfare is at stake, they must have the central role in demanding compliance with 
international human rights treaties from their governments. However, when 
civil society is weak and when the government is so repressive that it is very 
costly for civil society to pressurize the government, its role in compliance with 
international treaties is minimal. 257 International agreements are not magic tools. 
However, international law can influence domestic rights policies and practices 
when domestic groups have the motive and the means to demand protection of 
rights as reflected in ratified treaties. In contrast, when people do not have the 
means and the motives to exercise their rights, when people are not willing to 
“take up the torch for themselves”; the effect of international treaties remains 
rather small.  
In subsequent chapters I will examine the preconditions for compliance 
identified in this chapter in the context of Russia. Firstly I will focus on the 
issue whether Russian institutions are dedicated, endowed with the power, able 
and willing to implement human rights on the domestic level in a predictable 
and impartial manner. Subsequently I will scrutinize how norms of international 
law – and in particular international human rights provisions and judgments of 
the ECtHR – are situated within Russia’s legal system. I will analyse the 
position of international law in the Russian Constitution and in other legislation 
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as well as focusing on the practice of the Constitutional Court in interpreting 
those norms. I will continue by examining construal of human rights and their 
role in the social and political context of Russia. Finally I will focus on the issue 
of civil society and examine implementation of three central civil and political 
rights: the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of assembly and 
the right to freedom of association in Russia. In conducting this analysis, I will 
mainly focus on legislation in the sphere of civil and political rights and on the 
case law of the Constitutional Court.  
  
68 
II RUSSIA’S INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND  
ITS INFLUENCE ON COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES  
Wherever law ends, tyranny begins (John Locke) 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, compliance with human rights treaties 
and successful implementation of human rights on the local level is likely when 
certain domestic opportunities present themselves. International human rights 
treaties supplement and interact with domestic political and legal institutions but 
they cannot replace them, as stressed by Beth Simmons.258 As argued in Section 
1.4.1 of this study, essentially, a balanced constitution and its enforcement on a 
national level is a prerequisite for functional institutions for facilitating and 
safeguarding implementation of human rights. It is impossible to achieve proper 
compliance with international human rights instruments and implementation of 
the rights and freedoms enacted therein without a functioning constitutional 
framework: an enforceable constitution along with courts and other institutions 
having the power and legitimacy to ensure that the Constitution is adhered to.259 
Domestic institutions are of crucial importance because domestic institutions 
determine the degree of protection granted to fundamental human rights and 
freedoms on the domestic level, as highlighted by Tonya Putnam.260  
Thus, the focus of the present chapter is Russia’s constitutional framework. I 
begin by analysing the concept of rule of law. It will be determined whether the 
Russian Constitution provides the necessary framework for developing a law-
bound state and whether the provisions of the constitution are adhered to in 
practice. The principle of rule of law is intimately connected to the separation of 
powers and the independence of the judiciary. The independence of the judiciary 
is a crucial component of the separation of powers and is of vital importance for 
implementing the rights and freedoms enacted in the ECHR and for enforcing 
the judgments of the ECtHR. Accordingly, I will analyse the issue of separation 
of powers in Russia, with particular focus on the independence of the Russian 
judiciary. Finally I will contemplate the consequences of the characteristics of 
the Russian constitutional institutional framework on compliance with and 
implementation of human rights law in Russia. The focus of this chapter is rule 
of law and the Russian domestic institutional framework. My analysis relies 
primarily on academic works by both Russian and international scholars and 
reports and studies published by the CoE.  
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In the next chapter I will specifically examine how international human rights 
law is incorporated into the Russian legal order. I focus on Russian state practice 
and analyse domestic construal and treatment of human rights both in legislation 
and in the practice of the Constitutional Court. I will particularly focus on the 
issue of how the ECHR and judgments of the ECtHR are situated within the 
overall context of human rights protection in Russia.  
 
 
2.1. The concept of rule of law in the Russian legal landscape 
“The real struggle for us is for the citizen to cease to be 
the property of the state” 
(Adam Michnik)261  
 
Andrew Moravcsik has emphasized that the willingness of states to accept and 
enforce human rights norms depends on the pre-existing level and legacy of 
domestic democracy.262 It matters whether countries have “an overarching sense 
of responsibility…for respecting human rights and the rule of law”, as voiced 
by Anna Jonsson Cornell.263 The law-based state will prevail only when 
meaningful mechanisms exist to ensure the balance of executive, legislative and 
judicial powers, notes Courtney Hillebrecht.264 The rule of law and an insti-
tutional framework that guarantees that the rule-of-law principle is adhered to 
are both important premises for the development and implementation of human 
rights in any country.  
In many Western countries, the rule of law and an institutional framework 
based on it have deep historical roots. The rule of law, together with individual 
freedoms and political liberty, are “principles which form the basis of all 
genuine democracy”, as stated in the preamble to the Statute of the CoE265. The 
rule of law is an essential part of the common European heritage. As explained 
by the ECtHR in its landmark judgment Golder v. UK,266 a profound belief in 
the rule of law was one of the reasons why the signatory governments decided 
to build the system of the CoE and to collectively enforce certain rights enacted 
in the UDHR. Thus, in Western legal culture the fundamental principle of a 
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law-based state is a basic concept. However, the concept of a law-based state 
has historically not been entrenched in Russian legal doctrine.267  
The Western model of rule of law assumes that governments are law-based – 
that they respect their own laws. In contrast, the notion that the sovereign could 
be bound by law was not established in Russian or Soviet law.268 As assessed by 
several scholars, problems with rule of law and institutional reforms related to it 
are major obstacles underlying Russia’s agonizingly slow progress in advancing 
its human rights situation. Various difficulties related to transitioning from 
Soviet doctrine to a new constitutional democracy based on the rule of law and 
human rights have characterized Russia’s participation in the CoE.269 Russia has 
“a strong tradition of the rulers feeling themselves above the law, and very little 
tradition of the State working under law”, as argued by Jane Henderson.270 The 
Russian political structure has from the outset been based on the absolute power 
of the ruler, assuming that “all power was vested in the sovereign”. Russian 
legal-political doctrine has rejected the idea that the sovereign could be bound 
by law. The absolute power of the ruler included dictating privileges and their 
conditions and law was mostly “a matter of convenience to the sovereign … 
utilized or ignored according to the sovereign’s needs”.271 Individual rights and 
freedoms were strictly limited under the tsars, not to mention Communist rule 
and during Russia’s post-Soviet leadership. Russia was not influenced by the 
spread of fundamental rights and freedoms in the 19th and 20th centuries and 
“free expression failed to establish any meaningful foothold in Tsarist Russia or 
the Soviet Union.” 272  
Reforms in Tsarist Russia never extended to Western democratic thought; 
indeed, authoritarianism flourished throughout the Tsarist era.273 The Marquis 
de Custine, a French aristocrat and travel writer, noted in his classic book “La 
Russie en 1839”: “This Empire…is just a prison, the key to which is located with 
the emperor”.274 Richard Pipes, in his classic book “Russia under the Old 
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Regime”, noted that the absence of a large and vigorous bourgeoisie in Russia 
has been an important factor contributing to Russia’s deviation from the 
political patterns of Western Europe.275 Liberal ideas have significantly influ-
enced political institutions and practices in Western Europe largely because a 
strong middle class has fought for those liberal ideas. The Western middle class 
stood for their business interests, their property rights and for public order 
respecting their rights. Pipes argues that “[I]t is reasonable to assume a more 
than casual connection between the notorious underdevelopment in Russia of 
legality and personal freedom and the impotence or apathy of its middle class”.276 
In the 20th century the Bolsheviks substituted the totalitarian ideology of the 
Russian tsars with their own totalitarianism,277 continuing “the arbitrary and 
oligarchical rule over a land they took from the tsars”.278 The position that the 
leaders alone knew what was good for society was characteristic of Soviet 
leaders. All restrictions on power were rejected in order to secure their personal 
rule. 279 Although the Bolsheviks asserted they established a law-based state and 
Soviet Russia formally acknowledged constitutionalism, in reality these prin-
ciples were not followed.280 Jane Henderson explains: “In the Soviet system, 
rights were presented as something awarded to the citizen in return for the duties 
that the citizen performed for the state. There were no inherent “human rights”, 
only dependent “individual rights”.281” On the one hand, the 1936 “Stalin” 
Constitution, written in beautiful Russian, presents an idyllic picture of a well-
ordered state with citizens’ rights and duties set out for the first time at the USSR 
level. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly were 
all enacted in Article 125 of the 1936 Constitution. However, additional legis-
lation was needed to invoke any of the rights presented in the Constitution.282 
This recalls Newton Minow’s famous speech to the Association of American 
Law Schools:  
 
After 35 years, I have finished a comprehensive study of European comparative 
law. In Germany, under the law, everything is prohibited, except that which is 
permitted. In France, under the law, everything is permitted, except that which 
is prohibited. In the Soviet Union, under the law, everything is prohibited, 
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including that which is permitted. And in Italy, under the law, everything is 
permitted, especially that which is prohibited.283  
 
Another feature of Soviet constitutions was that social and political rights con-
tained very clear words of limitation. The freedoms of speech, the press, 
assembly and meetings, street processions and demonstrations were guaranteed 
if exercised “in conformity with the interests of the people and in order to 
strengthen and develop the socialist system”. Activities that did not appear (to 
the state) to serve these lofty purposes were criminalized.284 As concluded by 
Angelika Nußberger: “There was no separation of powers, no open discussion 
of political issues and no civil society independent from the State. Changes 
were initiated only in the late 80’s when Gorbachev used the perestroika and 
glasnost slogans”285. In the second half of the 1980s under the rule of 
Gorbachev, “the Soviet peoples first experienced basic human freedoms and a 
law-based state”286 and Russia was starting to go through a period of rethinking 
fundamental values, one of those values being the supremacy of law.287  
Article 1 of the 1993 Russian Constitution establishes that Russia is a 
democratic federal law-bound state with a republican form of government. As 
argued by Gennady Danilenko, the new Russian Constitution “signifies a com-
plete departure from the Communist dictatorship and a passage to democratic 
government. As a new basic law for a “democratic federal legal state,” the Con-
stitution became an important step toward the establishment of a Rechtsstaat in 
Russia.”288 
Although the Constitution provides the necessary framework for developing 
a law-bound state, however, “almost as soon as the Constitution was adopted, it 
began to be undermined,” argues Jane Henderson.289 Henderson notes that the 
Constitution, although a landmark document, “the first in Russia to be taken 
seriously as a legal document”, was nevertheless created “during a time of trouble 
and is not a balanced document” and its provisions have been heavily in favour 
of presidential powers from the start.290 “Since the Russian Constitution came 
into force, there has been no real institutional, political or legal opposition force 
to counterweight the presidential authority”, claims Jean-Pierre Massias.291  
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The president’s powers in the 1993 Constitution have been characterized as 
“impressive”. Already at the beginning there was a concern that such powers 
“set up the possibility of a presidential dictatorship.”292 However, at least for-
mally the Constitution stipulates separation of powers. Structures of separate 
institutions do exist in Russia: a federal legislature, courts, an elected executive 
and a structure of federal-regional divisions. Nevertheless, all institutions are 
dominated by the presidential administration and Russia has no effective check-
and-balance system. 293 “Oversight by the Legislature of the executive branch is 
at best weak and at worst a diversionary sham,” declares Jane Henderson.294 
The president nominates individuals to the upper chamber of the Legislature, 
the Federation Council; proposes candidates for appointment to the higher 
courts, including judges for the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, as 
well as Court Chairs. The president may cancel central government decrees and 
regulations, which he regards as inconsistent with the Constitution, federal laws 
and his own edicts.295 At the Constitutional Court, a presidential representative 
is supposed to ensure that the president’s perspective is borne in mind, and that 
that views of the Constitutional Court can be reported back directly to the 
president.296 Corrupt schemes are widespread and appointments to posts such as 
the post of presidential representative to the Constitutional Court are often “a 
reward” for exemplary service.297  
In addition to already extensive express powers enacted in the Constitution, 
the Constitutional Court has developed a doctrine of implied powers extending 
presidential powers by implication. The doctrine of implied powers extends the 
president’s authority further from powers expressly delegated to him, when the 
authority “fits within the overall spirit of the constitutional provisions” defining 
the role of the president (Article 80 of the Constitution). For example, in 1995 
the Constitutional Court held that the president had by implication a power to 
amend the Constitution.298  
Moreover, executive power has developed and favoured various informal 
institutions. During the 1990s, President Yeltsin used a system of exclusivity, 
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political favouritism and personal bargaining to win allies and gain support. 
Informal institutions and rules began either to replace formal ones or to fill the 
institutional vacuum not regulated formally.299 President Vladimir Putin con-
tinued to develop various institutions that were not established in the Consti-
tution. In Russia various “paraconstitutional” innovations marginalising the 
Constitution and increasing the informal power of the president were created: 
namely, presidential representatives in federal districts, the State Council and 
the Public Chamber. The Public Chamber was established to express informed 
public opinion; The State Council is an advisory body to the president con-
sisting of Federation Council members, former governors and other members 
appointed by the president. The State Council discusses policy matters and is a 
purely consultative body. It has no firm basis in law, as it was created by presi-
dential edict: it could be “dissolved at the stroke of a presidential pen”. This 
body allows members to have regular personal contact with the president and 
engage in lobbying.300 Jane Henderson claims that as a result, “[t]he federal 
balance, already imprecisely defined in the Constitution, has been shifted towards 
central control through the Presidential Federal Representatives and other 
paraconstitutional innovations, marginalising the Constitution”. 301  
Russia has a presidentialist constitution signalling a concentration of executive 
authority. Whereas presidentialist constitutions do not have to involve de facto 
diminishing the powers of other institutions, in many cases this still happens, 
especially in (semi) authoritarian systems. Constitutional arrangements inevitably 
influence the expectations of society and signal power relations. Henry E. Hale 
has suggested that in highly paternalistic societies individuals might com-
prehend politics “as an arena of personal wealth redistribution and targeted 
coercion” and reproduce these practices due to such misconceptions and related 
fears. A presidentialist constitution generates expectations in society that the 
presidential network is more powerful and thus allows the president to accu-
mulate even greater informal power.302 
As a result, the “president can construct a system in which s/he dominates 
the political system by virtue of both formal and informal authority (usually in 
tight combination). In this case the informal power structure might be charac-
terized as a kind of single pyramid in which the president administers society 
through an ever-broadening conglomeration of vertical networks of subpatrons 
and clients”.303 In highly paternalistic societies, constitutions have an effect 
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mainly because they signal that the network capturing presidential office is the 
most powerful network in the country. This signalling effect of the Constitution 
“enables the president to set informal rules and practices and to selectively give 
life to formal rules that other networks must acknowledge or risk political or 
economic isolation, creating a strong tendency to single-pyramid politics” argues 
Henry E. Hale..304 
Sarah Whitmore has described Russia as a neopatrimonial country “where 
formal liberal democratic institutions are infused with informal, patrimonial 
practices such as clientelism, patronage and rent-seeking”.305 Personal relation-
ships, and what is said rather than what is written, have traditionally occupied 
an important role in Russia’s polity. Alena Ledeneva explains:  
 
As it tended to be in the Soviet Union, the party boss’s word was most conc-
lusive when it was spoken, not written. If the two ever deviated, the verbal 
held… The primacy of the informal oral commands and handshake agreements 
reflected the weakness of the law, insidious secrecy and mistrust, and the need 
for authority figures to cut through the thicker of often-conflicting administrative 
requirements.306 
 
In Ledeneva’s view, similar patterns also characterize contemporary Russia. Jane 
Henderson has noted that, as a result of various reforms and extra-constitutional 
practices, the already fragile balance of powers has been further diminished in 
Russia. Reforms and practices such as restructuring political parties and the 
electoral law, increasing the central power and diminishing the power of regions, 
making legislative amendments obstructing the work of NGOs, and tightening 
control of the media have further increased the concentration of power and 
strengthened the role of the president. These tendencies demonstrate that since 
the beginning of the 21st century the “power vertical”, which existed both during 
the Soviet Union and imperial Russia, has become increasingly stronger.307 
Contemporary Russia “lacks political and judicial institutions with the auto-
nomy, strength, and authority to defend (or at least fight over) the pie-crust pro-
mises that are made in its Constitution” as put by Jeffrey Kahn.308 Due to lack of 
experience with rule of law, democracy and human rights, legal, political and 
cultural practices undermining the provisions of the Constitution have not been 
obliterated in Russia. On the contrary, informal networks and paraconstitutional 
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institutions continue to dominate. The majority of Russians do not understand 
the necessity for separation of powers and the role of institutions such as the 
Federal Assembly. They continue to express a wish to be led by a strong 
ruler,309 as also evidenced by polls demonstrating the skyrocketing popularity of 
President Putin. As derives from polls by the authoritative Levada Center, in the 
period between the spring of 2014 and the autumn of 2017 the approval rating 
of Vladimir Putin rose from 80 to 90 %.310 
Failure to adhere to the principles of rule of law reflected inter alia in a lack 
of separation of powers in Russia has far-reaching consequences and is inevitably 
related to implementation of human rights in Russia. Systematically repressing 
fundamental freedoms in Russia is symptomatic of a wider structural problem: 
it is in essence a separation of powers problem, argues Jeffrey Kahn.311  
However, the picture with rule of law in Russia is not as black and white, as 
often pictured, claims Kathryn Hendley. Criticizing Russia for lack of rule of 
law is a “simplistic approach” which “has contributed to the monolithic narrative 
of law in Russia” 312 observes Hendley in her monograph “Everyday Law in 
Russia”. She claims that “given that the rule of law is an ideal type that exists 
nowhere in its pure form, it stands to reason that perfect illustrations of the 
absence of the rule of law are likewise unlikely.” 313 Based on her research, she 
argues that Russia has dualistic law:  
 
A legal system characterised by two basic realities. On one hand, ordinary 
Russians are able to access their legal system with relative ease. Though not 
perfect, the courts resolve most disputes efficiently and, in doing so, judges are 
guided by written law, both procedural and substantive. If assessed in terms of 
these mundane disputes, the Russian legal system would receive respectable 
scores on many elements of the rule of law. On the other hand, these routine 
cases, though representing the vast majority of cases brought to the courts, to 
not capture the full story of Russian law. Those who bring nonroutine disputes 
into the legal system (or have such cases brought against them) risk being 
swept into the shadowy world of the telephone law. In such cases, the written 
law takes back a seat to brute power and any pretense of justice is absent. The 
more powerful party is able to dictate the outcome of the case.314 
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Hendley maintains that “though the ultimate conclusion might be substantially 
the same, this more nuanced approach, which requires us to unpack the “rule of 
law” concept, yields key insights as to the relative functionality of key aspects 
of Russian legal system. It also gives voice to the multitude of Russians who 
have been able to mobilize the law to good effect.” 315 She claims “though not 
disputing the challenge to the rule of law posed by telephone law, I argue that 
this zero-sum analysis has caused us to neglect the relevance of law to the 
everyday lives of Russians… As we aggregate the experiences of Russians, 
damning the entire legal system because a small number of cases are plucked 
out for special treatment seems unwarranted.” 316 In Hendley’s view “instead of 
treating the rule of law as an all-or-nothing concept” we should recognize it as 
the sum of its parts existing along a spectrum.317 Hendley does not provide a 
clear answer how to assess the presence or absence of rule of law in Russia, but 
claims, “maybe the time has come to step back from indexes and to encourage 
the sorts of thick descriptions that better capture the everyday role of law.” 318 
Undoubtedly, none of the countries can claim to have “ideal rule of law” and 
it has not been my intention to argue that Russia is the “perfect illustration of 
the absence of rule of law”. Such analysis indeed would tell nothing about the 
role of law in a particular country. However, I do not agree with Hendley that 
scholars have damned the entire Russian legal system “because of small number 
of cases plucked out for special treatment”. Whereas the problem of indepen-
dence of the Russian judiciary is grave and I will focus on this issue in the 
following subchapter of my dissertation, the problems with rule of law are more 
diverse. Whereas there is no comprehensive definition or a list of criteria, for 
example according to World Justice Project Rule of Law Index,319 rule of law 
consists of constraints on government powers; absence of corruption, open 
government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, 
civil justice, and criminal justice. The core of rule of law is the understanding 
that law should govern, that all people and all institutions should be subject to 
the law. In Russia the president dominates the political system by virtue of 
formal authority deriving from the extensive powers provided in the Consti-
tution and informal authority deriving from various reforms and practices 
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diminishing the already fragile balance of powers in the Constitution. This has 
widespread implications on the work of the Russian legislative power and the 
quality of laws they produce as well as on the work of the Russian judiciary, 
which in turn influence the protection of rights and freedoms of Russian people. 
 
  
2.2. Independence of the Russian judiciary  
“Before the law stands the gatekeeper”  
(Franz Kafka, “The Trial”) 
 
An independent judiciary is a key institution in order to enable people to realize 
their rights. Independence of the judiciary is a crucial component of the sepa-
ration of powers and is of vital importance for implementing the rights and 
freedoms enacted in the ECHR and enforcing the judgments of the ECtHR. 
Developments in Russia’s court system from the perestroika era to contempo-
rary Russia have been a roller-coaster ride.320 Reform of the judicial system 
aiming at increasing trust in the courts and enhancing judicial prestige has been 
a key challenge in modern Russia.321 In the 1990s, development of an indepen-
dent judiciary began and judges were granted security of tenure and greater self-
regulation.322 The role of judges, their special status and independence are pro-
tected by the Russian Constitution as well as federal laws. Article 120 of the 
Constitution establishes that judges shall be independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and federal law. Judges are irremovable and the powers of a judge 
can be ceased or suspended only on the grounds and according to the rules fixed 
by federal law under Article 121 of the Constitution.  
According to the assessment of Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe, legislation protects judges relatively well from 
undue influence or pressure.323 However, similar legal guarantees for judges 
that also existed in the USSR Constitutions of 1977 and 1936 failed to protect 
the judiciary from undue pressure. According to legal academic Valerii 
Savitskii, “not a single constitutional provision proclaiming the independence of 
the courts was applied in practice. The norms of the Constitution merely served 
as a fig leaf covering the spineless obsequiousness and grovelling obedience of 
the so-called judicial power, which from day one, was under the thumb of the 
party apparatus”.324 Although Soviet constitutions declared that judges were 
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independent and subordinate only to the law, the Communist Party used the so-
called nomenklatura system to vet candidates for judicial office before any 
name was put forward.325 In a similar vein, the legal guarantees established 
under the 1993 Constitution have not been realized in practice. Unfortunately, 
for many reasons, judges have been in “a pivotal position as prime targets for 
bribery or other untoward pressure”.326 In 2004 Constitutional Court Chair 
Zorkin claimed that Russia’s judicial system was in many aspects worse than it 
was in the Soviet era327 and emphasized the problem of corruption: “our courts 
are mired in corrupt relations with business. Bribe-taking in courts has become 
one of the most corrupt markets in Russia…built on various corrupt networks 
operating at various levels of the power structure” .328 
Professor Yelena Lukyanova from the National Research University Higher 
School of Economics argues that the Russian judge knows that any of his 
acquittals will be called into question, repeatedly verified and appealed. This 
makes Russian judges to manipulate procedural norms and limits of judicial 
discretion to make the “safest” decision from their own perspective. To prevent 
this, the Russian judge needs additional guarantees that any of his decisions 
based on law will not affect his status. Russian judge should instead understand 
that he bears responsibility for a knowingly unlawful decision, Lukyanova 
claims.329 
The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe has referred 
to widespread problems with independence of the Russian judiciary, such as 
manipulating the judicial system and using it for political purposes, neutralizing 
political opponents, undermining business competitors and settling personal 
conflicts.330 It is widely believed that “telephone justice”–familiar from the Soviet 
era–is still carried out in Russian courts.331 There exist so-called “zakaznye 
dela” (prosecutions to order). A new term “Basmannoe pravosudie” 
(Basmannyi justice) has been invented, referring to justice serving the needs of 
the authorities or powerful persons named after the Basmannyi court where in 
some high-profile cases this kind of approach was adopted.332 For example, the 
sentencing of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in December 2010, to six more years of 
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imprisonment and that of the members of the punk band Pussy Riot, in August 
2012, were largely perceived as a sign that the judiciary in Russia remains 
subject to political pressure and the influence of the executive. 333 
Reforms reducing the autonomy of the judiciary started when Vladimir Putin 
first became president of Russia. One of the motives for reform was that judicial 
independence created “too much autonomy for individual federal judges, with 
the risk that they would be “independent of the law””.334 Appointments for 
judicial positions are administered by qualification commissions composed of 
legal professionals, but since 2001 the role of the president in the appointment 
procedure has increased. The president can refuse to appoint a candidate to the 
position without an obligation to provide reasons for this decision. The 
president also appoints the Court chairs for a six-year term, renewable once. 
Court chairs, being notoriously powerful, are of vital importance in guaran-
teeing the independence of the judiciary. In Russia, court chairs play an impor-
tant role in hiring, promotion and remuneration and disciplinary responsibility 
of judges; they also enjoy a wide discretion in allocation of court cases among 
judges.335 Disciplinary measures can be taken in case of violation of the Law on 
the Status of Judges or the Code of Judicial Ethics. 336 The Federal Constitutio-
nal Law on Disciplinary Judicial Presence was adopted in 2009 and in March 
2010 the Disciplinary Judicial Presence337 was established.338  
The Constitutional Court has held that disciplinary measures should be applied 
only in those cases where infringement by a judge is completely incompatible 
with the honour and dignity of judges.339 However, lack of clear criteria regarding 
the grounds for disciplinary procedures have been assessed as “one of the main 
factors undermining the independence of judges”.340 Vague grounds, such as a 
requirement to avoid anything which can undermine the authority of the 
judiciary enacted in Article 3 of the Law on the Status of Judges can be used to 
put pressure on judges and to “justify abusive dismissals, thus jeopardizing the 
independence and impartiality of judges”.341  
In practice, disciplinary proceedings against judges are common, and there are 
cases when judges have been pressured to resign under the threat of disciplinary 
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proceedings.342 For example, when Judge Olga Yegorova was appointed as the 
Chair of the Moscow City Court, eighteen judges resigned and four were dis-
missed only in the course of her first two years as Chair.343 Some cases have 
also reached the ECtHR. One notorious case, Kudeshkina v. Russia344, con-
cerned Moscow judge Olga Kudeshkina, dismissed for degrading the authority 
of the judiciary and undermining the prestige of the judicial profession. As a 
judge in a high-profile criminal case, she refused to follow the instructions given 
to her by Prosecutor Dmitri Shokhin and the Chair of Moscow City Court, Olga 
Yegorova, to reach a favourable decision regarding highly-placed officials and 
to falsify the Court’s records. Kudeshkina was removed from the case. She 
publicly criticized the pressure applied on her and drew attention to the lack of 
independence of the Russian judiciary in general. “Years of working in the 
Moscow City Court have led me to doubt the existence of independent courts in 
Moscow. Instances of a court being put under pressure to take a certain decision 
are not that rare, not only in cases of great public interest but also in cases 
encroaching on the interests of certain individuals of consequence or of parti-
cular groups”, she argued.345 
Judge Kudeshkina also turned to the High Judiciary Qualification Panel with 
a request to charge Chair Yegorova with a disciplinary offence for exerting 
unlawful pressure on her. However, no grounds for charging Chair Yegorova 
with a disciplinary offence were found. Subsequently, the president of the 
Moscow Judicial Council requested that Judge Kudeskina be dismissed from the 
Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow as she had insulted the Russian court 
system and “behaved in a manner inconsistent with the authority and standing 
of a judge”.346 The Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow held that Kudesh-
kina had committed a disciplinary offence and dismissed her for deliberately 
disseminating deceptive and insulting perceptions of the judges and judicial 
system of Russia, degrading the authority of the judiciary and undermining the 
prestige of the judicial profession.347 Eventually Kudeshkina turned to the 
ECtHR. The Court held that there had been a breach of Article 10 (freedom of 
expression) as Russia had failed to strike a fair balance between freedom of 
expression and protecting the authority of the judiciary. Punishing judges for 
raising questions of public interest such as judicial independence has a chilling 
                                                                          
342  Ibid. 
343 Masha Karp, ‘The Case of Judge Kudeshkina’ (13 September 2010) Rights in Russia 
<http://www.rightsinrussia.info/blogs/mashakarpthecaseofjudgekudeshkina> accessed 
1 December 2017.  
344  Kudeshina v Russia (App 29492/05) ECtHR 26 February 2009. 
345  Ibid para 19.  
346  Ibid para 32.  
347  Ibid para 34. 
82 
effect on public debate on the effectiveness of judicial institutions, the ECtHR 
stressed.348 
Several other cases in the ECtHR have concerned the independence of the 
judiciary in Russia. The case of Baturlova v. Russia349 concerned a letter sent by 
the president of the regional court to the first-instance court, in which the latter 
was explicitly instructed to re-examine a final binding decision on the ground of 
newly-discovered circumstances.350 The ECtHR found a violation of Article 
6(1) due to lack of independence of the first instance court. Again, in the case of 
Igor Kabanov v. Russia,351 the Court found a violation of Article 6(1) as lack of 
impartiality of the judges concerned led to termination of the applicant’s 
membership in the Bar Association of Russia.352 Besides, the general public in 
Russia does not perceive judges as independent and impartial, a factor greatly 
contributing to continuing legal nihilism in Russia.353  
The institution of the Constitutional Court has been regarded as the most 
important change in the Russian legal landscape after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.354 Leading Russian justices such as Vladimir Tumanov, previous Chair 
of the Constitutional Court, and Valerii Zorkin, the incumbent Chair of the 
Constitutional Court, have both emphasized the Court’s role in giving “living 
voice” to the Constitution and as a safeguard against abuses of power.355  
However, the role and independence of the Constitutional Court has also 
been retrenched in the course of various reforms. Until 2009 the Constitutional 
Court judges themselves elected the chair of the Constitutional Court for a 
three-year term. However, since 2009 the regulation changed and now the 
Council of the Federation upon the recommendation of the president appoints 
the chair for a term of six years.356 Retired Constitutional Court judge Mor-
shchakova has criticized the new arrangements as they significantly reduce the 
Court’s independence.357 Concern about the loss of judicial independence was 
also highlighted following the recusal of two independent-minded judges of the 
Constitutional Court. In 2009, after Constitutional Court Judge Vladimir 
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Yaroslavtsev expressed outspoken views in the international media regarding 
the reforms and argued that the judiciary has been subjected to pressure from 
the executive power and the Russian security services, colleagues from the 
Constitutional Court accused Yaroslavtsev of undermining the authority of the 
judiciary. A formal warning was not issued, but he was advised to resign from 
his post as the Constitutional Court’s representative on the Council of Judges. 
Yaroslavstev complied and resigned from the Council of Judges, but remained a 
judge in the Constitutional Court. Another judge of the Constitutional Court, 
Anatoli Kononov supported Yaroslavtsev publicly and criticized the conduct of 
their fellow judges. He also on several occasions referred to lack of indepen-
dence in the Russian judiciary and assessed the amendments regarding appoint-
ment of the chair of the Constitutional Court as undemocratic and disrespectful.358 
Anatoli Kononov resigned his tenure due to criticism by fellow judges; no 
formal disciplinary proceedings were carried out.359  
Interestingly, both of them had previously dissented in high-profile cases, 
including one concerning presidential appointments of governors in 2006.360 
Jane Henderson has argued that these two cases “indicate an increased level of 
subservience at the Constitutional Court, which is the court most appropriately 
placed to keep balance between the different branches of the State.” 361 Upheavals 
at the Constitutional Court, the most powerful of Russia’s courts, demonstrate a 
period of subservience and undermine the efforts of the Constitutional Court in 
building a coherent legal system and an independent judiciary in Russia.362  
The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe assessed in 
his 2013 report that in Russia procedures for the selection, appointment and 
promotion of judges “lack transparency, clear criteria and rules for selection and 
accountability”363 and that the system “does not ensure full and unequivocal 
protection for judges from possible abuse”.364The Commissioner has advised 
that in order to ensure independence, the procedures and criteria related to the 
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appointment and dismissal of judges and the application of disciplinary 
measures should be clarified365 and that selecting chairs of courts should be the 
prerogative of the judiciary.366  
Apart from reforms hindering the judiciary, it has been observed that one 
systemic factor characteristic of the Russian court system is that many Russian 
judges are recruited from the ranks of prosecutors, the police or court clerks, 
making them used to the hierarchical system. Approximately one third of 
Russian judges have previously worked in law enforcement institutions, 17% of 
judges have been employed as prosecutors and 16% as investigators or police-
men. In contrast, for example in England the majority of judges are former 
barristers having practical trial experience and used to individual autonomy.367  
The background related to enforcement institutions obviously has impli-
cations on the mind-set of judges, which in turn inevitably influences their 
work. Another characteristic of Russian judges, especially in higher courts, is 
that many of them have close ties to Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev. In 
2010 President Medvedev had an opportunity to nominate three new Consti-
tutional Court judges within five months. He appointed two former consti-
tutional law professors, Aleksandr Kokotov and Konstantin Aranovskii, and 
criminal law specialist Aleksandr Boitsov. Aranovskii was a fellow graduate 
student of Medvedev in the Law Department of St Petersburg State University 
and Boitsov was a fellow lecturer when Medvedev lectured there from 1991–99. 
Besides, several other Constitutional Court judges are connected to St Peters-
burg State University, the alma mater of both Medvedev and Putin.368  
Another factor to bear in mind is that the majority of current judges started 
their career in the Soviet system, which clearly has its implications on their 
mentality. All the first judges in the RSFSR Constitutional Court, with the 
exception of Tamara Moshchakova, had been members of the Communist Party. 
369 In the Soviet system judges were not expected to be independent from other 
branches of the state: “Marxist theory denied the validity of the bourgeois 
“separation of powers”, and judges were expected to play their part in transfor-
ming people into the ideal new socialist man or woman”.370 “Telephone law” – 
receiving instructions from above by phone – was a widespread practice in 
politically sensitive court cases. Even when there were no direct instructions, 
the background and education of the judges contributed to a belief in the 
mentality of judges that in any case the wellbeing of society has to be set above 
the rights of individuals. 371  
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Since to a great extent these same individuals still serve as judges, the 
attitudes and the mind-set of a judiciary that trained and practised in the Soviet 
system does not support changes towards more autonomy and independence. 
Nils Muižnieks argues that due to the prevalent mind-set, the role of the judge is 
seen as defending “the best interests of the state, rather than individual human 
rights.”372 Several “traditional” elements such as reliance on “contacts” and 
informal networks still remain in the Russian court system. These continue to 
undermine the independence of the judiciary. 373Attempts to reform the judicial 
system have been met with resistance on the part of judges, chairs and other 
lawyers “brought up in Soviet times, without any understanding of what a law-
based society actually means”.374  
The Committee of Civil Initiatives, headed by former Minister of Finance 
Alexei Kudrin, concluded in a recent study that in order to increase the indepen-
dence of Russian courts it is necessary to introduce mandatory rotation of heads 
of courts with a prohibition on re-running for the same office. Electing chairs by 
judges themselves is supported.375 However, reforms increasing the indepen-
dence of the courts are not supported on the political level. Besides, Vladimir 
Zorkin, the most powerful Russian judge and the Chair of the Constitutional 
Court, has recently conveyed that in the conditions of terrorism and other factors 
hindering national security, the Russian legal system should be transformed to 
correspond to the security situation.376 His message can been interpreted as a 
signal for law enforcement agencies that the Constitutional Court will not inter-
fere with expanding their powers and also a signal for fellow-judges not to 
cause problems for power structures.  
A strong and independent judiciary is of crucial importance in order to allow 
citizens to defend their rights and freedoms. The Russian judiciary is an insti-
tution that could slow Russia’s backward slide regarding fundamental rights and 
freedoms. “In particular, systematically engaged and empowered sub-national 
courts have the capacity to shape a renewed jurisprudence of free expression in 
Russia – precisely where the rubber hits the road”.377 However, the judiciary in 
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contemporary Russia is not independent. Legislative amendments to the laws on 
the Constitutional Court have been widely viewed as a step backwards in terms 
of democracy and are indicative of a growing lack of judicial independence in 
Russia. Still, it cannot be argued that all Russian courts and judges are flawed in 
all cases. Kathryn Hendley argues that whereas “Russian courts operate fairly 
normally when it comes to mundane cases”, they are not perfect. However, 
“courts everywhere are flawed”, she notes.378 Nevertheless, “the dual legal 
system that has evolved in Russia – in which the courts can be relied on to 
handle mundane cases, but are likely to bow to the will of the powerful in 
touchier cases – is a far cry from the rule-of-law–based state that was the initial 
goal”.379  
 
 
2.3. Consequences of the characteristics of Russia’s 
institutional framework on compliance  
with international human rights treaties  
One of the central ideas of this study is that that the CoE can have a meaningful 
influence on compliance with the ECHR and its other instruments only when 
domestic circumstances support compliance with international human rights law. 
One of such pivotal domestic circumstances is a functioning institutional frame-
work, particularly an enforceable constitution, independent courts and other 
institutions having the power and legitimacy to ensure that the constitution is 
adhered to, as I identified in Section 1.4.1 of this study. In this chapter I have 
focused on the Russian institutional framework and found that true institutional 
reform has not taken place in Russia and that Russia has not become a law-
bound state. I argue that absence of the rule of law and independent institutions, 
particularly the absence of independent courts, is one of the major obstacles 
impeding Russia’s compliance with international human rights treaties.  
A law-based state will prevail only when meaningful mechanisms exist that 
ensure the balance of executive, legislative and judicial powers, as put by 
Courtney Hillebrecht.380 Rule of law and an institutional framework that guaran-
tees that the principle of rule of law is adhered to are important premises for the 
development of human rights in any country. Enforceable constitutions and 
independent and well-functioning institutions can facilitate compliance with 
international human rights law and ensure that the obligations undertaken by the 
government are adhered to. Although the Russian Constitution establishes a 
formal framework for a liberal rule of law state in Russia, in practice Russian 
executive power is almost unlimited and other institutions lack the power, 
capability and willingness to implement human rights predictably and impartially.  
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As pointed out by Schimmelfennig, the socialization of norms can be 
measured by assessing to what extent an institutional norm has been established 
in a country’s domestic political institutions and culture.381 In the case of 
Russia, it can be concluded that formal constitutional norms have not led to 
constitutional socialization towards a liberal rule of law state. Problems with 
rule of law clearly already existed when Russia was preparing to become a 
member of the CoE and remained when Russia acceded to the CoE. “The long 
list of inadequacies and demands indicated that the gap between the legal order 
existing at the time of accession and a legal order based on the rule of law was 
enormous”, as argued by prof. Angelika Nußberger, a distinguished public 
international law scholar and ECtHR judge.382 Various indexes of rule of law 
comparing countries worldwide still place Russia near the bottom. In 2014 only 
26.4% of countries worldwide ranked lower than Russia on the World Bank’s 
rule of law indicator.383 The World Justice Project ranks Russia in 75th place out 
of 102 countries analysed in their rule of law index.384 
The rule of law situation has important implications on whether and how 
Russia complies with the ECHR and other international law. Domestic legis-
lation and domestic institutions are of pivotal importance for effectively com-
plying with obligations deriving from the ECHR. In accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, the primary responsibilities as well as the mechanisms 
for enforcing the ECHR lie with national institutions, as highlighted in Section 
1.1.4 of this study. The enforceability of the ECHR depends to a great extent on 
the constitutional framework of the country, as highlighted by Pamela Jordan.385 
It has been demonstrated that weak domestic institutional constraints on the 
executive facilitate à la carte compliance with the judgments of the ECtHR and 
further exacerbate the implementation crisis in the CoE.386 Strong executive 
power and weak other institutions tend to predict à la carte compliance, meaning 
that countries do not enforce all judgments but rather cherry-pick. Courtney 
Hillebrecht has pointed out that in the CoE system the most noteworthy cases of 
à la carte compliance are Russia and Italy. They tend to comply better with 
obligations to pay compensation and other expenses, but fail to implement 
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remedies requiring structural changes due to the political costs related to these 
reforms.387 
The pre-existing level and legacy of domestic democracy is an important 
factor determining the willingness of states to accept and enforce human rights 
norms on a domestic level, argues Moravcsik.388 It matters whether countries 
have “an overarching sense of responsibility for respecting human rights and the 
rule of law”, as vocalized by Anna Jonsson Cornell.389 Russia indeed lacks a 
legacy of domestic democracy, as well as a legacy of closely-related concepts of 
rule of law and human rights. Molly Warner Lien predicted in the 1990s that the 
“future existence of a Russian law-based state cannot be assumed”. 390 She 
pointed out that despite much optimism about the future role of law in Russia, 
“the content of the laws and the extent to which law is respected by government 
will inevitably be a product of the heritage of Russian and Soviet legal philo-
sophy”.391  
However, lack of historical experience is not the only factor determining the 
future of rule of law. Various other post-Soviet countries have been able to 
compensate for lack of historical experience and have become law-abiding 
countries. It should not be forgotten that the Russian Constitution establishes a 
formal framework for a liberal rule of law state in Russia. On the other hand, 
the checks and balances existing in the Constitution are weak and have been 
increasingly marginalized and de facto deactivated, although they are formally 
maintained de jure for legitimation purposes, as explained by Sarah White-
more.392 Various paraconstitutional institutions and informal networks demon-
strate that in Russia the president can bypass the Constitution while orches-
trating important changes. “This reinforces the potential rift between “law on 
the books” and “law in action”: a long-standing issue in Russia”.393 Moreover, 
Russian legislation does not provide the judiciary with proper shielding from 
unlawful internal and external pressure: this has important implications for the 
implementation of human rights in Russia. “Perhaps the greatest challenges to 
implementation in Russia are the lack of an independent judicial system and the 
political pressure judges face to bow to the Kremlin’s demands” Courtney 
Hillebrecht has voiced .394 “The very existence of telephone law brings the rule 
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of law into question in Russia”395 as put by Kathryn Hendley. The lack of 
independent courts leaves Russia’s political opposition vulnerable to constant 
pressure from the authorities.396 
Whereas in routine cases, the courts do not experience substantial external 
pressure, it is impossible to predict which cases turn out to be routine and which 
ones turn out to be nonroutine cases. Kathryn Hendley explains:  
 
Because of the fuzziness of the dividing line between the routine and non-
routune, most Russians tend to overcorrect; they avoid mobilizing the law on 
their behalf if they perceive the slightest risk of being sucked into the shadowy 
world of telephone law…Several of the most prominent Putin-era examples of 
politicized justice serve as cautionary tales.”397  
 
“The fuzziness of the distinction between routine and nonroutine cases is facili-
tated by the persistence of vaguely worded legislation,”398 argues Hendley. Lack 
of clarity of legal provisions and wide discretion for officials to interpret the 
meaning of law goes hand in hand with low levels of rule of law and this 
inevitably undermines predictability.399 Lack of independence of the Russian 
judiciary also has widespread implications on the legislation of Russian Fede-
ration: “the emasculation of the Constitutional Court under Putin has left the 
Putin-controlled legislature free to craft statutes that provide plenty of wiggle 
room for authorities” stresses Hendley.400 
Whereas Russia tried to take the path of democracy and rule of law, several 
obstacles appeared on the way: inability to secure free and fair elections and 
inability to restrict the power of the leader by law, as pointed out by Yelena 
Lukyanova. As a result nothing came out, because “law is a balanced multi-
dimensional system. There are no trifles in it that can be safely neglected or 
sacrificed without threatening the existence of the system as a whole.”401 In her 
view the case of Crimea is a classic example of violation of the rule of law by 
(mis) interpreting meanings and manipulating procedures by Russian President, 
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the parliament and the Constitutional Court, including its chairman Valery 
Zorkin. 402  
To conclude, human rights compliance is unlikely unless true institutional 
change occurs in Russia. Professor Angelika Nußberger argues that many of the 
Russian authorities still act as they used to act during Soviet times. In her view, 
Russian “human rights violations are caused by a behaviour that is based on the 
idea of the uncontrollability of the State and the complete submission of the 
individual”.403 Hathaway emphasizes that in order to improve implementation 
of human rights in domestic contexts it is vital to reform domestic institutions: 
to develop institutional capacity and to overcome “the institutional inertia” that 
largely contributes to slow transformation of human rights practices in countries 
with authoritarian pasts.404 When a majority of government officials used to 
repressive means and other human rights violations remain in their posts, this 
considerably hinders effective reforms. In Hathaway’s view, “repressive beha-
viour lingers long after the initial impetus for it disappears… governments and 
the individuals who make decisions within them become habituated to engaging 
in human rights violations, and this behaviour takes time and continued con-
scious effort to change”. 405  
Constitutional provisions establishing separation of power, checks and 
balances and providing guarantees for the judiciary simply do not function in 
practice when the majority of people working in those institutions are used to 
authoritarian practices and continue to implement them.  
Even if the constitutional framework was perfectly in accordance with the 
principle of rule of law, legal institutions and top-down supply of law are not 
sufficient for the rule of law to operate in practice, as pointed out by Kathryn 
Hendley. She argues that rule of law can blossom only when met with bottom-
up demand for law.406 Thus the future of rule of law in Russia also depends on 
the development of civil society and its ability to demand that their government 
adheres to the Constitution and the norms of international law. These aspects 
are analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this study.  
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III INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW INTO THE RUSSIAN LEGAL ORDER  
In the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but organized robbery?  
(Saint Augustine) 
 
Human rights law can be implemented on the domestic level only when the 
norms of international human rights law are incorporated into the national legal 
order – this is one of the central preconditions for compliance with international 
human rights law (as discussed in Section 1.4.2 of this study). In the context of 
the ECHR it is of utmost importance how well the provisions of the ECHR and 
the judgments of the ECtHR are situated within the legal order. Accordingly, in 
this chapter I focus on Russian state practice and analyse the construal and 
domestic treatment of human rights in legislation, in the practice of the Consti-
tutional Court, and in Russian legal scholarship. I will examine the position of 
international law in the Russian legal order, with particular focus on the 
interplay between international human rights law and the Russian Constitution, 
relying on the relevant legislation and the case law of the Constitutional Court 
as well as interpretations by Russian constitutional law scholars. I will mainly 
focus on the issue how the ECHR and ECtHR judgments are situated within the 
Russian legal order.  
 
 
3.1. Position of international human rights law  
in the Russian legal order 
At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s Russia experienced a 
short period of enthusiasm towards international law, including human rights 
law. Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of a “common European home”, based on 
respect for human rights and the rule of law while addressing the Parliamentary 
Assembly on 8 July 1989.407 Gorbachev wrote in 1992: “It seems that we are 
today passing through “a period of acute sensitivity to human rights, to the 
rights of the individual – a period in which we rethink fundamental values.”408 
Mikhail Gorbachev and Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, both represented 
the Westernizing school of thought and took steps to modernize Russia through 
Westernization.409  
This period was characterized by “the ideology of opening up Russia to 
international regimes”, particularly to European human rights law. The Russian 
political elites realized that Western Europe had accumulated more experience 
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with human rights than Russia and Russia could learn from the West. In turn, 
Western Europe was hoping to “civilize” Russia and to “re-socialize” human 
rights into Russian domestic practices.410 During this period, international stan-
dards of human rights were widely used to fill gaps in domestic legislation. 
International human rights standards, especially the framework of the Council 
of Europe, vastly influenced constitutional developments and construal of rights 
and freedoms in Russia.411 On 5 September 1991 the USSR Congress of 
People’s Deputies (CPD) adopted the USSR Declaration of the Rights and 
Freedoms of Man, which enshrined the doctrine of inherent rights in Soviet law 
for the first time.412 On 22 November 1991, the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic passed its own Declaration of the Rights and Freedoms of 
Man and Citizen. In April 1992, in newly independent Russia, the provisions of 
this Declaration were incorporated wholesale into the Russian Constitution, 
giving Russia for the first time a set of constitutional rights that matched 
international human rights standards.413 In 1993 Russia adopted a very modern, 
rule-of-law and human-rights centred Constitution414 highlighting that “Man, his 
rights and freedoms are the supreme value. The recognition, observance and 
protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall be the obligation 
of the State” (Article 2 of the Constitution). “In the Russian Federation no laws 
shall be adopted cancelling or derogating human rights and freedoms” (Article 
55(2)). In accordance with Article 55 (3) of the Russian Constitution, the rights 
and freedoms of man and the citizen may be limited by federal law only to the 
extent necessary for protection of the fundamental principles of the consti-
tutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of other people, 
to ensure the defence of the country and the security of the state. These limi-
tations are very similar to those enacted in the ECHR.  
Article 15 of the Russian Constitution gives domestic legal force to inter-
national treaties ratified by the Russian Federation. “The commonly recognized 
principles and norms of international law and the international treaties signed by 
the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system”, states 
Article 15(4) of the Russian Constitution. Pursuant to Article 15(3) any inter-
national treaty becomes part of the Russian legal system upon the official 
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publication of a law ratifying the treaty and therefore it is not necessary to 
transform treaties into the domestic legal system in order for Russian courts to 
apply the provisions of international law.415  
The approach of the 1993 Constitution towards international law is radically 
different from Soviet constitutions. In Soviet Russia international law, including 
human rights law, was not considered to be part of national law; therefore the 
new approach towards international law is truly revolutionary considering 
Russian standards. Legal scholars, practitioners as well as politicians initially 
assessed this newly-established approach towards international law very 
positively.416 Article 15(4) of the Constitution demonstrates the Constitution’s 
“friendly view on international law” that is also confirmed in Article 17(1) and 
article 55(1) of the Constitution, as stated by Angelika Nußberger.417 In the 
1993 Constitution the relationship between international law and the national 
system of laws was established in accordance with contemporary standards, as 
assessed by Igor Lukashuk, who was a Russian scholar of international law and 
a member of the United Nations International Law Commission from 1995 to 
2002.418 
Whereas according to the Constitution the ECHR forms an integral part of 
Russian legal system, its status in the hierarchy of norms has been a highly 
disputable question in academic discussions, in the practice of the Constitutio-
nal Court, as well as in political discourse.419 Article 15 of the Constitution is 
located in Chapter 1, namely “The Fundamentals of the Constitutional System”. 
The locus of Article 15 in the constitutional system signifies that no other 
provision of the Constitution or any other legal act may contradict its inter-
pretation or application, as argued by Igor Lukashuk.420  
On 5 May 1998 Russia ratified the ECHR and accepted the jurisdiction of 
the ECtHR. Theoretically there is no difference between the ECHR and, for 
example, the Russian Civil Procedural Code in terms of their implementation in 
national courts. Article 15(4) of the Constitution is more favourable toward the 
ECHR as it sets out the priority of an international treaty over national legis-
lation, as conveyed by Anton Burkov.421 The ECHR does not directly require 
states to give direct effect to the ECHR within national law; however, Russia 
has deliberately chosen to do so. The ECHR as well as other international 
treaties are “component parts” of Russia’s legal system. Pursuant to Article 1 of 
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the Law “On ratification of the Convention”422, the Russian Federation recog-
nizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR in regard to the interpretation 
and application of the Convention. Therefore, national courts in Russia are 
obliged to invoke the ECHR on an equal footing with any national legislation. 
Moreover, the courts also have to rely on interpretation of international treaties 
by international organs, such as the ECtHR.423  
Russia has enforced various reforms in order to render its legal order in 
accordance with the standards of the CoE. For example, the new Criminal Code 
and Criminal Procedural Code improving the conditions of detention and 
improving procedural rights were largely influenced by the ECHR. Moreover, 
human rights education improved when Russia joined the CoE. Numerous 
training sessions and other methods for learning and cooperation were organized 
for Russian officials, judges, and human rights advocates, enabling those pro-
fessionals to use the knowledge gained in their everyday work.424 Upon 
becoming a member of the CoE, Russia also undertook to reform the judiciary 
in line with its standards. 425  
As explained by Sergey Marochkin, the director of the Institute of State Law 
at the University of Tyumen and one of the leading Russian scholars in the 
sphere of constitutional law, the role of courts in clarifying the relationship of 
Russian law and international law and the role of international law in Russian 
legal system has been of pivotal importance.426 Marochkin argues:  
 
The constitutional principle that makes international norms and treaties an 
integral part of the domestic legal order entails a wide role of courts in that 
order. In a country in which the political and legal order was closed for many 
decades and where application of international law was quite rare, the signi-
ficant role of the courts consists in the increasing insertion and entrenchment of 
this law into different kinds of cases and legal relations. Courts resort to 
international law for their legal reasoning, formulation of legal positions, the 
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determination of applicable law, and the deliberation and formulation of a final 
decision in the case.427 
 
In Marochkin’s assessment:  
 
The courts do not treat and realize this constitutional principle in a formalistic 
manner (i.e. according to just its literal meaning). They have developed and 
enriched its content, and strengthened the domestic rule of law by resorting to 
international law: basing themselves not only on the legal component (generally 
recognized principles and norms and international treaties), but on virtually all 
elements of the international normative system.428 
 
The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has provided very 
authoritative and useful guidelines for the Russian courts on the application of 
the commonly recognised principles and norms of the international law and the 
international treaties of the Russian Federation. In its resolution of 10 October 
2003 the Plenum of the Supreme Court explained that “[i]nternational treaties 
play a paramount role in the protection of human rights and basic freedoms” 429 
and claimed that there is a need to “further improve the judicial activity 
regarding the implementation of provisions of international law on the national 
level”.430 For ensuring correct and uniform application of international law by 
the Russian courts, the Supreme Court explained that deriving from the 
provisions of Part 4 of Article 15, Part 1 of Article 17 and Article 18 of the 
Constitution  
 
[h]uman rights and freedoms have direct effect within the jurisdiction of the 
Russian Federation, in accordance with the universally recognized principles 
and norms of international law and the international treaties of Russian 
Federation. They determine the meaning, contents and the application of laws, 
the activities of legislative and executive branches of power [and] of the local 
self-government. 
 
The Supreme Court also clarified: 
 
[t]he universally recognized principles of international law should be under-
stood as the basic imperative norms of international law, accepted and recog-
nized by the international community of states as a whole, deviation from which 
is inadmissible. The universally recognized principles of international law 
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include, inter alia, the principle of universal respect for human rights and the 
principle of fulfilment of international obligations in good faith.431  
 
The Court made it clear that rules of an effective international treaty of the 
Russian Federation “have priority of application over the laws of the Russian 
Federation”432 The Supreme Court reminded that “incorrect application of 
universally recognized principles and norms of international law and the inter-
national treaties…may constitute grounds for the reversal or amendment of a 
judicial act.” 433 
In connection with the ECHR, the Supreme Court stated: 
 
[A]s a member state of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the Russian Federation recognizes the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Human Rights as compulsory in issues of interpretation 
and application of the Convention and its Protocols in the event of presumed 
breach of provisions of said treaty acts by the Russian Federation… This is 
why the said Convention should be applied by courts with regard to the 
practice of the European Court of Human Rights in order to avoid any 
violation of the Convention.434  
 
The Court also reminded that the execution of judgments implies “the obli-
gation of the state to take individual measures, aimed at erasing the violation of 
human rights, stipulated by the Convention, and the consequences of those 
violations for the applicant, as well as general measures, aimed at preventing 
further similar violations.” 435 
In 2013 the Plenum of the Supreme Court issued another authoritative reso-
lution focusing on the application of the ECHR and its protocols by Russian 
courts of general jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that in compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, protection of the rights and freedoms envisaged by the 
ECHR “first of all is the duty of state authorities, including courts”.436  
The Supreme Court reiterated that the legal positions of the ECtHR “con-
tained in the final judgments of the Court delivered in respect of the Russian 
Federation are obligatory for the courts.”437 The Court also reminded that the 
legal positions of the ECtHR must be taken into consideration while applying 
Russian law and that “the content of the rights and freedoms provided by the 
laws of the Russian Federation must be defined in view of the content of similar 
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rights and freedoms displayed by the European Court when applying the 
Convention and the Protocols thereto.”438 The Supreme Court explained that the 
legal positions of the ECtHR must be taken into consideration when applying 
the ECHR and its protocols, but also other international treaties that Russia has 
ratified.439 The Supreme Court also noted: 
 
[t]he courts should always substantiate the necessity of restriction of human 
rights and freedoms based on the established factual circumstances…restriction 
of human rights and freedoms is allowed only when there exist related and 
sufficient grounds for such restriction, as well as if the balance between lawful 
interests of the person whose rights and freedoms are restricted and the lawful 
interests of other persons, the state and society is preserved.440 
 
The 2003 resolution and 2013 resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court 
providing guiding explanations to lower courts constitute a major part of 
Russian legal framework. It derives from these documents that the provisions of 
international treaties of the Russian Federation have priority of application over 
the laws of the Russian Federation; that the universally recognized principles of 
international law include the principle of universal respect for human rights and 
the principle of fulfilment of international obligations in good faith; that human 
rights and freedoms have direct effect within the jurisdiction of the Russian 
Federation; that Russia acknowledges the jurisdiction of the ECtHR; that the 
legal positions provided in judgments of the ECtHR delivered in respect of the 
Russian Federation are obligatory for Russian courts and that the legal positions 
of the ECtHR must be taken into consideration while applying and interpreting 
Russian law.  
Being bound by international agreements creating rights for citizens and 
obligations for the state has been both a novel and a challenging situation for the 
Russian judiciary, on whose work it has had a big impact.441 In 2009 Alexei 
Trochev wrote that “the Russian legal system’s adherence to the standards of the 
1950 convention is a complicated work in progress that develops in fits and 
starts, and in which power holders wrestle with the question of their legal 
autonomy to limit the domestication of the European human rights standards in 
Russian governance.” 442 The judgments of Russian courts have demonstrated 
that the useful guidelines provided by the Supreme Court have not been consis-
tently followed. In Trochev’s view the capacity of the Russian judicial system 
to deal with structural violations of the ECHR and to obey the guidelines 
provided by the Supreme Court is limited, because the judges have little 
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incentive to “disrupt the status quo and speak the truth to power at the request of 
the ECtHR”, as the pressure from law-enforcement personnel and other local 
parties is higher than the influence of Strasbourg; the judiciary does not have a 
high position in the “power map of Russia” compared to important government 
figures and private sector and the judges are so overloaded with work that they 
do not have time and resources to get acquainted with the case law of the 
ECtHR.443  
In general, subsequent to ratification of the ECHR, the Russian courts and 
other institutions had a favourable approach towards the Convention. Although 
initially the case law of the ECtHR was rarely cited, this approach changed when 
the Constitutional Court and other courts began to refer to the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR and to apply its standards in their argumentation on a regular basis.444 
Roughly 10 years after the ratification, Russian lower courts referred to ECHR 
in a growing number of cases, however pressure from the executive and also 
pressure from other judges reluctant to apply the ECHR were important factors 
hindering this. 445 Despite the government officials “tried their best to stem the 
flood of complaints” to the ECtHR “to avoid embarrassment at home and 
abroad”, Russians flooded the ECtHR in great numbers.446 “Responding to losses 
in Strasbourg, Russia witnessed a furry of legislative activity, as well as increased 
funding for the prison system and the judicial branch”447 as noted by Trochev. 
Constitutional Court also began to regularly examine and frequently refer to 
the case law of the ECtHR. Whereas in some cases the decisions of the Consti-
tutional Court were in accordance with the jurisprudence with the ECtHR, in 
other cases the Constitutional Court referred to the case law of the ECtHR 
selectively or vaguely and even misinterpreted the ECtHR448 Also Angelika 
Nußberger agrees that while there are cases where the positions of the ECtHR 
are correctly referred to and used in the Court’s argumentation, there are many 
flaws in citation and the main role of referring to ECtHR case law seems to be 
to emphasize the harmony between the standards developed by the ECtHR and 
the Russian Constitutional Court.449 Nußberger has assessed that in a majority 
of cases the references of Russian courts to the ECHR are flummery and lack 
meaningful analysis. They are “often not more than lip service and do not have 
an impact on the outcome of the cases”.450  
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In 2007 the Constitutional Court held that the wording to be “part of its legal 
system” in Article 15 (4) of the Constitution conveys the message that inter-
national agreements should be “taken into account”, thus undermining the role 
of the ECHR and other international agreements in the Russian legal system, as 
the Constitutional Court indicated that it is not obligatory but only recom-
mended to implement international law.451 In 2007 Russian legal scholar Anton 
Burkov assessed the impact of the ECHR on the Russian legal system in terms 
of its implementation by domestic courts as unsatisfactory due to a manifest and 
visible imbalance between normative provisions and jurisprudence.452 Despite 
the difficulties related to integrating the ECHR into the Russian legal order and 
the mind-set of its people, it has been assessed that “the decisions of the ECtHR 
have had a catalysing effect on the development of legislative and judicial 
practices in Russia”.453 
Overall, integrating the ECHR into the Russian legal order and into the 
mind-set of Russian judges and Russian citizens has been easier said than done. 
“Initially, ratification of the Convention was barely noticed in Russia. It had no 
impact, for example, on the planning and implementation of military operations 
in the conflict in the North Caucasus. And these operations (non-judicial 
executions, indiscriminate bombing, torture, forced disappearance, unlawful 
arrests...) had nothing in common with the Convention”, as argued by Russian 
human rights lawyer Kirill Koroteev.454 During the Second Chechen war, PACE 
adopted several resolutions aimed at resolving the conflict, which Russia 
ignored. In April 2000 Russia’s voting privileges in the Parliamentary Assembly 
were suspended and a threat was made to suspend Russia’s membership in the 
CoE altogether due to grave human rights infringements in Chechnya. Due to 
Russia’s various reassurances, the voting rights were reinstated in January 2001; 
however, tensions remained.455  
Jean-Pierre Massias has argued that in terms of human rights 10 years after 
becoming a member of the CoE “Russia under Vladimir Putin was in a con-
siderably regressed situation compared with its situation in 1996. Not only were 
commitments made when it acceded not fully met, but regulations and political 
practices regarding the exercise of power in 2006 were less democratic than 
those of 1996, even though Russia had been admitted in the hope of democratic 
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progression.”456 Whereas until 2005 the decisions of the ECtHR gained wide 
coverage in the media and were mostly “taken seriously by the Russian 
authorities”, since then the trend has changed sharply and cooperation between 
the ECtHR and the Russian executive started to decrease and has done so 
increasingly.457 In 2005 Konstantin Kosachev, Head of the Russian delegation to 
PACE, labelled the commitments that Russia undertook in the 1990s as 
“romantic expectations” aimed at political gains and achieving international 
legitimacy. He argued that mechanical transfer of standards and norms “from 
enlightened Europe to Russian soil” was not sufficient for the development of 
democracy in Russia.458  
In 2006 Russia refused to ratify Protocol № 14 dealing with reform of the 
ECtHR as arguably the protocol contradicted the principles of Russian law.459 
However, Russia finally agreed to ratification in 2010. Russian executive power 
has demonstrated its unwillingness to cooperate with the European Court by 
refusing to present documents to the court, most notably in Chechen cases, 
considering them irrelevant, declaring them a state secret, or refusing on the 
grounds that such demands contradict the Russian Criminal Procedural Code, 
prohibiting the disclosure of materials from an uncompleted investigation. 
Several problems have also arisen with observance of the Court’s instructions 
concerning article 39 of Court Procedure (Temporary measures), usually 
applied when the applicant faces extradition or deportation to countries where 
they may be subject to torture or brutal treatment. Ignoring decisions requiring 
the Russian authorities to stop extradition or deportation to Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, several people have been sent back to these countries pursuant to 
rulings of local courts.460  
The relationship with the ECtHR was a topic of considerable debate in 
Russia before the State Duma elections of 2011. That summer, Aleksandr 
Torshin, then acting chair of the Federation Council initiated a new draft law 
according to which judgments of the ECtHR could be implemented in Russia 
only if first approved by the Constitutional Court. However, this proposal was 
dismissed.461 The Russian political and legal mainstream currently interprets the 
obligations that Russia undertook while joining the CoE as “discriminatory and 
excessive”. The format of Russian participation in the Council of Europe was 
the result of a fairly brief period in Russian foreign policy that is no longer in 
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line with current realities, as argued by Konstantin Kosachev, Chair of the 
Federation Council Committee on international Affairs and Chair of the Russian 
delegation at PACE from 2004 to 2012.462  
Alexei Pushkov, currently a senator from Perm Krai, a former Chair of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee in the State Duma and head of the Russian 
delegation at PACE from 2012 to 2016 has argued: 
 
Initially Russia was in an unequal position in her relation with the Council of 
Europe, making herself dependent on the West while allowing monitoring and 
evaluation, however not being able to evaluate Western countries. This has 
been a relationship of teacher and student. However, the role of Russia in the 
Council of Europe does not match its territory, its nuclear arms, nor its status 
as one of the leading countries of the modern world and a member of the UN 
Security Council. Neither the US nor China… have bound themselves with 
commitments before any international organizations that could harm their 
freedom of manoeuvre besides the UN.463  
 
Thus, several Russian political leaders have vocally demonstrated Russia’s 
reluctance to follow the standards of the CoE and to occupy the role of the 
student.  
Nevertheless, throughout the years the ECtHR has in many ways directly 
strengthened the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
Russia. PACE in cooperation with the Human Rights Centre of the University 
of Essex, has prepared a valuable overview of the impact of the ECHR in State 
Parties, including Russia464. The analysis demonstrates that as a result of Burdov 
v. Russia465 and Burdov v. Russia (No. 2)466 concerning the damages to the health 
of the applicant when he was exposed to radioactive emissions in Chernobyl, 
Russia adopted the Federal Compensation Act (the Federal Law no. 68-FZ “On 
Compensation for a Violation of the Right to a Trial within a Reasonable Time 
or the Right to the Enforcement of a Judgment within a Reasonable Time”467 
accompanied by a Federal Law amending certain legislative acts of the Russian 
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Federation468). The regulation now enables to claim compensation for prolonged 
non-enforcement of a judgment. Moreover, Russia has taken various measures 
to remedy violations of the rights to liberty (Article 5 of the ECHR). Between 
2008 and 2011 several legislative amendments were adopted to clarify the 
calculation of the detention period when the court decides to refer a case back to 
the investigation stage; to limit the time period of remand detention and to 
promote alternatives to remand detention. Other examples of impact of the 
ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR are plentiful.469 Thus, it cannot be argued 
that international law, especially the ECHR has had no influence on Russian 
legal system and that the standards of the ECHR are not incorporated in Russian 
legal system. Whereas plentiful problems exist in this regard, it cannot be 
denied that in many spheres the ECHR has had an important influence on 
Russian legislation and domestic practices.  
 
 
3.2. Changed interpretation of the interplay between 
international law and the Russian Constitution  
in the practice of the Constitutional Court  
Undeniably the priority of international law over national law as stipulated in 
Article 15 of the Constitution has not become “an everyday legal reality on the 
ground” in Russia.470 Although the Russian Constitution is monist, the voices 
demanding amendment of the constitutional provision stipulating the priority of 
international law over domestic law have become ever stronger.471 Several 
politically sensitive cases such as Markin v Russia472 concerning parental leave 
of Russian servicemen; Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia473 concerning pri-
soners’ right to vote and OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia 474 con-
cerning the expropriation of Yukos oil company have triggered a fierce debate 
in the Russian public and legal domain concerning the role of international law 
in the Russian domestic legal order and have further disoriented the sensitive 
relationship between Russia and the ECtHR.  
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In the Markin case the ECtHR essentially overruled a Constitutional Court 
judgment, which triggered a strong backlash among the Russian legal and po-
litical elite. The ECtHR held that a provision of Russian law prohibiting the 
grant of parental leave to military servicemen and allowing it only for service-
women is discriminatory as it violated Article 14 of the ECHR in combination 
with Article 8 of the ECHR. The Constitutional Court of Russia previously 
found that this provision is in accordance with the Constitution. The Con-
stitutional Court emphasized the special role of military service in guaranteeing 
the defence and security of Russia, which justifies the prohibition of parental 
leave for servicemen as it ensures that servicemen fulfil their duty to defend the 
Fatherland. In its analysis, the Constitutional Court also focused on the special 
role of women in bringing up children that is safeguarded by Article 38(1) of 
the Constitution, establishing that motherhood, childhood and the family shall 
be protected by the state. In the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, 
treating men and women differently regarding parental leave is justified as 
traditionally women have taken care of the children and such arrangements best 
serve the needs of families.  
In Anna Jonsson Cornell’s assessment, the Constitutional Court decision in 
Markin illustrates a highly traditional view of gender roles in society and praise 
for unlimited sovereignty and national security. 475 Markin is especially note-
worthy as in this case the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR “clashed directly 
on what fundamental rights actually mean and who has priority in expressing 
it”, as conveyed by Lauri Mälksoo.476 The debate following Markin exemplifies 
the extremely tense relationship between international law and constitutional 
law in Russia. The Chair of the Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, found the 
judgment to be “unprecedented”, a threat to Russian sovereignty and warned 
that Russia was not willing to accept the directions of the ECtHR uncon-
ditionally.477  
Zorkin has subsequently also denounced the ECtHR’s increasingly pro-
nounced judicial activism, its tendency to reveal structural defects of national 
legal systems and criticized the Court’s failure to acknowledge the socio-
historical context of different member states. He argues that such failure to 
consider Russian society and culture that was reflected in Markin gave an 
important incentive for Russia to develop the role of the Constitutional Court in 
the mechanism of implementation of the ECtHR’s case law.478 The Consti-
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tutional Court, as well as Russian executive branch, took Markin as an invi-
tation to a duel by the CoE.  
Alexei Trochev argues in his recent analysis on the interplay of the Russian 
Constitutional Court and the ECtHR:  
 
The fact that the Markin case received so much publicity is telling. The Rus-
sian CC needs the ECtHR as 1) an intellectual conversation partner to improve 
its legal reasoning; 2) a target of criticism to show loyalty to an arbitrary 
administrative regime; and 3) an assistant in restricting abuses of rights as a 
constitutional regime requires and for expanding the jurisdiction of the 
Russian CC.479 
 
In his view the Constitutional Court’s interaction with the ECtHR “is highly 
pragmatic as both tribunals are interested in reducing the number of complaints 
against Russia in the Strasbourg Court.”480However, the Constitutional Court, 
being “in constant yet precarious search for expanding its jurisdiction in the 
shadow of the memory of the 1993 suspension, has to navigate between the 
ever-shifting short-term priorities of Russian rulers and gradually weakening 
constitutional restraints on their power.” 481 Trochev explains in his analysis that 
Russia is torn between a constitutional regime (formal constitutional rules and 
rules of European human rights law) and an administrative regime (arbitrary 
rule). The Constitutional Court pragmatically operates under both of these 
contradictory governance regimes, aiming to find the middle ground.482 Thus, 
the Constitutional Court is not operating only under the formal constitutional 
framework, but is very much influenced by the expectations and interests of the 
administrative regime, which inevitably has an impact on the judgments they 
make.  
Since Markin, the attitude toward international law has made a sharp turn-
around. On 6 December 2013 the Constitutional Court held that a court of 
general jurisdiction, when considering implementation of a judgment of the 
ECtHR, must suspend the proceedings and request the Constitutional Court to 
assess the case from the aspect of constitutionality when it is impossible to 
implement the judgment without simultaneously disregarding provisions of 
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Russian domestic law. The Constitutional Court explained that when there is no 
conflict with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court determines possible con-
stitutional means of implementing the ECtHR judgment within the limits of its 
competence.483  
In this case the Constitutional Court firmly established the role of the Con-
stitutional Court in protecting Russia’s sovereignty and provided a loophole for 
refusing to implement ECtHR judgments in case of conflict with the Russian 
Constitution and the case law of the Constitutional Court. The Russian Con-
stitutional Court sent a clear signal that it is up to the Constitutional Court to 
determine the fate of ECtHR judgments in Russia.  
In June 2015, after Russia failed to submit an action plan for just satisfaction 
awarded to shareholders of Yukos, ninety-three Russian deputies of the State 
Duma requested the Constitutional Court to clarify the constitutionality of 
various Russian laws including the federal law “On Ratification of the ECHR” 
and the federal law “On International Treaties”. In the view of the deputies, 
those laws unconstitutionally obliged Russian authorities to implement judg-
ments of the ECtHR even in the case of conflict with the Russian Con-
stitution.484 In its judgment of 14 July 2015, the Constitutional Court held that 
the ECHR was an integral part of the Russian legal system, recalled that 
pursuant to Article 46 of the ECHR Russia “recognized ipso facto and without 
special agreement the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights as 
obligatory”485and held that contested provisions in Russian legislation were in 
accordance with the Russian Constitution, hence not agreeing with the position 
of the deputies in this regard.  
However, the Constitutional Court also conveyed that despite the similar 
value-basis of the Russian Constitution and the ECHR, conflicts between the 
two can exist. In these cases the Constitution should be given preference and 
accordingly if enforcing the judgments of the ECtHR would be in conflict with 
Russia’s constitutional values, Russia is not obliged to “follow the judgments 
literally”.486 The Constitutional Court highlighted the priority of the Russian 
Constitution over the ECHR and the legal positions of the ECtHR as well as the 
importance of maintaining national sovereignty. In the court’s assessment, 
implementation of international treaties and judgments of international organs is 
conditional upon these being in accordance with the Russian Constitution. 
Russia may in exceptional cases “withdraw from the implementation of the 
obligations imposed on it, when such derogation is the only possible way to 
avoid violations of the fundamental principles and norms of the Constitution of 
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the Russian Federation”, the court stated.487 The Constitutional Court also pro-
posed creation of a special legal mechanism ensuring supremacy of the Con-
stitution in the implementation of ECtHR rulings.488  
With this judgment the Constitutional Court moved a step further from its 
judgment of 6 December 2013. If in 2013 views were presented subtly, now the 
court expressly stated that in the case of conflict between the Constitution and 
the ECHR, Russia is not obliged to execute judgments and recommended a 
change in Russian legislation, with which at this point such argumentation was 
not in conformity.  
Therefore, although Russia has voluntarily subjected herself to the juris-
diction of the ECtHR, it no longer agrees to implement judgments when these 
undermine the sovereignty of the Russian Federation or are not in accordance 
with its constitutional norms and underlying values. Valery Zorkin has high-
lighted that the 2015 judgment of the Constitutional Court “reproduces and 
develops the legal position on the supremacy of the Constitution”489 when 
executing ECtHR decisions. Emphasizing the role of the Constitution and some-
what ambiguous constitutional values at the apex of the legal hierarchy in 
Russia has become the new mantra of Russian judges, legal scholars and poli-
ticians. International obligations are accepted only when they fit into Russia’s 
inner framework of constitutional norms and values.  
The 2015 ruling of the Constitutional Court “clearly signifies a change in the 
political attitude towards implementing decisions of the European Court”, as 
vocalized by Maria Smirnova, an expert on Russian constitutional law.490 In its 
2013 and 2015 decisions on the interplay between the Constitution and the 
ECHR in Russia’s legal order, the Constitutional Court as the highest court in 
Russia has demonstrated its outright rejection of international law and standards 
imposed by international bodies when they do not conform to the Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation of Russian constitutional norms and principles. It is also 
remarkable that the Court’s most important conclusions mirrored the opinion of 
the president’s representative to the Constitutional Court, Mikhail Krotov. Con-
sidering the principles of separation of powers and the independence of the 
judiciary, the presence of the president’s representative at the Constitutional 
Court is highly questionable; however, since 1996 this has been the reality in 
Russia.491  
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Valery Zorkin has drawn attention to the double-headed issue that the Con-
stitutional Court needs to fulfil two tasks simultaneously: to harmonize Russia’s 
legal system with international law and to protect Russia’s constitutional 
identity.492 This inevitably is a task that all constitutional courts have to deal 
with. The necessary equilibrium for the Russian Constitutional Court is reflected 
in building Russia’s constitutional identity on the principle of sovereignty, 
leaning away from international standards and, as such, inevitably violating 
previously undertaken international obligations as well as its own constitution 
that explicitly stresses international law as an integral part of Russia’s legal 
system. 493 
As a logical follow-up to the Constitutional Court judgment in December 
2015, mirroring the court’s decision, Russia amended the Law on the Consti-
tutional Court,494 which no longer accepts the binding force of ECtHR judg-
ments and allows the Constitutional Court to declare these judgments unen-
forceable when implementation would be in conflict with the Russian Con-
stitution.495 The amended law empowers the Constitutional Court to decide at 
the request of the relevant federal executive authority (in most cases the 
ministry of justice) whether the decision of an international court, such as the 
ECtHR, should or should not be enforced in Russia.496 The Constitutional Court 
should give its assessment when interpretation of an international treaty given 
by an international human rights protection body such as the ECtHR is pre-
sumably in conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation497.  
The law uses the term “an interstate body for protection of the rights and 
freedoms of a person” (межгосударственный орган по защите прав и свобод 
человека); however, the implicit aim of the law has been to block implemen-
tation of ECtHR case law. If the Constitutional Court decides that an interstate 
body’s ruling is unenforceable due to conflict with the Russian Constitution, 
any action aimed at satisfaction under the relevant decision cannot be per-
formed,498 meaning that the judgment cannot and will not be enforced in Russia. 
The law has been widely criticized for its “all or nothing solution”. The law is 
very black and white: it presumes that the Constitutional Court should declare 
that there either is no conflict between the Constitution and the decision of the 
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ECtHR or, when there is a conflict, Russia should refuse to implement it, as 
conveyed by the Venice Commission.499  
The Amended Law on the Constitutional Court does not provide any measures 
for reconciling domestic law and an ECtHR judgment; instead, the law firmly 
blocks execution as a whole. It also must be noted that using conflict with 
Russian constitutional principles as a justification for refusing to execute ECtHR 
judgments is not a valid argument from the perspective of international law. The 
provisions of a state’s internal law cannot be invoked to justify failure to perform 
the state’s duties, as stated in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.  
The Amended Law on the Constitutional Court has been interpreted as a 
necessary precaution against attempts to exert external pressure on Russia. 
“Indeed, human rights are sovereign, but the state is sovereign too”, argues 
Alexander Manov, an assistant professor at Kutafin Moscow State Law Uni-
versity.500 “Interaction of the European and national legal orders is impossible 
in conditions of subordination”, argues Valery Zorkin.501 In his interpretation, 
the steps taken by the Constitutional Court aspire to safeguard Russia’s interests 
in the complicated relationship with the CoE as especially reflected in ECtHR 
decisions intruding on the national sovereignty of Russia.502 Another way to 
interpret the law is that it was meant to send a clear signal to the ECtHR that the 
Court should not go too far with its interpretations, otherwise Russia would 
refuse to enforce judgments, which in turn would discredit the authority of the 
ECtHR as well as the whole system of the CoE.  
The Amended Law on the Constitutional Court has extensive legal and 
practical implications. Most importantly, it has weakened the position of Russian 
citizens in defending their rights. The law enables the Constitutional Court to 
adopt a position without holding a hearing,503 meaning that only the federal 
authority, which submitted the complaint, has an opportunity to present its 
arguments but the applicant who is obviously affected by the decision to enforce 
or not to enforce the judgment is not heard. When only the federal authority is 
heard and the applicant’s position is formally disregarded, the principle of a fair 
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trial is violated by the state.504 When the constitutional court decides that a 
judgment should not be executed, applicants who have been rewarded with just 
satisfaction by the ECtHR are refused compensation for breach of their rights. 
Although Valery Zorkin has conveyed that the Constitutional Court blocks 
execution of ECtHR judgments only when the protection provided by the Russian 
Constitution is higher than by the ECtHR,505 this does not seem a very plausible 
statement, considering the standards of rights protection in Russia. In any case, 
the ECHR sets forth minimum standards for protecting rights and freedoms, and 
member states are not precluded from ensuring a higher level of protection as 
stated in Article 53 of the ECHR. It is indeed highly unlikely that the ECtHR 
would find a violation if the domestic legal order provided for a higher level of 
protection, as argued by the Venice Commission.506 
Another implication is related to the role of international law in the Russian 
legal system. Under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
states are bound to respect ratified international agreements.507 Considering that 
Article 15(4) of the Russian Constitution clearly acknowledges the binding 
nature of international law and treaty obligations, it can be argued that applying 
the amended Law on the Constitutional Court is itself in conflict with the 
Constitution as well as with Russia’s international treaty obligations. Inter-
national treaties that Russia has joined are the “supreme force in the land” 
according to the Russian Constitution, recalls Dmitry Kochenov, a professor of 
European Union constitutional law at the University of Groningen. 508 It is 
somewhat controversial that when the law aims to defend the Constitution, 
applying the law would violate the Constitution. 509 Moreover, Bill Bowring, a 
professor of international human rights law at the University of London’s Birk-
beck College, shares the position that the law is neither in accordance with the 
Constitution nor with the 1998 law ratifying the European Convention on 
Human Rights.510 The 2015 amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court 
require changing the Russian Constitution, as currently the part regulating the 
powers of the Constitutional Court as well as article 15 establishing the primacy 
of international law are not in accordance with new legislation, claims Iryna 
                                                                          
504  Venice Commission (n 499) paras 85, 101. 
505  ‘Prezident ob’jaznil neobhodimost’ prioriteta Konstitutsionnogo suda nad ESPC’ 
(14 December 2015) Pravo.ru. <http://pravo.ru/news/view/124886/> accessed on 3 December 
2017.  
506  Venice Commission (n 499) para 76. 
507  Ibid para 97. 
508  As cited in Carl Schreck, ‘Russian Law on rejecting human rights courts violates Con-
stitution, experts say’ (16 December 2015 ) Radio Free Europe   
< http://www.rferl.org/content/russian-law-on-rejecting-human-rights-courts-violates-constit
ution-experts-say/27432125.html> accessed 2 December 2017. 
509  Ibid. 
510  Ibid. 
110 
Marchuk.511 Declaring a judgment of the ECtHR unenforceable also clearly 
violates Article 46 of the ECHR, “which is an unequivocal legal obligation and 
includes the obligation for the State to abide by the interpretation and the 
application of the Convention made by the Court in cases brought against it”.512  
The Constitutional Court has used the powers granted by the Amended Law 
on the Constitutional Court to block execution of ECtHR judgments in two 
cases. On 19 April 2016513 the Russian Constitutional Court rejected execution of 
the ECtHR ruling in Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia.514 The Russian Ministry 
of Justice lodged an application with the Constitutional Court to decide whether 
execution of the ECtHR decision pertaining to the question of prisoners’ voting 
rights would be in accordance with the Russian Constitution. The applicants, 
who were convicted criminals, were barred from voting in elections to the State 
Duma and in presidential elections in accordance with Article 32(3) of the 
Russian Constitution. The ECtHR held that such a blanket ban on voting rights 
violated Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR providing for the right to free 
elections. The Constitutional Court held in its 2016 ruling that execution of 
Anchugov and Gladkov is impossible due to conflict with the Russian Con-
stitution. In the court’s interpretation only judgments that are in conformity with 
the Russian constitutional order are enforceable:  
 
Implementation in the legal system of Russia of the Judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights … is admissible, if it conforms to the provisions of the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation, pertaining to the fundamental prin-
ciples of the constitutional order and of the legal status of the individual in 
Russia.515 
 
Evidently, neither the ECtHR nor any other international institution can oblige 
countries to use unconstitutional means for executing judgments. Conflicts 
between national systems and rulings of the ECtHR exist in practice, but a variety 
of solutions are available for reconciling the ECHR with the national constitution 
such as by means of dialogue, interpretation or by reforming national legislation, 
as stressed by the Venice Commission.516 Moreover, a rich variety of methods 
of interpretation are available. Besides, several amicus curiae briefs submitted 
to the Constitutional Court by distinguished Russian lawyers and academics517 
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advised the Constitutional Court to resolve possible conflict through inter-
pretation. They proposed analysing whether a specific method of execution of a 
judgment was in accordance or in conflict with the Constitution.  
In the experts’ view, the possible conflict between Article 3 of Protocol 1 of 
the Convention and Article 32(3) of the Russian Constitution can and should be 
resolved by means of interpretation of this constitutional provision. In their 
assessment, interpretation allows a higher standard to be set for human rights 
protection in harmony with the ECHR. They stressed that in most European 
legal systems interpretation is the primary means for resolving similar conflicts 
and the Russian Constitutional Court itself used this method when it decided to 
establish a moratorium on the death penalty in Russia. In doing so, the Court 
emphasized the special nature of the international obligations Russia had under-
taken when joining the CoE as well as emphasizing the evolution of inter-
national legal standards of human rights.518  
Legal experts from the Institute of Law and Public Policy noted in their 
amicus curiae brief519 that using various means of interpretation such as systemic, 
historical and evolutionary approaches when interpreting Article 32(3) of the 
Russian Constitution and considering the test of proportionality, one can con-
clude that an absolute ban on prisoners’ voting is by far not the only possible 
interpretation of this provision. For example, systemic interpretation allows 
analysis of various mitigating factors in accordance with the principle of pro-
portionality, including guaranteeing the highest level of protection of individual 
rights and freedoms. Historical interpretation shows that the Russian Consti-
tutional Court has previously successfully overcome obstacles between the 
Constitution and international law. Evolutionary interpretation allows conside-
ration of modern trends in international law in interpreting voting rights.  
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However, in this case the Constitutional Court did not take into account the 
suggestions provided in the amicus curiae briefs. The Constitutional Court did 
not analyse whether a particular method of execution would be unconstitutional 
but analysed whether execution per se would be unconstitutional and preferred 
a more literal interpretation of Article 32(3). The Constitutional Court held that 
deriving from the idea of Article 15(1) and 15(4) of the Constitution, Russia 
cannot ratify international treaties that are in conflict with the Constitution. 
Accordingly, the ECtHR cannot cancel the supremacy of the Russian Con-
stitution by providing interpretations that are in conflict with the Russian Con-
stitution and the interpretation provided by the ECtHR clearly violates Article 
32(3) of the Constitution.  
As put by the Constitutional Court: Providing a literal interpretation of 
Article 32(3) of the Constitution, the Court held that execution of the ECtHR 
judgment in Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia would be impossible “so far as 
the prescription of Article 32 (Section 3) of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, having supremacy and supreme legal force in Russia’s legal system, 
with all certainty means an imperative ban, according to which all convicted 
persons serving a sentence in places of deprivation of liberty defined by the 
criminal law have no electoral rights with no exceptions”.520 The Constitutional 
Court’s narrow approach to interpreting the Constitution was criticized by 
various Russian scholars and practitioners. For example, according to Dmitry 
Krasikov, the Head of European and Comparative Law Chair at Saratov State 
Law Academy, the Court arrived at its conclusions based on the linguistic and 
grammatical method of interpretation and subordinated other methods of inter-
pretation fully to this approach, completely omitting the factor of Russia’s inter-
national obligations from its interpretation.521 
The Constitutional Court also emphasized the importance of dialogue and 
respect towards the constitutional identity of member states and warned that 
deviation from the principle of subsidiarity on behalf of the ECtHR can result in 
conflict with the constitutional legislator. As held by the Constitutional Court:  
  
The interaction of the European conventional and the Russian constitutional 
legal orders is impossible in conditions of subordination, so far as only a 
dialogue between different legal systems is a basis for their appropriate 
balance, and the effectiveness of norms of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Russian legal order in many 
respects depends on respect of the European Court of Human Rights for 
national constitutional identity.522  
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Occasionally the Constitutional Court also used softer language towards the 
ECtHR and emphasized the need to find compromises and a fair balance:  
 
Bearing in mind the significance of the system, which judgments of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights form a part of, and for the sake of maintaining its 
appropriate and successful functioning, the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation is ready to search for a lawful compromise, whose bounds are 
outlined by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.523 
 
However, the judgment did not propose any mechanisms for finding a fair 
balance or a compromise. “The Constitutional Court’s line of arguments only 
creates an illusion of evaluating the possibility of interpretation of the Article 
32(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in consistency with the 
ECtHR’s approach”, argues Dmitry Krasikov, the Head of the European and 
Comparative Law Chair at Saratov State Law Academy.524 Krasikov vocally 
criticized the Constitutional Court for its deficiencies in reasoning from the 
standpoint of law and facts, especially considering the Constitutional Court’s 
powerful role in “guiding” the ECtHR’s practice into the Russian legal system. 
As explained by Krasikov, the interpretation provided by the Constitutional 
Court serves as a guideline for developing Russian legislative and law enforce-
ment traditions pertaining also to respect for international law and influences 
research and public discussion on matters of international law, this having very 
wide implications in Russia.525 
The issue of prisoners’ right to vote has also been a source of conflict between 
the United Kingdom and the ECtHR for many years. Over 12 years ago, on 
6 October 2005 the ECtHR delivered a judgment in Hirst v. United Kingdom 
No. 2526 stating that the blanket ban on convicted prisoners voting was contrary 
to Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR. The ECtHR argued that the act banning 
convicted prisoners from voting strips of their Convention right to vote a signi-
ficant category of persons and it does so in a way which is indiscriminate. The 
provision imposes a blanket restriction on all convicted prisoners in prison. It 
applies automatically to such prisoners, irrespective of the length of their 
sentence and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their 
individual circumstances. Such a general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction 
on a vitally important Convention right must be seen as falling outside any 
acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide that margin might be, and as 
being incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.527 
Similarly with Russia, the government of the United Kingdom has so far 
failed to enforce the judgment and to take steps to secure compliance with the 
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ECHR.528 The continued failure to amend the legislation imposing a blanket ban 
on voting has resulted in various other cases in the ECtHR, where the ECtHR 
has reiterated that there had been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the 
ECHR. Whereas certain problems with enforcing the judgments of the ECtHR 
exist in all Member States of the CoE, so far Russia is the only one to adopt 
legislation that expressly allows refusing to execute the ECtHR judgments.  
On 19 January 2017529 the Russian Constitutional Court blocked the enforce-
ment of another ECtHR decision in the case of OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya 
Yukos v. Russia.530 The ECtHR held that Russia had breached Article 6 of the 
ECHR (fair trial) as Yukos shareholders did not have sufficient time to prepare 
their case before the Russian courts. The ECtHR also held that Russia had 
breached Article 1 of Protocol I of the ECHR and obliged Russia to pay an 
unprecedented amount of compensation – 1.8 billion Euros – to ex-shareholders 
of Yukos. 
In its argumentation the Constitutional Court paid considerable attention to 
interpreting the central principles of international law. Inter alia, the Court inter-
preted Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the prin-
ciple of pacta sunt servanda)531 and Article 53532 of the Vienna Convention 
stating that treaties conflicting with jus cogens at the time of conclusion are 
void. The Constitutional Court maintained that according to Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention an international agreement and the interpretation given to it 
by an interstate body (such as the ECtHR) has to be in accordance with the 
constitution of the country that acceded to the treaty. Moreover, the interpretation 
given to a treaty by an interstate body has to be sufficiently concretized and not 
diverge from generally accepted norms of international law (jus cogens). 533 Jus 
cogens norms “undoubtedly include the principles of state sovereignty and non-
interference in the internal affairs of states” as stated by the Constitutional 
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Court534 and that not even the ECtHR can be “an ultimate authority” and derogate 
from jus cogens.535  
In the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, the principle of sovereignty 
is non-derogable and accepted as such by the international community of states 
as a whole as according to the definition of jus cogens provided in Article 53 of 
the Vienna Convention a jus cogens norm “is a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm 
of general international law having the same character.” This is a highly uncon-
ventional interpretation of jus cogens, as no authoritative international courts or 
legal scholars have provided evidence to support this statement. Whereas jus 
cogens norms are in constant evolution536 there is no international consensus 
that the principle of sovereignty should amount to jus cogens.537  
However, there is emerging consensus that the obligation to implement human 
rights without discrimination should be considered jus cogens.538 Although 
sovereignty is an important principle of international law, it is widely 
recognized that the principle of sovereignty is not absolute and can be limited 
inter alia for the protection of human rights. In the words of Iryna Marchuk, the 
interpretation of sovereignty provided by the Constitutional Court “is a mis-
reading of the fundamental principles upon which international law is 
erected”.539 
The Constitutional Court also used Article 46540 of the Vienna Convention 
and argued that when the ECtHR interprets some concept differently from its 
ordinary meaning, or interprets it contrary to the object or purpose of the ECHR 
that is incompatible with the constitutional order, the state in respect of which a 
decision has been made has the right to refuse to execute it as in this case 
execution would go beyond the limits of obligations voluntarily adopted by the 
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state upon ratification of the ECHR. 541 Article 46(1) allows invalidation of a 
state’s consent to be bound by a treaty only if expressing consent to be bound 
by a treaty was in violation of national law when such violation “was manifest 
and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.” Moreover, 
a manifest violation has to be “objectively evident to any State conducting itself 
in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith” (Article 46(2) 
of the Vienna Convention). The Constitutional Court did not explain details of 
this objectively evident violation evident at the time of giving consent to be 
bound by the ECHR. They concluded that: 
 
Accordingly, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights cannot be 
considered binding on the Russian Federation, if the specific provision of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on 
which this decision rests, as a result of the interpretation carried out in 
violation of the general rules of interpretation of treaties, conflicts with the 
provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation that have their basis in 
the international public order and that form the national public order, especially 
in the case of conflict with those [provisions] that are related to the rights and 
freedoms of man and the citizen and with the foundations of the constitutional 
system of Russia. 542 
 
The Court also repeated the position expressed already in its decision of 14 July 
2015 that, as an exception, Russia can refuse to implement a judgment of the 
ECtHR when this is the only way to avoid violating the Russian Constitution. 
Therefore, in the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, when an internatio-
nal treaty violates the principle of sovereignty and/or when the ECtHR has 
interpreted a treaty in a way that Russia could not have foreseen at the time of 
ratifying the ECHR, Russia may derogate from the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda and refuse to execute judgments of ECtHR in accordance with 
Articles 26, 46 and 53 of the Vienna Convention.  
The Constitutional Court also conveyed that it cannot support the inter-
pretation of the ECtHR when the Russian Constitution and the case law of the 
Russian Constitutional Court protects rights and freedoms “more fully in 
comparison with the corresponding provisions of the Convention as interpreted 
by the European Court of Human Rights, considering also the balance with 
rights and freedoms of others (Article 17(3) of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation”.543 The CoE has always welcomed the setting of higher standards in 
national legal systems compared to the standards of the ECHR. However, in this 
case it remains unclear how exactly the Russian Constitution protects rights and 
freedoms “more fully” than the ECHR and why it should automatically rule out 
executing judgments of the ECtHR.  
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In its subsequent argumentation the Constitutional Court contended rather 
oddly that paying compensation to Yukos shareholders would in essence be 
immoral and unfair. The Constitutional Court explained that the Yukos Company 
“used sophisticated illegal schemes, manifested itself as a malicious defaulter of 
taxes and ceased its existence, leaving a substantial outstanding debt” and these 
actions by the company had a destructive effect on the legal order and prevented 
stabilization of the constitutional-legal regime and public order in Russia. The 
Constitutional Court argued that paying considerable compensation to the 
former shareholders of the company who used illegal schemes of tax evasion 
and “avoided making huge amounts of tax payments needed for fulfilment of 
public services to all citizens in order to overcome a financial and economic 
crisis, contradicts constitutional principles of equality and fairness in tax 
matters”.544 
Considering that equality and fairness in tax matters are not Russian 
constitutional principles but are regulated in the Russian Tax Code it seems as if 
the Constitutional Court had difficulties with finding well-founded arguments to 
demonstrate that execution of the ECtHR judgment indeed violated the 
constitution. As noted by Iryna Marchuk, an associate professor at the Faculty 
of Law at the University of Copenhagen, with this judgment the Constitutional 
Court elevated the Tax Code to constitutional law status and “construed by 
means of invoking overly broad and abstract principles of equality and fairness 
in the matters of taxation.” 545  
Also in this case, experts from the Institute for Law and Public Policy sub-
mitted a thorough and a well-argued amicus curiae brief to the Constitutional 
Court, where they found that paying just satisfaction to YUKOS shareholders is 
a constitutionally permissible way to enforce the judgment in OAO Neftyanaya 
Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia. The payment of just satisfaction for the violation 
of the ECHR “resulting from the unlawful acts and decisions by domestic 
authorities, not only does not contradict but rather directly follows from the 
general principles of the relationship between the Russian Constitution and the 
ECHR judgments” as noted in the amicus curiae brief.546 
Experts from the Institute for Law and Public Policy explained that Russian 
Constitution does not prohibit ECtHR from awarding just satisfaction to victims 
whose rights guaranteed under an international treaty have been violated or 
from determining the procedure for paying just satisfaction. They also noted 
that Constitutional Court has previously held that within the meaning of the 
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provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing the effective judicial protection of 
everyone’s rights and freedoms, “the final judgments of the ECtHR, including 
the award of just satisfaction, must be complied with.”547As argued in the amicus 
curiae brief, the ECtHR judgment in OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. 
Russia “does not contradict the fundamentals of Russia’s constitutional system 
and constitutional legal framework”.548 The violation of the ECHR did not result 
from Russia’s constitutional or other legislative provisions, but from unlawful 
actions and decisions of Russian domestic authorities.549 It was explained that 
the Russian Federation can choose any of the options of just satisfaction within 
the boundaries provided in para 2(a) and 2 (b) of the said judgment.550 Whereas 
the majority of the Constitutional Court did not find the arguments of the amicus 
curiae brief to be convincing enough, it must be noted that judges Konstantin 
Aranovskiy and Vladimir Yaroslavtsev issued dissenting opinions (added to the 
decision of the Constitutional Court) that reflect many of the positions provided 
in the amicus curiae brief.  
During more than twenty years, Russian courts have interpreted and applied 
the provisions of international law in their judgments. The Constitutional Court 
has had a leading role in interpreting and implementing the judgments of the 
ECtHR and in defining the role of the ECtHR in Russia’s legal system.  
As put by Sergey Marochkin:  
 
During twenty years of Russia’s participation in the Strasbourg system, practice 
and views regarding human rights in the country have changed radically. In 
1996 the country joined the European human rights system and in 1998 put 
itself under international jurisdiction for the first time in its history. People 
now had an unprecedented opportunity to defend their rights against the state. 
From this perspective, such participation has been a success.551 
 
According to Marochkin, in most cases the Russian Constitutional Court has 
correctly referred to the judgments of the ECtHR judgments and has had a key 
role in implementing the ECtHR judgments in Russia. Generally the Consti-
tutional Court has been aimed at remedying the situation in line with Strasbourg 
law.552 Overall, the attitude towards the ECHR has been very diverse in the 
Russian legal community: 
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A significant part of researchers, experts, analysts, observers, judges from the 
Russian CC and other courts, as well as lawyers are in favor of strict adherence 
to international obligations, no matter how unpleasant this may be for the 
political and financial image of the country; the prevailing ‘tune’ is to keep 
Russia in the European legal field and to ensure the ‘duet’ of the two Courts. In 
comparison with this, on the political flank, predominant spirits are in favor of 
upholding national interests, sovereignty, non-interference by the ECtHR in 
domestic matters. Official and political statements about the Courts are more 
politicized and partisan. At a high official level, the possibility of leaving the 
ECtHR’s jurisdiction has even been suggested. The prevalence of the ‘party in 
power’ over the ‘rule of law’ principle is obvious. 553 
 
In Marochkin’s assessment, amending the law on the Constitutional Court and 
the latest case law interpreting the interplay of the ECHR and Russian Con-
stitution, “clearly reflect political motives. They demonstrate an unwillingness 
to be open, to delegate some powers to international bodies, as stated in the 
Constitution, and ‘rollback’ in pursuit of former self-sufficiency.”554 He argues 
that the Constitutional Court has reversed from the approach of cooperation bet-
ween the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR to contrasting the Constitutional 
Court and the ECtHR and to emphasizing the superiority of the Constitutional 
Court. These steps do not demonstrate “a dialogue or a duet with the ECtHR but 
rather a confrontation, fitting into the chain of political measures as well as legal 
ones.”555 
However, he concludes with the positive note, arguing that “nevertheless, a 
cumulative assessment of long-term participation practice in the European 
system and the interaction between the two Courts does not so far give grounds 
to speak of an overwhelming desire for a break or to walk out on Strasbourg 
law.” 556 
The legislation and the case law of the Constitutional Court analysed above 
demonstrates that the interpretation concerning the interplay between the Russian 
Constitution and the ECHR has changed considerably during past twenty years. 
Whereas ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR has had a profound impact on 
Russian legal system and state practice, currently Russian legislation and the 
Constitutional Court no longer acknowledge the binding force of ECtHR 
judgments. This is in clear conflict with the previous interpretations of the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court as well as with international obli-
gations that Russia has undertaken.  
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3.3. The role and interpretation of human rights  
in the Russian Constitution  
Article 2 of the Russian Constitution stipulates, “Man, his rights and freedoms 
are the supreme value. The recognition, observance and protection of the rights 
and freedoms of man and citizen shall be the obligation of the State”. Whereas 
pursuant to Article 2 of the Constitution man, his rights and freedoms are “the 
supreme value”, this Article has given rise to highly controversial debates about 
the role and meaning of human rights in the Russian Constitution.  
The Russian Constitution also enshrines the principle of ideological plura-
lism in Article 13: “In the Russian Federation ideological diversity shall be 
recognized…No ideology may be established as state or obligatory”, as 
stipulated in article 13.557 Valery Zorkin has argued that drafting such an article 
was aimed at defending pluralism of opinions, attitudes, and doctrines, to 
separate the state’s integrity from ideological dictates.558 Constitutional recog-
nition of political pluralism was a direct response to the ideological monism 
prevalent in Soviet constitutions. Soviet power implanted ideological monism 
into all walks of Soviet life. All Soviet constitutions echoed the spirit of Marxist-
Leninist ideology and featured a direct relationship with the worldview of the 
ruling party. “Scientific communism” was the official and the only acceptable 
ideology.559 The ideology of Marxism in the USSR was entirely statist and 
illiberal, an approach that also characterized the attitude towards international 
law, including human rights law.560  
According to Soviet legal scholarship it was impossible to guarantee rights 
and freedoms that were not in accordance with the aims of building communism. 
Restricting rights and freedoms was considered to be necessary to protect 
society against abuse of rights and freedoms detrimental to the state and 
society.561 The individual had to serve the state and society and to contribute to 
building communism as the state ideology. Hence, the approach of the 1993 
Constitution was a sharp U-turn in terms of its approach to ideology and to 
human rights. Neutrality in respect of the ruling parties and establishing the 
legal foundation for political pluralism brought the 1993 Constitution close to 
the constitutions of modern democratic states.  
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The Russian Constitution, like any other constitution, contains a system of 
constitutional values, which, depending on the specific historical and social 
preconditions, can line up hierarchically, argues Orest Martyshin, Professor of 
Constitutional Law at Kutafin Moscow State Law University.562 Constitutions 
inevitably enshrine conflicting values and finding the right balance point bet-
ween those values is an everlasting issue of debate in all societies. Martyshin 
posits that in Russia there are two “excesses” of constitutional values trying to be 
“absolute” principles: the priority of human rights and (ultra-) conservatism.563  
These two approaches have also been described in terms of person-centred 
and system-centred worldviews. The person-centred worldview highlights the 
paramount importance of human rights and treats “the common good” as a pre-
condition for the realization of human rights. In the system-centred worldview, 
in contrast, “the common good” dominates over the individual, explains Valen-
tina Lapaeva, a senior scholar from the Institute of State and Law of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences.564 Scholars supporting the system-centred approach rely 
on the limitations deriving from Article 55(3) of the Constitution stipulating: 
“The rights and freedoms of man and the citizen may be limited by federal law 
only to the extent necessary for protecting the fundamental principles of the 
constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of other 
people, for ensuring the defense of the country and the security of the State”.  
Professor Yelena Lukyanova from National Research University Higher 
School of Economics, and a fierce opponent of Valery Zorkin, also claims that 
in Russia there are two legal communities, which speak quite different lan-
guages and have diametrically different understanding of rule of law and human 
rights. One community is composed of officials, judges and parliamentarians, 
members of election commissions and law enforcement officers. Others are 
lawyers, human rights activists and some independent scientists. Whereas there 
are highly professional independent experts in the field of law, as a rule they 
have little impact on the level of the state, argues Yelena Lukyanova.565  
Valentina Lapaeva argues that the adoption of the Constitution was an 
important step in the movement towards freedom in its normative (human rights) 
and institutional (democracy based on rule of law) forms as the person-centred 
orientation of government’s legal policy was normatively consolidated in the 
Constitution.566 In 1998 Valery Zorkin expressed that the Constitution had 
become a systematic legal expression of the basic political values that define the 
“face of the new Russia”: the rights and freedoms of man and the citizen, 
democracy, federalism, rule of law, the social state, separation of powers, 
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parliamentarism.567 He argued that adopting the new Constitution in 1993 was a 
transition to an entirely new phase of development for Russia, where man with 
his rights and freedoms was placed at the centre of the political system and 
declared “Today we can say with certainty that over the past ten years there 
have been fundamental changes in the legal conscience of Russians. Society is 
beginning to learn the basic values of democracy and the rule of law”568. He 
emphasized the development towards a liberal, open and democratic society and 
noted that the Constitution and its interpretation by the Constitutional Court 
must ensure Russia’s integration into the “open world”. He argued that Russia 
had no future if it did not fit into the world community, setting European stan-
dards as a model. In his assessment, European standards of rights and freedoms 
would change the whole national legal culture; however, this would take a long 
time.569 
Valentina Lapaeva argues that the basic vector for modern political and legal 
development in Russia is the transition from a system-centred type of arrange-
ment of society, traditional to a country in which individual freedom is domi-
nated by the government, to a person-centred model of society, based on the 
principle of priority of human rights and freedoms. She claims that “with all the 
inherent difficulties and contradictions, our society’s movement towards freedom 
is following a historically predetermined logic of post-Soviet socio-economic 
transformation and objective processes of globalization, dictating the need for 
universalization of national policies and legal systems based on the civili-
zational achievements of Western democracies.”570 Implicit references to the 
ideas of Francis Fukuyama can be recognized in her argumentation. However, 
the roots of this line of thought can also be found among Russian philosophers. 
For example, the 19th century Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov argued:  
 
Human community consistently aspires to become a free association of indi-
viduals…The aspiration of the individual to self-affirmation and to sheer libe-
ration from the primitive unity of the clan remains a universal and indisputable 
fact…Freedom is the foundation of all human existence …In the absence of indi-
vidual freedom, human dignity and higher moral development are impossible.571  
 
However, overall there is widespread opposition amongst Russian scholars to the 
idea of human rights and freedoms as the “supreme value”. Such criticism 
became apparent after the initial optimism of the 1990s, also entailing that 
support for the Western model of democratic government and democratic values 
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evaporated. The representatives of the conservative school argue that whereas 
the drafters of the Constitution set a goal to lift the text of the Constitution to 
the level of world standards of liberalism, these liberal ideas had little to do with 
Russia and hence should be dropped. In the early 1990’s the idea of world 
standards of constitutional law, expressing universal human values and the idea 
of “civilized nations” – referring to the democratic liberal states of the West – 
were popular. However, they never materialized in Russia, as argued by Orest 
Martyshin. He claims that this is due to the fact that Russia and the West are 
fundamentally different. Liberal democracy has a long tradition in the West and 
it has become an integral part of the national consciousness in Western countries, 
but not in Russia.572 In his view a great discrepancy exists between the ideology 
aimed at by the drafters of the Constitution and reality.  
According to Martyshin’s interpretation, the proclaimed principles of human 
rights in the Russian Constitution “are of programmatic character” and that the 
thesis that “Man, his rights and freedoms are of the highest value” is only a kind 
of an ideal benchmark, far from current social realities. 573 The Russian people 
have met the claim that Russia should move towards freedom and other liberal 
concepts with “strong internal resistance”, as presented by Martyshin. He 
asserts that although ideals are important guidelines for a constitution, “the 
constitution must be in accordance with reality, because the constitution should 
not only be a document setting purposes, but a working document”.574 According 
to this understanding, when a country for whatever reasons is not able to stand 
up to the principles and standards established in its constitution, those principles 
and standards should be dismissed and interpreted more as idealistic goals 
rather than legal norms giving rise to legal obligations.  
Besides, Valery Zorkin now views liberal values as not compatible with the 
Constitution and considers any influence from Western democracies as a threat 
to Russian sovereignty.575 Recently Zorkin conveyed that talking about the 
dilemma between rights and freedoms and national security was meaningless, as 
security is one of most important human rights. Therefore, the state should be 
able to restrict other freedoms and to transform the legal system in accordance 
with security needs especially in the complicated security situation that Russia 
is currently facing. 576 Orest Martyshin has clearly stated that the idea of human 
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rights as a priority in Russian Constitution is fallacious. 577 He argues that the 
human rights-centred position has received “a distinctive, though not a literal 
and a rather softened expression” in Article 2 of the Constitution and that the 
reality of a system-centred society simply cannot be questioned in Russia. “A 
person-centred society is not only problematic, but it is simply fundamentally 
not feasible… Any society is a union of people. It is centripetal and not centri-
fugal… A society whose members possessed complete freedom would be an 
anarchic utopia.”578 Such claims are evidently directed at belittling the role of 
human rights in the Russian Constitution and its value-basis as well as under-
mining the whole idea of protecting individual rights and freedoms. Arguments 
labelling the idea of protection of human rights in the Russian Constitution as 
“false” and in other ways problematic also mirror the official rhetoric of the 
Russian authorities.  
Conservative legal scholars tend to be highly critical of liberal scholars and 
practitioners advocating human rights. Liberal scholars are often accused of in-
competence, stupidity, treason, extremism and other misdoings. Advocating 
universal human rights and international standards is considered to be “charac-
teristic of certain social circles”579 in Russia, implying that those social circles 
are not mainstream and do not have good reputation among mainstream scho-
lars and practitioners. Orest Martyshin claims that Russian liberal scholars’ 
slogans of the priority of human rights indicate a wrongful and naïve under-
standing of liberalism and global standards of post-totalitarian consciousness.580 
In his view the priority of human rights is not a global standard of democracy or 
of liberalism and that Russian liberal scholars have misunderstood the true 
meaning of these concepts by giving them “a wrong, libertarian interpretation”.581 
In Martyshin’s view, Russian liberalism “is a product of a sick political con-
sciousness, brought up by totalitarianism, built on its denial and unable to move 
beyond opposites…if totalitarianism sacrifices a person for the sake of a state, 
then the post-totalitarian Russian “liberasts” offer another extreme: they are 
ready to sacrifice the state for the sake of a person.”582  
It is evident that some Russian legal scholars interpret the concepts and 
principles of international relations and international law in their own distinct 
way that is often not in accordance with Western understandings of those con-
cepts. For example, in the interpretation of Orest Martyshin, liberalism, formed 
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over centuries in “civilized countries”, avoids extremes, is meant to synthesize 
personal and social interests, and ensures that in case of conflict the public 
interest prevails over personal interests. He concludes that society should always 
take priority over individual interests and that this principle is fully consistent 
with international standards such as Article 29 (2)583 of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights (UDHR).584 Surely a claim that, in case of conflict, 
limitations protecting the common good should overshadow an individual’s 
right or freedom is unfounded. Obviously no individual right is absolute and 
Article 29(2) of the UDHR sets limits on exercising individual rights, but those 
limitations are not outright exceptions from rights: limitations cannot over-
shadow the right itself.585  
Another claim demonstrating derogation from human rights as the central 
value of the Constitution is the requirement that Russia should clarify its ideo-
logical foundations based on its own national and historical characteristics and 
abandon treating the experience of “civilized nations” as an absolute, “especially 
in its naive sense” as put by Martyshin.586 In addition to values and principles 
expressly mentioned in the Constitution, conservative scholars emphasize 
implicitly expressed values such as patriotism or traditional values and skilfully 
tie such concepts with the “underlying meaning” of the Constitution. They argue 
that the phenomenon of constitutional ideology is much broader than just law, 
that it cannot be found from precise provisions of the Constitution and also 
includes the spirit, traditions and values that all contribute to the normative 
content of the existing legal environment.  
For example, Gadis Gadziev, a justice of the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation and one of the authors of the Law on the Constitutional 
Court, argues that the Constitution is sometimes criticised for enshrining selfish 
personal rights and overlooking common interests. For him this is not proble-
matic, as he claims that the focus of the Constitution is not on human rights. 
Gadziev emphasizes that the preamble to the Constitution establishes both 
human rights and freedoms, but also “civic peace and accord”. Gadziev argues 
that a country based on the rule of law has to ensure that the freedom of one 
person is united to the freedoms shared by everyone. This includes respect for 
traditions, especially the tradition of patriotism, which he considers to be one of 
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the most important traditions.587 The preamble to the Constitution highlights 
“reviving the sovereign statehood of Russia and asserting the firmness of its 
democratic basis” and “honouring the memory of ancestors who have conveyed 
to us the love for the Fatherland, belief in goodness and justice.” Justice Gadziev 
praises these lines as his favourites in the Constitution, as in his interpretation 
these lines reflect the ideology of constitutional patriotism.588  
Sergey Horunzhi posits that – based on the text and the idea of Constitutional 
norms – we can speak of a minimum of patriotic, social, democratic and legal 
ideological foundations of our country.589 Nikolay Bondar, another justice of the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, distinguishes three dimensions 
of constitutional values in modern constitutionalism: 1) the value of the consti-
tution itself; 2) values enshrined in the norms and institutions of the consti-
tution; 3) implicitly expressed constitutional values deriving from practical con-
stitutional-judicial axiology.590 The spiritual, non-normative basis of consti-
tutional values is vastly emphasized. It is argued that the spiritual basis of 
constitutional values derives from combining the interests of the individual and 
the interests of society. It is emphasized that the civilizational identity of 
Russia, Russian politics and political culture are related to the Byzantine 
tradition. In particular this applies to the idea of a universal hierarchical order, 
where a single individual is included in the collective structure, which forms 
part of a higher, divine cosmic order and traditionally formed priority of the 
collective interest over individual interests.591  
Besides, religious arguments are increasingly popular in interpreting the 
underlying values of the Russian Constitution, notwithstanding that according 
to Article 14 of the Constitution Russia is a secular state. Although Russian 
society is to a large degree secularized, religion still exercises considerable 
influence on the values of the Russian people.592 According to the position of 
the Russian Orthodox Church, redemption from sin is the ultimate goal for 
humans and in the Church’s view the interpretation of human rights should also 
stem from this goal. The Orthodox Church contrasts the “egoistic” rationality of 
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human rights with self-sacrifice, the ultimate (Orthodox) Christian value.593 
“Instead of discussing human rights in terms of the state’s responsibility to 
respect and protect people, the Church chooses to elaborate on human rights in 
terms of personal morality and salvation. Instead of looking for mechanisms to 
protect human beings from the institutional abuse of power, the Church worries 
that people become egoistic when using the rationality of human rights”, 
explains Namli.594  
Orthodox believers have a negative perception of an ideologically neutral 
state, aimed at modernization and democratization, associated with ideals and 
expectations formed in the previous century. According to their standpoint, the 
secular basis for public morality is unacceptable, as are rational democratic 
principles of the state apparatus and legitimation of power.595 Such trends have 
received incarnation in the works of authors declaring themselves to be re-
presentatives of “Russian protective political and legal thought”596. They argue, 
for example, that “ideals of rule of law, individual freedoms, the prevalence of 
law as a means of social control are spiritually emasculated, in a civilizational 
sense destructive and suitable for spiritual and cultural conditions exclusively in 
Europe” and they find it is necessary for Russia to overcome the evil of Western 
culture with the help of conservative thinkers.597 Their position is that, as the 
order for organizing a state is derived from the Kingdom of God, the only 
possible form of government is Orthodox and absolute monarchy.598 
In the interpretation of conservative scholars, when analysing the relation-
ship between Articles 2 and 55(3) of the Constitution, either there is no one 
“higher value” or the existence of “even higher values” as listed in Article 55(3) 
must be assumed.599 The liberal approach derives from the position according to 
which: whereas rights and freedoms inevitably impose mutual limitations on 
each other, the starting point for finding a balance between them should be 
human rights “especially in light of the effort to build Russian civil society on 
constitutional principles of democracy and a law-bound state, in which human 
rights are proclaimed to be the primary value.”600 Valentina Lapaeva also 
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emphasizes the need to find a proportionate balance between the protection of 
rights and freedoms and protection of morality or other constitutional values 
enshrined in Article 55(3), as only such an approach adequately fits into a 
systematic analysis of the Constitution.601  
Lapaeva has criticized Russian courts for carelessly, without proper legal 
analysis, concluding that restricting rights and freedoms was necessary for pro-
tecting the constitutional values listed in Article 55(3) of the Constitution. She 
explains that the courts should also analyse the consequences when human 
rights and freedoms as constitutional values are not properly protected. While 
discussing the aspect of proportionality, the courts should convincingly demon-
strate that the protection of relevant constitutional values is impossible without 
restricting the right or a freedom of a person.602 The Supreme Court has estab-
lished that the courts should always substantiate the necessity for restriction of 
human rights and freedoms based on established factual circumstances. The 
courts can conclude that a restriction is justified only when there are relevant 
and sufficient grounds for such restriction, as well as if the balance between the 
lawful interests of the person whose rights and freedoms are restricted and the 
lawful interests of other persons, the state and society, is preserved.603 
Some Russian constitutional law scholars have taken a more moderate posi-
tion and seek to conciliate the two approaches to interpreting the Constitution: 
the West-looking pro-human rights school and the statist, anti-Western school. 
As explained by Sergey Belov, a constitutional law professor from St Peters-
burg State University, norms on human rights in constitutional texts and inter-
national treaties, although textually similar, are interpreted not in abstracto but 
under the influence of national constitutional values, in the context of specific 
national constitutional systems. He explains that there is no universality in a 
constitutional court’s approaches to human rights and freedoms even in cul-
turally relatively similar European countries. According to Belov it is important 
to analyse the diverse experience of constitutional systems and identify the 
special features of those systems. If we want to move towards universal con-
stitutionalism, this can be born only “as a result of the dialogue of constitutional 
systems, rather than the imposition on national constitutional jurisdictions of 
those approaches that have been developed in the practice of certain states and 
are seen as fundamentally unacceptable in other states”.604 
In the view of Yelena Lukyanova, the Constitution lays out the value sys-
temic meaning of the activities of all state institutions defines their goals and 
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objectives and outlines the limits of interference in the life of man and society. 
“These goals, meanings and limits coincide with their international and European 
reading. Only it is hardly possible to call this constitutional choice Western. It is 
universal. But if someone likes to call it Western, let it be Western.” She also 
points out “if we recognize the priority and inviolability of the current Russian 
Constitution – we do not have an object for a dispute over values. We have a 
direct constitutional duty to follow the prescriptions that have the highest legal 
force.”605 
 
 
3.4. Consequences of changed interpretations  
As highlighted in Section 1.4.1 of this study, compliance with the ECHR can 
happen only when its norms are incorporated in the national legal order and are 
enforceable. This is the second major precondition for compliance with inter-
national human rights treaties. In this chapter I have examined how the ECHR 
has been incorporated into the Russian legal order. I have analysed the construal 
and domestic treatment of human rights in legislation, in the practice of the 
Constitutional Court and in Russian legal scholarship. I have focused on the 
interplay between international human rights law and the Russian Constitution, 
relying on relevant legislation and the case law of the Constitutional Court as 
well as interpretations by Russian constitutional law scholars. 
I found that the case law of the Russian Constitutional Court allowing 
execution of ECtHR judgments to be blocked and the amendments to the law on 
the Constitutional Court are important obstacles hindering compliance with the 
ECHR. CoE member states are obliged to enforce ECtHR judgments. In my 
view the ECHR is not effectively incorporated into the Russian legal order, as is 
also demonstrated by the method of “cherry-picking” used for enforcing the 
judgments of the ECtHR. À la carte compliance with ECtHR judgments backed 
by the Russian Constitutional Court threatens the effective functioning of the 
ECHR framework as well as further impeding dialogue between Russia and the 
CoE.  
Whereas Article 15 of the Constitution highlights the priority of international 
law over national law, such priority has not become a legal reality in Russia. 
Instead, the position of international law is contingent on approval by the Con-
stitutional Court. Implementation of international agreements can be refused 
when they are not in accordance with the interpretation of the Constitutional 
Court. By refusing to enforce the judgments of the ECtHR – mainly on the 
grounds of sovereignty – the Constitutional Court has restricted protection of 
the rights and freedoms deriving from the ECHR for Russian citizens. As a 
result, enforcing the ECHR in Russia is clearly limited and to a great extent 
depends on the political sensitivity of the case.  
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On the one hand, Russia has a modern, human rights-centred constitution 
enshrining that man, his rights and freedoms are the supreme value and that 
protecting those rights and freedoms is the obligation of the state. When the 
Constitution was adopted, many leading scholars and judges could second that 
idea. However, more than twenty years have passed since adoption of the Con-
stitution and the liberal, human rights-centred approach has gradually been 
substituted by the system-centred and vocally anti-human rights and anti-liberal 
interpretation of the Constitution by many scholars. There are two opposing 
approaches to interpreting constitutional values in Russia: the liberal, human 
rights-centred school and the conservative, traditional values-centred school and 
currently the conservative school is clearly dominant. Lauri Mälksoo has noted 
in the context of international law scholars that there are “statist” and “pro-
human rights” schools of international law: “[t]he statist school talks about “is” 
and the pro-human rights school about “ought” – an alternative vision of what 
Russia could have become like – but did not”.606 As demonstrated above, the 
same pattern is applicable in the case of constitutional law scholars. The drafters 
of the Constitution belonged to the latter group: they had a liberal approach 
emphasizing human rights as the highest value. That approach was initially very 
popular in Russia and many prominent authorities, including Valery Zorkin, the 
head of the Constitutional Court, supported it. 
“The Constitution, as acknowledged by virtually all reputable legal scholars, 
fully complies with the best democratic standards in the world”, proudly pro-
claimed Valery Zorkin, when the Constitution had been in force for ten years.607 
Yet, now as the Constitution will soon be celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversary, 
the views of the head of the Constitutional Court have taken a U-turn. Zorkin 
now views liberal values as not compatible with the Constitution and considers 
any influence from Western democracies as a threat to Russian sovereignty.608 
Recently Zorkin conveyed that talking about the dilemma between rights and 
freedoms and national security is meaningless, as security is one of the main 
human rights. Therefore, the state should be able to restrict other freedoms and 
to transform the legal system in accordance with security needs especially in the 
complicated security situation that Russia is currently facing.609 
Overall, since the beginning of the 21st century Russia has experienced a re-
orientation in terms of ideology and values: from “universal standards” towards 
national traditions, from liberalism towards conservatism.610 Although the text 
of the Constitution has remained the same, the interpretation of the Constitution 
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has changed considerably during that time. Despite initial optimism regarding 
respect for individual rights and freedoms, currently the system-centred, con-
servative approach, which denies the principle of human rights as the highest 
value, dominates interpretation of the Constitution. This approach emphasizes 
collective values, patriotism and religious norms as the core values of the Con-
stitution and constitutional ideology. Supporters of this conservative approach 
agree that restricting civil and political rights such as freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly and freedom of association is justified, if it helps to 
protect religious values, morality and other traditional values. The conservative 
school is also focused on belittling the meaning of Article 2 of the Constitution 
and demeaning and de-humanizing messages from liberal scholars and human 
rights activists.  
Leading legal authorities such as Valery Zorkin argue that liberal values are 
not compatible with the Russian Constitution and that any influence from 
Western democracies is a threat to Russian sovereignty. Majority of legal 
scholars argue that protecting human rights and freedoms as the highest value of 
the Constitution is false and in other ways problematic. The Constitutional 
Court has been criticized by some liberal voices for its failure to establish a pro-
portionate balance between protection of rights and freedoms and protection of 
morality and other constitutional values enshrined in Article 55(3) of the Russian 
Constitution. According to this criticism, the courts often conclude that restric-
ting rights and freedoms is necessary for protecting the constitutional values 
listed in Article 55(3) of the Constitution without proper analysis and use of the 
principle of proportionality. 
Widespread confrontation with human rights became especially evident when 
the initial optimism of the 1990s evaporated and, instead of the expected progress, 
chaos was still prevalent in many walks of life. The idea – that although the 
drafters of the Constitution aimed to lift the text of the Constitution to the level 
of world standards of liberalism and Russia was on its way to joining the club of 
“civilized nations”, these standards have never had anything to do with Russia 
and should be dropped – is clearly more prevalent than the claim of human 
rights as the supreme value. There is an emerging consensus among mainstream 
scholars that Russia should not try to mimic Western standards while inter-
preting its Constitution, nor in any other field. They argue that moving towards 
a freer society has encountered strong internal resistance in Russia and the Con-
stitution should be interpreted in accordance with local realities rather than a set 
of idealistic standards, which are unsuitable and unacceptable in Russia.611  
Although Russia is a secular state, the Russian Orthodox Church has a vast 
influence on the interpretation of constitutional values in Russia. The Orthodox 
Church emphasizes that the Russian legal system should have a firm ideological 
basis and this basis should be in accordance with the viewpoints of the 
Orthodox Church. Pursuant to Article 2 of the Constitution, it is the obligation 
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of the state to protect the rights and freedoms of its people. However, the 
Russian Orthodox Church has chosen to elaborate on human rights not in terms 
of the state’s obligations to protect people from institutional abuse of power but 
from the perspective of personal morality and salvation. According to the 
position of the Russian Orthodox Church, interpretation of human rights should 
stem from the goal of “redemption from sin”. In the Church’s view, human rights 
are associated with “egoistic” rationality, which is a reflection of individualist 
Protestantism and reformist Jewish thought, whereas in Russian society the 
ultimate (Orthodox) Christian value at the top of hierarchy of all values is self-
sacrifice. The Russian Orthodox Church focuses its attention on criticizing people 
for wanting to protect their egoistic motives rather than on the duty of the state 
to fulfil its constitutional obligations.  
In the view of the Russian Orthodox Church, the rule of law, human rights 
and democratic principles are “spiritually emasculated”, destructive and suitable 
only in Europe, whereas Russia should overcome these evils of Western culture 
with the help of conservative thinkers and the spiritual guidance of the Russian 
Orthodox Church.612 The Orthodox Church construes human rights through its 
own specific lens and has gathered its approach to human rights in the Orthodox 
Declaration of Human Rights.613 Thus, the Church in Russia is actively inter-
preting legal texts related to human rights and is developing its own compi-
lations of human rights based on the ideology of the Russian Orthodox Church.  
Eliminating state ideology and respecting the principle of ideological diversity 
enshrined in Article 13 of the Constitution has been associated with various 
problems in Russian society by legal authorities as well as religious leaders. Calls 
for clear guidance on values have increased. The Russian Orthodox Church as 
an institution is willing to provide such guidance. However, the Russian Orthodox 
Church does not support the idea of an ideologically neutral state. Its standpoint 
is that rational democracy, the rule of law and the principle of a secular state are 
an unacceptable basis for public morality.  
Lauri Mälksoo has noted that the “otherness” of the West characterizes 
Russian legal scholarship on international law. There is a sharp distinction 
between the “native” (domestic, local, national ) and “foreign” or “Western”614 
understandings of international law and its role, mirroring the differentiation 
between “socialist” and “bourgeois” in Soviet academic works. A separate “epi-
stemological community” of international law scholars which is speaking and 
publishing in Russian is largely isolated from Western international law scholar-
ship.615 Neglecting Western influences and focusing on inward-looking pers-
pectives can “act as protective castles” for Russian scholars. Mälksoo argues that 
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this is largely a political matter, related to issues of Russia’s autonomy and 
independence.616 The trend to neglect approaches characterized as “Western” is 
also visible in other fields in academia. Controversies between different 
approaches are “translated into the epistemological domain, leading to a totally 
counterproductive assertion that “Western” science is unable to understand 
Russia’s specificity”, argue Andrey Makarychev and Viatcheslav Morozov.617 
My research on interpretations of Russian constitutional law confirms the sharp 
distinction between “native” and “Western” and the prevalent tendency to neglect 
everything related to “Western” in Russian legal scholarship as well as in the 
overall functioning of the legal system, its institutions and most importantly, in 
the process of adjudication. 
Whereas Article 15 of the Constitution highlights the priority of international 
law over national law, this priority has not become a legal reality in Russia. My 
research on the recent practice of the Russian Constitutional Court confirms the 
finding of Anna Jonsson Cornell that Russian courts “employ methods of 
constitutional interpretation that directly restrict the impact of European human 
rights on Russian law and hence individuals’ rights protection”.618  
In its recent judgments, the Constitutional Court has established that despite 
what is written in article 15 of the Constitution, the position of international law 
is contingent on approval by the Constitutional Court. In the interpretation of 
the Constitutional Court, any international agreement that does not comply with 
the Constitution of the Russian Federation as interpreted by the Constitutional 
Court can be challenged and refused implementation. This approach can “lead 
to the lack of predictability at the international level as to whether Russia, as a 
party to any treaty, will honour its obligations under international law”619 as 
pointed out by Iryna Marchuk. Russian lawyer Sergei Golubok predicts “An 
open and flagrant refusal by the highest domestic court to fulfil obligations 
under the Convention is jeopardizing international legal cooperation among 
European countries, such as the recognition and enforcement of Russian court 
decisions abroad”.620  
The positions established by the Constitutional Court vis-à-vis ECtHR judg-
ments can be described as “yet another example of the application of inter-
national law à la carte”.621 Although neither the Russian Constitution nor 
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Article 46 of the ECHR allow for “cherry-picking” in implementing international 
law and enforcing ECtHR judgments, the case law of the Constitutional Court as 
well as the amended law on the Constitutional Court suggest that such cherry-
picking is a reality. The case law of the Constitutional Court that in effect 
blocks execution of ECtHR judgments and the amendments to the Law on the 
Constitutional Court have potentially far-reaching implications for the Russian 
legal order, for the level of protecting rights and freedoms, for attitudes in 
Russian society and for the relationship between Russia and the CoE. 
The amendments to the law on the Constitutional Court and preceding 
decisions of the Constitutional Court carry a strong ideological message to both 
internal and external audiences. Firstly, protecting human rights is interpreted as 
a Western influence that has to be avoided. Secondly, the principle of 
sovereignty is indisputably set at the apex of the hierarchy of legal principles. 
The principle of sovereignty is the main guiding principle behind the amended 
law on the Constitutional Court and the case law of the Constitutional Court that 
inspired these amendments. “Whereas in the interpretation of most Western 
scholars the balance point between state sovereignty and human rights has 
inclined towards human rights, in Russia the principle of sovereignty has priority 
in the hierarchy of principles”.622 Russian debates on sovereignty reject “Western 
influences” that set certain limits to the principle of sovereignty.623 For example, 
in the “West” it has been argued that authoritarian countries do not possess 
properly legitimate sovereignty, as governments that do not respect the basic 
idea that people are the source of the power of the government lose their 
sovereignty.624 However, Stanislav Chernichenko, a Russian legal scholar and 
diplomat, has contested the wording of the Russian Constitution, according to 
which the people are the bearer of sovereignty, as in his interpretation only the 
Russian Federation itself can occupy such a role.625  
“Russian preoccupation with sovereignty” does not dovetail with placing 
democratic governance and human rights at the centre of a standard of inter-
national legitimacy, argues Roy Allison, as such ideas “give rise to the image of 
an exclusive club of liberal democratic states, a club denied to Russia”.626 
Russia’s approach to the principle of sovereignty can be characterized as some-
what nineteenth-century Hegelian, as in Russia sovereignty as such is glorified, 
viewed as “an embodiment of the Absolute Idea, often detaching the state from 
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its democratic legitimacy”.627 It is important to remember that Russia does not 
praise sovereignty in the abstract but focuses on “Russia’s sovereignty”, at the 
same time ideologically questioning the sovereignty of smaller neighbouring 
states.628  
Russia’s refusal to execute high-level ECtHR cases due to conflict with the 
values of the Russian Constitution meshes well with the concept of sovereign 
democracy.629 In principle the Constitutional Court recognizes the jurisdiction 
of the ECtHR, emphasizes its importance and praises the role of the ECHR. 
However, when there are judgments that in the interpretation of the Consti-
tutional Court do not fit with Russian constitutional principles, especially the 
principle of sovereignty, the judgments of the ECtHR should be blocked. In the 
view of the Constitutional Court, human rights must be subordinated to national 
interests.  
One aspect of sovereign democracy is “refusal to undergo foreign super-
vision and meddling. Yet the decisions of the CoE are seen as such in Russia, 
and are thus a source of irritation and misunderstanding”.630 Lauri Mälksoo has 
argued that, according to the prevailing view in Russian international law scholar-
ship, state interests and international law are closely connected and accordingly, 
the doctrine of international law to a great extent follows the official positions 
of Russia.631 Similar trends also emerge while analysing the positions of con-
stitutional law scholars, but also the positions of the Constitutional Court and 
individual judges. One of the underlying reasons might be that in Russia it has 
almost at all times been potentially dangerous to openly discuss politically 
sensitive questions while more philosophical but less practical research has been 
tolerated.632  
Obviously, previously described Russian state practice further torments 
Russia’s fragile relationship with the CoE. The amended Law on the Con-
stitutional Court and blanket refusal to implement judgments of the ECtHR as 
already twice decided by the Russian Constitutional Court are unprecedented in 
the CoE. These steps clearly pose a threat to the effectiveness of the ECtHR and 
create an even greater stumbling block to dialogue between Russia and the 
ECtHR. It has been argued that the Constitutional Court ruling refusing to 
implement Yukos “leaves a serious rupture beyond repair in relations between 
Russia and the ECtHR” 633 The Russian Constitutional Court ruling to refuse 
implementation of Yukos “threatens the very integrity and legitimacy” of the 
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European Convention on Human Rights, noted Nils Muiznieks.634 In 2009 Bill 
Bowring assessed that it would be very unlikely for Russia to leave the CoE as 
its standards were not “alien implants” in Russia, the ECHR is integrated into 
the Russian legal system and a new generation of Russian lawyers have been 
educated in the spirit of it635. Currently Russian voting privileges in the PACE 
are suspended since the annexation of Crimea and there is increasing discussion 
about Russia leaving the CoE system altogether.636 
Persistent problems with implementation demonstrate “a clear lack of politi-
cal will to execute the Court’s judgments and to follow the Committee of Minis-
ters’ recommendations”, claims Klaas de Vries, a rapporteur with the PACE 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights.637 If there is no political will to 
cooperate with the CoE then, despite Russia’s violations, there is very little the 
organization itself can do to restore the relationship with Russia. It is still un-
likely that Russia wishes to step out of the CoE as the Committee of Ministers 
and other organs of the CoE allow Russia to influence European processes and 
maintain a useful dialogue, which Russia does not want to give up.638  
However, it has become increasingly questionable whether Russia can legally 
remain a member of the CoE. All members of the CoE are obliged to enforce 
ECtHR judgments and clearly à la carte compliance with ECtHR judgments 
backed by the Russian Constitutional Court is not in accordance with the 
membership criteria.639 It is increasingly difficult for the CoE to defend the prin-
ciples that form its core when some member states fundamentally oppose those 
principles. “The rulings of international human rights courts are at the centre of 
their mission to protect human rights, and states’ compliance with these rulings 
is critical for the tribunals to meet their objectives”, as emphasized by Courtney 
Hillebrecht.640 The Venice Commission has noted that, considering Europe’s 
multi-layered legal order, certain tensions between those different layers may 
indeed be unavoidable.641 However, the CoE can play a meaningful role only 
when all parties are motivated to resolve those tensions and find compromises, 
otherwise the organization risks with turning into a pitiful shadow of itself.  
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The crisis in the relationship with the CoE also directly influences Russian 
citizens. The Russian decision not to implement Yukos “weakens the safeguards 
for individuals and companies against possible state abuses”, as noted by Nils 
Muiznieks.642 Steps taken by the Russian authorities and judiciary to block 
implementation of ECtHR judgments severely harm the protection of rights and 
freedoms of Russian citizens as they are not able to get the protection that 
should be provided by the ECHR system. However, it must be recalled that 
most ECtHR rulings are not as politically sensitive as Yukos or Anchugov and 
Gladkov and probably will be enforced despite the mechanisms provided by the 
Amended Law on the Constitutional Court. Although the future relationship 
between Russia and the CoE is unsure, cooperation between them is still 
ongoing. Russia has made its annual payment to the CoE for 2017 and has not 
taken any steps to remove itself from the organization. 
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IV CONSTRUAL AND THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN THE RUSSIAN SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT  
A stable society is achieved not by balancing opposing forces but 
by conscious self-limitation: by the principle that we are always 
duty-bound to defer to the sense of moral justice. 
(Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, “Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and 
Tentative Proposals”)  
 
Human rights law is very much a normative field and the interpretation and 
implementation of human rights in a specific country is closely tied to the values 
adhered to in that country: both on the state level of as well as in society at large. 
As explained in Section 1.3.3 of this study, the influence of international human 
rights treaties greatly depends on the domestic political and social context 
where international treaties have to operate. International human rights law can 
shape actions and outcomes in the domestic arena only when the prevailing 
political climate and the value-system in state institutions as well as in society at 
large are supportive towards human rights and their underlying values and enable 
citizens to demand their rights. This is the third central precondition for successful 
compliance with international human rights law, as revealed by my analysis.  
Accordingly, in this chapter I examine the Russian political and social context 
where international human rights treaties are functioning. I analyse whether the 
political climate in Russia respects human rights and enables citizens to demand 
their rights. Firstly I focus on ideological searches by the Russian state and the 
values guiding these searches in the period following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Secondly, I discuss how the underlying values of human rights are inter-
preted in Russia and analyse the issue of legal nihilism and its influences on 
compliance with international human rights law.  
 
 
4.1. Searching for the ideological face of modern Russia: 
values underlying the Russian constitutional  
framework and political climate  
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world” is the starting line of the preamble of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 1 of the UDHR continues: “All 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Thus, inherent 
dignity and equality are the core principles of international human rights law. 
This ideological basis for human rights has mostly been established and deve-
loped by liberal states: “states with some form of representative democracy, a 
market economy based on private property rights and constitutional protections 
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of civil and political rights”.643 Inevitably, human rights can thrive and develop 
in societies that accept the ideological underpinnings of human rights. Mostly 
these underpinnings have been accepted by Western liberal democracies.  
Ideas and ideology shape the decisions and actions of governments in both 
the domestic and international arena as well as shaping the decisions and actions 
of citizens. Hence, when speaking of implementation of human rights in Russia, 
it is vital to focus on the ideological currents prevalent in Russian society. The 
breakdown of the Soviet Union left Russia with an ideological vacuum. Russia 
had to reinvent and redefine its ideological roots, to find a new strategy for 
defining Russia, its essence and aims. The principles of ideological pluralism 
and de-ideologisation that rose from the shadows into the limelight during the 
1990s never became solidly rooted in the Russian legal and social landscape.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, Russian President Boris Yeltsin voiced that 
whereas historically Russia always has had its own ideology “now we have 
none.”644 Following decades of pervasive control by the Communist Party, the 
collapse of the Soviet order produced a unique situation of vacuum. Not only 
had the centralized power of the party-state collapsed: “In a simultaneous 
process, its associated ideology evaporated, leaving subjects to grope for new 
senses of identity and for new interpretations of what had happened and what 
would follow.”645 In 1990 Russia became in many ways more liberal. Joining 
the “liberal club” was a message that Russia wanted to send to the international 
audience by adopting a modern constitution based on democracy, rule of law 
and protection of human rights and freedoms and by ratifying the ECtHR. Rein 
Müllerson, a Professor of International Law at King’s College of London Uni-
versity and previously an adviser to the Chair of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR (Mikhail Gorbachev), has characterized the approach Russia took in the 
1990s as naïve and simply unbelievable:  
In the 1990s, I was shocked to read that the then Russian Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev had said that post-Soviet Russia did not have any specific or 
particular national interests, that its foreign policy would in the future be guided 
only by universal interests and human values. Even then I wondered how such a 
person could be the Foreign Minister of a country with the size and history of 
Russia.646 
                                                                          
643  Michael W Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’ (1983) Philosophy & 
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However, in his book “Human Rights: Ideas, Norms and Reality” from 1991 
Müllerson, one of the leading international lawyers of the late Soviet period, 
was substantially more friendly towards human rights and criticised the inability 
of the Soviet Russia to guarantee human rights protection in practice. He argued 
that without a multi-party system, without political pluralism and free and fair 
elections it is impossible to guarantee human rights and freedoms.647 Müllerson 
explained that although socialist doctrines often emphasized the central impor-
tance of a human being, claiming that a person is a measure of all things, in 
reality the “social” was always given a priority over the “individual”. The needs 
and the interests of the individual were completely subordinated to the public 
interests, particularly to state interests in the understanding of the leaders of the 
socialist revolution. Although after the death of Stalin, mass repressions in 
Russia largely stopped, the idea of the complete subordination of the individual 
to the collective and, above all, to the state, continued in all spheres of life.648 
He demonstrated in his book that the rift between the written text of the Consti-
tution and the “reality on the ground” was wide during Soviet period. Although 
the Constitution enshrined the protection of the social and economic rights, in 
real life they were guaranteed on a low level, especially considering the 
rights of millions of innocent people who suffered in GULAG camps, noted 
Müllerson.649 
Whereas joining the “liberal club” was a political goal in the beginning of 
the 90s, liberal ideas have not become the guiding idea of Russian contemporary 
political ideology. Russian scholar Orest Martyshin claims that constitutional 
reform and eliminating the state ideology has led to ideological uncertainty, 
amorphism and confusion amongst Russians who were used to clear guidelines 
during the Soviet era.650 Increased “omnivorousness” regarding values, loss of 
moral principles and other “disastrous effects such as overwhelming egoism, 
cynicism and distrust of others” are also related to these processes, argues Orest 
Martyshin.651 International law is involved in an increasingly severe ideological 
struggle, whereas compared to Soviet science of international law contemporary 
Russian scholarship has lost its ideological foundation, argues Sergey Bakhin, a 
Professor of International Law at St Petersburg State University. He regrets that 
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Western ideas and interpretations are transmitted without critical reflection and 
that the connection with the Soviet legacy has been lost.652 
Defining Russia in terms of ideology and distinguishing Russia from other 
states has been given increasing prominence by the Russian ruling elite. It has 
been noted that Vladimir Putin “has searched for an ideological, even spiritual, 
underpinning for his grip on power. Disturbed by the protest movement…Putin 
turned to a mishmash of nationalism, conservative values, Russian Orthodoxy, 
and a fear of the corrupting influence of the degenerate West.”653 The process 
has been described as a “morality turn”654 and a quest for “moral sovereignty”.655 
Besides, Russian Orthodoxy increasingly actively claims the role of the main 
carrier and guardian of national culture, spirituality, morality, and the creator of 
a uniting ideology for all people and as such has become an important partner 
for the state authorities in rediscovering Russia’s ideological underpinnings. 
During his speech at Valdai, Vladimir Putin has demonstrated protecting 
Christian values as an important aspect of the blossoming complexity of Russian 
“state-civilization”, simultaneously accusing Euro-Atlantic countries of rejecting 
the root-values and moral principles of Western civilization and implementing 
policies equating belief in God with belief in Satan at the same time.656  
Various Russian legal scholars emphasize the ideological function of the 
Russian Constitution and are supportive of the idea that the Constitution is the 
basis for the “national idea” or even “state ideology” of Russia. Ideological func-
tion is one of the main features of the Russian Constitution, argues Vyacheslav 
Maklakov, Professor of Constitutional Law at Kutafin Moscow State Law Uni-
versity.657 Maklakov emphasizes that the constitutions of developed countries 
always contain universal ideological values (общечеловеческие идеологические 
ценности), above all human rights, compliance with which is the first duty of 
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the state according to the Russian Constitution.658 Every social transformation 
presumes and generates ideological justifications that are reflected in most impor-
tant political and legal documents that represent a kind of ideological manifesto. 
Therefore, constitutions also contain certain ideological foundations, which are 
based on constitutional values, explains Martyshin.659  
Although the Russian Constitution enshrines the principle of ideological 
pluralism, this does not limit the right to design and develop theories of an ideo-
logical nature, explains B. S. Ebzeev, a former judge of the Constitutional 
Court.660 The principle of ideological pluralism does not prohibit the existence 
of “a national idea”, which may in turn become the subject of an ideology for 
political and civil institutions, argues Sergey Horunzy.661 However he stresses 
that the principle of ideological pluralism presumes that no ideology should be 
enforced by the state as binding.662 A constitution declares the most important 
principles on which life in a society should be built, and this can be labelled a 
“state ideology”, argues O. V. Martyshin. He claims that all countries have a state 
ideology to a smaller or larger extent, but “the real problem is not whether there 
should be a state ideology, but rather what kind of ideology it is”.663 The state 
may have an ideology; however, it should not be exclusive and binding on all; 
the state should remain neutral and equidistant regarding ideology, argues 
Constitutional Court judge G. Gadziev.664  
As can be seen from their writings, Russian legal scholars and judges in 
general do not support an exclusive and binding state ideology as it existed in 
Soviet times. Nevertheless, several of them highlight the ideological function of 
a constitution as one of the most important functions of the Russian Consti-
tution and they are rather positively minded about a certain “national idea” or 
“modern state ideology” that comprises the most important principles for a 
given society and that should also be mirrored by the political and civil insti-
tutions of the country.  
The value-conflict between the “decadent West” and “righteous Russia” with 
its distinct set of “higher” values is visible not only in interpretations of the con-
stitution, but also in many other areas. This value-conflict seems also to be the 
focal point for the search for the ideological face of contemporary Russia. 
Hostility towards the West, emphasis on the sovereignty of Russia as one of the 
most influential centres of the modern world and its civilizational distinctiveness 
are also reflected in Russia’s latest foreign policy strategy from 2016. According 
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to Russian foreign policy strategy,665 Russia’s foreign policy is first and fore-
most aimed at ensuring the security of the country, its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and consolidating the position of Russia “as one of the most influential 
centres of the modern world”. However, strengthening the rule of law and 
democratic institutions and international peace, security and stability “in order 
to establish a just and democratic international system based on collective prin-
ciples in solving international problems, on the supremacy of international law” 
is also mentioned as one of the top priorities. The foreign policy strategy also 
emphasizes good-neighbourliness with adjacent countries and assistance in the 
elimination of tension and conflicts in their territories. Development of “mutually 
beneficial and equal partnerships” with other countries and organisations “based 
on respect for the principles of independence and sovereignty, pragmatism, 
transparency, multipolarity, predictability and non-confrontational upholding of 
national priorities” is mentioned. Also emphasized are strengthening Russia’s 
role in global space through strengthening the position of the Russian language, 
popularizing Russian culture, cultural identity and historical heritage, education 
and science and consolidating the Russian diaspora. Interestingly, the strategy 
stresses the need to strengthen the position of the Russian mass media and mass 
communication in global information space and the necessity to bring the 
Russian point of view on international processes to the wider circles of the world 
community.  
Lastly, the strategy focuses on promoting development of constructive dia-
logue and partnership in the interests of strengthening consensus and mutual 
enrichment between different cultures and civilizations. Compared to the 2013 
foreign policy concept666, references to human rights and freedoms have been 
removed; the term “religions” has been replaced by “civilizations” and the new 
task of propagating the Russian point of view on international processes is 
included.667  
A statement that Russia and its value-system are essentially different from 
the West has roots in Russian philosophical discussions from centuries ago. 
Slavophiles668 and Eurasianists669 emphasized that Russian civilization was 
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distinct from the decadent West regarding its values and trajectory of develop-
ment. Lauri Mälksoo has observed “the constant preoccupation with Europe/the 
West, particularly through the concept of “civilization”, has also been an 
uninterrupted trend in Russian international law scholarship.670 Contemporary 
anti-Western rhetoric in Russia has been considerably influenced by the ideas of 
Alexander Dugin671, an ideologist of New-Eurasianism. Dugin has supported 
and popularized Vladimir Putin’s positions on limiting human rights and free-
doms, intolerance of homosexuality, the need to support traditional family 
values and emphasized the role of Orthodox Christianity in Russia’s rebirth as a 
great power. In Dugin’s view, Russia progressed from Communism to demo-
cracy, and from a pro-Western, extremist, liberal democratic Atlantic model to a 
patriotic Eurasian course.672 In his view it was impossible to introduce Western 
liberal values into Russia due to a profound resistance by society because 
Western values confronted “the basic archetypes of our national way of life”.673  
However, also liberal, pro-Western ideas have deep historical roots in Russia. 
The first Russian professor of law, Semyon Desnitskiy (1740–1789) studied in 
the University of Glasgow during Scottish Enlightenment and when he returned 
to Russia, he brought the ideas of Enlightenment with him, which had an 
important impact on the education of his students.674 During 1830s and 1840s 
most active debates between Westernisers (западники) and Slavophiles took 
place in Russia. Westernisers viewed Russia as a Western country that should 
learn from the West and develop Western democratic institutions. Westernisers 
associated the West with progress and development and they thought that 
following the patterns of the West would solve Russia’s problems. Slavophiles, 
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on the contrary, viewed Russia as a unique country that should not mirror 
Western institutions, but should only mirror Western technical progress.675 
Thus, the contemporary debates over the role of the West, its flaws and benefits 
for the development of Russia very much resemble the debates that took place 
already centuries ago.  
Whereas Russian contemporary political rhetoric is not monolithic, and there 
are contemporary Westernisers as well as contemporary Slavophiles, the 
prevailing tendency in the official political rhetoric is to construe human rights 
as external Western influences hindering the traditional values of Russian society 
and the sovereignty and security of Russia. Russian political documents picture 
the West as decadent, dangerous and inferior, suffering from various immoral 
“diseases”. For example, “Russia is not Europe” is the central assertion of 
Russian cultural policy requiring inter alia abandoning the principles of multi-
culturalism, tolerance, to develop Russia’s cultural policy solely on the basis of 
a unique and distinctive Russian civilization and to prohibit state support for 
behaviours that are unacceptable from the perspective of traditional Russian 
values.676  
The idea of unlimited sovereignty is the core principle for contemporary 
Russia. One implication of the idea of unlimited sovereignty is the concept of 
“sovereign democracy”, invented by Vladislav Surkov, who has been viewed as 
the main ideologist of the Kremlin during the term of office of Vladimir Putin. 
According to the concept of sovereign democracy, “democratic values are neither 
contested nor rejected [,] but subordinated to national interests”.677 Put simply: 
democracy is not always a bad idea but it is bad when it messes with “higher 
values”: Russian unique interests, values, culture and traditions should always 
stand above democratic values and institutions. A wish to legitimize its conduct 
by reference to Russia’s own culture, traditions and norms, not international 
standards, underlies the idea of “sovereign democracy”.678 In the view of Roy 
Allison, this concept “expresses a statist rejection of the transference of “external” 
norms to the Russian domestic order” and is aimed at fostering regional public 
order opposing “external”, Western influences.679 Russia as a regional hegemon 
defining and enforcing norms in its surrounding CIS region uses global principles 
such as sovereignty and non-intervention in its rhetoric. However, it “exercises 
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discretion whether or not to apply these principles in the CIS regional order”, 
argues Roy Allison.680 Moreover, preserving its own domestic structure of 
power – for example, order and concentration of power – is a top priority for 
Russia that vastly influences the construal of international society in Russia. 
Russia has privileged order over justice on a domestic level and also advocates 
the same approach internationally, such as by emphasizing the principle of state 
sovereignty and rejecting the idea that external actors should be able to judge or 
influence “internal affairs” claims Roy Allison.681 
The Kremlin has skilfully taken advantage of the authority and popularity of 
the Orthodox Church in Russia. Politicians use religious interpretation of 
dignity, morality and sinfulness to demonstrate that human rights and freedoms 
and liberal values are not in accordance with Russian civilizational values. In 
Russia, the political and religious authorities increasingly use the language of 
“sinfulness” and “lost dignity” when they talk about human rights. As I have 
argued previously, Russian people have very little – almost no – experience 
with basic freedoms and a law-based state.682 The concept of a law-based state 
is not part of Russian legal culture and is alien to the Russian people. In Russia 
only a small fraction of society has any interest in freedoms.683 Only 4% of 
Russian people consider limited civil rights and democratic freedoms to be one 
of the most alarming problems in Russian society.684  
Russian people might not have experience with individual rights and freedoms. 
However, they have quite a lot of experience with the Orthodox Church and its 
code of conduct. Lack of knowledge and experience regarding human rights 
makes it possible to “translate” the meaning of rights and freedoms by using the 
vocabulary of the Russian Orthodox Church, an institution that enjoys high 
reputation and authority in Russia. “Morality” is one of the key concepts used in 
this “translation process” and this concept is highly meaningful for Russians. 
Russian politicians and political documents construe civil and political rights as 
“sin”, “sodomy”, “immorality” and “insult of religious feelings” and supporters 
                                                                          
680  Ibid 19. 
681  Ibid 20. 
682  Mäger, ‘Russia’s Illiberal Ideology and Its Influences on the Legislation in the Sphere of 
Civil and Political Rights’ (n 1).  
683  Maksim Ivanov, ‘Rossija zaprosili strogii rezim. Grazdane privetstvujut novye zaprety’ 
(28 July 2012) Kommersant <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1990744> accessed on 7 De-
cember 2017.  
684 This was the least popular option from 24 options presented in the study. See further: 
Levada Center ‘The Most Alarming Problems’ (Levada Center 2017)   
<https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/09/26/the-most-alarming-problems/> accessed on 7 De-
cember 2017.  
147 
of civil and political rights are labelled as a “liberasty”, a “fifth column” or 
“foreign agents.”685  
Lev Gudkov, director of the Levada Center, one of very few independent 
sociological research centres in Russia, claims that the authorities successfully 
use propaganda to influence the Russian people and to discredit the meaning of 
liberal values, perceptions of the rule of law and human rights.686 Russian 
human rights lawyers Maria Kiskachi and Maria Issaeva claim “state-blessed 
homophobia … has affected not only the minds of an abstract “vast majority” 
but also those of the political elite and professional communities of lawyers, 
judges, and even scholars.”687 
As a result of this “translation” process the majority of Russians view 
freedom as an element of threat, because they have been convinced that as only 
some people can use their freedom “correctly” so that it makes sense to limit 
freedoms for all. In Soviet times people were accustomed to equality in poverty, 
and also nowadays prefer to have equality in having not too much freedom, 
because according to the mainstream it is better to avoid “overly free” people 
like the girls from Pussy Riot or demonstrators at rallies.688  
The “uniqueness” of Russia as a country and of Russian values is the guiding 
idea of Russian government’s approach to human rights. The central claim is 
that the liberal ideas that human rights carry are fundamentally unsuitable for 
Russian society and are not in accordance with the value-system of Russians.  
On the one hand it can be agreed that “due to differences in history and 
culture, in certain aspects the Russian people differ in their values from the 
Western mainstream”.689 However, not all scholars agree that these differences 
are indeed as wide as they are pictured for the public. In many ways Russians 
are very liberal. Whereas the government emphasizes the idea of traditional 
family values to justify adopting restrictive legislation, Russia has one of the 
world’s highest rates of both divorce and abortion and very liberal abortion 
legislation.690 Whereas “Western” permissiveness and moral relativism is neg-
lected in various Russian political and legal documents, in practice Russians are 
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highly “permissive” in terms of family life and sexual relations. Vladimir Magun 
and Maksim Rudnev691 from the Higher School of Economics have shown that 
compared to most Europeans an average Russian has a strong focus on self-
interest and is more committed to the values of wealth and power, personal 
success and social recognition rather than solidarity, equality, justice or tolerance. 
Research by Magun and Rudnev demonstrates that Russia’s value-system is 
relatively similar to other post-communist countries and to Mediterranean 
countries. They argue that Russia shares a general logic of cultural and social 
development with the rest of the world and has much in common with countries 
of a similar economic level and recent political history.692  
Hence, it derives from the study by Magun and Rudnev that liberal values 
are not inherently alien to “the Russian soul”. It is likely that the idea that 
Russian people value solidarity and well-being of society more highly than they 
value individual goals is to a great extent construed and successfully exploited 
by Russia’s political, legal and religious elite. Contrary to their claims that 
Russian culture and society are deeply “ethico-centric”, studies show that Russian 
people value individual success and freedom of choice in matters related to 
family life, instead of leading their lives in the spirit of Orthodox Christian 
values. Therefore, the thesis that Russian people are willing to contribute to the 
well-being of society and are somehow distinctly more righteous and caring 
than their European counterparts, regularly exploited by Russia’s political, legal 
and religious elite, seems unjustified. Whereas Russians are indeed more 
religious and more patriotic than an average Western-European, they also do 
value freedom of choice when it comes to their private lives.693  
One of the aims of the current Russian government has been to convince 
Russian people that there are fundamental differences between Russia and the 
West, especially regarding the values these societies adhere to. However, 
Vladimir Magun and Maksim Rudnev’s work694 based on a European Social 
Survey has demonstrated that such a value-conflict between Russia and the 
West is not based on objective facts. Rather, such assessments are to great 
extent ideological constructs, although very enduring and influential. There 
have been periods in Russian history when such a value-conflict has not been 
dominant at all and it is likely that when the political context changes, such 
value-conflicts will also lose their relevance.  
Using civilizational arguments to justify the refusal to comply with inter-
national law is just a convenient propaganda device to excuse lack of develop-
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ment or to hide the true reason for such refusal, argues Yelena Lukyanova. In 
her view the crux of the civilizational problem is not reflected in the disparity 
between different types of civilization, but the disparity between civilization 
and barbarism. As put by Lukyanova:  
 
In the modern world the great divide between “civilization” and “barbarism” is 
rooted in the attitude of people towards law. When the state becomes more and 
more a service, the quality of which is assessed by society, law becomes the 
universal civilizational value, the preservation and development of which is the 
common task of all. Law is not just a list of rules, but a set of standards based 
on the international morality of peaceful coexistence, agreed by societies and 
states.  
 
In Lukyanova’s view the Constitutional Court’s failure to rely on the true spirit 
of law and on the spirit of civilization, is an example of barbarism. However, 
“barbarism can be treated. Not instantly, but it can be treated. Quite simply. By 
education and culture,” concludes Lukyanova.695  
 
 
4.2. Interpreting the underlying values  
of human rights in Russia  
4.2.1. The concept of human dignity in Russia  
The idea of human rights is largely based on the inherent dignity of every human 
being. Inevitably, the success or failure of a country to implement human rights 
depends on the value-system of the society, particularly on the value the society 
imposes on a human being – whether the idea of the inherent dignity of every 
human being is accepted or only certain people are considered as dignified and 
worthy of protection.  
In Russian society, the Russian Orthodox Church is a highly influential 
authority for defining concepts such as dignity and morality. The Orthodox 
Church has also actively taken up interpreting human rights documents from the 
Church’s perspective. The Russian Orthodox Church vigorously emphasizes 
Russia’s civilizational distinctiveness from the West: indeed, the Church has 
even adopted its own declaration of human rights “on behalf of the distinct 
Russian civilization”.696 Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
derives from the idea of the inherent dignity of every human being, the Russian 
Orthodox declaration is based on the idea that dignity can be acquired when one 
acts in accordance with the norms and practices of the Russian Orthodox 
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Church. When one fails to do so, one is not acting in a moral way and cannot 
“acquire” dignity. The Russian Orthodox Declaration on Human Rights states:  
 
[W]e distinguish the worth and the dignity of the individual. Worth is inherent; 
dignity is acquired…[h]uman rights represent the basic worth of the individual 
and should be used to realize the individual’s dignity. For this very reason, the 
support of human rights cannot be separated from morality. Uprooting these 
rights from morality is to profane them, for immoral dignity cannot occur].697 
 
Accordingly, there is a deep value conflict between the interpretations provided 
by the Russian Orthodox Church and the interpretations given to human rights 
in international human rights documents. The Russian Orthodox Church views 
human dignity as something “acquired”, something that an individual has to 
earn by acting in accordance with Christian morality “for immoral dignity 
cannot occur”. The declaration also underscores that it is up to the religious 
tradition to distinguish good from evil; therefore the Orthodox Church itself is 
the one that can determine the content of dignity. The declaration approves the 
rights and freedoms of man only “to the extent that they help the individual to 
ascend to goodness, save the individual from internal and external evil, and 
allow the individual to be fully integrated to society”.  
Hence, the declaration contests the idea of universal and inherent human 
rights and is willing to approve only these rights that remain in the limits of the 
Church’s interpretation of “good”. The declaration also lists values that are “no 
less important than human rights”: faith, morality, the sanctity of holy objects 
and one’s homeland and warns that “We must not allow situations to occur in 
which the realization of human rights tramples upon religious or moral tra-
ditions, insults religious or national feelings or sacred objects, or threatens our 
homeland’s existence.” The declaration also alerts that “inventing” rights that 
legalize behaviour condemned by traditional morality is dangerous.  
Patriarch Kirill I, the head of Russian Orthodox Church, and an extremely 
powerful and popular figure in Russia, is also positioning himself as an expert 
on human rights, having published a book on human rights and human dignity 
and interpreted topics related to human rights in various speeches and publi-
cations. In his book on human rights and human dignity, Kirill interprets the 
concept of human dignity as being worthy of respect, having high status and not 
being sinful, as by committing sinful deeds people lose their dignity. 698 The 
Orthodox Church’s interpretation of human rights, fortified by the authority of 
Kirill I, is aimed at belittling the meaning of human rights and de-humanizing 
people who support rights and freedoms apart from church-defined morality as 
sinful and unworthy. As noted by Lauri Mälksoo: “[t]he ultimate effect of such 
re-thinking of the notion of human dignity is evident: philosophical relativi-
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zation of the validity of human rights. Instead of–at least fundamental–human 
rights being inalienable, they can in fact be taken away (or back) by the state 
and the society if the person herself is understood as having undermined her 
human dignity.”699  
It is characteristic of Russian (legal) culture that citizens value interpersonal 
relationships more highly than conformity with imposed legal rules, argues Jane 
Henderson.700 The idea of acting in a “moral” way is more important than any 
legislation. As explained by Erich Solovev: “such is its philosophy, its fine 
literature, and its folklore. A Russian will not accept in its heart any norm or 
institution that is not morally justified; hence, the ethical foundation of law has 
a decisive significance for the development of legal consciousness and the 
formation of a legal conscience in every citizen.” 701  
However, deriving from its strong Orthodox heritage, Russian culture has is 
a rather specific understanding of morality. Elena Namli, a professor of ethics at 
Uppsala University, argues that the essence of morality in Russian culture is 
responsibility for society. In Russian culture “rights” and “morality” are comp-
letely different concepts. “The very mention of rights appears as a sign of person 
not taking moral responsibility”, explains Namli.702 Accordingly, when a Russian 
is convinced that some legal norm is immoral it is very easy to neglect these 
norms. Importantly, in Russian society the “moral watchdog” that gets to define 
what is moral and ethical and what is not, is to a great extent the Russian 
Orthodox Church. The position of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the 
responsibilities of each human being for society constitutes the essence of 
“moral behaviour” for a majority of Russians. For example, Patriarch Kirill I 
advises punishing “those who in their obsession with pride and selfishness set 
themselves above society, destroying its values…in tune with the inner voice of 
the majority of our people”.703 Hence, in the interpretation of Kirill I, it is dan-
gerous for a society when the moral code of some citizens is not in accordance 
with the “inner voice of the majority” and therefore such people should be 
punished and treated as outcasts.  
The position of the Russian Orthodox Church not only influence construal of 
norms and values among the ordinary Russian people, but they are also very 
much connected to the official rhetoric of the state analysed in Section 4.1 of 
this study. For example, Kirill I skilfully associates the concept of the morality 
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of the Russian Orthodox Church with the paramount value in rhetoric of current 
Russian government: the principle of sovereignty. According to Patriarch Kirill I, 
the most important proof of the sovereignty of Russia as a unique civilization is 
its spiritual sovereignty “based on values shared by the moral majority of our 
society.”704 In his interpretation, protecting the values of Russian society equates 
with protecting Russian (spiritual) sovereignty.705 There is a well-functioning 
“symbiosis” between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state, as the state 
very much relies on the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church to defend its 
anti-human rights policies.  
Notwithstanding that Russia’s constitutional claim to be a democratic, rule-
of-law state, where “man, his rights and freedoms are the supreme value”, in 
modern Russia human rights are construed as inherently inferior to the values of 
patriotism, unlimited sovereignty and traditional values as – mainly – defined 
by Orthodox Christianity. Human rights are framed as a dangerous Western 
influence that must be fought against. Liberal values are belittled, regarded as 
inferior to “ideologically approved” values such as patriotism and morality, as 
defined by Orthodox Christianity.  
Whereas the inherent dignity of every human being is the guiding idea of 
international human rights law, including the ECHR, the Russian Orthodox 
Church views human dignity as something that an individual has to earn by 
acting in accordance with Christian morality. In the interpretation of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, “sinful” individuals such as LGBT people are not worthy of 
dignity and hence their rights should not be protected equally with “dignified” 
people. This interpretation belittles the meaning of human rights and de-
humanizes people who do not wish to live in accordance with church-defined 
rules about dignity and morality.  
 
 
4.2.2. The influences of legal nihilism  
Legal nihilism: “finding creative ways to get around (oboiti) the law has long 
been the norm in Russia,” as conveyed by Kathryn Hendley.706 Lack of respect, 
condescension, a negative disposition towards the law, all form the essence of 
legal nihilism: “legal nihilists obey the law when convenient, and otherwise 
ignore it.”707 Russian political culture has been characterized by such a lack of 
respect for law for centuries and legal nihilism is still widespread in modern 
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Russia. Prime Minister Medvedev has openly labelled Russia as a country of 
legal nihilism unseen in any other European country.708  
In Russian culture “not just possessors of power but even ordinary people 
underestimate the importance of the rule of law”, argues Elena Namli, a pro-
fessor of ethics at Uppsala University and a research director at the Uppsala 
Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies.709 An important aspect of legal nihilism 
is lack of trust towards the judicial system. “Dramatic lack of trust in the capacity 
of the judicial system to sustain justice”710 characterizes modern-day Russia. 
This famous Russian legal nihilism resulting from centuries-long abuse of 
power is reflected in hopelessness and cynicism in regard to the legal system.711  
Another aspect of legal nihilism is a belief that moral justice is possible 
regardless of the lack of legal justice. In Russia, justice and rights are not 
associated with morality: they are completely distinct concepts. Namli argues 
that in Russia the essence of morality is responsibility for society. She cites an 
example that even when Khodorkovsky was not legally “guilty” of the crimes 
he was sentenced for, he is considered to be responsible for the difficult economic 
situation in Russia; he is considered morally “guilty” by society.712 Moral guilt 
is considered to be more important than fair trial and justice, while talking about 
human rights is interpreted as a sign of refusing to take moral responsibility.713 
For individual citizens, interpersonal relationships are valued more highly than 
conformity to imposed legal rules.714 Namli suggests that a strong Orthodox 
heritage is an important historical explanation for this phenomenon. 715  
Various factors contribute to legal nihilism in contemporary Russia, such as 
the poor example set by the state, people’s tolerance and lack of criticism towards 
state actions, low legal literacy and unwillingness to defend one’s rights.716  
However, Kathryn Hendley argues, based on various studies that the legal 
nihilism of Russian society is largely a myth since the majority of people do not 
agree that the law can be avoided if inconvenient or unjust and the majority of 
cases in courts are resolved without inappropriate interference. On the one hand 
legal nihilism is “an inescapable feature of Russian legal culture”, but its 
popularity is decreasing.717 In her latest contribution to the research on rule of 
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law and legal nihilism in Russia, Hendley concludes that “Russians are not as 
nihilistic as usually assumed, but neither are they free of skepticism when it 
comes to their legal system”.718 Hendley acknowledges that Russians have low 
trust towards the court system and that Russians try to avoid bringing their 
disputes to courts. “Their first reaction to difficulties – whether they arise with a 
neighbour, a stranger, or a state official – is to work out an informal solution. 
They contemplate turning to the courts only when such efforts prove unsuc-
cessful.”719 Russians are reluctant to sue their friends and neighbors because “to 
do so would be to violate informal norms built up over generations”. However, 
when there is no personal connection, they are more willing to turn to court. 
“Lacking any basis for trust, they turned to law to protect their interests.”720 
Hendley argues that the main reason why Russians are reluctant to turn to the 
courts is not telephone law but “dread of the inevitable red tape and emotional 
turmoil that accompany litigation.”721 This is similar in many countries, as 
“everywhere litigation tends to be a last-resort solution.”722  
Indeed, in many cases Russians do trust their court system enough and many 
cases get resolved in Russian court system without telephone law or other 
external influences. However, the overall trust towards the court system remains 
low and majority of Russian people are not used to turning to the courts to defend 
their rights. Culturally, the aspect of “moral justice” has been more important 
than “legal justice” because people have not been able to get legal justice from 
the state institutions and resolving conflicts in court is often in conflict with 
informal norms rooted in Russian society. In general, Russian people have little 
faith in the legal framework of the country, including the legislation related to 
human rights protection.  
Legal nihilism contributes to the fact that liberal values and civil and political 
rights are understood as morally unjustified and not serving the “well-being of 
the polity” in Russia. Almost half of Russian people (45%) are convinced that 
Western democracy would have “disastrous effects” on Russia.723 Russians do 
not feel threatened or concerned when civil and political rights are limited in the 
country. They do not notice it or, when they do, they do not consider it as a 
serious issue.724  
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It is my view that they do not consider it a serious issue because they know 
that in the Russian system one cannot rely on the state defending your rights 
and freedoms, but everybody has to fight for themselves and their close ones. 
Moreover, as I demonstrated in Chapter II, Russian people have for centuries 
lived in conditions where power has constantly been abused and they have very 
little experience with democracy, rule of law and human rights, they have little 
knowledge of these concepts and little trust in them. Accordingly, defending 
one’s legal rights via the court system and other state institutions is not 
culturally inherent to the Russian people. Considering the lack of experience 
and lack of knowledge in the field of human rights and freedoms, the Russian 
people simply do not understand the effects of repressive laws and what is at 
stake for the Russian political landscape. All these tendencies leave the Russian 
people particularly vulnerable to further abuse of power by the authorities.  
 
 
4.3 Analysis and conclusions  
A supportive attitude towards human rights and their underlying values in the 
political climate, state institutions as well as in society at large is a crucial 
precondition for successful compliance with international human rights treaties, 
as explained in Section 1.3.3 of this study. Therefore, in this chapter I have 
focused on the attitude towards human rights and their underlying values in the 
Russian political and social context. Whereas there is no monolithic body of 
Russian opinion, it emerged from my research that the dominant political 
rhetoric in contemporary Russia is anti-human rights and is fuelling antagonism 
between a dangerous and immoral West and a righteous Russia in Russian 
society. Today’s government is reluctant to acknowledge the value of human 
rights and is undermining human rights in its rhetoric, as evidenced by various 
Russian official political documents that I analysed in this chapter and by 
speeches and other expressions of the ruling political coalition. This attitude is a 
clear obstacle to effective compliance with international human rights treaties. 
Furthermore, I found that the idea of human rights remains alien to a majority of 
Russian people.  
Whereas this cannot be said about all Russians and there surely is a diversity 
of views and attitudes: there are scholars, human rights NGOs, lawyers and 
other activists who defend human rights in courts, in universities and other fora, 
their impact on the overall attitudes towards human rights in Russian society 
and their impact on state policies remains low. A problem with legal nihilism is 
still present in Russia. Overall Russian people have little trust towards the judicial 
system, towards human rights and rule of law. As an interesting tendency, the 
Russian Orthodox Church has taken a very active role in interpreting human 
rights in Russia. However, the Church interprets the underlying values of human 
rights, particularly the concept of human dignity very differently from the 
interpretation underlying international human rights law. According to the view 
of the Russian Orthodox Church, dignity is not inherent, but has to be earned: 
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thus, not all are equally dignified and not all people deserve protection of their 
rights and freedoms. Although in many ways the Russian people are very liberal, 
the Russian political mainstream utilises all means possible to convince the 
Russian people of the downsides of political liberalism and the disastrous effects 
of human rights, which in their interpretation are only suitable for the degraded 
West. In my view the anti-human rights attitude of the government as well as 
the fact that the idea of human rights has remained alien to a majority of the 
Russian people are important obstacles that hinder compliance with the ECHR 
as well as effective cooperation with the CoE.  
Russia has had to struggle with an ideological vacuum for over twenty years. 
On the one hand, neutrality in respect of the ruling parties and establishing the 
legal foundations for political pluralism brought the 1993 Constitution close to 
the constitutions of modern democratic states. However, whereas Russia previ-
ously had had a strong ideology – however problematic this might have been – 
suddenly they had none. In the 1990s Russia started to reinvent its identity. 
Whereas all post-communist societies had to reinvent their identities to some 
extent, for Russia the change was extremely bitter. In many countries, such as 
the Baltic States, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant long-awaited freedom 
and independence; in Russia the collapse of the Soviet Union meant losing the 
position of a superpower and is to this day perceived as a negative event by a 
majority of Russians.725 
Initially Russia opened up to European human rights law by adopting a 
modern constitution enshrining human rights as the highest value, by becoming 
a member of the CoE and by making various reforms in its legal system. During 
the 1990s the constitutional principle of ideological diversity was regarded as a 
gigantic step towards pluralism of values and ideas, considering Russia’s 
authoritarian past and the compulsory ideology of Marxism-Leninism that 
permeated all walks of Soviet life. As Zorkin has explained, the principle of 
ideological pluralism in the Russian Constitution was drafted with the aim of 
protecting pluralism of opinions, attitudes, and doctrines and to separate the 
state’s integrity from ideological dictates, to oppose the ideological monism of 
Soviet constitutions. 726  
Despite the aim of opposing ideological monism reflected in Article 13 of 
the Russian Constitution, in modern Russia ideological monism is vigorously 
and insidiously sneaking back in. Starting from the 2000s the approach towards 
human rights started to change both in the political arena as well as in academia 
and the court system. As I have argued elsewhere, Russia’s contemporary 
prevailing political ideology can be characterized by fundamental separation 
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from the West727 on the issue of values and rights, particularly regarding civil 
and political rights and freedoms.728 Notwithstanding that Russia’s constitutional 
claim to be a democratic, rule-of-law state, where “man, his rights and freedoms 
are the supreme value”, Russian ruling elite construes human rights as inherently 
inferior to the values of patriotism, unlimited sovereignty and traditional values 
mainly defined by Orthodox Christianity. Human rights are framed as a dan-
gerous Western influence that must be fought against. Liberal values are belittled, 
regarded as inferior to “ideologically approved” values such as patriotism and 
morality as defined by Orthodox Christianity. Promoting Christian values, the 
Russian Orthodox interpretations of morality and the security and sovereignty 
of Russia are recognized as unqualified values by the government. 
While searching for an ideological underpinning for his power, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin has guided the official rhetoric of Russia away from 
the idea of human rights and towards protecting Russia’s own values, Russian 
“moral sovereignty”, from Western influences. In Russian official documents 
human rights are now construed as a negative influence of the West, lacking 
moral principles and causing disastrous effects in Russian society. According to 
the prevailing view, human rights and freedoms should be respected and 
protected only when they do not infringe upon truly “higher values” such as 
morality and other traditional values, state security and sovereignty. Although 
this approach does not amount to a state ideology in the sense of Marxist-
Leninist ideology, it clearly infringes the principle of ideological pluralism and 
in the bigger picture this emerging ‘state idea’ endangers protection of human 
rights and overall pluralism in Russian society.  
Interpretations given to human rights in contemporary Russia by mainstream 
legal scholars as well as the political and religious elite are increasingly following 
a pattern familiar from Soviet Constitutions. The rhetoric of the Kremlin as well 
as mainstream scholarship supports the idea that the task of the individual is to 
adhere to the dictates of the state. Rights are granted to those who are loyal to 
the state.729 Pursuant to the Russian Orthodox interpretation of human rights, 
only those rights that are in accordance with the inner morality of Russian 
society and other needs such as state security should be respected – and others 
neglected. Moreover, people whose morality code is not in accordance with the 
“inner voice of the majority” are considered to be dangerous for society and 
therefore should be punished and treated as outcasts, as advised by the head of 
the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill I.  
In the history of Russia the noblest task of being a leading Russian inter-
nationalist has been to help the state with legitimizing arguments, as noted by 
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Lauri Mälksoo.730 Today, the majority of legal scholars as well as of the 
judiciary use ideological arguments familiar from official political rhetoric to 
interpret the Constitution and the balance of rights and freedoms with other 
values. The focus of mainstream legal scholarship is on denouncing individual 
liberties and promoting Christian values, the Russian Orthodox interpretation of 
morality and security and the sovereignty of Russia as unqualified values. Several 
legal scholars and Constitutional Court judges also approve a state ideology 
guiding the actions of political institutions as well as society as a whole. Thus, 
various groups and authorities that legitimize official arguments denouncing 
human rights back the state.  
Whereas many lawyers, NGOs and other activists in Russia promote human 
rights protection, the idea of human rights has remained largely alien to the 
majority of Russian society. In my view, at least three underlying factors can be 
distinguished. Firstly, Russian society is characterized by legal nihilism resulting 
from centuries-long abuse of power. Whereas it cannot be argued that all 
Russians are legal nihilists, the problem of legal nihilism is still widespread. A 
majority of Russians have little trust towards the judicial system; they underesti-
mate the importance of rule of law and are mainly guided by interpersonal 
relationships and social norms present in these relationships, whereas legal 
norms tend to have little importance. It is also noteworthy that the doctrine of 
the Russian Orthodox Church, which construes defending one’s rights and 
freedoms as a sign of avoiding moral responsibility towards society, is very 
influential in Russia. Secondly, in Russia the interpretation of underlying values 
of human rights, particularly the concept of human dignity is greatly influenced 
by the doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church arguing that not all people are 
dignified, that dignity must be earned by proper behaviour. Thirdly, the idea of 
human rights remains alien because the Russian political elite uses all means 
possible to convince the Russian people of the disastrous effects of human 
rights, which in their interpretation are only suitable for a degraded West. As a 
result of this “translation” process, the majority of Russians view human rights 
as something dangerous and immoral and are not motivated to demand 
protection of human rights from their government.  
In 1947 George F. Kennan, a famous American diplomat, argued in his iconic 
essay “X” that Stalin needed the concept of a hostile world to legitimize his 
autocratic rule. The innate socialist antagonism with capitalism served the needs 
of Soviet leaders.731 As can be concluded from the analysis in this chapter, the 
Russian state has replaced the antagonism of Socialism versus Capitalism with 
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antagonism between the West and Russia, but the official rhetoric is strikingly 
similar.  
The Russian government has various means to influence the prevalent value-
system in Russian society and to fuel the antagonism between the West and 
Russia among the Russian people. The Russian state has used the authority of 
the Russian Orthodox Church to justify its ideological messages. Moreover, 
political leaders can shape the views of people via the media, which are almost 
completely under the control of the Kremlin. Furthermore, they can transmit 
ideologically “suitable” messages through the educational system, socializing 
Russian people into certain norms and values from a very young age. While an 
exchange student at St Petersburg State University, I was very surprised to see 
how the educational system is extremely critical towards the West in general; 
how international law or the law of Western states is referred to as ‘bourgeois 
law’ (буржуазное право) in textbooks; how human rights law is marginalized 
and how young students mirror these statements in their conversations and 
scholarly works.  
I was also surprised to see how actively the victory in the Second World War 
and the “achievements” of Communism were praised. When I introduced my 
views about historical events as experienced by my family and other Estonians 
during and after the Second World War, including occupation, mass deportation 
of Estonians by the Soviets, the destruction of the Estonian political and cultural 
elite, demolition of people’s homes and property and various ideological 
pressures, the students in the classroom were utterly amazed and said that they 
had never heard of anything like this. The professor’s interpretation was that 
“Estonians wanted to be part of the Soviet Union and there was no pressure. 
Were you there when all those events happened? If you were not, how can you 
be sure? Most probably these are just stories.” Thus, no true debate of historical 
events was possible and alternative views were quickly downgraded. When 
discussions about controversial topics are discouraged in the educational system 
as well as in the public sphere, this inevitably hinders the development of civil 
society whose central task is to pose questions and to demand changes.  
Sociological research has demonstrated that value-based civilizational dif-
ferences between Russia and the West are not objective facts, but are to great 
extent ideological constructs. It is hard to find evidence for the claim that there 
is a certain set of uniquely “Russian values” incompatible with the values of 
Western or other countries. The Russian people are very much focused on 
individualistic values such as personal success, individual wealth and power. 732 
Therefore the thesis that Russian society is somehow more righteous than the 
liberal West, which has been regularly exploited by the Russian political, legal 
and religious elite, has little proof. Incompatibility of the Russian value system 
and Western liberalism is to a great extent a social construction that could be 
changed when the social and political context in Russia changes. However, as 
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long as the Russian political mainstream does not support the idea of human 
rights, but is actively contesting it with all means available, little change can be 
expected. 
The Russian state does not want to base its international reputation on pro-
tection of human rights, does not want to belong to the “club” of rights-adhering 
states. On the contrary, human rights and countries respecting human rights are 
ridiculed in the official rhetoric. As demonstrated in Chapters II and III, the 
Russian constitutional framework does not support compliance with international 
human rights law and international human rights law is not institutionally 
embedded in the Russian legal order. Accordingly, mechanisms for persuading 
or shaming Russia into compliance with human rights law cannot be expected 
to be effective and when the social and political milieu remains actively anti-
human rights, little hope is at hand for better compliance with international 
human rights treaties. Thus, as the Russian state has little motivation to adhere 
to the norms and values underlying the CoE and as the idea of human rights has 
remained largely alien to Russian society, the relationship between Russia and 
the CoE will likely remain complicated and controversial.  
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V IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION IN RUSSIA  
“Freethinkers are those who are willing to use their minds without prejudice and 
without fearing to understand things that clash with their own customs, privileges, or 
beliefs. This state of mind is not common, but it is essential for right thinking” 
(Leo Tolstoy, On Life and Essays on Religion) 
 
As demonstrated in Section 1.4.2 of this study, the presence of a strong civil 
society able and willing to demand and realize human rights and compliance 
with international human rights is central for effective compliance with the 
ECHR. As noted by Beth Simmons, it is of central importance whether domestic 
groups have the motive and the means to demand protection of their rights as 
reflected in international treaties.733 Thus, civil society can play a meaningful 
role when the legal order provides people with the basic means to demand pro-
tection of their rights and freedoms. This chapter and the following two chapters 
provide an overview of numerous legislative amendments adopted in Russia 
since 2011 in the field of civil and political rights, focusing on three central 
rights: the right to freedom of expression (Chapter 5); the right to freedom of 
association (Chapter 6); and the right to freedom of assembly (Chapter 7). It 
will be analysed how these three central rights are incorporated into the Russian 
legal order and implemented in practice and what implications the amendments 
have on the protection of rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR.  
 
 
5.1. Overview of the legal framework  
Freedom of expression is enacted in most constitutions these days, “whether 
ratified by liberal democracies or announced by petty dictators”.734In accor-
dance with Article 29 of the Russian Constitution, everyone shall be guaranteed 
the freedom of ideas and speech. Propaganda or agitation instigating social, 
racial, national or religious hatred and strife is not allowed and propaganda of 
social, racial, national, religious or linguistic supremacy is banned. Pursuant to 
Article 29 no one may be forced to express their views and convictions or to 
reject them. Article 29 also guarantees freedom of information and freedom of 
mass communication and bans censorship. 
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Freedom of expression and the right to information are regulated more spe-
cifically by several federal laws. Pursuant to Federal Law № 149-FZ735 citizens 
(individuals) and organizations (legal entities) shall be entitled to seek and receive 
any information in any form and from any source, subject to the requirements 
established by Federal Law № 149-FZ and other federal laws. 736Access to 
information can be limited in order to protect the constitutional order, morality, 
health, rights and lawful interests of other persons, national defence and state 
security.737 Dissemination of information is carried out freely, subject to the 
requirements established by the legislation of the Russian Federation.738 Trans-
mission of information through the use of information and telecommunication 
networks is carried out without restriction, subject to the requirements estab-
lished by federal laws on disseminating information and protection of intel-
lectual property.739 
Some limitations of freedom of expression are enacted in Article 4 para-
graph 1 of the Federal Law “On mass media”740 according to which it is prohi-
bited to use the media for committing a criminal offense, for disclosure of 
classified information, for distribution of materials containing public calls for 
terrorist activities or publicly justifying terrorism, for publishing other extremist 
materials, materials that promote pornography, violence and cruelty, and mate-
rials that contain foul language. Activities by the media can be terminated by a 
court when in the case of repeated violations of these requirements during a 
twelve-month period (Article 16, paragraph 3). 
While interpreting the scope of freedom of expression and its limits, the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation have in 
many aspects mirrored the positions of the ECtHR. According to the Supreme 
Court: “Freedom of expression and freedom of the media constitute the foun-
dations of modern society and a democratic state. Implementation of these 
rights and freedoms may be subject to such limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society.”741 Similarly, the Constitutional Court 
of the Russian Federation has repeatedly stressed that the right to freedom of 
expression and dissemination of information may be restricted only for the 
protection of constitutional values, while respecting the principle of legal 
                                                                          
735  Federal’nyy zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 27.07.2006 No 149-FZ “Ob informatsii, 
informatsionnykh tekhnologiyakh i o zashchite informatsii” (hereinafter: federal law on 
information). 
736  Ibid Article 8 para 1.  
737  Ibid Article 9 para 1.  
738  Ibid Article 10 para 6. 
739  Ibid Article 15.  
740  Federal’nyy zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 27.12.1991 No 2124–1 “O sredstvakh 
massovoy informatsii” (hereinafter: federal law on mass media)  
741  Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, No 5-APG 13–57 (19 March 2014)  
<http://base.garant.ru/70622862/> accessed on 6 December 2017.  
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equality and the criteria of reasonableness, proportionality and necessity in a 
democratic state; emphasizing that such restrictions cannot distort the core 
meaning of the constitutional right and encroach on its essence – otherwise it 
leads to derogation and abolition of the right itself.742 The Constitutional Court 
has also referred to the case law of the ECtHR stating that freedom of expression, 
being one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and the basic 
conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-realization, also extends 
to cases where unpopular, shocking and provocative statements are being 
made.743 
The Supreme Court has noted that when resolving cases related to the 
activities of the media, it is necessary to take into account that the exercise of 
freedom of expression and freedom of the media carries with it special duties, a 
special responsibility, and may be subject to limitations established by law, 
when they are necessary in a democratic society to respect the rights or repu-
tations of others, for protection of national security and public order, the pre-
vention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for preventing 
disclosure of information received in confidence, and for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.744 However, often the aim of 
referring to the case law of the ECtHR remains unclear, as the Constitutional 
Court often connects referred-to case law to the facts of the case before it and 
the conclusions in many cases are contrary to the main points of referred-to case 
law.745 Although the Constitution and federal laws in principle protect freedom 
of expression, a wide discrepancy exists between norms established by the 
Constitution and “reality on the ground”.  
 
 
5.2. Freedom of expression and the internet 
The internet media and internet access have developed at accelerated speed in 
Russia. The new media – social media channels such as Facebook, Vkontakte, 
Twitter, Youtube and various blogs – have provided a forum for free discussion 
and information-dissemination among Russian civil society. The new media has 
purveyed an alternative to the Kremlin-controlled media-landscape. When for 
most of Putin’s term of office national broadcast media and national newspapers 
                                                                          
742 Russian Constitutional Court, No. 15-P (30 October 2003); Russian Constitutional Court, 
No 7-P (16 June 2006); Russian Constitutional Court, No. 14-P (22 June 2010).  
743  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 1053-O (2 July 2013)  
744  The Supreme Court explicitly referred to Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, paragraph 3 of Article 19 and Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Article 10 (2) of the Convention for the Protection of human Rights and 
Fundamental freedoms, Article 29 and 55 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation). 
Russian Supreme Court, No. 16 (15 June 2010) <http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/ 
online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=125973> accessed on 7 December 2017.  
745  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 1053-O (2 July 2013) 
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were placed under tight control, the internet-media were left relatively inde-
pendent.746 However, in recent years a considerable change has occurred and a 
number of laws restricting dissemination of information on the internet have 
been passed. Most of them are characterized by the possibility of blocking 
various internet resources by public authorities without any court decision.  
 
 
5.2.1. Law on blacklists  
In July 2012 restrictions on internet content were introduced by Federal Law 
No. 139-FZ747 “On Amendments to the Federal Law “On protection of children 
from information harmful to their health and development” and other legislative 
acts of the Russian Federation” (hereinafter: “law on blacklists”). The law 
amended Federal Law “On information, information technologies and protec-
tion of information”748 (Federal law No 149-FZ) and provided for creation of a 
register of prohibited websites containing certain types of information, the 
distribution of which is prohibited in the Russian Federation. According to the 
amendments, web-sites are included in the register when they contain porno-
graphic images of minors or material which could attract minors to participate 
in pornographic acts; information on manufacture or use of drugs; and infor-
mation that incites commission of suicide or contains suicide instructions.749 
This list of prohibited information was later complemented by information about 
minors who have suffered as a result of illegal acts or inaction750 and information 
in violation of regulations on gambling and lotteries751. In addition, web-pages 
can be included in the register on the basis of a court decision when the court 
has established that the web-page contains content that is forbidden in the 
Russian Federation752. Obviously there is no clearly defined list of such 
                                                                          
746  Anna Nemtsova, ‘Life for Russia’s Liberals Just Got a Whole Lot Worse’ (9 April 2014) 
Foreign Policy <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/09/life_for_russias_ 
liberals_just_got_a_whole_lot_worse> accessed on 8 December 2017.  
747  Federal’nyy zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 28.07.2012 No 139-FZ “O vnesenii 
izmeneniy v Federal’nyy zakon “O zashchite detey ot informatsii, prichinyayushchey vred 
ikh zdorov’yu i razvitiyu” i otdel’nykh zakonodatel’nykh aktov Rossiyskoy Federatsii” 
(hereinafter: federal law for protecting children from harmful information 2012).  
748  Federal law on information (n 735).  
749  Ibid, Article 15.1 (5) sub-sections 1 a), b) and v).  
750  Federal’nyy zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 05.04.2013 No 50-FZ “O vnesenii izme-
neniy v otdel’nyye zakonodatel’nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii v chasti ogranicheniya 
rasprostraneniya informatsii o nesovershennoletnikh, postradavshikh v rezul’tate proti-
vopravnykh deystviy (bezdeystviya))”. 
751  Federal’nyy zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 21.07.2014 No 222-FZ “O vnesenii izmeneniy 
v Federal’nyy zakon” O gosudarstvennom regulirovanii deyatel’nosti po organizatsii i pro-
vedeniyu azartnykh igr i o vnesenii izmeneniy v nekotoryye zakonodatel’nyye akty Ros-
siyskoy Federatsii “i otdel’nyye zakonodatel’nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii”.  
752  Federal law on information (n 735), Article 15.1 (5), sub-section 2.  
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prohibited information in Russian legislation and the judiciary has wide 
discretion in determining what is allowed and what is prohibited.753 
Web-resources can be included in the register based on a decision by three 
authorized federal executive bodies: Russia’s Federal Service for Supervision in 
Telecommunications, Information Technology and Mass Communications 
(Roskomnadzor), the Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN), or the Federal 
Service on Surveillance for Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-
Being (Rospotrebnadzor). The register is managed by Roskomnadzor and 
management of the list is regulated by Government decree No. 1101754 When 
Roskomnadzor adds a website to the register, content-hosting providers have 
twenty-four hours to notify the website owner and ask to remove the prohibited 
content. The website owner has another twenty-four hours to comply and to 
remove the content.755 If the website owner does not comply, the service 
provider is obliged to block access to the website within twenty-four hours.  
The website will be removed from the register when the owner removes 
prohibited content and sends a request for reinstatement or appeals the ban in 
court.756 
The ideological justification for the law on blacklists has been protection of 
family values, specifically protecting the health and development of Russian 
children. The official title of Federal Law No 139-FZ: “On amendments to the 
federal law “On protection of children from information harmful to their health 
and development” and other legislative acts of the Russian Federation” clearly 
refers to the stated goal of the law: to protect children. Sergey Zhelezniak, one 
of the authors of the law, has noted: “Our goal is … protecting our children 
from the information that directly can damage their health and even life.”757 
                                                                          
753  Maksim Mart’yanov, ‘Kriterii otsenki zapreshennoi informatsii’ (13 December 2013) 
Garant.ru < http://www.garant.ru/article/510868/> accessed on 7 December 2017.  
754  Postanovleniye Pravitel’stva Rossidkoy Federatsii ot 26 oktyabrya 2012 g. No. 1101 “O 
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fitsirovat’ sayty v informatsionno-telekommunikatsionnoy seti “Internet”, soderzhashchiye 
informatsiyu, rasprostraneniye kotoroy v Rossiyskoy Federatsii zapreshcheno”).  
755  Federal’naya Sluzba po Nadzoru v sfere svyazi, informatsionnyh tehnologii i massovyh 
kommunikatsii, Protsedura rassmotreniya zayavok v edinom reestre (no date)  
<https://eais.rkn.gov.ru/> accessed 7 December 2017.  
756  Federal law for protecting children from harmful information 2012 (n 747), Article 3 
section 2 (subsections 7–11).  
757  Damir Gaynutdinov, Analiz pravoprimenitel'noy praktiki Federal’nogo zakona ot 
28.07.2012 № 139-FZ “O vnesenii izmeneniy v Federal’nyy zakon “O zashchite detey ot 
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Denis Davydov, the head of the League for a Safer Internet, claims that about 
80% of harmful information in Runet is located on foreign websites and the new 
law provides an opportunity to combat this information in a civilized way. 
Another author of the law, Ekaterina Larina, has argued that the law was passed 
to combat foreign sites and block them”.758 According to the explanatory note to 
the law on blacklists,759 forced blocking of web pages containing prohibited 
information mirrors the best practices of other countries: for example, in the UK 
access is also blocked to sites containing child pornography or other prohibited 
material. Besides, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, New 
Zealand and Malta have special systems to combat the spread of child porno-
graphy.  
It is difficult to argue that countries should not combat child pornography or 
other activities harming children. It is the duty of every country to protect children 
from such harmful influences. However, in the Russian case the law officially 
aimed at protecting children from harmful influences has been used for many 
other “informal aims” not enacted in the law nor explained in the explanatory 
note. In reality, using the noble goal of protecting children, millions of adults in 
the Russian Federation have been deprived of their constitutional right to 
receive information, as noted by the experts of Moscow Helsinki Group.760  
As prohibited material is very vaguely defined in the law, not only sites 
potentially dangerous for children, but all sorts of websites, mainly operated by 
opposition-minded citizens, are at risk of being taken offline. Experts warn that 
the law leads to disproportionate over-blocking of legal content also because 
often it is technically impossible to block access only of a certain article or video 
and as a result the whole web-page must be blocked in order to comply with the 
law. Moreover, the law leaves a very wide discretion to government agencies 
that can submit websites for the register without a court order and cause dispro-
portionate harm to freedom of expression.761 The Russian Presidential Council 
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760 Gaynutdinov (n 757) 2.  
761  See, for example, Ekaterina Vinokurova, ‘Cet’ za URL ne otvechaet’ (4 August 2012) 
Gazeta.ru <http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/08/03_a_4709265.shtml> accessed 8 Decem-
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for Civil Society and Human Rights has also criticized the law, claiming that 
the proposed procedure for blocking domain names and IP-addresses (rather 
than URLs) may result in mass closure of bona fide resources; that the 
restrictions are based on subjective criteria and evaluations and that blocking 
does not address the underlying causes of harm to children.762 They emphasize 
that it is important to stop censorship of the internet and warn against building 
new “electronic curtains” with a detrimental impact on the rights and oppor-
tunities of Russian citizens and on the development of society and the economy 
in general.763Wikipedia’s Russian website protested against the bill with a  
24-hour blackout: they published a critical heading “Imagine the world without 
free access to knowledge” on their websites.764 Vkontakte, Yandex, and 
LiveJournal also joined the protest.765  
Overall, the law on blacklists can be viewed as another attempt to exercise 
control over the media and to increase censorship. As with other “morality-
driven” laws, a law ostensibly aimed at protecting from harmful information has 
been used very widely for blocking various internet-resources, most of which 
have nothing to do with protecting children.  
During the first year after the law was passed, Roskomnadzor received tens 
of thousands of requests to place web content in the register and the register 
contained thousands of items.766 In 2014, according to the RosKomSvoboda 
project, 6876 domains out of 7103 located in the register, that is, 96.8% of 
domains, were blocked without any legal basis, for the sole reason that they 
were located on the same IP-address as resources considered as forbidden infor-
mation.767 Examples of blocking influential websites under the new legislation 
include blocking the entire LiveJournal platform for three days.768 RuTracker, a 
file-sharing website, was blocked due to a copy of “The Suicide Handbook” in 
                                                                          
762  Sovet pri Prezidente Rossiyskoy Federatsii po razvitiyu grazhdanskogo obshchestva i 
pravam cheloveka ‘Zayavleniye chlenov Soveta v otnoshenii zakonoproyekta No. 89417-6 
“O vnesenii izmeneniy v Federal’nyy zakon “O zashchite detey ot informatsii, prichinyayu-
shchey vred ikh zdorov’yu i razvitiyu’ (2 July 2012)   
<http://president-sovet.ru/documents/ read/47/> accessed 8 December 2017.  
763  Ibid.  
764  See for example: Charles Clover, ‘Russia’s Wikipedia strikes over blacklist’ (10 July 
2012) Financial Times.  
765  RBK, ‘Vkontakte, Yandeks, i ZHZH protestuyut protiv tsenzury v Internete’ (11 July 
2012) <http://top.rbc.ru/society/11/07/2012/659368.shtml> accessed 8 December 2017.  
766  Roman Rozhkov, ‘Minkomsvyazi ottachivaet tehniku’ (26 March 2013) Kommersant 
<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2154714> accessed on 8 December 2017. 
767  Roskomsvoboda, ‘Monitoring sostoyaniya Reestra zapreshennyh saitov’ (no date) 
http://reestr.rublacklist.net/ accessed 8 December 2017.  
768  Malavika Jagannathan, ‘Temporary block on LiveJournal in Russia exemplifies over-
blocking’ (6 August 2012) OpenNet Initiative <https://opennet.net/blog/2012/08/temporary-
block-livejournal-russia-exemplifies-overblocking> accessed 8 December 2017.  
168 
their database769; online library Librusek was blocked because it contained a 
copy of “The Anarchist Handbook”770; the LiveJournal blog of Rustem Ada-
gamov, one of most popular blogs in Russia, was blocked for publishing “suicide 
propaganda” as the blog entry included photos of Tibetan independence activists 
performing self-immolation.771 A blog entry by another famous Russian blogger, 
Artemy Lebedev, was blocked due to a link to the YouTube video called “Dumb 
Ways to Die”, as the lyrics of the song “described various methods of suicide 
and animated characters illustrated methods of suicide in a humorous way that 
attracts and incites children and teenagers to commit suicide”.772 In June 2013, 
the state-owned ISP Rostelekom blocked fifteen web-pages773, including 
Gazeta.ru and Lenta.com, after the regional court of Ulyanovsk ruled on 23 
May 2013 in case No 2-3551/13774 that material published on those websites 
promoted bribery and undermined the authority of Russian Federation.775  
The court referred to Article 10 (6) of federal law № 149-FZ, which prohibits 
dissemination of information which is subject to criminal or administrative 
liability and the provisions of the criminal code regulating bribery and corrup-
tion. However, the court did not indicate which materials published on the 
websites were illegal and on what grounds, nor what information on the web-
sites formed the basis of the claim. The Court argued that access to those web-
pages should be limited to restore the rights of the citizens of the Russian 
Federation as “free access to this information promotes the formation of social 
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consensus on the possibility of committing corruption offenses and undermines 
the authority of the government of the Russian Federation and Russian laws”. 
As the court did not indicate which materials published on the websites were 
illegal, Rostelekom restricted all access to the websites.776 
Despite criticism by international and national human rights defenders and 
lawyers, Russian society in general has been supportive of the new measures to 
regulate the internet. Additional regulation of the internet and creation of a 
register of banned websites was welcomed by 62% of Russians in 2012. Some 
51% of respondents said that banning sites did not limit freedom of expres-
sion.777 Moreover, global ISPs have been rather cooperative with Russian 
requests. Google, YouTube and Twitter have all removed or blocked content 
allegedly violating Russian legislation.778 
 
 
5.2.2. Law on arbitrary blocking of extremist materials 
On 1 February 2014 new amendments to the federal law “On information, infor-
mation technologies and protection of information”779 came into force. Federal 
Law No. № 398-ФZ780 (“law on arbitrary blocking of extremist materials”) 
enables the General Prosecutor’s Office to block resources that, in its assess-
ment, contain calls for riots, extremist activities, and participation in mass (public) 
events held in violation of the established order without a court order.781 A 
characteristic feature of the new regulation is the lack of mechanisms to address 
violations preceding blocking and lack of an appeal mechanism. In addition, the 
powers given to the Prosecutor General in fact substitute judicial procedure for 
the recognition of materials as extremist, as set forth in the Federal Law of 
25 July 2002 № 114-FZ “On countering extremist activities”. Another cha-
racteristic feature of the law on arbitrary blocking of extremist materials is the 
vagueness of its terms. No definition appears of what constitutes “extremist 
activities”; “illegal activities” or “participation in public events held in violation 
of the established order”. These expressions have been described very broadly, 
allowing for blocking of various resources. 
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779  Federal law on information (n 735).  
780  Federal’nyy zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 28.12.2013 No 398-FZ “O vnesenii izme-
neniy v Federal'nyy zakon “Ob informatsii, informatsionnykh tekhnologiyakh i o zashchite 
informatsii”. 
781  See Article 15.3 of the Federal law on information (n 735).  
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The Constitutional Court has held782 in the context of the law “On countering 
extremist activities” that it is not necessary to enact clear criteria for defining 
extremist activities and extremist materials, as such concepts should be 
comprehensible for Russian citizens even without clear criteria. The Court 
noted that the requirement of certainty, clarity and unambiguity of legal norms 
arising from the constitutional rule of law and legal equality does not preclude 
the use of estimated or universally understood concepts that subjects should 
comprehend either directly or through clarifications issued by the courts. The 
Constitutional Court established that classifying all activities and materials 
associated with initiation of social, racial, national or religious hatred and pro-
paganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person on the basis of their 
social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude towards 
religion, as extremist activities (extremism) and extremist materials is based on 
reproduction and concretization of the positions of the Russian Constitution and 
therefore as such do not violate constitutional rights and freedoms. The Consti-
tutional Court also referred to the ECtHR, which has explained that in all cases 
the law cannot be completely free from the terms which to a greater or lesser 
extent require judicial interpretation, clarification of doubtful points and adaption 
to changing circumstances.783  
The Constitutional Court concluded that there was no conflict with the prin-
ciples of rule of law and the requirements of legal equality and legal certainty. 
Although the ECtHR has indeed established that the law cannot be completely 
free from terms needing certain interpretation, the Constitutional Court did not 
compare the facts of the cases, but simply used the argumentation of the ECtHR 
to fit its own explanation without considering the overall context.  
The official guiding idea of the law on the arbitrary blocking of extremist 
materials is to protect the Russian people from threats related to extremism and 
to protect the security of the Russian Federation. The authors of the law have 
explained in the explanatory note 784 that the law allows a functioning mecha-
nism to be created to protect Russian society from illegal information distri-
buted in the media, including the internet, especially to protect against threats 
related to inviting people to participate in illegal mass riots and against threats 
related to carrying out extremist or terrorist activities that spread religious or 
national hatred. It is also explained that since only the Prosecutor General of the 
Russian Federation or his deputies can carry out actions aimed at protecting 
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people from dissemination of unlawful information under the law on arbitrary 
blocking of extremist materials, it excludes the possibility of abusing the law 
and full protection of the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens is guaranteed.  
Although the authors of the law have full trust that the Prosecutor General is 
not abusing the powers granted to him, practice has shown that the law has been 
widely used to silence activities by the political opposition. In 2014 about 4,500 
websites were blocked due to alleged extremist content.785 For example, in 
March 2014 the prosecutor ordered the blogs of prominent opposition figures 
Garry K. Kasparov and Aleksei A. Navalny and posts published in the inde-
pendent media outlets Daily Journal and Grani.ru to be blocked because they 
had encouraged “illegal activities and participation in public events held in 
violation of the established order.” ISPs also blocked access to the site for the 
radio station Ekho Moskvy, which carried Mr. Navalny’s blog. Blocked pages 
contained content critical of Kremlin policy in Ukraine and in all cases it 
remained unclear what “illegal activities and participation in public events held 
in violation of the established order” had been promoted.786 In January 2015 
Moscow lawyer Anton Sorvachev sent a complaint787 to the Prosecutor General 
regarding Alexei Navalny and Grani.Ru in connection with publication of a 
video of the verdict in the case of “Yves Rocher”. On 30 December 2014 after 
hearing the verdict, Alexei Navalny said, “This government does not deserve to 
exist, it must be destroyed”, which was filmed and published on the Grani.Ru 
video channel on YouTube788.  
Sorvachev required the prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings pursuant 
to Article 280(2) of the Criminal Code for public calls for extremist activities by 
using the internet. According to Sorvachev: “Alexei Navalny, using the media 
and the internet, called for a mass gathering of people on the streets and for the 
destruction of power in the Russian Federation”. On 14 January 2015 Roskom-
nadzor asked the news portal “Agency of Business News” to take down 
illustrations of “Charlie Hebdo” magazine depicting Mohammad as, according 
to Roskomnadzor, those illustrations are extremist and recommended not men-
tioning the illustrations in a positive tone. 789 At the request of the General 
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Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation, a page of the Ukrainian 
children’s camp “Azovets” in the social network “VKontakte” was included in 
the register of banned information in September 2015 as the majority of the 
material published there was arguably illegal in Russia. According to the General 
Prosecutor the community carried out propaganda of Ukrainian extremist orga-
nizations whose activities are prohibited on the territory of the Russian Fede-
ration. The materials of the community arguably encouraged minors to become 
their followers, and also stimulated violence.790 
 
 
5.2.3. The law on bloggers 
In May 2014 Federal Law No. 149-FZ “On information, information techno-
logies and protection of information” was amended again. Federal law of 5 May 
2014 No 97-FZ (the “law on bloggers”), which came into force on 1 August 
2014,791 establishes strict control over the blogosphere and social media by 
assigning additional responsibilities for social networks, forums and bloggers. 
According to the law on bloggers, they must notify the authorized federal body 
of initiation of dissemination of information (or) exchange of data between users. 
Secondly, they are obliged to keep data on admission, transfer, delivery and 
processing of information by all users of electronic communications and also 
data on the users themselves for six months after the end of the specified actions 
on the territory of Russia. This information must be provided to authorized state 
bodies engaged in operational investigative activities or ensuring the security of 
the country. In the case of failure to meet those duties, access to information 
resources may be limited. In addition, this would entail administrative liability.  
The new amendments also provide for a register of websites, including blogs, 
that host public information and which are accessed by over three thousand 
users a day. Roskomnadzor organizes monitoring of web-sites; determines the 
number of daily users; and has the right to request information necessary to 
maintain the register. There is an obligation to provide requested information no 
later than within ten days from the date of receipt of the request 792 Bloggers are 
also assigned a number of duties, which oblige them to follow the same stan-
dards as the mass media. In particular, they should not allow disclosure of secret 
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information protected by law, public calls to terrorism, extremist materials, 
pornography or use of foul language on their blogs. Bloggers are obliged to 
check the accuracy of information prior to publishing it and immediately 
remove false information. Bloggers are obliged to disclose their surname, 
initials and e-mail address on the blog. 
According to the explanatory note to the law on bloggers, the law aims to 
protect the rights of Russian citizens and to regulate dissemination of infor-
mation and data exchange between internet users.793 The explanatory note is 
very laconic in its explanations and it remains unclear what precise rights the 
law aims to protect. Critics of the law claim that its “hidden” aim is to impose 
censorship on ideas and opinions on the internet although censorship is pro-
hibited under Article 29(5) of the Constitution. The law has been described as 
another proof of Russia being a “police state”.794 Anton Nosik, a blogger and 
media entrepreneur argues: “It’s about creating a situation where big brother is 
watching you; you are part of a list, you are being watched, being observed, you 
are being served notices and could even serve a criminal sentence if you choose 
to speak out.”795  
 
 
5.2.4. Regulating the internet media in the practice of the ECtHR  
In its landmark freedom of expression case Handyside v United Kingdom the 
ECtHR held that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential 
foundations of a democratic society, one of the basic conditions for its progress 
and for the development of every man. Freedom of expression is applicable not 
only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “demo-
cratic society”.796 
The ECtHR has developed the “necessary in a democratic society test” for 
balancing the essential protection of freedom of expression with the equally 
important necessity of protecting those interests limiting freedom of expression. 
The concept of “margin of appreciation” enables to assess “whether and to what 
extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a difference of 
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treatment”797. However, the margin of appreciation is not a magic tool allowing 
states to step over human rights simply stating that this is necessary to protect 
the values or cultural background of their country. For example, it was held by 
the ECtHR in Öllinger v Austria that there is little scope for restrictions on poli-
tical speech or on debate over questions of public interest798 and restricting a 
person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to 
impart799 is a violation of the right to freedom of expression. Otherwise, “society 
would be faced with being deprived of the opportunity of hearing differing 
views on any question which offends the sensitivity of the majority opinion.”800 
Limitations in order to protect the rights of others should not be interpreted, 
inter alia, to restrict political debate. 801 The threshold for prohibiting expression 
on the basis of protecting public order is high and must be evidence-based, 
rather than premised on speculation.802 
In a similar fashion, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated 
that for a limitation on the right to freedom of expression or freedom of peaceful 
assembly to be considered necessary, states must demonstrate in a “specific and 
individualised fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the necessity and 
proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct 
and immediate connection between the expression and the threat.”803 The 
ECtHR has on numerous occasions stressed, “the Internet plays an important 
role in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination 
of information in general.”804  
Analysing the law on blacklists in the context of ECtHR case law, it can be 
concluded that mechanisms provided under the law would in most cases amount 
to a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. For example, in the case of Ahmet 
Yildirim v. Turkey805 the ECtHR unanimously held that the blanket blocking of 
                                                                          
797 X. and others v Austria (App 19010/07) ECtHR 19 February 2013, para 98.  
798  Öllinger v Austria (76900/01) ECtHR 29 June 2006, para 38.  
799  Leander v Sweden (App 9248/81) ECtHR 26 March 1987, para 74; Sirbu and others v 
Moldova (Apps 73562/01, 73565/01, 73712/01, 73744/01, 73972/01) ECtHR 15 June 2004, 
para 18. 
800 Alekseyev v Russia (Apps 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09) ECtHR 21 October 2010, 
para 77. 
801 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 (12 September 
2011) CCPR/C/GC/34, para 28.  
802  Article 19, Traditional values? Attempts to censor sexuality. Homosexual propaganda 
bans, freedom of expression and equality (London 2013) 14  
<http://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/3637/LGBT-propaganda-report 
ENGLISH.pdf> accessed on 8 December 2017.  
803 United Nations Human Rights Committee (n 801) para 35.  
804  Times Newspapers Ltd v The United Kingdom (Apps 3002/03, 23676/03) ECtHR 10 
March 2009, para 27; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey (App 3111/10) ECtHR 18 December 2012, 
para 48.  
805  Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey (App 3111/10) ECtHR 18 December 2012. 
175 
access to an entire online platform was a violation of the right to freedom of 
expression. The case was brought by Ahmet Yıldırım, who published his 
academic work and other materials on a website hosted by the “Google Sites” 
portal. In 2009 the Denizli Criminal court ordered blocking of access to another 
website also hosted by Google Sites, as it allegedly insulted the memory of 
Atatürk. The administrative body responsible for executing the blocking order, 
the TİB (Turkish Telecommunications and Electronic Data Authority), re-
quested that an order be issued blocking all access to Google Sites and this 
order was upheld by Denizli Criminal Court. The ECtHR found that the blocking 
amounted to a violation of Yıldırım’s right to freedom of expression. It was 
noted that in order to comply with the requirements of Article 10 of the ECHR, 
a restriction must be prescribed by law and must be formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable individuals to regulate their conduct.  
The Turkish regulation did not authorise the wholesale blocking of an entire 
online platform such as Google Sites. The law also failed to provide sufficient 
safeguards against potential abuses. The ECtHR also held in Ahmet Yildirim v. 
Turkey that Turkish legislation had conferred extensive powers on an admi-
nistrative body, the TİB, in the implementation of a blocking order originally 
issued in relation to a specified site. The ECtHR noted: “In matters affecting 
fundamental rights it would be contrary to the rule of law…for a legal discretion 
granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. 
Consequently, the law must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any 
such discretion and the manner of its exercise.806 At the time the blocking order 
was issued, there must be a clear and precise rule enabling the applicant to 
regulate his conduct in the matter.” 807 
Besides, the Russian law on blacklists does not authorize the wholesale 
blocking of an online platform and does not provide sufficient safeguards 
against potential abuses. The majority of blocked websites have nothing to do 
with the aims of the law and the law does not protect those sites against the 
abuses of Rozkomnadsor and organizations authorized to block websites, as 
there are no clear and precise rules enabling people to regulate their conduct in 
this matter and very wide discretion is granted to Rozkomnadzor and other 
organizations authorized to block websites. The ECtHR also stressed the 
importance of judicial review, designed to strike a balance between different 
interests, and argued that this is “inconceivable without a framework estab-
lishing precise and specific rules regarding the application of preventive 
restrictions on freedom of expression”808 It is the task of the national court to 
analyse “whether a less far-reaching measure could have been taken to block 
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access specifically to the offending website.” 809 In Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey the 
ECtHR held that “the judicial review procedures concerning the blocking of 
internet sites are insufficient to meet the criteria for avoiding abuse, as domestic 
law does not provide for any safeguards to ensure that a blocking order in respect 
of a specific site is not used as a means of blocking access in general.”810 The 
Russian case is different in this regard, namely that the court is not involved at 
all – it is the discretion of Rozkomnadzor and other authorized bodies to make 
relevant decisions about blocking websites, which makes the situation even 
worse. The staff of those organizations is hardly competent to strike a balance 
between different interests and avoid abuse of freedom of expression.  
Regarding the role or bloggers, the ECtHR has noted that bloggers and 
popular users of social media sites play an important role in enhancing public 
access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information; hence they are 
also “public watchdogs” like the traditional media and fall under the protection 
of Article 10 of the ECHR. 811 
 
 
5.3. Freedom of expression vs traditional values812 
This Section focuses on the federal law on protection of the feelings of 
believers813 criminalizing insults to religious feelings and establishing administ-
rative prohibition of “propaganda of untraditional sexual relations”814, which are 
the central examples of Russian legislators’ initiative to protect Russian tradi-
tional values.  
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5.3.1. Law on protection of the feelings of believers 
The federal law on protection of the feelings of believers amended the Criminal 
Code of the Russian Federation, making insulting the feelings of believers a 
criminal offence. According to the regulation, public action expressing obvious 
disrespect to society and committed in order to insult the religious feelings of 
believers is punishable by up to one year of imprisonment or in aggravated form 
up to three years of imprisonment.815 Similarly to previously analysed legis-
lative amendments restricting freedom of expression in the internet, in the case 
of the law on protection of the feelings of believers the terms are also very 
vaguely defined. The law gives no indication what “obvious disrespect to society 
in order to insult the religious feelings of believers” entails; thus it is up to the 
courts to define what deeds demonstrate obvious disrespect to society and insult 
the religious feelings of believers.  
Several State Duma representatives have argued that acts committed in order 
to insult the religious feelings of believers are socially dangerous, because they 
violate the traditional and religious norms developed in Russian society over 
many centuries, its moral foundations are contrary to morality, entail serious 
consequences and have an antisocial orientation. 816 On the one hand, the 
majority of Western countries also protect the honour and dignity of people – in 
most cases this is done in civil codes and insults to feelings are not criminalized. 
However, Russian legislators have demonstrated that in Russia insulting the 
feelings of believers is considered to be a truly grave act worthy of criminal 
punishment.  
Liberal voices from Russia and the West have labelled the law “a blasphemy 
bill”. The law was adopted shortly after the Pussy Riot trial, which initiated a 
passionate debate in Russian society on the subject of protecting religious 
feelings. Interestingly, in Russia only a small fraction of people viewed this 
debate as a debate over free speech. Most Russians viewed this debate rather as 
“a targeted assault on a religious group and a trespass on the rights of religious 
believers to worship in their holy places unmolested”, as explained by Dustin 
Koenig.817 The political and religious elite also framed the debate in a similar 
vein. Although considerable international criticism was levelled at how the 
Pussy Riot trial was resolved in Russia and freedom of speech was in the focus 
of this criticism, these arguments did not convince ordinary Russians. The 
Russian political and religious elite skilfully used this criticism to demonstrate 
the immorality of Western values and to consolidate support for their methods 
of punishing trespassers.  
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In the light of law on the protection of the feelings of believers, one may 
conclude that when dealing with debates over religious rights and freedoms, 
particularly those related to the Russian Orthodox faith, Russia clearly favours 
freedom of religion over freedom of expression, instead of providing equal 
treatment for both.818 Additionally, it must be noted that the aim of protecting 
holy Russian Orthodox values is used to convince the Russian people of the 
immorality of Western values and the need to strictly punish those who overstep 
the moral boundaries established by the Orthodox Church.  
 
 
5.3.2. Anti-homosexual propaganda law 
The Ryazan Oblast was the first Russian region to impose administrative fines 
for “public actions aimed at propaganda of homosexuality (sodomy and les-
bianism) among minors” under Ryazan’s regional law on the protection of 
morality and health of minors819 in 2006 and under Ryazan’s regional law on 
administrative offences820. Following the example of Ryazan, several other 
regions in the Russian Federation enacted similar laws to prohibit propaganda 
of homosexuality: the Republic of Bashkortostan (2012), the regions of 
Arkhangelsk (2009) Chukotka, Irkutsk (2013), Kostroma (2012), Krasnodar 
(2012), Magadan (2012), Novosibirsk (2012), Samara (2012) and the City of St. 
Petersburg. Laws prohibiting “homosexual propaganda” share in common a 
provision of administrative or criminal sanctions banning the dissemination of 
any LGBT-related information. Most laws outline protection of either the rights 
of minors, the protection of public morality, or support for particular religious 
traditions as one of their purposes. The laws are also characterized by very 
vague definitions of key terms.821 As a consequence of these laws, consistent and 
escalating interference has occurred with the freedom of expression of LGBT 
people, which has resulted in widespread arrests, detention and the imposition 
of fines.822  
On 19 January 2010 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation held 
that the Ryazan regional law on the protection of morality and health of minors 
“did not provide for any measures aimed at prohibition of homosexuality, did 
not contain its official condemnation, was not of a discriminatory nature and was 
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not capable of allowing any excessive acts by the authorities”.823 The Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation gave its tacit approval to the propaganda laws 
by rejecting appeals against convictions in the lower courts. For example, in a 
consideration of the Arkhangelsk law, the Supreme Court held that regulating 
homosexual propaganda to minors was justified, lawful and not in violation of 
any other federal law.824 The Supreme Court emphasized that regional laws do 
not prohibit all public expression of homosexuality and do not interfere with the 
right to obtain and convey general and neutral information regarding homo-
sexuality. The Supreme Court also stated that anti-propaganda laws do not 
prevent the holding of public events (such as “gay pride” events) or debates but 
regulate the discussion of homosexuality specifically in relation to minors.825  
The assessment of the Supreme Court has been repeatedly restated by the 
Russian government, which argues that propaganda laws are in compliance with 
federal and constitutional law and, rather than unnecessarily impairing citizens’ 
right to freedom of expression, provide a “well–balanced” and proportionate 
response to the need to protect children from information that they are “not able 
to critically estimate” due to their age.826 
On 29 June 2013 federal law introduced administrative liability for “pro-
paganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors” This applies throug-
hout the whole of the Russian Federation. The law passed through the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation with the enthusiastic support of all 
legislators. The Duma passed the Bill at First Reading by 388-1 on 25 January 
2013, and at Second Reading by 436-0 on 11 June 2013. The Federation Council 
(the upper house of the Federal Assembly) passed the Bill by 137-0 on 26 June 
2013. The law received the required approval from the President of Russia, 
Vladimir Putin, on 30 June 2013.827  
The Code of Administrative Offences of Russian Federation now includes 
propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships among minors, expressed in 
the dissemination of information aimed at forming non-traditional sexual attitudes 
among minors, the attractiveness of non-traditional sexual relationships, a dis-
torted image of social equality among traditional and non-traditional sexual rela-
tionships, or forced imposition of information of non-traditional sexual relation-
ships, which can attract interest in such relationships, as an administrative 
offence. The legislation also prohibits dissemination of information that negates 
                                                                          
823  Russian Constitutional Court, N 151-О-О (19 January 2010).  
824  Russian Supreme Court, N 1 – APG12- 11 (15 August 2012) (hereinafter Russian 
Supreme Court 15 August 2012)  
825  See: Paul Johnson, ‘Homosexual Propaganda Laws in the Russian Federation: Are They 
in Violation of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) 3 Russian Law Journal 
37–61; 45. 
826  Russian Supreme Court 15 August 2012 (n 745); Ibid 46. 
827 Johnson (n 825) 44. 
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family values, propagates non-traditional sexual relationships and forms 
disrespect to parents and (or) other family members.828  
As conveyed in the explanatory note to the draft law, propaganda of homo-
sexuality is widespread in Russia today. It is argued that this kind of propaganda 
is carried out through the media as well as via public actions, which construe 
propaganda of homosexuality as a norm of behaviour. The explanatory note 
claims that such propaganda is especially dangerous for children and young 
persons, who are not capable of critically evaluating this kind of information 
“which is poured upon them every day”. According to the explanatory note, in 
this regard, it is necessary first of all to protect the younger generation from the 
effects of homosexual propaganda.829  
The anti-homosexual propaganda law prohibits “propaganda of non-traditional 
sexual relations among minors”, more specifically the dissemination of infor-
mation aimed at forming non-traditional sexual attitudes among minors, the 
attractiveness of non-traditional sexual relationships, a distorted image of social 
equality among traditional and non-traditional sexual relationships. Restricting 
the right to freedom of expression has to be prescribed by law and this condition 
has two requirements, as established by the ECtHR: 1) The law must be ade-
quately accessible and 2) The law must be foreseeable: a norm cannot be 
regarded as a “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the 
citizen to regulate their conduct and to understand the consequences of their 
actions.830  
A study conducted by NGO Article 19 claims that key terms in the prohi-
bitions are either not defined or are defined in vague terms. In particular, the 
laws fail to define the term “propaganda”. It is not clear what types of infor-
mation are prohibited, what intent must be proven to show culpability, and what 
“among minors” actually means.831 This means that individuals cannot decide 
with any certainty whether their conduct is legal or not and the ambiguity of the 
provisions leaves too much discretion to police and prosecutors and may 
therefore be enforced arbitrarily.832 Additionally, the Venice Commission has held 
that the provisions under consideration are not formulated with sufficient 
precision. The scope of terms such as “propaganda” is very wide, ambiguous 
and vague and fails to reach the standard of “foreseeability”.833 Maria Issaeva, a 
                                                                          
828  Federal law protecting children from harmful information 2013 (n 814) Article 5(2) 
subsection 4 
829  Poyasnitel’naya zapiska k proektu federal’nogo zakona “O vnesenii izmeneniy v kodeks 
Rossiskoy Federatsii ob administrativnyh pravonarusheniyah” <http://base.consultant.ru/ 
cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=PRJ;n=93974> accessed on 11 December 2017.  
830  The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom (App 6538/74) ECtHR 26 April 1979, para 49. 
831  Article 19 (n 802) 23. 
832  Ibid. 
833  Venice Commission, Opinion 707 / 2012. CDL-AD(2013)022: Opinion on the issue of 
the prohibition of so-called “Propaganda of homosexuality in the light of recent legislation in 
some Council of Europe Member States, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 95th 
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Russian lawyer, agrees that the provisions fail to satisfy the requirement of 
foreseeability. This entails risks, including arbitrary application and abuse of the 
law in practice.834  
Moreover, the provisions do not sufficiently define the circumstances in which 
they are applied. The scope of the provisions is not limited to sexuality explicit 
content, but is also applicable to legitimate expressions of sexual orientation. 
The Venice Commission is of the opinion that the provisions on prohibition of 
“homosexual propaganda” are not formulated with sufficient precision as to 
satisfy the requirement “prescribed by law” contained in paragraph 2 of Articles 
10 and 11 of the ECHR.835 
The practice of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation has not made the issues substantially more clear. In its judgment of 
19 January 2010, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, examining 
the constitutionality of the provisions adopted in Ryazan region, formulated a 
definition of “propaganda of homosexuality among minors”. According to the 
Constitutional Court, homosexual propaganda is “activity aimed at purposeful 
and uncontrolled dissemination of information which is able to cause damage to 
the moral and spiritual development or to the health of minors, inducing them to 
form warped perceptions that traditional and non-traditional marital relations 
are socially equal, bearing in mind that minors, due to their age, are not able to 
estimate such information critically.”836  
The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation837 has considered that “such 
prohibition does not prevent holding public events, including public debates on 
the social status of sexual minorities, without dictating a homosexual lifestyle to 
minors who are not able to critically estimate such information due to their 
age.838 The notion of “propaganda of homosexuality” still remains vague, as the 
Russian courts have not specified what information “is able to cause damage to 
the moral and spiritual development or to the health of minors” or “is dictating a 
homosexual lifestyle to minors”. It is thus not clear from the case law whether 
terms such as propaganda should be interpreted restrictively, or whether they 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Plenary Session (14–15 June 2013) (Strasbourg 18 June 2013) paras 28 and 79 
<http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282013%29022-e> 
accessed on 11 December 2017 (hereinafter: Venice Commission, opinion on the pro-
paganda legislation).  
834  Maria Issaeva. ‘Russia and universal freedoms: overview of restrictions on LGBT rights’ 
(13 December 2013) Cambridge Journal of International and Compartive Law  
<http://cjicl.org.uk/2013/12/13/russia-universal-freedoms-overview-restrictions-lgbt-rights/> 
accessed on 09 December 2017. 
835  Venice Commission, opinion on the propaganda legislation (n 833) paras 28, 37 and 79. 
836  Russian Constitutional Court, N 151-О-О (19 January 2010). 
837  Ibid.  
838  Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers, ‘Communication from the Russian Federation 
concerning the case of Alekseyev against Russian Federation. (Application No. 4916/07)’ 
DH-DD(2013)67 (28 January 2013) < https://rm.coe.int/168063c864> accessed on 11 
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cover any information or opinion in favour of homosexuality or any debate over 
homophobic attitudes and deeply-rooted prejudices in Russia.839  
Thus, it can be concluded that the provisions prohibiting “propaganda of 
non-traditional sexual relations” are not sufficiently clear to enable individuals 
to regulate their conduct in conformity with the law. Although the legislation 
does not expressis verbis prohibit all information and debate over LGBT issues, 
as demonstrated above, in practice the provisions have been interpreted in a 
very broad sense and they have made discussions on LGBT issues virtually 
impossible in the public sphere or in the media.  
Justifications for prohibiting “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations” 
in Russia are premised on protecting the rights of others, in particular, children 
and the protection of public morals. These are legitimate aims in the meaning of 
Article 10(2) of the ECHR. However, the ECHR does not allow any of the 
legitimate aims to be invoked to justify discriminatory practices. The restric-
tions must in any case meet the test of proportionality and be necessary in a 
democratic society. Where a prohibition singles out expression or assemblies 
related to homosexuality for differential treatment, clear and objective evidence 
must be introduced to justify why the same prohibition does not extend to 
information pertaining to heterosexuality.840 Moreover, measures, which aim to 
remove promotion of sexual identities other than heterosexual from the public 
domain “affect the basic tenets of a democratic society characterized by 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, as well as the fair and proper 
treatment of minorities. Thus, such measures would have to be justified by 
compelling reasons.”841 
 
 
Protecting public morals  
An important justification for the anti-homosexual propaganda legislation has 
been protection of morals, a legitimate aim provided in Article 10(2) of the 
ECHR. On the one hand, there is no European-wide consensus on the require-
ments of morals and the classic approach of the ECtHR has been that states 
have a wide margin of appreciation in assessing measures necessary for pro-
tection of morals, as established in Handyside v. United Kingdom.842 However, 
while states enjoy a margin of appreciation, this discretionary leeway does not 
permit public morals to be invoked to “justify discriminatory practices” or “to 
perpetuate prejudice or promote intolerance”843. In Fretté v. France the ECtHR 
                                                                          
839  Venice Commission, opinion on the propaganda legislation (n 833) paras 31 and 34.  
840  Article 19 (n 802). 
841 Venice Commission, opinion on the propaganda legislation (n 833) para 48.  
842  Handyside v The United Kingdom (App 5493/72) ECtHR 7 December 1976. 
843 Leo Hertzberg et al. v Finland (Communication No. 61/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 
at 124 (1985)). Individual opinion by Committee members Opsahl, Lalla and Tarnopolsky 
(2 April 1982).  
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explained that the margin of appreciation couldn’t be interpreted as giving states 
carte blanche to exercise arbitrary power.844 A wide consensus exists among CoE 
countries on the right to freedom of expression to campaign for the recognition of 
the rights of sexual minorities and consequently the state’s margin of appre-
ciation for protection of public morality is narrow.845  
If measures to implement the legitimate aims provided in Article 10(2) of the 
ECtHR make a difference in treatment based on sexual orientation, the state’s 
margin of appreciation is narrow and the state must demonstrate that such 
measures were “necessary”, and not “merely suitable”.846 Different treatment 
based on sexual orientation requires particularly serious reasons by way of justi-
fication or, as is sometimes said, particularly convincing and weighty reasons. 
Different treatment that is solely based on considerations of sexual orientation is 
unacceptable under the ECHR.847 Moreover, in its choice of means, the state 
“must necessarily take into account developments in society and changes in the 
perception of social, civil-status and relational issues, including the fact that 
there is not just one way or one choice when it comes to leading one’s family or 
private life”848.  
The Russian Constitutional Court has explained that “In so far as one of the 
roles of the family is [to provide for] the birth and upbringing of children, an 
understanding of marriage as the union of a man and a woman underlies the 
legislative approach to resolving demographic and social issues in the area of 
family relations in the Russian Federation”849. Thus, in the view of the Consti-
tutional Court the law is carried by the idea that the only way to lead one’s 
family is being in a heterosexual relationship and producing children in order to 
resolve the demographic and social issues Russia is facing. Although Russia is 
indeed facing a demographic crisis, this interpretation does not recognize the 
right to freely choose the way how to lead one’s family and private life and 
implies that choices related to family and private life must also be in accordance 
with certain standards established, not by the individual but by the state.  
Standards of private and family life in Russia are greatly influenced by the 
interpretations of the Russian Orthodox Church, particularly its concept of 
dignity.850 The underlying logic of the anti-homosexual propaganda law is that 
homosexuality is conscious, but an antisocial and an immoral choice that is 
contrary to the values promoted by the Russian Orthodox Church. However, 
human rights violations “justified by traditional, cultural or religious values are 
often targeted against minority or disenfranchised groups that are not in a posi-
                                                                          
844 Fretté v France (App 36515/97) ECtHR 26 May 2002, para 41. 
845  Venice Commission, opinion on the propaganda legislation (n 833) para 51. 
846  X and others v Austria (App 19010/07) ECtHR 19 February 2013, para 140.  
847 Ibid, para 99. 
848  Ibid, para 139. 
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850  See Section 4.2.1 of this study.  
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tion to shape the dominant discourse defining the values of the overarching 
society or community” as highlighted in the report of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council .851  
This is clearly the case in Russia, where Russian traditional values, backed 
by religious arguments, are targeted against the LGBT group who, due to their 
stigmatized position and the legal prohibition on expressing their position on 
LGBT topics, are not in a position to shape the dominant (currently homo-
phobic) discourse in Russia. Moreover, tradition is often “invoked to justify 
maintaining the status quo, failing to take into account the reality that traditions, 
cultures and social norms have always evolved over time”.852 The contemporary 
science-based understanding of homosexuality is that it is an orientation that 
develops due to various biological reasons before birth and is not a matter of 
conscious choice.853 Sexual orientation is a fundamental human right protected 
under Article 8 of the ECHR, so that homosexuality as such cannot be deemed 
to be contrary to “morals”, in the sense of Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR, as on 
numerous occasions explained by the ECtHR.854 The ECtHR has also affirmed 
that the individual and collective exercise of the right to freedom of expression 
encompasses the right to publicly express one’s sexual orientation or gender 
identity.855  
The absence of a European consensus on issues such as the right for homo-
sexual couples to adopt a child or to marry, is of no relevance in the context of 
freedom of expression, because “there is no ambiguity about the other member 
States’ recognition of the right of individuals to openly identify themselves as 
gay, lesbian or any other sexual minority, and to promote their rights and free-
doms, in particular by exercising their freedom of peaceful assembly” and 
“demonstrations similar to the ones banned in the present case are common-
place in most European countries” as explained in Alekseyev v. Russian Fede-
                                                                          
851  United Nations Human Rights Council, Study of the Human Rights Council Advisory 
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ration.856 The European Court’s case law reflects a European consensus on such 
matters as abolition of criminal liability for homosexual relations between 
adults857, homosexuals’ access to service in the armed forces858, the grant of 
parental rights859, equality in tax matters and the right to succeed to a deceased 
partner’s tenancy860 and equal ages of consent under criminal law for hetero-
sexual and homosexual acts861. Accordingly, the existence of an increasing 
European consensus in these matters is accompanied by a narrow margin of 
appreciation accorded to member states in restricting the rights and freedoms of 
LGBT people.862 . 
Whereas another popular argument used to justify restricting the rights and 
freedoms of LGBT people is that the majority of society supports such restric-
tions, this approach is not in accordance with the underlying values of human 
rights as well as of democratic society in general. The ECtHR has noted that the 
predisposed bias of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority 
cannot amount to sufficient justification for interference with freedom of 
expression or the peaceful assembly rights of LGBT people. It would be incom-
patible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of Con-
vention rights by a minority group were made conditional on its being accepted 
by the majority. If this were the case, the rights and freedoms of minority groups 
would be only theoretical opportunities, not enforceable rights, which they are 
under the ECtHR.863  
Besides, the Venice Commission notes that the exercise of freedom of speech 
by sexual minorities cannot depend on the attitudes of public opinion towards 
homosexuality. Attitudes of other people cannot justify a restriction on the right 
to respect for the private life of LGBT people nor on their freedom to express 
their sexual orientation or to advocate for positive ideas in relation to LGBT 
issues and to promote tolerance.864 The Committee of Ministers of the CoE 
finds that neither cultural, traditional nor religious values, nor the rules of a 
“dominant culture” can be invoked to justify hate speech or any other form of 
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discrimination, including on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity.865 
It should also be noted that whereas the majority of Russian people report 
having homophobic views and there is wide public support for prohibition of 
“homosexual propaganda” one should not forget the state of freedom of the 
press in Russia. In Russia the government can influence public opinion and gain 
support for conservative ideology and legislation carried by the spirit of such 
conservative ideology with the help of a largely state-controlled mass media.866 
As independent media are almost extinct in Russia, opinions are not formed in 
conditions of free public debate. Views promoting tolerance towards LGBT 
people or any open discussions on LGBT issues are absent from the mainstream 
media.  
Thus, the views of people are inevitably influenced by a one-sided media 
landscape vigorously propagating homophobic views. Making the rights and 
freedoms of some minority group conditional on acceptance by the majority 
cannot be acceptable, as in this case the rights of minority groups were only 
theoretical and could not be enforced in practice, as noted by the ECHR in Bayev 
and others v Russia.867 This should especially be the case when free public debate 
is lacking in the country and the attitudes of the majority are to a large extent 
formed by a state-controlled media landscape and education system. Anti-
homosexual propaganda legislation is only increasing the existing widespread 
homophobia in the country, argues Maria Issaeva, a Russian lawyer. She claims 
that legislation supports a very negative opinion on the meaning of same-sex 
relationships and sexuality in general and essentially provokes a very “low” 
level of public discussion and comments disclosing considerable confusion in 
the minds of people, such as “saying “gays should be respected” is equivalent to 
paedophilia”.868  
In some cases the ECtHR has accepted the protection of morals as a justi-
fication for prohibitions, for example in cases of graphic demonstrations of 
obscenity.869 However, this is already prohibited in Russia and the anti-homo-
sexual propaganda legislation is not limited to prohibition of obscene or 
pornographic display of homosexuality, or to display of nudity or sexually 
explicit or provocative behaviour or material. The legislation covers vaguely 
defined propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations that, as practice has 
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shown, can cover any LGBT-related information, including for educational and 
public health purposes. On that basis, public morality as a justification for pro-
hibiting “homosexual propaganda” fails to pass the essential necessity and 
proportionality tests as required by the ECHR, as derives from analysis by the 
Venice Commission.870 In view of the European consensus on the right to 
freedom of expression, the fact that in Russia there is high intolerance towards 
homosexuals and it is argued that homosexuality is not part of the Russian 
traditional value-system does not justify differentiating people on the basis of 
their sexual orientation.  
In Bayev and others v. Russia the ECtHR reiterated that it would be “incom-
patible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of Con-
vention rights by a minority group were made conditional on its being accepted 
by the majority. Were this so, a minority group’s rights to freedom of religion, 
expression and assembly would become merely theoretical rather than practical 
and effective as required by the Convention” 871 and on these grounds rejected 
Russia’s claim that restricting public debate on LGBT issues can be justified on 
the grounds of protection of morals. 
 
 
Protecting minors  
The most important justification for the anti-homosexual propaganda legislation 
has been the need to protect the health and development of minors. According to 
the explanatory note to the anti-homosexual propaganda law, it is necessary to 
establish measures aimed at ensuring the intellectual, moral and emotional 
security of children and prohibition on performing any act aimed at popu-
larizing homosexuality is one of those necessary measures. Uncontrolled dis-
semination of information related to homosexuality can harm the health, moral 
and spiritual development of children, form misconceptions about the social 
equivalence of traditional and non-traditional sexual relations among people, 
and deprive children of opportunities to critically evaluate such information due 
to their age. In this case, restricting freedom of expression cannot be considered a 
violation of the constitutional rights of citizens, as the explanatory note states.872  
Enforcement of the anti-propaganda legislation has had a serious effect on 
public debate in Russia. For example, the Central District Court of Barnaul has 
ruled that five communities on the social media platform VKontakte, where 
people discussed various issues related to LGBT issues, shared their ideas and 
problems they encounter regarding their sexual orientation, contained propa-
ganda of non-traditional sexual relations among adolescents. On the basis of the 
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872  Poyasnitel’naya zapiska k proektu federal’nogo zakona “O vnesenii izmenenii v kodeks 
Rossiskoy Federatsii ob administrativnyh pravonarusheniyah” <http://base.consultant.ru/ 
cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=PRJ;n=93974> accessed on 10 December 2017  
188 
court ruling, Roskomnadzor placed these social media communities in the 
register of prohibited information and required removal of all illegal information 
referring to non-traditional family relations.873 Dmitri Bartenev, an attorney who 
represented the applicant in the case Alekseyev v Russia concerning the syste-
matic ban on gay parades in Moscow, has argued that whereas technically the law 
prohibits dissemination of information only in cases when such information can 
harm the health, moral and spiritual development of minors, it is completely 
unclear who and on the basis of what criteria can decide that information is 
harming minors. Whereas sexually explicit information could indeed harm child-
ren, the dissemination of such information is already banned. Thus, according to 
Bartenev it is doubtful whether the true aim of the law really is to protect 
minors.874  
Besides, a study by NGO Article 19 notes that the law does not distinguish 
between obscene expression and other forms of information regarding sex, 
sexuality, and gender identity. Russian legislation imposes essentially blanket 
prohibitions on dissemination of information related to LGBT issues and gender 
identity.875 Moreover, the drafters of the law have not indicated any evidence in 
the explanatory note or elsewhere demonstrating that availability of information 
on LGBT issues in the media or in the public sphere is harmful to children’s 
physical or mental health. The arguments of legislators have remained on the 
level of speculation and stereotypes.  
However, the Russian Constitutional Court has upheld the federal anti-homo-
sexual propaganda law: on 23 September 2014 the Constitutional Court dis-
missed the complaint of an applicant challenging the compatibility of Article 
6.21 of the Code of Administrative Offences with the provisions of the Consti-
tution.876 In its reasoning, the Constitutional Court closely followed the argu-
ments provided by legislators, particularly the justification of protecting minors. 
In its judgment the Court emphasized the state’s obligation to protect children 
from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual perversion and explained that 
the Russian Federation is entitled to establish specific restrictions on dissemi-
nating information if the information is aggressive and importunate in nature 
and is capable of causing harm to the rights and legal interests of others, par-
ticularly minors. According to the Constitutional Court, children must be pro-
tected from “information that is combined with an aggressive imposition of 
                                                                          
873 Federal’naya sluzba po nadzoru v sfere svyazi, informatsionnyh tehnologii i massovyh 
kommunikatsii, ‘Po resheniyu suda v yedinyy reyestr zapreshchennoy informatsii vneseny 
soobshchestva sotsial’noy seti “VKontakte”, propagandiruyushchiye netraditsionnyye 
seksual’nyye otnosheniya sredi podrostkov’ (21 September 2015)  
<http://rkn.govizmenenii.ru/news/rsoc/news34824.htm > accessed 12 December 2017.  
874  Dmitri Bartenev, ‘Perils of a Gay Law That Lacks Definition’ (12 March 2012) The Mos-
cow Times <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/perils-of-a-gay-law-that-lacks-definition-
13690> accessed on 9 December 2017.  
875 Article 19 (n 802) 25.  
876  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 24-P/2014 (23 September 2014). 
189 
specific models of sexual conduct, giving rise to distorted representations of the 
socially accepted models of family relations corresponding to the moral values 
that are generally accepted in Russian society, as these are expressed in the 
Constitution and legislation...”877. Thus, in the view of the Constitutional Court, 
only heterosexual families are socially accepted and bear the values of Russian 
society. Other interpretations of family are “distorted” in the Court’s view and 
children should be protected from such “distorted” interpretations of family.  
The Court further explained that the aim of the law is to “protect children 
from the impact of information that could lead them into non-traditional sexual 
relations, a predilection for which would prevent them from building family 
relationships as these are traditionally understood in Russia and expressed in the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation”878. Thus, in the interpretation of the 
Court, information about LGBT topics can transform children’s’ sexual identity 
and “lead them into non-traditional sexual relations”. Whereas in the Consti-
tutional Court’s view homosexuality is like an infection that can be transmitted 
through exposure to information, the court does not rely on any evidence to 
support these claims. Moreover, the Court implicitly argues that people should 
only form family relationships as these are traditionally understood in Russia.  
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court does not recognize the fundamental 
human right for one’s private and family life (ECHR Article 8) that all people, 
regardless of their sexual orientation, are equally entitled to. According to the 
reasoning of the Constitutional Court, the restrictions are also intended to prevent 
minors from turning their increasing attention to issues concerning sexual 
relations, which can significantly deform a “child’s understanding of such con-
stitutional values as the family, motherhood, fatherhood and childhood”.879 
Thus, as explained by the court, information on “non-traditional” sexual relations 
is likely to “deform” the understanding of constitutional values such as family, 
motherhood, fatherhood and childhood. This implies that there only one correct 
way to interpret constitutional values and an interpretation according to which 
LGBT people also have a right to family is already “deforming” constitutional 
values.  
The Court also conveyed that information on “non-traditional sexual relations” 
could adversely affect a child’s psychological state, development and social 
adaptation:  
 
The imposition on minors of a set of social values which differ from those that 
are generally accepted in Russian society, and which are not shared by and 
indeed frequently perceived as unacceptable by parents ... may result in the 
child’s social estrangement and prevent his or her development within the 
family, especially if one considers that equality of rights as set out in the 
Constitution, which also presupposes equality of rights irrespective of sexual 
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orientation, does not yet guarantee that persons with a different sexual orien-
tation are actually regarded in equal terms by public opinion; this situation may 
entail objective difficulties when trying to avoid negative attitudes from 
individual members of society towards those persons on a day-to-day level.880  
 
Thus, the reasoning of the Court implies that all Russian people should adhere 
to the values “generally accepted in Russian society” and especially that children 
should adhere to the values of their parents, even if these values are homophobic. 
Although the Constitution protects all people against discrimination, as de facto 
people with different sexual orientation are not regarded as equal in Russian 
society, the Constitutional Court recommends avoiding such “social estrange-
ment” and instead to ensure that all children adhere to values “generally 
accepted in Russian society”, even when these values do not promote equality 
and non-discrimination.  
Subsequent to emphasizing that information about non-traditional sexual 
relations distorts constitutional values; that non-traditional sexual relations can 
adversely affect a child’s psychology, development and social adaptation; that 
such relations are unacceptable to a majority of people in Russia and children 
should be socialized into values respected by the majority, the Court argues that 
the anti-homosexual propaganda law “does not signify a negative appraisal by 
the State of non-traditional sexual relationships as such, and is not intended to 
belittle the honour and dignity of citizens who are involved in such relation-
ships” and that it “cannot be regarded as containing official censure of non-
traditional sexual relationships, in particular homosexuality, far less their pro-
hibition”.881 
The conclusions of the Constitutional Court are contrary to the established 
practice of the ECtHR, according to which the predisposed bias of a hetero-
sexual majority against a homosexual minority does not amount to sufficient 
justification for interference with freedom of expression.882 The conclusions of 
the Russian Constitutional Court make exercising rights and freedoms guaranteed 
under the Russian Constitution and the ECHR conditional on the attitudes of the 
majority, thus making rights and freedoms of LGBT people only theoretical 
opportunities, not enforceable rights in Russia. In a democratic society charac-
terized by pluralism, it is normal that people, including in family relations, are 
confronted with views that are not in accordance with their own convictions. It 
cannot be expected that parents and children have to be of the same opinion on 
everything, particularly on such intimate issues as sexuality and children are 
also entitled to freedom of speech and ideas. As noted by the ECtHR “it would be 
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unrealistic to expect that parents’ religious or philosophical views would have to 
be given automatic priority in every situation, particularly outside school.”883  
In some cases parental views and the rights of third parties (e.g. the right of 
children to receive sex education) can be in conflict and it cannot be expected 
that parental views deserve more protection than the rights of children. In 
particular, when a family holds discriminatory or aggressive views, it is the 
obligation of the state to protect the child. As held by the ECtHR, all children 
must be protected from homophobia, have a right to be raised in a safe environ-
ment, where there is no violence, bullying, or other forms of discriminatory and 
degrading treatment, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity and 
all children are also entitled to receive objective information on issues related to 
sexuality and gender identity in educational institutions.884 In such sensitive areas 
where a conflict can arise between parental views and the rights of children, “the 
authorities have no choice but to resort to the criteria of objectivity, pluralism, 
scientific accuracy and, ultimately, the usefulness of a particular type of infor-
mation to the young audience.”885 Ideas on diversity, equality and tolerance 
contribute to social cohesion and help to diminish discriminatory practices.  
Thus, all children are entitled to information on issues related to sexuality, 
including on LGBT issues, particularly when the information is not sexually 
explicit, aggressive or inaccurate. Moreover, providing information and holding 
discussions related to LGBT issues in the media or as a part of sex education in 
school does not diminish the right of parents to educate and advise their children 
in line with their own religious or philosophical convictions.886 “Russian law 
already provides for criminal liability in respect of lecherous actions against 
minors and dissemination of pornography to minors, and these provisions are 
applicable irrespective of the sexual orientation of those involved”887 The 
ECtHR held that the Russian Government failed to provide reasons why existing 
provisions were insufficient and why minors would be more vulnerable to abuse 
when homosexual relationships rather than heterosexual ones are tackled.888  
Thus, it can be seen that the approaches of the Constitutional Court and the 
ECtHR have been diametrically different and the ECtHR has taken the pers-
pective that in order to protect children from homophobic attitudes, to respect 
their right to be raised in a safe environment and to respect their right to freedom 
of expression and information, children must be able to receive information and 
participate in discussions concerning issues related to sexuality and also LGBT 
topics, even if such discussions are not in accordance with their parents’ religious 
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or philosophical convictions. Views held by parents are not by default higher 
and more worthy of protection. There is no ground to believe that information 
about heterosexual relations is somehow more dangerous to children than infor-
mation about homosexual relations. As demonstrating explicit sexual behaviour 
and disseminating pornography to minors is already prohibited in Russia, it is 
difficult to understand in what way the anti-homosexual propaganda legislation 
really protects the health and spiritual development of children.  
In Russia the guiding ideology of the anti-homosexual propaganda legislation 
derives from the premise that homosexuality and all information connected to it 
is by default immoral and unacceptable and the aim of all homosexuals is to 
somehow inject homosexuality into children and corrupt them. “We would be 
quite unhappy if some inadequate individual were to invade a kindergarten 
trying to explain to minors that they should identify their sexual identity”889 as 
stated by Vitaly Milonov, a deputy of the City of St Petersburg local parliament 
and one of the main initiators of a local “anti-homosexual propaganda” law. 
Besides, the case law of the Constitutional Court derives from the premise that 
homosexuality is per se immoral, dangerous and unacceptable in Russian 
society. However, neither legislators nor the courts that have upheld the prohi-
bition on propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations have provided com-
pelling reasons for establishing such restrictions. The arguments of legislators as 
well as the court system are based on old stereotypes and prejudices rather on 
contemporary science-based knowledge. The presumption that “propaganda of 
homosexuality” by default harms children was rejected by the ECtHR in Alek-
seyev v Russia and in Bayev and others v Russia, where the ECtHR held:  
 
There is no scientific evidence or sociological data at the Court’s disposal 
suggesting that the mere mention of homosexuality, or open public debate about 
sexual minorities’ social status, would adversely affect children or “vulnerable 
adults”. On the contrary, it is only through fair and public debate that society 
may address such complex issues as the one raised in the present case. Such 
debate, backed up by academic research, would benefit social cohesion by 
ensuring that representatives of all views are heard, including the individuals 
concerned. It would also clarify some common points of confusion, such as 
whether a person may be educated or enticed into or out of homosexuality, or 
opt into or out of it voluntarily.890  
 
In Alekseyev v Russia the ECtHR concluded that the authorities’ decisions to ban 
public events aiming at promoting the rights of LGBT people under the pretext 
of protecting minors “were not based on an acceptable assessment of the 
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relevant facts”.891 In Bayev and others v Russia the Court reiterated that the 
Russian Government “did not provide any explanation of the mechanism by 
which a minor could be enticed into “[a] homosexual lifestyle”, let alone 
science-based evidence that one’s sexual orientation or identity is susceptible to 
change under external influence.”892 The Court dismissed these allegations 
because they lacked an evidentiary basis.  
 
 
Public health  
The third justification for establishing anti-homosexual propaganda legislation 
has been the need to protect public health and the demographic situation in 
Russia. In order to justify this aim, measures invoking protection of public health 
must be “both evidence-based and proportionate to ensure respect for human 
rights”.893 Neither the explanatory note to the anti-homosexual propaganda legis-
lation nor any other sources provide evidence demonstrating that the availability 
of LGBT-related information is harmful to public health. Homosexuality was 
decriminalised in Russia on 3 June 1993. In 1999, Russia adopted ICD-10 stan-
dards, which removed homosexuality from the register of officially recognised 
diseases.894 However, in popular attitudes homosexuality is still treated as a 
disease and related to various physical and mental health issues. Old stereotypes 
related to homosexuality, which have no evidence in modern science, never-
theless wield a strong influence on the people’s attitudes. Out-dated classi-
fications regarding homosexuality still influence medical practice in Russia as 
well as affecting the contents of educational materials in Russian schools and 
universities.895  
Banning and hiding information related to LGBT issues most probably has a 
more negative effect on public health, rather than having such information 
freely available. Access to health-related information and active discussion over 
information in society is more likely to bring positive results to public health. It 
has been demonstrated that limiting the free flow of information relating to 
LGBT topics and gender identity has harmful consequences for the physical and 
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mental health of LGBT people.896 As noted by the ECtHR in Bayev v Russia it is 
“improbable that a restriction on potential freedom of expression concerning 
LGBT issues would be conducive to a reduction of health risks. Quite the 
contrary, disseminating knowledge on sex and gender identity issues and raising 
awareness of any associated risks and of methods of protecting oneself against 
those risks, presented objectively and scientifically, would be an indispensable 
part of a disease-prevention campaign and of a general public-health policy.”897 
Thus, there are no plausible reasons to agree that limiting access to LGBT-related 
information is necessary to protect public health. On the contrary, limiting access 
to such information can have detrimental effects on public health.  
Besides, it remains unclear how suppression of information about same-sex 
relationships helps to solve Russia’s demographic crisis. Factors such as eco-
nomic prosperity, social-security rights and accessibility of childcare contribute 
to the demographic situation substantially more than the availability of LGBT-
related information in society. Moreover, in every country there exist hetero-
sexual couples who do not wish or are unable to have children and they are not 
socially rejected. Thus, the issue of having children cannot be a justification for 
restricting freedom of speech on LGBT issues. 898  
 
 
5.4. Limiting freedom of expression vs. protecting  
the “Motherland”, its honour and territorial integrity 
5.4.1. Banning public calls to action aimed at violating  
the territorial integrity of Russia 
On 9 May 2014, Victory Day, which is the most patriotic and symbolic day in 
Russia since the end of World War II, an amendment to the Russian Criminal 
Code banning public calls to action aimed at violating the territorial integrity of 
the Russian Federation899 (Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code) took effect. The 
law was adopted very shortly after Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014. Under 
Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code, speech criticizing or questioning Crimea’s 
annexation is a criminal offence, punishable by up to four years of imprison-
ment, or by up to five years of imprisonment when media or the internet are 
involved.900  
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As is the case with other previously analysed Russian laws restricting freedom 
of expression, this regulation is characterized by very vague wording which 
enables interpretation of discussions over controversial territorial issues in the 
media, on one’s social media page or in an internet forum as a criminal offence. 
No violent acts or incitement to violence/separatism are necessary in order to be 
prosecuted and convicted under Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code.  
By the end of 2016, fifteen people had been tried under 280.1 of the Cri-
minal Code and most of the cases concerned Crimea. In 2015 Alex Bubeev was 
found guilty of posting an article entitled “Crimea is Ukraine!” on his social 
media, though written by another author. This act was interpreted as “a call on 
an anonymous group of persons...[to] violate the integrity of the Russian 
Federation.”901 In another case Tatarstan’s Naberezhnochelny City Court found 
that Rafis Kashapov had used “textual and visual materials...to form a negative 
attitude toward Russia’s actions in Crimea in 2014...through claims about the 
“occupation” of Crimea and violations of international law.” 902 
Besides, several Crimean leaders and activists have been prosecuted and 
convicted under Article 280.1. Ilmi Umerov, a Crimean Tatar leader and Deputy 
Chair of the Mejlis (a representative body of Crimean Tatars listed as an extre-
mist organization and banned by the Russian authorities in 2016) was sentenced 
under Article 280.1 to two years of imprisonment for expressing dissent against 
the annexation of the Crimean peninsula. However on 26 October 2017 Umerov 
was released from custody and freed on humanitarian grounds. 903 Another 
Crimean Tatar leader, Rafis Kashapov, head of the All-Tatar Public Centre, 
sentenced under Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code has filed a complaint with 
the Constitutional Court to declare Article 280.1 unconstitutional.  
Having a debate on territorial issues, discussing events related to the 
annexation of Crimea or questioning decisions by the Russian authorities can 
lead to conviction and up to five years of imprisonment under Article 280.1 of 
the Russian Criminal Code. This legislation vastly limits the opportunity for 
public discussion regarding controversial territorial questions and sends a very 
clear signal that people who do not agree with the official position of the state 
will be severely punished. “Any citizen discussing any issue related to the loss 
of Russia’s territory risks criminal prosecution” as conveyed by Pavel Chikov, 
the head of the international human rights group Agora and its lawyer Ramil 
Akhmetgaliev.904 
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5.4.2. Law against rehabilitation of Nazism  
Another example of “patriotic” criminalization of free speech is criminalizing 
attempts to infringe on historical memory in relation to events that took place 
during World War II (Great Patriotic War) is the law against the rehabilitation 
of Nazism.905 Under this law Article 354.1 was added to the Criminal Code that 
criminalizes denial of facts recognized by the Nuremberg tribunal; approving of 
the crimes the Nuremberg tribunal judged; and spreading intentionally false 
information about the Soviet Union’s activities during World War II.  
Moreover, “artificially creating evidence for the prosecution” was made an 
aggravating circumstance and “spreading information on military and memorial 
commemorative dates related to Russia’s defence that is clearly disrespectful of 
society, and to publicly desecrate symbols of Russia’s military glory” was 
criminalized. 906 
Similarly to the legislation analysed above, the language used in the law 
against the rehabilitation of Nazism is very vague and the scope of the law is 
very wide. The term “spreading information on military and memorial com-
memorative dates related to Russia’s defence that is clearly disrespectful of 
society” is completely unclear and could mean almost anything. The term “inten-
tionally false information” is very similar to the language used in the Soviet 
Criminal Code, which included a provision on the prohibition of “spreading 
intentionally false information about the Soviet system”. This provision was 
deployed to punish dissidents.  
Moreover, how should one ascertain whether information about past events 
is false information? Inevitably it implies that there must exist “some final 
historical truth”.907 The Kremlin has taken several steps to skilfully control and 
consolidate the memory of World War II. Vladimir Putin has initiated a project 
to create a standard, official version of national history by unifying Russian 
history textbooks used in Russian schools.908 In Soviet times the “History of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union: a Short Course” (popularly known as the 
“Short Course”) commissioned by Stalin in 1935 was the most widely dis-
seminated and the most important book elucidating the ideology of Marxism-
Leninism. The aim of the book was to erase the role of the Old Bolsheviks in 
the building of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, and to praise Joseph 
Stalin as the true successor to Vladimir Lenin. Marxist-Leninist propaganda 
contained in the book was used to build and maintain a loyal and dedicated 
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party and society.909 Contemporary Russia seems to be walking a similar path. 
Establishing a state-approved version of history in contemporary Russia 
resembles the creation of the historical canon in Soviet times.910 The law against 
the rehabilitation of Nazism is another pillar to support the construction and 
maintenance of an official Kremlin-controlled historical narrative. “As the 
generation of war veterans is fading away, the state is seizing hold of all inter-
pretations of the war in an effort to remain the sole caretaker of national 
memory.”911 
The law upholds the “facts recognized” by the Nuremberg tribunal but not 
definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 912 Thus, discussing 
crimes committed by the Communists that were not recognized by the Nurem-
berg tribunal as war crimes could lead to criminal punishment. Overall, all 
viewpoints on the events related to World War II which are not in accordance 
with the Kremlin-controlled canon of history can be considered as “rehabi-
litation of Nazism” Hence, in Russia the official, “right”, “patriotic” version of 
history is protected by criminal law and providing an alternative interpretation 
of historical events is a criminal offence punishable by up to five years of 
imprisonment. Discussing the crimes of the Communist regime, the role of 
Stalin, the reasons behind the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, for example, could 
result in criminal conviction when not done in the manner approved by the 
official ideology. Thus, the law hinders the work of scholars studying the events 
of World War II and harms public debate, as discussing alternative viewpoints 
is made illegal. A member of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and 
Human Rights, Nikolai Svanidze, argues that equating the rehabilitation of 
Nazism with questioning the legality of the actions of the Soviet leadership 
during the Great Patriotic War is not rehabilitation of Nazism, but a search for 
historical truth and equating this with the promotion of rehabilitation of Nazism 
is not just wrong but malicious.913 Moreover, the Russian “Free Historical 
Society,” has pointed out that punishing people for the “artificial creation” of 
historical evidence does not enable scholars to carry out objective research.914  
Ideologically the law against the rehabilitation of Nazism fits well into the 
conservative-traditionalist legislative agenda of Russian legislators. Moreover, 
the law is also in accordance with the Kremlin’s tactic to symbolically divide 
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Russian society.915 Anti LGBT legislation, establishing strict punishments for 
expressing “extremist” or “separatist” views, limiting NGOs and public assemb-
lies, are all examples of dividing Russian society into “us” – patriotic Russian 
people having traditional values, heterosexual orientation – and “them” – people 
not fitting into the “norm” fifth columnists, fascists, and “liberasts”.  
It must also be remembered that the law coincides with the annexation of 
Crimea and a simultaneous propaganda war against Ukraine. In Soviet propa-
ganda the terms “Nazi” and “fascists” were widely used to demonize political 
opponents. In the ongoing propaganda war against Ukraine, Russian state tele-
vision has used the term “Nazis” to label the Ukrainian national movement, 
providing a pretext for annexing Crimea and justifying further interference in 
Ukraine. It has been argued that the law against the rehabilitation of Nazism 
assists in the ongoing propaganda campaign and that it aims to create “a heroic 
national narrative and legislate away any doubt about the state’s historical 
righteousness”. 916 
The Second World War is a powerful symbol in Russia. It is “the focal point 
of the nation’s memory; it plays a socializing role and unifies Russians… 
Russian identity is centred on the sufferings, martyrdom, and victory of the 
Great Patriotic War.”917 The legislation in question enables the Russian state to 
ensure that the most important symbol in Russia’s collective memory is inter-
preted in accordance with the official position of the Kremlin. Inevitably, some 
Russian people have memories, stories and opinions that are not in accordance 
with the official narrative. However, in Russia these people are forced into 
silence or have to risk criminal punishment. In June 2016 Vladimir Luzgin was 
convicted in Perm regional court under Article 354.1 of the Criminal Code for 
spreading intentionally false information about Russian history. Luzgin reposted 
on social media an article claiming that the Soviet Union and Germany were 
mutually responsible for starting World War II. The Court held that the article 
in question contained false information about cooperation between Communists 
and Nazis as it conflicts with the decisions of the Nuremberg tribunal and in the 
court’s view Luzgin intentionally disseminated false information because he 
supports the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism. Luzgin was convicted under 
Article 354.1 of the Criminal Code and fined. Luzgin appealed to the Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation. Luzgin’s lawyer claimed that it remains abso-
lutely unclear how the phrase “Hitler’s Germany committed a crime in compli-
city with the Communists” used in the article posted on the social media page 
can be interpreted as rehabilitation of Nazism. However, the Supreme Court 
upheld the judgment of the Perm regional court.918 
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Thus, Article 354.1 of the Criminal Code demonstrates an effort by Russian 
legislators to control and manage history, to establish a historical canon and to 
send a clear signal that historical events related to World War II should not be 
debated. Legislators have not provided any legitimate justification to demon-
strate that such a prohibition is necessary in a democratic society. Article 354.1 
limits the freedom of expression of the Russian people and makes objective 
research of historical events nearly impossible. Gleb Bogush has concluded that 
the amendments to Russian law criminalizing free speech are intended to have a 
“chilling effect” on debates over controversial issues in Russia and to control 
public dissent by criminal prosecution.919 
 
 
5.4.3. Classifying injuries and deaths during peacetime  
as a state secret  
Another piece of legislation limiting the right to freedom of expression and infor-
mation is the decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 28.05.2015 
No. 273 “On Amendments to the List of Information Recognized as State 
Secrets” declaring publishing information about “personnel losses” during “the 
conduct of special operations during peacetime” a state secret.920 Thus, in 
Russia all deaths among the military can be classified as state secrets and not 
only in time of war (which was also a state secret under previous regulation) but 
also in peacetime. Under the federal law on state secrets, disclosing Russian 
state secrets is punishable by up to seven years in prison.921  
A group of human rights activists and journalists filed a complaint with the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation against the decree of President Vladi-
mir Putin on classifying data on soldiers killed in peacetime. The applicants 
argued that the decree violates the constitutional right of citizens to receive and 
disseminate information and that the president overstepped his powers since, 
according to Russia’s Constitution, the constitutional right to freely seek, 
receive and circulate information can only be restricted by federal law. Thus, 
the list of information constituting a state secret can only be amended by federal 
law, not a by presidential decree. The applicants claimed that the decree was 
directed against investigating the deaths of Russian soldiers in Donbas and 
aimed at discouraging the relatives of dead soldiers from communicating with 
journalists and demanding material compensation from the Ministry of Defence. 
However, on 13 August 2015 the Supreme Court upheld the presidential decree 
amending the regulation on state secrets. The applicants filed an appeal. 
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However, the Board of Appeal of the Supreme Court decided on 10 November 
2015 that the previous judgment should remain in force. In the view of the 
Supreme Court, the decree protects information about the deployment, structure 
and operational situation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which 
is a state secret, and does not contradict federal law on state secrets.922 
Thus, under the new regulation of state secrets the families of dead soldiers 
are discouraged from disclosing the injuries to or deaths of Russian soldiers and 
to discuss those issues in public. Whereas according to different sources hundreds 
of Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine923, Russia has officially refused to 
acknowledge the presence of its soldiers in Eastern Ukraine and as such 
casualties are a state secret in Russia; no official data on Russian casualties in 
Ukraine or in other conflict zones are made available nor is there any public 
debate on the death of Russian soldiers in the Russian mainstream media.  
 
 
5.5. Yarovaya legislation  
On 6 July 2016 Vladimir Putin signed Federal Law No. 374-FZ on “Amend-
ments to the federal law on combating terrorism and certain legislative acts of 
the Russian Federation with respect to establishing additional measures for 
combating terrorism and ensuring public safety”.924 The package of “anti-
terrorist” laws is popularly known as the “Yarovaya legislation”. The package 
was nicknamed after deputy Irina Yarovaya, the initiator and strong advocate of 
the legislation.  
As laconically stated in the explanatory note, the aim of the law is to provide 
additional measures to protect the citizen and society from terrorism and to 
prevent such crimes. 925 The Yarovaya legislation introduces changes to twenty-
one laws, including the Russian Criminal Code. Changes to the Criminal Code 
include expanding criminal liability for children starting from fourteen years of 
age, criminalizing failure to report a non-committed crime (205.6 of the Criminal 
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obshchestvennoy bezopasnosti” (the Yarovaya legislation).  
925  Poyasnitel’naya zapiska k proektu federal’nogo zakona “O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye 
zakonadatel’nye akty Rossiiskoy Federatsii v chsti ustanovleniya dopolnitel’nyh mer proti-
vodeistviya terririzmu i obespecheniya obshestvennoi bezopasnosti”  
<http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=PRJ&n=144433&rnd=25992
7.2930420274#0> accessed on 15 December 2017.  
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Code) and substantially increasing penalties for various crimes related to vaguely-
defined extremism and terrorism. In accordance with the amended Criminal 
Code, fourteen year-old children can be prosecuted for crimes such as 
international terrorism, participating in terrorist communities, terrorist organi-
zations and illegal armed groups, for taking part in terrorist training camps, for 
participating in mass unrest, for making an attempt on the life of a state offi-
cial, and for attacking an official or facility that enjoys international protection 
and for failing to report a crime.926 Pursuant to Article 205.6 of the Criminal 
Code a person having reliable information about plans to carry out crimes such 
as vaguely-defined acts of terrorism, armed mutiny aimed at undermining 
Russia’s territorial integrity and many other crimes and who fails to notify the 
authorities may be convicted of a criminal offence and imprisoned for up to one 
year. The Yarovaya legislation also establishes responsibility for failure to assist 
the authorities. However, as noted by Gleb Bogush, a Russian criminal law 
scholar, failure to assist a person in a life-threatening condition is not punishable 
under Russian law.927 Under another amendment to the Russian Criminal Code 
(Article 361, acts of international terrorism) causing an explosion, committing 
arson or other acts endangering the life, health, freedom or integrity of Russian 
citizens intended to violate the peaceful coexistence of nations and peoples or 
against the interests of the Russian Federation, as well as a threat to commit 
such acts outside of Russian territory are punishable by imprisonment from ten 
to twenty years or life imprisonment.  
The minimum sentence for incitement of hatred (Article 282 of the Criminal 
Code) is two years. The punishment for organizing an extremist community is 
imprisonment of from two to six years, whereas previously the maximum 
penalty was a fine of up to 200,000 roubles. Gleb Bogush indicates that whereas 
organizing an extremist community is punishable by a sentence of six years, the 
maximum sentence for murder committed in the heat of passion is three years 
under the Russian Criminal Code.928 The law also increases penalties for people 
who incite terrorist activity and justify terrorism on the internet. The maximum 
penalty for these crimes will be seven years of imprisonment and a ban on 
various professional activities for five years. With this legislation, individuals 
who post materials on the internet will be subject to the same penalties as are 
imposed on media outlets. Overall, under amendments to the Criminal Code the 
                                                                          
926  See for an overview of most important amendments in English: Meduza, ‘Russia’s State 
Duma just approved some of the most repressive laws in post-Soviet history’ (24 June 2016) 
Meduza < https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/06/24/russia-s-state-duma-just-approved-some-
of-the-most-repressive-laws-in-post-soviet-history> accessed on 9 December 2017.  
927  Gleb Bogush, ‘“Zakony Yarovoi” i ugolovnoe pravo’ (1 July 2017) Legal Report  
<https://legal.report/author/zakony-yarovoj-i-ugolovnoe-pravo> accessed on 15 December 
2017.  
928  Gleb Bogush, ‘Killing Russian Criminal Law’ (7 July 2016) Carnegie Moscow Center 
<http://carnegie.ru/commentary/2016/07/07/killing-russian-criminal-law/j2tn> accessed on 
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punishments for vaguely defined “extremist” or “terrorist” crimes are substan-
tially more severe than those for violent crimes, such as certain types of murder, 
which seems highly unreasonable.  
Gleb Bogush argues that the Yarovaya legislation undermines the core 
principles of criminal law, as adopting the Yarovaya laws has brought back 
notorious Soviet legal principles such as holding people criminally responsible 
for withholding information. The amendments “erode the criminal law that an 
entire generation of Russian lawyers has come to know and practice. With key 
principles of the Criminal Code stripped bare – principles such as the inability 
to hold someone criminally responsible for their thoughts and beliefs and the 
primacy of individual rights – legal textbooks will soon have to be rewritten”, 
Bogush notes. 929 However “[d]espite this alarming symptom of the degradation 
of the rule of law, politicians and lawyers alike remain unconcerned, seemingly 
viewing criminal law as nonessential”.930 Bogush predicts that application of the 
“nonsensical and brazenly repressive” law will be selective and further hinders 
political activity by Russia’s people. 931 
The Yarovaya legislation also establishes new requirements for commu-
nication and internet operators such as telephone and mobile service providers, 
operators of informational systems, owners of websites, and hosting providers, 
taking effect on 1 July 2018. Companies are obliged to store recordings of their 
customers’ text messages, voice information, images, audio, video, electronic 
communications and other activities by users of communication and internet 
services on Russian territory. The content of these messages must be stored for 
six months. Companies also have to store metadata concerning all messages 
sent and received between users (the time of the communication, the partici-
pants) for three years and must provide information to authorized Russian 
government bodies conducting executive or investigative activity or providing 
national security without a court order. These government bodies include the 
Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service and investi-
gators within executive investigative authorities. 932  
Aiming to “combat extremism”, the Yarovaya legislation also substantially 
restricts religious groups’ opportunities to practice their religion. Under Article 
8 of the Yarovaya legislation, various amendments were made to the federal law 
“On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations”. The Yarovaya 
legislation defines missionary activity as “activity by a religious association 
aimed at disseminating information about its doctrine among persons who are 
not participants (members, followers) of that religious association, in order to 
involve these people as participants (members, followers) of that religious 
association, as conducted directly by the religious association or by citizens 
                                                                          
929  Ibid. 
930  Ibid. 
931  Ibid. 
932  See Article 15 of the Yarovaya legislation. See also: Meduza (n 926).  
203 
and/or legal entities it has authorized to do so publicly, with the help of the 
mass media and internet information and telecommunications network, or by 
other lawful means.”933 Missionary activity is allowed only in places identified 
by law (e.g. premises or land in the ownership of a religious organization or at 
cemeteries). However, it is not permitted in public places or premises of other 
religious organizations. A person performing missionary activity has to carry at 
all times a decision of a religious organization officially registered in Russia 
authorizing the person to conduct missionary activity. Details of registration 
must be visible on the decision. The law also prohibits conducting missionary 
activities when these violate public safety and public order, when extremist 
activity is carried out; when missionary work is directed at enforcing family 
breakup; when missionary activities infringe on a person, or the rights and 
freedoms of citizens, damage the morality and health of citizens, are carried out 
while using drugs or other illegal substances or prompt citizens to refuse to 
execute obligations established under the law. The law also prohibits offices of 
foreign religious organizations that are registered in Russia to carry out missio-
nary activities in Russia and establishes various punishments for breaching the 
new requirements. 934 
The provisions introduced by the Yarovaya package have been used to press 
charges against yoga instructor Dmitry Ugai, who gave a lecture on yoga philo-
sophy, as arguably he carried out illegal missionary activities; to press charges 
against a Hare Krishna follower in Cherkessk when, according to a complaint to 
the authorities, he stood on a street and told someone about his faith, although 
both were later dropped. However, in October 2016, an American was fined for 
conducting Baptist services in his apartment. In December 2016, a Vladivastok 
court ordered an international Christian organization, “The Salvation Army”, to 
destroy forty copies of the Bible as they breached the rules for labelling 
religious materials.935  
The new law sends a variety of important ideological messages to Russian 
society. It has been argued that the Yarovaya package allows the law enfor-
cement authorities to demonstrate effective combating of terrorism.936 As the 
terms “terrorism” and “extremism” are very widely defined indeed, almost any 
activity can be placed under the umbrella of “combating terrorism and extre-
mism”. Yoga instructors, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses: all are treated as a 
potential threat to the Russian state and Russian citizens. Another important 
                                                                          
933  The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ‘Overview of the Package of Changes 
into a Number of Laws of the Russian Federation Designed to Provide for Additional 
Measures to Counteract Terrorism’ (21 July 2016) 10 <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/ 
files/Russia/Yarovaya.pdf> accessed on 9 December 2017.  
934  Ibid. 
935 Dar’ya Litvinova, ‘Primenenie “Zakona Yarovoi”: sposob delat statistiku?’ 2 (2017) Pra-
vovoi Dialog <http://legal-dialogue.org/ru/russias-anti-terrorist-yarovaya-law-controversially- 
implemented-spotlight> accessed 10 December 2017.  
936  Ibid.  
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message the law sends to society is the glorification of the Russian Orthodox 
Church and discrediting of smaller religious groups such as Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Mormons, and some evangelical sects. Whereas the religious 
freedom of Russian Orthodox believers is protected, the Yarovaya legislation 
allows significant limitations on the already limited religious freedom of other 
religious groups. On 20 April 2017 at the request of the Ministry of Justice the 
Supreme Court declared the Jehovah’s Witnesses Administrative Centre an 
extremist organization and demanded Jehovah Witnesses as an extremist 
organisation to close down all their activities in Russia. As a result, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses are no longer allowed to congregate for worship at their churches or 
anywhere else in Russia. People involved with Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia 
face criminal prosecution and punishments ranging from fines of 300,000 to 
600,000 roubles to a maximum of ten years in prison. The Ministry of Justice 
has noted that since 2007 the Russian courts have banned the activities of eight 
Russian Jehovah’s Witnesses organizations and ninety-five pieces of literature 
have been prohibited and included in the federal register of banned extremist 
materials.937 Hence, the Russian court system has interpreted the faith and 
activities of Jehovah’s Witnesses as extremist, meaning highly dangerous to the 
Russian state and citizens and accordingly, worthy of severe punishment.  
Overall, the Yarovaya package attempts to equate criticizing the authorities 
with terrorism, and at the same time to place the Russian Orthodox Church at 
the apex of other faiths and religious practices, as assessed by Alexey Kozlov.938 
 
 
5.6. Analysis and conclusions  
As explained in Section 1.4.1 of this study, an important precondition for comp-
liance with the ECHR is effective incorporation of the ECHR into the national 
legal order. Only when the legal order provides basic guarantees can civil 
society demand their rights, as derives from Section 1.4.1 of this study. Local 
people must have not only the motive but also the means to demand protection 
of their rights as reflected in international treaties.939 In this chapter I analysed 
how the right to freedom of expression is incorporated in the Russian legal 
order and implemented in practice. I also focused on the interplay between 
legislative amendments and the situation of civil society. I argue that the 
legislative amendments analysed in this chapter demonstrate that the right to 
freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 10 of the ECHR is not effec-
tively incorporated in the Russian legal order and there are widespread 
                                                                          
937 Human Rights Watch, ‘Court Bans Jehovah’s Witnesses’ (20 April 2017)  
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/20/russia-court-bans-jehovahs-witnesses> accessed on 
9 December 2017. 
938  Alexey Kozlov, ‘Freedom of Assembly in Russia in 2016. Review of Legislation and 
Law Enforcement’ 3(2017) Legal Dialogue.  
939  Ibid 17  
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problems with implementing it. Russian legislators view the right to freedom of 
expression essentially as a harmful phenomenon that should be limited on as 
many grounds as possible. This inevitably limits the effect of the ECHR on the 
Russian legal order and hinders the opportunities of Russian civil society to 
raise important issues and to demand their rights, creating a further obstacle to 
cooperation between Russia and the CoE.  
In the first section of this chapter I provided an overview of the right to 
freedom of expression in the Russian legal framework. The right to freedom of 
expression is a constitutionally protected right in Russia. Article 29 of the 
Russian Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of thought and expression, 
as well as freedom to freely seek, receive, transfer and spread information by 
any legal means. Pursuant to Article 55 of the Constitution, rights and freedoms 
may be restricted by federal laws for the protection of constitutional principles, 
public morals, health and the rights and lawful interests of others, and to ensure 
the defence and security of the state. All people in Russia are entitled to equal 
access to the right to freedom of expression. Article 19 of the Russian Consti-
tution guarantees equality of rights and freedoms to everyone, irrespective of, in 
particular, sex, social status or employment position. The Constitutional Court 
of the Russian Federation is well aware of the ECtHR’s interpretation of the 
right to freedom of expression.940 
It was revealed from my analysis that, although the Constitution and federal 
laws in principle provide protection for freedom of expression, a wide dis-
crepancy exists between the norms established by the Constitution and the 
“reality on the ground”. Following Russia’s independence from the Soviet Union, 
the advance of free expression in Russia “has been episodic at best” and even 
that limited progress is now threatened.941 In Russia the state authorities have an 
expansive view of restrictions on speech and a cramped view of freedom itself, 
claims Jeffrey Kahn. Due to widespread limitations imposed on freedom of 
expression, the constitutional provisions protecting freedom of expression are 
now merely “a wonderful set of promises” in Russia.942  
The second section of this chapter focused on freedom of expression on the 
internet. When Russian civil society started to make demands and to dissemi-
nate their ideas in various popular internet resources, the civil society became a 
real threat to the authorities, argues Yelena Lukyanova. A defensive reaction of 
the state followed, aimed at eliminating the diversity of information and the 
diversity of meanings from the public sphere. In her view it is not by chance 
that conversations about Russia’s uniqueness sounded with renewed vigor after 
                                                                          
940  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 1053-O (2 July 2013). Referring to cases: (Handyside 
v The United Kingdom (App 5493/72) ECtHR 7 December 1976; Otto-Preminger-Institut v 
Austria (13470/87) ECtHR 20 September 1994; Wingrove v The United Kingdom (App 
17419/90) ECtHR 25 November 1996 etc.). 
941  Ahdieh and Flemming (n 272) 32. 
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the protest movement. In her view, arguments about civilizational and cultural 
uniqueness are just propaganda tools used by the government and have little 
substance in reality. Lukyanova predicts that as long as the government aims to 
exercise the supreme power in Russia, civil society will meet resistance on 
behalf of the government. 943 
My previous analysis shows that the law on blacklists, the law on arbitrary 
blocking of extremist materials and the law on bloggers have established severely 
restrictive regulation for disseminating information on the internet. Whereas for 
many years the sphere of internet-media was largely ignored by the authorities, 
“one day Russians woke up and found they could not open any of the main 
opposition news outlets or blogs” – the government had shut them down.944  
The protest movement incentivized the Russian authorities to limit civil 
rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of expression. Not surpri-
singly, the backlash on freedom of expression on the internet started after the 
protest movement threatened the positions of the ruling elite at the beginning of 
Putin’s third term as president. Freedom of speech can be politically very 
“costly” in totalitarian regimes. The government understood that freedom of 
expression in the social media is too powerful a tool in the hands of Russia’s 
developing civil society. The protest movement demonstrated that free speech 
can threaten the Russian political arrangement, where power is consolidated in 
the hands of a very few. Accordingly, the need to secure the position of official 
Kremlin-controlled information space and systemic order was another incentive 
to limit the opportunities of opposition-minded people to spread their ideas 
freely over the internet.  
Traditionally, the majority of Russians have gained their information from 
the television, which is under the strict control of the Kremlin. Data from the 
Levada Center research agency shows that television is a major source of news 
for 88 percent of Russians.945 The Kremlin has direct control over the television 
and over most of the “traditional” information landscape. The state owns, either 
directly or through proxies, all five of the major national television networks, as 
well as national radio networks, important national newspapers, and national 
news agencies.946 The internet provides a broad range of alternatives to the 
state-controlled messages disseminated via television. “[B]logging reflects the 
regime’s loss of its ability to sustain the Kremlin-centred symbolic order, to 
                                                                          
943  Lukyanova, ‘O prave nalevo’ (n 329).  
944  The Washington Post ‘Vladimir Putin stamps on his citizens again, this time with Inter-
net censorship’ (14 March 2014) The Washington Post <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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946  Freedom House, ‘Freedom of the press: Russia’ (2014) <https://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
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generate socially appealing meanings and to control the discursive space which 
became more and more fragmented and thus competitive”, as argued by Nicole 
Bode and Andrey Makarychev.947 Thus, in order to sustain the Kremlin-centred 
systemic order, it has been pertinent to limit freedom of expression in social 
media channels.  
It was also revealed from my analysis that laws restricting freedom of 
expression on the internet do not meet the ECtHR’s test of proportionality. The 
explanatory notes to the laws analysed refer to the need to protect the health and 
development of children (the law on blacklists), to protect Russian citizens from 
threats related to extremism (law on arbitrary blocking of extremist materials) 
and to protect the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens and regulate dissemi-
nation of information in the internet (law on bloggers). At first sight, all of those 
aims seem plausible and indeed many countries have adopted laws to achieve 
similar aims. It is difficult to argue that countries should not combat child 
pornography or other activities harming children and indeed it is the duty of 
every country to protect children from harm. However, it is very difficult to 
agree that the restrictions in Russia correspond to those needs or are propor-
tionate responses to those needs or are supported by relevant and sufficient 
reasons presented by the authorities.  
The ideological undertones of these laws are very different from the official 
aims declared. In Russia the law on blacklists – officially aimed at protecting 
children from harmful influences – has been used for many other “informal 
aims” neither enacted in the law nor explained in the explanatory note. The law 
on blacklists, the law on arbitrary blocking of extremist materials and the law on 
bloggers are all characterized by very vague definitions, leaving it to the 
relevant authorities to interpret these laws. Prohibited material is very vaguely 
defined in the law on blacklists and, as a result, not only sites potentially dange-
rous for children, but all sorts of websites, mainly operated by opposition-
minded citizens, are at risk of being taken offline. It is not defined in the law on 
arbitrary blocking what constitutes “extremist activities” or “illegal activities 
and participation in public events held in violation of the established order”.  
According to ECtHR case law, in order to comply with the requirements of 
Article 10 of the ECHR, a restriction must be prescribed by law and must be 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable individuals to regulate their 
conduct.948 Whereas the restrictions provided in the law on arbitrary blockings 
clearly do not meet those criteria and do not enable individuals to effectively 
regulate their conduct, in the view of the Constitutional Court it is not necessary 
to enact clear criteria for defining extremist activities and extremist materials – 
indeed, such concepts should be comprehensible for Russian citizens even 
                                                                          
947  Nicole Bode and Andrey Makarychev, ‘The New Social Media in Russia: Political 
Blogging by the Government and the Opposition’ (2013) 60 Problems of Post-Communism 
53–62. 
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without clear criteria.949 Such vagueness of terms is not in accordance with the 
ECHR and in practice has resulted in disproportionate over-blocking of legal 
content.  
Moreover, the law on blacklists, the law on arbitrary blocking of extremist 
materials and the law on bloggers provide very wide discretion to government 
agencies and the General Prosecutor’s Office and undermine the role of the 
courts. The ECtHR has stressed the importance of judicial review, aimed to 
strike a balance between different interests, and argued that a framework estab-
lishing precise and specific rules regarding the application of preventive 
restrictions on freedom of expression is vital to strike this fair balance.950 In 
Russia it is in the discretion of Rozkomnadzor and other authorized bodies to 
decide if websites should be blocked, although this should be the task of the 
Russian courts. The staffs of agencies such as Rozkomnadzor are hardly com-
petent to strike a balance between different interests and to avoid abuse of 
freedom of expression. The law on arbitrary blocking of extremist material 
enables the General Prosecutor’s Office to assess whether the content is calling 
for riots, extremist activities, and participation in mass events. The powers of 
the Prosecutor General in fact substitute judicial procedure for the recognition 
of materials as extremist. Whereas the authors of the law conveyed that they had 
full trust that the Prosecutor General would not abuse the powers granted to 
him, practice has shown that the law has been widely used to silence the voices 
of political opposition. 
As demonstrated above, the majority of blocked websites have nothing to do 
with aims of the law; rather they have been targeted as political opposition. 
Instead, a legislative framework designed to restrict freedom of expression on 
the internet is aiming to “sovereignize” Russia’s internet, it has been argued.951 
The justification for all of the laws analysed above has been that information 
available on the internet is dangerous to Russian society and the Russian state 
and thus should be controlled and restricted by the relevant Russian authorities. 
The “sovereignty” of the Russian internet was a key topic at the 2015 Russian 
Internet Governance Forum, where national security interests were cited as a 
justification for maintaining control over RuNet.952 Thus, although the official 
aim may be to protect the welfare of children or to protect Russia from terro-
rism, the hidden aim seems to be to secure the position of official rhetoric and to 
suppress opposition, limiting the spread of “ideologically unfit” information and 
“sovereignizing” Russia’s internet. As a result, millions of Russians are 
                                                                          
949  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 1053-O (2 July 2013). 
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deprived of their constitutional right to express, disseminate and receive 
information. 
The third section of this chapter focused on the conflict between freedom of 
expression and traditional values in Russia. It can be concluded that, despite 
constitutional claims of equality and non-discrimination and the constitutional 
guarantee to protect the right to freedom of expression, criminalizing public 
acts, expressing vaguely-defined “obvious disrespect to society, committed in 
order to insult the religious feelings of believers” and punishable by up to three 
years of imprisonment is not in accordance with the standards of the Russian 
Constitution or the standards of the CoE. Additionally, regional and federal 
laws prohibiting “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations” unlawfully 
restrict the right to freedom of expression in Russia, as indeed was established 
by the ECtHR in Bayaev and others v. Russia. The administrative prohibition of 
“propaganda” of non-traditional sexual relations, ostensibly aimed at protecting 
minors, has “effectively criminalized any advocacy of LGBT rights or 
equality.”953 Legislation has almost eliminated opportunities for the media to 
shed light on topics covering sexual minorities, especially issues related to 
discrimination against LGBT people.  
The Russian authorities have not provided objective and reasonable expla-
nations to clarify why vaguely defined propaganda of non-traditional sexual 
relations should be prohibited, whereas propaganda of traditional sexual rela-
tions should not. Officially, the restrictions have been framed as an issue of 
public morality, protection of children and protection of public health. The 
argumentation of Russian legislators as well as the Constitutional Court implies 
that homosexuality and all information related to it is by default immoral and 
dangerous and can somehow inject homosexuality into children and corrupt 
them. However, this approach has no factual basis. The ECtHR has rejected the 
presumption that any information or public debate on LGBT issues could harm 
minors on numerous occasions, including in Alekseyev v Russia and in Bayev 
and others v Russia.954  
The Russian Government has failed to explain how a minor could be enticed 
into a homosexual lifestyle or to provide any evidence that external influences 
such as information from the media could change anyone’s sexual orientation.955 
Sexual orientation is a fundamental human right protected under Article 8 of the 
ECHR and thus homosexuality as such cannot be deemed to be contrary to 
“morals” in the sense of Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR, as has on numerous occa-
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sions been explained by the ECtHR.956 Although the overall attitude towards 
homosexuals is very negative in Russia, the exercise of Convention rights by a 
minority group cannot be made conditional on its being accepted by the majo-
rity. In this case, LGBT people or other representatives of minority groups could 
not effectively exercise their rights, which remain mere theoretical oppor-
tunities. This result is not in accordance with the ECHR, as explained by the 
ECtHR in Bayev and others v. Russia. Considering that in Russia free public 
debate is lacking and the attitudes of the majority are to a large extent formed 
by a state-controlled media landscape and education system, this is an especially 
serious issue.  
The argument of protecting traditional values is often invoked to justify 
maintaining the status quo. However, traditions, cultures and social norms are 
not fixed facts but have evolved over time and continue to evolve.957 In Russia, 
traditional values, backed by the Russian Orthodox Church, are targeted against 
the LGBT group who – due to their stigmatized position and a legal prohibition 
on expressing their position – are not in a position to shape the dominant 
(homophobic) discourse in Russia. The arguments of legislators as well as the 
court system are based on old stereotypes and prejudices rather than on con-
temporary science-based knowledge and as such, are not sufficient to justify a 
clear breach of freedom of expression.  
It can be concluded that in the case of Russian anti-homosexual propaganda 
legislation, there is no reasonable relationship between the means employed 
(prohibition of vaguely-defined propaganda of non-traditional relations) and the 
aims sought to be realised (protection of children; protection of morality and 
public health).  
In my view the laws aimed at protecting traditional values have an important 
“hidden” aim: to discredit the liberal approach to human rights, to discredit the 
concept of dignity and morality that underlies international human rights treaties 
and to discredit the Western value system as such. Protecting LGBT rights in 
Western countries is constantly ridiculed by Russian politicians, the media and 
also in academia. Another “hidden” aim of “morality-driven laws” is to discredit 
Russian people who want to protect, develop and exercise freedom of expres-
sion and other human rights in Russia. Labelling these Russian people as a 
“liberasty”958 and interpreting advocating the rights and freedoms of gay people 
as something dirty and obscene marginalizes this socially and politically active 
part of Russian society.  
Legislation is used to paint a picture for Russian people that LGBT people 
are socially inferior individuals who entail terrible threats to Russian children 
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and all efforts should be made to protect children from their gross influence. 
Thus, the main focus of the legislation seems to be to stigmatize LGBT people, 
to belittle LGBT topics in the eyes of the Russian people, further contributing to 
existing widespread homophobia and violence against all Russian minorities. It 
is widely argued that the homophobic rhetoric deployed in favour of anti-
homosexual propaganda laws has contributed to legitimising discrimination and 
violence against LGBT people and human rights activists in general.959  
It has been argued, “Homophobia is state policy in Russia, a kind of new 
sexual sovereignty defending Orthodox Christian morality against the corrosive 
influence of Western decadence.”960 Russian legislators and the Russian court 
system interpret the concepts of morality and dignity in the same meaning as 
interpreted by the Russian Orthodox Church961 – that only those who are 
“approved by society” are dignified, are moral and hence worthy of protection. 
Accordingly, it derives from such interpretation that those who fall outside 
those brackets defined by the Orthodox Church, for example those born gay, do 
not deserve to exercise rights and freedoms on an equal footing with “normal” 
members of society.  
Russian legislators have skilfully tied the concepts of morality and dignity as 
understood by the Russian Orthodox Church to the interpretation of these 
legislative moves. Additionally, the media has supported the interpretation of 
these laws as a quest for a higher morality inherent to the Russian people and 
essentially missing in the Western value system. For example, the debate on the 
Pussy Riot case as well as the debate on the anti-homosexual propaganda law – 
debates inherently influencing the rights and freedoms of the Russian people – 
are not discussed in the language of rights and freedoms, but in the language of 
threats to Russian state and society.  
In Section 4 of this chapter I scrutinized Russian legislation aimed at pro-
tecting the Motherland, its honour and territorial integrity. The amendment to 
the Criminal Code banning public calls to action aimed at violating the terri-
torial integrity of the Russian Federation; the law against the rehabilitation of 
Nazism, criminalizing denial of facts recognized by the Nuremberg tribunal, 
approving of the crimes that the Nuremberg tribunal judged and spreading 
intentionally false information about the Soviet Union’s activities during World 
War II; and the decree of the president according to which all deaths among the 
military can be classified as state secrets not only in time of war but also in 
peacetime, demonstrate that protecting the prevailing ideology and the interests 
and the actions of the ruling political elite are the guiding aims of law-making in 
Russia. “The government has long used the “fight against terrorism and extre-
mism” to justify repressive laws, no matter how obviously senseless they may 
be. As a result, Russia’s statutory framework can now be effectively used to 
                                                                          
959  Filomonov (n 816); Article 19 (n 802) 7, 8. 
960  Guillory (n 685).  
961  See Section 4.2.1 of this study.  
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target not only credible extremist threats, but also political opponents of the 
state” decries Gleb Bogush, Associate Professor at the Department of Criminal 
law and Criminology at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Laws officially 
aimed at protecting Russian security and territorial integrity directly reflect an 
emerging Russian mythology of the unique Russian value-system. Protecting 
the heroism of the Red Army, highlighting the victory in World War II and 
labelling all alternative viewpoints as fascism or extremism: arguments preva-
lent in prevailing political rhetoric are now codified in Russian criminal law.  
Bogush has also noted that justifying repressive laws “no matter how 
obviously senseless they may be” with the argument of combating terrorism and 
extremism has been a long-standing strategy for the Russian government. Con-
sequently, legislative amendments enable Russia’s statutory framework to be 
used to target political opponents, not just credible extremist threats. As a result, 
laws have contributed to further depoliticizing the Russian population: “The 
copious prohibitions contained in the legislation inundate citizens, suppressing 
their political activity and forcing them into self-censorship and social passivity. 
This is less a result of the substance and severity of the new prohibitions than of 
their number and scope” argues Bogush.962  
All legislative acts analysed in this chapter have certain characteristics in 
common. Firstly, the key terms of the laws are very vaguely defined and they 
are not sufficiently clear to enable individuals to regulate their conduct in 
conformity with the law. This unclarity has led to arbitrary application – web-
sites of opposition-minded people are blocked and people sharing articles on 
their social media on politically sensitive issues in Russia are punished for 
disseminating “extremist” materials. An important problem related to vaguely 
defined regulations is that when laws are not clear enough in order to allow 
people to regulate their conduct, this can easily lead to self-censorship. When no 
one knows what kind of speech is punishable, it is safer not to express oneself at 
all. That being so, pluralism – already lacking in Russia and one of the building 
blocks of a democratic society – simply cannot exist at all. 
The legislative acts restricting freedom of expression analysed in this chapter 
also allow a very wide discretion to government agencies and the General Pro-
secutor’s Office to interpret and enforce vaguely defined provisions. Moreover, 
they also undermine the role of the courts, whose tasks are assigned to 
government agencies and to the General Prosecutor.  
Another common feature characterizing the laws analysed in this chapter is 
that they fail to meet the proportionality test established by the ECtHR, which is 
very similar to the proportionality test deployed by Russian courts.  
The messages that the legislation carries mirror the positions taken by the 
executive branch towards human rights and freedoms. Russian president Vla-
dimir Putin has emphasized that freedom of speech and normal political activity 
must be distinguished from “illegal instruments of soft power…which are used 
                                                                          
962  Bogush, ‘Killing Russian Criminal Law’ (n 928).  
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all too frequently to develop and provoke extremist, separatist and nationalistic 
attitudes, to manipulate the public and to conduct direct interference in the 
domestic policy of sovereign countries”.963  
Widespread restrictions on freedom of expression have made proper public 
debate on various politically sensitive questions virtually impossible. The 
legislation restricting freedom of expression has been used to further curb the 
voice of opposition-minded people and to limit the development of civil society 
in Russia. Free and open debate, which is an essential component of a 
democratic society, is lacking in Russia but instead is criminalized.  
 
  
                                                                          
963  The Washington Post (n 944). 
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VI IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION IN RUSSIA  
6.1. Overview of the legal framework  
The right to freedom of association has been regarded by the Venice Commis-
sion as “a barometer of the general standard of the protection of human rights 
and the level of democracy in the country”. 964 The right to freedom of 
association is a prerequisite for other rights and freedoms such as freedom of 
religion, the right to privacy and the right to equal treatment and is also essential 
for the development of civil society. Freedom of association, together with 
freedom of expression, enables people and groups to peacefully pursue their 
aims without arbitrary intervention by the state. NGOs and other associations 
allow citizens to associate and on that basis to better promote and pursue their 
agendas.965 The ability to function without arbitrary interference by the state, for 
example, is pivotal for NGOs to be able to function properly. NGOs working in 
the field of human rights advocacy can be particularly vulnerable to various 
pressures and thus need enhanced protection by states as well as by the 
international community.966  
Freedom of association is protected under Article 30 (1) of the Russian 
Constitution, stating that everyone shall have the right to association, including 
the right to create trade unions for the protection of their interests.967 Freedom 
of association is also protected in various human rights instruments that are 
binding on Russia. Under Article 11(1) of the ECHR, everyone has the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, 
including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of their 
interests. However, the right to freedom of association is subject to a number of 
                                                                          
964  Venice Commission, Opinion on the compatibility with human rights standards of the 
legislation on nongovernmental organisations of the Republic of Azerbaijan’ 636/2011. 
CDL-AD(2011)035 (Strasbourg 2011) para 41 <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/ 
documents/CDL-AD(2011)035-e.aspx> accessed on 13 December 2017.  
965  Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 129-fz on amending certain legislative 
acts (Federal law on undesirable activities of foreign and international non-governmental 
organisations), 814/2015. CDL-AD(2016)020-e: (Strasbourg 2016) paras 6–7  
<http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2016)020-e> accessed on 
13 December 2017 (hereinafter: Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 129-fz); 
Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Russia’s Foreign Agent law: Violating human rights and 
attacking civil society (2014) 6 <http://nhc.no/filestore/Publikasjoner/Policy_Paper/NHC_ 
PolicyPaper_6_2014_Russiasforeignagentlaw.pdf> accessed on 13 December 2017. 
966  Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 129-fz (n 965) para 9.  
967 Konstitutsija Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 25 dekabrja 1993 goda, s izmenenijami ot 30 de-
kabrja 2008 goda. (Constitution of the Russian Federation of 25 December 1993). See for 
the text of the Constitution in English: <http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-02.htm> 
accessed on 1 December 2017. 
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exceptions enshrined in Article 11 (2) of the ECHR. Article 11(2) states that no 
restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.968 
Apart from the Constitution, in Russia mainly two federal laws regulate the 
activities of the NGOs: the 1995 Law on Non-Commercial Organisations969 and 
the 1995 Law on Public Associations.970 Non-commercial organisations 
following under the Law on Non-Commercial Organisations are defined as “not 
having profit-making as the main objective of their activity and not distributing 
earned profit among the members”. Public associations971 falling under the Law 
on Public Associations are defined as “voluntary, self-governing, non-profit 
formations, set up at the initiative of individuals who have united on the basis of 
the community of interests to realize common goals, indicated in the charter of 
the public association”.972 Subsequently I will focus on legislative amendments 
adopted since 2012 that have considerably influenced exercise of the right to 
freedom of association in the Russian Federation. 
 
 
6.2. Law on foreign agents  
On July 20, 2012, less than three months after President Putin’s inauguration, 
the Russian State Duma adopted Law No. 121-FZ “On Making Amendments to 
Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the Regulation of 
Activities of Non-commercial Organizations Performing the Functions of 
Foreign Agents” commonly known as the “Foreign Agents Law”.973 Under the 
Foreign Agents Law, organizations that receive foreign funding and engage in 
“political activities” are obliged to register as “foreign agents”. “Foreign agents” 
are subject to strict controls, including extensive annual audits, quarterly finan-
cial reporting and voluminous reporting on all activities every six months. 
Organisations falling into the category of “foreign agents” are obliged to label 
                                                                          
968 European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe, CETS No. 5. 
969  Federal’nyi zakon ot 8.12.1995 N 7-FZ “O nekommercheskih obedineniyah”.  
970  Federal’nyi zakon ot 14.04.1995 N 82-FZ “Ob obshestvennyh obedineniyah”.  
971  About 50% of noncommercial organizations operating in Russia are public associations 
(Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 129-fz (n 965) para 13).  
972  See Article 5 of federal law N 82-FZ (translation in Venice Commission, Opinion on 
federal law no. 129-fz (n 965) para 13).  
973  Federal’nyy zakon ot 20.07.2012 No 121-FZ “O vnesenii izmeneniy v nekotoryye zako-
nodatel’nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii po regulirovaniyu deyatel’nosti nekommercheskikh 
organizatsiy, osushchestvlyayushchikh funktsii inostrannykh agentov” <http://www.rg.ru/ 
2012/07/23/nko-dok.html> accessed on 15 December 2017. (Hereinafter: law on foreign 
agents).  
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all materials and resources such as publications, letters and electronic material 
as material produced by a “foreign agent”. 
The official justification for the Foreign Agents Law is that Russia has to 
protect itself from external actors trying to intervene in Russian internal matters 
and threaten Russian sovereignty by providing funds for NGOs working in 
Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has noted: 
 
The civilized work of non-governmental humanitarian and charity organiza-
tions deserves every support. This also applies to those who actively criticize 
the current authorities. However, the activities of “pseudo-NGOs” and other 
agencies that try to destabilize other countries with outside support are un-
acceptable…I’m referring to those cases where the activities of NGOs are not 
based on the interests (and resources) of local social groups but are funded and 
supported by outside forces.974 
 
The Foreign Agents Law has been criticised for its vague terminology. Lack of 
clarity in terminology makes the law a perfect tool “to stifle criticism by 
weakening the capacity of organizations that challenge state policies and 
practices, hampering their freedom of expression”, as noted by the Norwegian 
Helsinki Committee.975 According to the Presidential Council on Human Rights, 
the use of terms like “foreign agents” in Russian legislation may have a nega-
tive impact on the effectiveness of NGOs’ work as well as on their collaboration 
with state bodies.976 The term “foreign agents” is derived from Soviet termino-
logy, labelling civil society organizations as “suspects, as enemies and as 
targets.” 977 In 1924 Stalin specifically defended the retention of “organs of 
suppression” on the ground that “as long as there is capitalist encirclement there 
will be a danger of intervention with all the consequences that flow from that 
danger… In accordance with that theory… all internal opposition forces in 
Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of 
reaction antagonistic to Soviet power” as explained by George F. Kennan 
seventy years ago.978  
Arguments used to defend the Foreign Agents Law very much resemble the 
Soviet rhetoric. NGOs are considered to be a threat to the Russian state and 
society and hence their activities must be kept under close scrutiny. While 
addressing the State Duma with a speech celebrating the annexation of Crimea 
                                                                          
974  Vladimir Putin, ‘Russia and the changing world’ (27 February 2012) Ria Novosti 
<https://www.rt.com/politics/official-word/putin-russia-changing-world-263/> accessed on 
15 December 2017.  
975  Norwegian Helsinki Committee (n 965). 
976  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 10-P/2014 (8 April 2014).  
977  Johann Bihr, ‘Two Media Support NGOs Classified as “Foreign Agents”’ Reporters Wit-
hout Borders (25 November 2014) <http://en.rsf.org/russie-two-media-support-ngos-
classified-25-11-2014,47276.html> accessed 15 December 2017.  
978  Kennan (n 279). 
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in March 2014, Vladimir Putin used the terms “fifth column” and “disparate 
bunch of national traitors” to describe people and organisations who did not 
belong into the “absolute majority” who supported Russia’s actions in Crimea.979 
The language of fifth column and national traitors has become commonplace to 
describe NGOs and civil society as such. NGOs are pictured as dangerous 
agents of influence that deserve to be controlled and, if needed, then also 
punished. 
Introduction of the law has resulted in the closure of a significant number of 
human rights organisations in Russia, either because of their unwillingness to be 
referred to as a “foreign agent” or due to failure to meet the obligations the law 
imposes upon them. The first organization sued by the Ministry of Justice for 
failure to register as a foreign agent was Golos, an organization focusing on 
election observations.980 In March 2013 the Russian government launched 
inspections of hundreds of NGOs deemed to be “foreign agents” to pressurise 
them to register as such. At least fifty-five groups received warnings and at least 
twenty groups received official notices of violation requiring them to register as 
“foreign agents”. Several NGOs refused to register because they did not want to 
follow various bureaucratic requirements and considered the term “foreign 
agent” slanderous. The prosecutor’s office and Ministry of Justice filed at least 
twelve administrative cases981 against NGOs for failure to abide by the “foreign 
agents” law and at least six administrative cases against NGO leaders982. Several 
                                                                          
979  Vladimir Putin, ‘Vladimir Putin Adresses the State Duma Deputies, Federation Council 
Members, Heads of Russion Regions and Civil Society Representatives. Transcript of the 
Speech’ (18 March 2014) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603> accessed on 
13 December 2017. 
980  Norwegian Helsinki Committee (n 965) 4. 
981  Administrative cases were filed against the Association of NGOs in Defense of Voters’ 
Rights “Golos” (Moscow), who lost the suit; Kostroma Center for Support of Public Ini-
tiatives (Kostroma), who lost the suit; Anti-Discrimination Center “Memorial” (St. Peters-
burg), who won two administrative cases, but later lost a similar civil suit by the prosecutor’s 
office and chose to shut down; Coming Out (St. Petersburg), who won the administrative 
case but later lost a similar civil suit by the prosecutor’s office; Side by Side LGBT Film 
Festival (St. Petersburg), who won the suit; Regional Public Association in Defense of 
Democratic Rights and Freedoms “Golos” (Moscow) – who lost the suit; Center for Civic 
Analysis and Independent Research GRANI (Perm), who won the suit; Perm Civic Chamber 
(Perm), who won the suit; Perm Regional Human Rights Center (Perm), who won the suit; 
Women of Don (Rostov region), who lost their suit; Ecozachita! – Zhensovet (Kaliningrad), 
who lost the suit and the Association “Partnership for Development”, who lost the suit. See: 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups. The Battle Chronicle’ 
(8 September 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-
chronicle> accessed on 13 December 2017. 
982  The leaders of the following 6 NGOs faced administrative charges personally: Anti-
Discrimination Center “Memorial” (St. Petersburg), won the suit but the organization chose 
to shut down when it lost a “foreign agent” civil suit to the prosecutor’s office; Side by Side 
LGBT Film Festival (St. Petersburg), won the suit; Coming Out (St. Petersburg), won the 
suit; Association “Partnership for Development”, lost the suit; Kostroma Center for Support 
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organizations that won their administrative case also had to go through a civil 
law suit, as prosecutors brought an almost identical civil case against them. The 
prosecutor’s office won civil suits against six NGOs983, arguing that their failure 
to register as “foreign agents” harmed the public interest. Following relevant 
court rulings, the NGOs were required to register as “foreign agents” within two 
weeks or were shut down.  
By October 2014 at least six groups chose to shut down rather than register 
as foreign agents, including the Anti-Discrimination Center (ADC) Memorial in 
Saint Petersburg, two Golos election watchdogs (Golos Association and 
Regional Golos), JURIX (Lawyers for Constitutional Rights and Freedoms) and 
Side-by-Side LGBT.984 Additionally, one of the most prominent human rights 
organisations, HRC “Memorial”, which received the Sakharov Prize for 
Freedom of Thought awarded by the European Parliament to individuals or 
organisations that have made an important contribution to the fight for human 
rights or democracy, was added to the list of foreign agents. HRC “Memorial” 
was investigated by the Prosecutor’s Office, who concluded that HRC 
“Memorial” was engaged in “political activity”, due to its human rights work 
and was receiving foreign funding. The Prosecutor’s Office issued an order on 
29 April 2013 and required HRC “Memorial” to register as an organisation 
performing the functions of a foreign agent, in accordance with the Foreign 
Agents Law. On 23 May 2014, the Zamoskvoretsky district court of Moscow 
dismissed the appeal of HRC Memorial.985 
On the same day as the rejection of the appeal, the Russian Parliament voted 
in favour of an amendment to the Federal Law “On NGOs” which provided the 
Ministry of Justice with the power to include on the register of non-commercial 
organisations NGOs that are acting as “foreign agents” and have failed to 
register as such. On June 4, 2014, President Vladimir Putin signed amendments 
to the law, granting the Ministry of Justice full powers to register NGOs as 
“foreign agents” itself, without a court decision and without the consent of the 
NGO concerned. The Ministry can act on the basis of information collected by 
itself or sent by its local departments, as well as by state bodies, local 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of Public Initiatives (Kostroma), lost the suit; Association of NGOs in Defense of Voters’ 
Rights “Golos” (Moscow), won the suit. See Human Rights Watch (n 981).  
983  These organisations included: Anti-Discrimination Center “Memorial” (St. Petersburg), 
who lost the suit and shut down; Coming Out (St. Petersburg), who lost the suit and shut 
down; Women of Don (Rostov region), who lost the suit and was registered as a “foreign 
agent”; Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies (Saratov), who lost the suit was 
registered as a “foreign agent”; Youth Humanistic Movement (Murmansk), who lost the suit 
and is appealing the ruling; Association “Partnership for Development” (Saratov), who lost 
the suit and was registered as a “foreign agent” 
984  Human Rights Watch (n 981). 
985 Front Line Defenders ‘Rejection by Court of Human Rights Centre Memorial's appeal 
against order to register as ‘foreign agent’’ (27 May 2014) <http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/ 
node/26032#sthash.Oqzmlm4q.dpuf> accessed on 15 December 2017.  
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authorities, organisations or citizens. A decision to include an organisation as a 
“foreign agent” on the register of non-commercial organisations can be appealed 
in court. Many NGOs sent a joint open letter986 to President Putin condemning 
the law as the concept of a foreign agent is only linked to the source of funding, 
without any acknowledgment of the nature of the activities carried out by the 
organization; the definition of political activities is vague and broad, allowing 
for arbitrary and selective use of the law and that the law establishes excessively 
strict control over activities of “foreign agents”, with additional audit and 
reporting requirements.987 By the end of 2015 the Ministry of Justice had included 
one hundred and eleven Russian organizations on its list of “foreign agents”.988 
On 8 April 2014 the Constitutional Court upheld the Foreign Agents Law.989 
The provisions of the Foreign Agents Law proceed from the presumption of 
legality and the conscientiousness of the activities of non-commercial organi-
zations, argues the Constitutional Court. The Foreign Agents Law was directed 
at ensuring the transparency of activity of NGOs that receive monetary means 
and other property from foreign sources and participate in political activity 
carried out on the territory of the Russian Federation, with the aim of 
influencing decisions taken by state bodies and state policy conducted by them. 
Such organisations influence the rights and freedoms of all citizens as they can 
use foreign funding in the interest of the sponsor, as noted by the Constitutional 
Court.990 The Constitutional Court also tried to specify the definition of “poli-
tical activity”. The Court stated that whether an organisation is engaged in 
political activity or not should be assessed on the basis of the work of the 
organization, not on the basis of the actions of its individual members. The 
Court noted that a NGO is taking part in political activities “if, irrespective of 
its aims as written in its statute, it participates (including by providing financial 
support) in the organisation and holding of political actions aimed at influencing 
decisions of state bodies or changing state policies or aimed at influencing 
public opinion with the above mentioned objectives”. 991  
                                                                          
986  ‘Open Letter to Members of the State Duma of the Russian Federation on Introducing 
Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Part Regulating Activities of 
Non-commercial Organizations, which Carry Functions of Foreign Agents’ (06 July 2012) 
<http://www.nhc.no/no/nyheter/2012/Draft+law+on+foreign+funded+civil+society+raises+c
oncern.b7C_wlbM4d.ips>. 
987  If a registered organization fails to comply, its executive manager can be subject to a 
300.000 RUR (7.500 EUR) fine or up to three years in prison. 
988  Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Russia (n 920).  
989  The Constitutional Court received five complaints on the law. They were filed by the 
Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin, by the Kostroma Centre of Civic 
Initiatives, and by human rights defenders Sergey Smirensky, Victor Yukechev and Ludmila 
Kuzmina. The Court decided to consider all the complaints together. 
990  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 10-P/2014 (8 April 2014). 
991  Ibid. 
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Examples of political activities include reunions, meetings and demonstra-
tions, rallies and pickets, electoral or referendum campaigns, public appeals, 
including appeals to state institutions, disseminating information (including 
through the use of modern technologies) evaluating decisions of state bodies or 
their policies. The Court concluded that any such list would necessarily not be 
comprehensive.992 The Constitutional Court also assessed in its ruling of 8 April 
2014 that there was no legal basis to argue that the term “foreign agent” had a 
negative connotation from the Soviet era and noted that the term “foreign agent” 
was intended to discredit Russian NGOs.993 
According to the standards of the ECHR, restrictions on freedom of asso-
ciation may be imposed only in the interest of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals and for protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
The “prescribed by law” test requires analysis whether a legal provision is 
sufficiently precise to enable the citizen reasonably to foresee the consequences, 
which a given action may entail.994  
While discussing the constitutionality of the Foreign Agents Law, the 
Constitutional Court did not follow the guidelines established by the ECtHR. 
Although the Constitutional Court aimed to clarify the term “political activity”, 
the explanations provided were very vague. Activities such as influencing state 
policies or public opinion leave too much space for arbitrary interpretation, 
making it impossible for citizens to regulate their conduct. The judgment of the 
Constitutional Court did not provide sufficient clarity so as to enable NGOs that 
receive foreign funding to know how to comply. The Constitutional Court also 
did not focus its attention to the issue whether the law provided effective 
safeguards against arbitrary interference with the respective substantive rights, 
most importantly the right to freedom of association. The ECtHR has stated that 
the “in accordance with the law” test implies that there must be a measure of 
legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interference by public autho-
rities and that it would be “contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion 
granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power… the 
law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent 
authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard 
to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate 
protection against arbitrary interference.” 995 
The wide discretion given to the Prosecutor’s office was untouched by the 
Constitutional Court. Overall, it remained unresolved by the Constitutional 
                                                                          
992  Ibid.  
993  Ibid. 
994  The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom (App 6538/74) ECtHR 26 April 1979, para 49. 
995  Malone v The United Kingdom (App 8691/79) ECtHR 2 August 1984, para 82.  
221 
Court whether the restrictions were necessary and proportionate to a legitimate 
aim in a democratic society. 996  
On 20 April 2016, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted a draft 
law modifying the law “On Non-Commercial Organisations” where the concept 
of “political activity” introduced by the Foreign Agents Law in 2012 was 
further elaborated. According to the law all NGOs except political parties are 
recognized as participating in political activities carried out in Russia if, 
regardless of the purposes and tasks specified in its constituent documents, the 
organisation carries out activities in the fields of state construction; protection 
of the foundations of the constitutional system of Russia; the federal structure of 
Russia; protection of sovereignty and ensuring the territorial integrity of Russia; 
protection of lawfulness, the legal order, state and public security, national 
defence and foreign policy; protection of the socio-economic and national 
development of Russia, development of the political system, activities of state 
bodies and/or local government bodies; is carrying out activities related to 
legislative regulation of human rights and freedoms with the aim of influencing 
the development and implementation of state policy or is carrying out activities 
related to the formation of state and local government bodies and their decisions 
and actions. 997  
Under the new regulation, the specified political activity can be carried out 
in the forms of:  
1) participating in the activities of the organization and holding public events in 
the form of meetings, rallies, demonstrations, processions or picketing; or in 
various combinations of these forms, organization and conduct of public 
debates, discussions, speeches;  
2) participation in activities aimed at obtaining a certain result in elections, 
referendum, participation in monitoring elections, referendums, formation of 
                                                                          
996  However, the Constitutional Court held that it is for the prosecution to prove that the 
organisation intends to take part in, or has carried out, political activities and has failed to 
register. In the case of doubt on whether the activities or goals of an NGO are political, a 
presumption that the organisation is acting in accordance with the law and in good faith 
should apply. The Court also ruled that the mandatory minimum fines for individuals and 
organisations that fail to register (set in the law at 100,000 and 300,000 rubles) should be 
amended to give the courts discretion to apply lower fines, and ordered that the relevant 
provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure be amended accordingly. See further: 
Russian Constitutional Court, No. 10-P/2014 (8 April 2014). Note that amendments to the 
law, which give the Ministry of Justice power to register organizations as “foreign agents” 
without their consent shifts the burden of proof as NGOs have to turn to the court in order to 
prove that they are not “foreign agents” instead of prosecutors having to prove that they are. 
Registered organizations will have to comply with the extra reporting requirements for 
“foreign agents” until an eventual victory in court leads to de-registration. See: Norwegian 
Helsinki Committee (n 965).  
997  Federal’nyy zakon ot 02.06.2016 N 179-FZ “O vnesenii izmeneniy v stat’yu 8 
Federal’nogo zakona Ob obshchestvennykh ob” yedineniyakh i stat’yu 2 Federal’nogo 
zakona O nekommercheskikh organizatsiyakh” (Article 2).  
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electoral Commissions, referendum commissions and the activities of political 
parties;  
3) public appeals to state bodies, local government bodies, their officials, as 
well as other actions that affect the activities of these bodies, including those 
aimed at adopting, amending, repealing laws or other normative acts;  
4) distribution, including by use of modern information technologies, opinions 
on the state decisions and policies pursued by them;  
5) formation of socio-political views and beliefs including conducting public 
opinion polls and publicizing their results or conducting other sociological 
research;  
6) involvement of citizens, including minors, in the specified activities; and  
7) financing the specified activities. 998 
 
The law also established that political activities did not include activities in the 
sphere of science, culture, art, health, health promotion and disease prevention, 
social services, social support and protection of citizens, protection of mother-
hood and childhood, social support for disabled people, promotion of a healthy 
lifestyle, physical culture and sports, protection of plants and animals, charity 
work. As can be seen from the extensive list, a very broad range of activities is 
included under the definition of political activity. Basically all activities that 
influence the actions of government in the sphere of human rights legislation 
and implementation are considered as political activities. Accordingly, po-
tentially all organisations advocating human rights fall within the category of 
foreign agents and have to meet the strict requirements imposed on them. The 
same applies to all NGOs that engage in organizing some sort of public events 
or who engage in vote monitoring. As a result, in contemporary Russia NGOs 
cannot fulfil the role of “watchdogs” as their activities are severely restricted. 
The right to freedom of association, especially in the sphere of NGOs, has been 
rendered almost non-existent. NGOs and people involved in their work are 
characterized as enemies of the country, as spies and traitors. 
 
 
6.3. Law on undesirable organisations 
In addition to legislation focusing on limiting the activities of Russian NGOs 
labelled as “foreign agents”, on 23 May 2015 a law popularly known as the Law 
on Undesirable Organisations999 took effect. The law amended the Criminal 
Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Code of Administrative Offences, Law 
No. 272-FZ on Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights 
and Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation and Law No. 114-FZ on 
                                                                          
998  Ibid.  
999  Federal’nyy zakon ot 23.05.2015 N 129-FZ “O vnesenii izmeneniy v otdel’nyye zako-
nodatel’nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii”. 
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the Procedure for Exit from the Russian Federation and Entry to the Russian 
Federation.  
According to the Law on Undesirable Organisations, the Prosecutor General, 
in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, can declare a foreign firm or 
NGO “undesirable” when the activities of a foreign or international NGO threaten 
the foundations of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, the 
country’s defence capability or the security of the state. As a result, the organi-
zation has to cease its activities in Russia, is banned from holding public events, 
from distributing information and from all cooperation with other organisations 
in Russia. Individuals and organisations also face having their accounts frozen, 
and individuals who do not comply with the requirements may face administ-
rative and criminal proceedings, with penalties of up to six years in prison. 1000 
In similar vein to other laws infringing upon the rights to freedom of expres-
sion and freedom of association, the Law on Undesirable Organisations is 
characterized by vague definitions, excessive powers of the Prosecutor’s Office 
and undermines the role of the courts in Russia. The Venice Commission has 
assessed that the Law on Undesirable Organisations infringes upon the freedoms 
of association, assembly and expression, as well as the right to an effective 
remedy. The Venice Commission noted the lack of clear criteria for the inclu-
sion of organisations among undesirable NGOs and recommended that such 
clear criteria be created. Moreover, the Venice Commission emphasized that 
judges, not the Office of the Prosecutor General, should be the ones to decide 
whether an NGO should be declared “undesirable” in Russia and that detailed 
explanations should also be provided to the NGOs concerned.1001 
According to the explanatory note to the Law on Undesirable Organisations, 
the legislation is aimed at defending Russia from various external threats, 
including the threat of terrorism and “colour revolutions”. It is noted that 
political, military and international conflicts have enabled the development of 
destructive organisations that are the carriers of terrorist, extremist and natio-
nalist ideas, pursue criminal goals and cause significant harm to the world 
community. The explanatory note states that it should be one of the priorities of 
the Russian authorities to prevent the penetration of these organizations into the 
territory of the Russian Federation in order to protect the foundations of the 
constitutional order, morality, rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens, 
the defence and security of the Russian state and public order. It is necessary to 
prevent foreign organisations from threatening the fundamental values of Russia. 
According to the explanatory note, implementation of the proposed measures 
will make it possible to increase the effectiveness of impeding the activities of 
foreign structures that pose a threat to the security of the state, form the threat of 
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“colour revolutions” or contribute to the emergence of hotbeds of tension on an 
inter-ethnic and inter-confessional basis.1002 
However, in practice the law has been used to ban the activities of foreign 
and international organisations working in the field of human rights, rule of law 
and democracy. Under the Law on Undesirable Organisations, entities such as 
the National Endowment for Democracy, the OSI Assistance Foundation, the 
Open Society Foundation, the US-Russia Foundation for Economic Advance-
ment and the Rule of Law, the National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the Media Development 
Investment Fund (MDIF) have been declared “undesirable” in Russia. According 
to a statement posted on the website of the Prosecutor General’s office, the 
International Republican Institute (IRI) and the Media Development Investment 
Fund (MDIF) pose “a threat to the foundations of the constitutional order and 
national security,” although it remains unclear how exactly these organisations 
threaten Russia’s constitutional order and national security. Declaring such 
organisations as undesirable organisations is “designed to send yet another 
unmistakable message: Russian NGOs and independent media should steer 
clear of foreign funders – and foreign funders should steer clear of Russia,” as 
argued by Sergei Nikitin, Director of Amnesty International Russia.1003 
 
 
6.4. Analysis and conclusions 
This chapter examined how the right to freedom of association is incorporated 
into the Russian legal order and implemented in practice and how relevant 
legislation has influenced the opportunities of Russians to exercise their right to 
freedom of association guaranteed under the ECHR as well as the Russian 
Constitution.  
I found that the Foreign Agents Law adopted in 2012 and amended in 2014 
empowering the Ministry of Justice to register organizations as “foreign agents” 
without their consent and without a court ruling demonstrates that the right to 
freedom of association is not effectively incorporated into the Russian legal 
order. These legislative amendments have significantly hindered implemen-
tation of the right to freedom of association in Russia and restricted the oppor-
tunities for civil society to exercise and demand their rights. Russian NGOs are 
not able to peacefully pursue their aims without arbitrary intervention by the 
                                                                          
1002  Poyasnitel’naya zapiska k proekty federal’nogo zakona “O vnesenii izmenenii v neko-
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state. The independence and everyday activities of Russian NGOs are signi-
ficantly limited.  
As effective incorporation of the Articles of the ECHR into the national legal 
order and their enforceability is an important precondition to effective com-
pliance with the ECHR, it can be concluded that the legislative amendments 
strictly limiting exercise of the right to freedom of association is another 
obstacle hindering effective compliance with the ECHR.  
Moreover, when the legal order does not provide basic guarantees, when 
exercising one’s rights and freedoms is not encouraged, but on the contrary, 
discouraged as a result of strict regulations and punishments, civil society does 
not have the means to demand their rights, as noted in Section 1.4.1 of this 
study. Legislative amendments restricting the right to freedom of association 
further weaken civil society in Russia, also obstructing effective compliance 
with the ECHR.  
In 2011 and 2012 a protest movement spread across the country and pro-
vided another important impetus for restricting the activities of NGOs in Russia, 
as the danger of a Russian “colour revolution” became increasingly real. Whereas 
in 2006 various amendments had already started to curb foreign support for 
NGOs, legislative changes since 2012 have had especially dramatic con-
sequences for NGOs in Russia. Following the “Colour Revolutions” in Ukraine, 
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian state began to view NGOs, especially 
those financed from overseas, as a challenge to its sovereignty.1004  
Whereas the aim of the law has been to ensure transparency of NGOs, in 
practice the measures enacted by the law have disproportionately hampered the 
activities of NGOs, especially NGOs dealing with human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law.1005 The Foreign Agents Law and the law on undesirable 
organisations have reduced the impact of Russian and international NGOs on 
Russian society to a minimum. Russian NGOs have to deal with registrations, 
inspections and court proceedings instead of focusing on their main tasks. The 
activity of the majority of NGOs is disabled and many NGOs have had to cease 
their activities altogether.1006  
Influencing public opinion and policies is considered by the ECtHR to be a 
legitimate role of NGOs. In a democratic society, the public authorities are to be 
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exposed to permanent scrutiny,1007 including by NGOs, who are social “watch-
dogs”1008 and must be able to carry on their activities effectively and be able to 
rely on a high level of freedom of expression due to strong public interest.1009 In 
Russia, the role of watchdog is not a legitimate role. Instead, the activities of 
NGOs are construed as socially and politically dangerous and traitorous. The 
Foreign Agents Law has been used to limit the opportunities of the opposition 
to be heard. Many activists have been severely punished, which has sent a clear 
signal to the Russian people that they should not overstep the boundaries 
established by the state or otherwise they, too, will be punished. Thus, the 
liberally minded politically active part of Russian society advocating 
compliance with the ECHR and other international human rights law is placed 
in a highly disadvantageous situation.  
The Foreign Agents Law and its application by prosecutorial services and 
courts forms part of a wider picture of introducing restrictive legislation and 
practices since Vladimir Putin started his third term as Russia’s president, as 
assessed by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee.1010 The wider picture also 
includes restricting freedom of expression and freedom of assembly by 
imposing harsh administrative as well as criminal punishments for exercising 
civil and political rights. All of these laws are aimed at consolidating the power 
of the ruling elite and limiting opportunities for Russian society to choose some 
other path in the course of its development.  
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VII IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
ASSEMBLY IN RUSSIA  
7.1. Overview of the legal framework  
The right to freedom of assembly is one of the foundations of a democratic 
society. The Constitutional Court has established that the right to freedom of 
assembly enshrined in Article 31 of the Russian Constitution is “one of the 
fundamental and inalienable elements of the legal status of a person in the 
Russian Federation as a democratic State ruled by law and is among the recog-
nized fundaments of the constitutional structure that include ideological and 
political pluralism and a multi-party system”1011.  
The Constitutional Court has also explained that freedom of assembly 
together with other civil and political rights enacted in Articles 29, 30, 32 and 
33 of the Constitution “guarantees citizens the real possibility of influencing the 
action of public authorities through the holding of public events … and thereby 
fostering sustained peaceful dialogue between civil society and the State.” 1012 
The Constitutional Court has emphasized the need for special protection of 
freedom of assembly as a universally recognized democratic value “as it is 
through this means that the opinions and demands of diverse political forces and 
public groups are formed and expressed and that the necessary prerequisites are 
created for a two-way relationship between citizens … and public authority 
institutions.”1013 The Constitutional Court has stressed that the right to peaceful 
assembly ensures a possibility to influence the organization and exercise of 
public authority and to maintain a peaceful dialogue between civil society and 
the state, including criticism of the actions and policies of state powers.1014 The 
Court has explained that public events may be held to criticize the actions and 
decisions of state and local authorities and stressed that a public authority’s 
reaction towards public events must be neutral and “irrespectively of the 
political views of their initiators and participants” 1015 ensure lawful exercise of 
the freedom of assembly that does “not extend beyond the framework of 
admissible restrictions of citizens’ rights and freedoms within a democratic 
society ruled by law”.1016 
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When public assemblies meet the fundamental criterion of “peacefulness”, 
the state authorities have a positive obligation to guarantee the right to freedom 
of assembly. As explained by the Venice Commission, the criterion of “pea-
cefulness” is met when “organisers have professed peaceful intentions and the 
conduct of the assembly is non-violent. The term “peaceful” should be inter-
preted to include conduct that may annoy or give offence, and even conduct that 
temporarily hinders, impedes or obstructs the activities of third parties.”1017 
Evidently the right to freedom of assembly is not an absolute right. Neverthe-
less, restrictions “must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restric-
tions must be convincingly established”, as stressed by the ECtHR.1018 It is 
necessary to strike a balance between legitimate aims and the “right to free 
expression of opinions by word, gesture or even silence by persons assembled 
on the streets or in other public places”.1019 When participants or organisers 
“have violent intentions, incite to violence or otherwise deny the foundations of 
a “democratic society1020”, the guarantees of Article 11 do not apply and inter-
ference with the right to freedom of assembly is justified for the prevention of 
disorder or crime and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.1021 
In the case of sporadic violence or other unlawful acts committed by others, an 
individual remaining peaceful and not participating in such acts still cannot be 
deprived of the right to peaceful assembly1022. It has been established by the 
ECtHR that a demonstration as such does not fall outside the scope of Article 
11 § 1 even when there is “a real risk of a public demonstration resulting in dis-
order as a result of developments outside the control of those organising it” and 
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restricting such assembly must be in accordance with the terms of Article 11 
§ 2. 1023 
In the Russian legal order the right to freedom of assembly is guaranteed by 
the Constitution and federal laws. Article 31 of the 1993 Constitution states that 
citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to assemble peacefully, 
without weapons, hold rallies, meetings and demonstrations, marches and pickets. 
As seen from the wording of Article 31, the Russian Constitution makes the 
right to freedom of assembly dependent on citizenship, an approach criticized 
by the Venice Commission as deriving from international standards, so that all 
people regardless of their citizenship should enjoy right to freedom of 
assembly.1024 The Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 54-FZ of June 19, 
2004 “On Rallies, Meetings, Demonstrations and Picketing”1025 (hereinafter: 
Law on Public Assemblies) specifies that the regulation of Article 31 of the 
Constitution is the central piece of legislation applicable to the preparation and 
conduct of public assemblies. A “public event” is defined in the Law on Public 
Assemblies as “open, peaceful action accessible to everyone that is implemen-
ted as an assembly, meeting, demonstration, march or picketing or by using 
various combinations of those forms that is undertaken at the initiative of 
citizens of the Russian Federation, political parties, other public or religious 
associations”.1026 Public events without the objective enacted in the Law on 
Public Assemblies are out of its scope, although they can qualify as a mass 
simultaneous presence and/or movement, which can constitute an administrative 
offence under Art. 20.2.2 (1) of the Code of Administrative Offences introduced 
in 2012.1027 The president, the government and the authorities of the subjects of 
the Russian Federation can introduce legal acts pertaining to specific conditions 
for holding a public event1028 such as determining specially designated sites for 
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public events. The Law on Public Assemblies also allows these authorities to 
refuse to agree to the holding of a public event, to suspend and to terminate a 
public event.1029 
 
 
7.2 Amending the legislation on public assemblies  
After the elections to the Russian parliament in 2011, the Russian people actively 
exercised their constitutional right to freedom of assembly. People’s discontent 
with politics had been constantly rising after Dmitry Medvedev declined to 
participate in presidential elections and supported Vladimir Putin as the new 
president of the Russian Federation. This so-called “рокировка” (castling) 
insulted many people and disappointed hopes for change. Disappointment 
increased after the elections to the Duma, where massive electoral fraud took 
place. On 5 December the “Solidarnost” movement organised a registered 
meeting in Moscow at Chistiye Prudi, where a couple of thousand people 
participated. After this event, a series of demonstrations and meetings took 
place in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia gathering tens of thousands of 
participants. Protest activities continued throughout the winter and spring, 
numerous events were held in June and September 2012.1030 During and after 
the wave of protests, the Investigative Committee launched a series of criminal 
proceedings against opposition leaders and regular participants at these 
assemblies. The officers of the Investigative Committee raided the homes of 
opposition leaders, arguably looking for evidence for a criminal case related to 
the opposition rally on 6 May 2012. 1031 The Investigative Committee warned: 
“Those who think they can with impunity organize riots, plan and prepare 
terrorist attacks and other acts that threaten the lives and health of Russians, you 
underestimate the Russian special services’ professionalism”.1032 Charges were 
filed against some two hundred individuals for demonstrating on Moscow’s 
Bolotnaya Square on 6 May 2012, the day before Putin’s inauguration. On 
24 May 2013 the first criminal case against twelve persons suspected of partici-
pation in a mass riot was taken to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow 
and on 21 February 2014 eight persons were found guilty of participation in 
mass disorder and of violent acts against police officers and sentenced to 
between two to four and half years’ imprisonment. The judgment was upheld by 
the Moscow City Court. On 24 July 2014 the Moscow City Court found 
                                                                          
1029  Peters and Ley (n 1027) 81, 82.  
1030  Volkov (n 34).  
1031  The Economist, ‘Building up the Castle Wall’ (13 June 2012)  
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/06/protest-russia> accessed on 
19 December 2017. 
1032  Reuters, ‘Navalny: Jailing of protester underlines harsh Russia crackdown’ (10 November 
2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/10/us-russia-navalny-idUSBRE8A909H20 
121110> accessed on 19 December 2017. 
231 
Mr Udaltsov and Mr Razvozzhayev guilty of organising mass disorder on 
Bolotnaya Square on 6 May 2012 and sentenced them each to four and a half 
years of imprisonment. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld 
the judgment on 24 July 2014. Several other cases followed finding people 
guilty of participating in mass disorder and of committing violent acts against 
police officers during the demonstration on 6 May 2012.1033 
Following the wave of protests in 2011 and 2012, Russian president Vladimir 
Putin initiated a series of changes in the legislation on public assemblies. One 
month after Vladimir Putin’s inauguration, Federal Law no. 65-FZ introducing 
amendments to the law on public assemblies and to the Code of Administrative 
Offences1034 (hereinafter: law on public assemblies) was brought to the State 
Duma and came into force on 9 June 2012. The new Law on Public Assemblies 
significantly increased the fines for violating rules on holding public events and 
imposed restrictions on organizers and participants of public protests. The 
amendments provide a blanket ban on organising public events by persons who 
have been convicted of serious crimes against the constitutional order and state 
security as well as by persons who have committed certain administrative 
breaches more than once.1035  
The amendments also impose strict obligations on the organizer(s) of public 
events. For example, an organiser has to indicate the expected number of par-
ticipants in a public event in the notice to the authorities1036 and has to take 
measures to prevent the number of participants indicated in the notice from 
being exceeded, where exceeding that number creates a threat to public order 
and/or public safety, the safety of participants or other persons or risks damage 
to property.1037 Moreover, organisers are liable for damage caused by partici-
pants if they fail to fulfil certain obligations enacted in the Assembly Law. 1038 
Whereas pickets by one person are exempt from the prior notification pro-
cedure, the Law on Public Assemblies provides that single picketers must keep 
a distance of no more than fifty meters and the Russian courts can retrospec-
tively decide that the sum of single picketers “united by a single concept and 
overall organisation” constituted a public event.1039 In this case the event is 
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covered by the same regulations as public assemblies, meaning for example that 
the absence of notification is a breach of the Law on Public Assemblies and the 
organisers and participants can be held administratively liable for various 
breaches. The Law on Public Assemblies also prohibits campaigning for a 
public event starting from the time of submission of the notice until the time of 
reaching an agreement between the organiser and the authorities regarding the 
place and/or time for holding the public event. Moreover, the Law on Public 
Assemblies provides for “specially designated places” where public events must 
be held, designated by local authorities. However, in exceptional cases holding 
a public event elsewhere is possible if the organisers request it. Such a request 
may be refused only under specific circumstances,1040 notably when organising 
the event at a specific site is prohibited.  
The amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences1041 significantly 
increased the upper level of fines for violating rules on holding public events 
from 5,000 to 300,000 RUR for citizens and from 50,000 to 600,000 RUR for 
officials and introduced community work as a new type of sanction and created 
a new offence: organising a mass simultaneous presence and/or movement of 
citizens in public places resulting in a breach of public order. 
Officially, the law on public assemblies aims to protect society from radi-
calism. According to the explanatory note to the law on public assemblies, the 
aim of the law is to strike a necessary balance between the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly guaranteed to organisers and other participants at public 
assemblies, and the constitutional rights of other citizens who can experience 
various harms and difficulties as a result of public assemblies.1042 Restricting 
freedom of assembly is ideologically justified as “protecting” society from 
various harms and dangers and protestors are construed as radicals endangering 
the wellbeing of society.  
Various international fora focusing on human rights law and constitutional 
law have expressed concerns about the legislation. In the assessment of the 
PACE, the Law on Public Assemblies is regressive in terms of democratic deve-
lopment.1043The Venice Commission has recommended that Russia should 
allow peaceful spontaneous assemblies and urgent assemblies as well as 
simultaneous and counter demonstrations as long as they do not pose direct 
threats of violence or serious danger to public safety. In their assessment, the 
grounds for restrictions on assemblies should be narrowed to allow application 
of the principle of proportionality in order to bring them in line with Article 
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tation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (n 27). 
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11(2) of the ECHR. The Venice Commission has noted that the reasons for 
suspension and termination of assemblies should be limited to public safety or a 
danger of imminent violence. The Venice Commission recommended that the 
obligations of organisers be reduced to exercising due care and to narrow 
blanket restrictions on the time and place of public events. 1044  
However, contrary to those recommendations, Russian legislators have further 
harshened the legislation pertaining to the right to freedom of assembly. In July 
2014 the Russian Criminal Code was amended and repeated violation1045 of the 
rules on public assemblies was criminalized. Pursuant to Article 212.1 of the 
Russian Criminal Code, repeated violations of the established rules for orga-
nizing or holding public gatherings, meetings, rallies, marches, and pickets are 
punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. This amendment has received 
widespread criticism among human-rights defenders both in Russia and abroad. 
Article 212.1 of the Criminal Code violates the constitutional right to freedom 
of assembly as it establishes criminal prosecution not only for acts of violence 
and other illegal acts, but also for legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of 
assembly, claims Amnesty International.1046 According to Amnesty Internatio-
nal, many of the “established rules” for organizing public assemblies such as the 
requirement to notify the authorities and to receive their approval before the 
assembly or establishing administrative punishments for failure to notify or gain 
approval “are inconsistent with the freedom of peaceful assembly and expres-
sion per se and hence non-compliance with them should not be regarded and 
penalised as an administrative violation.”1047 Article 212.1 of the Criminal Code 
has been used to prosecute several opposition members and civil society activists 
and has been upheld by the Constitutional Court, although the Constitutional 
Court has offered its clarifications for implementing this provision.1048 
 
 
7.3. Assembly regulations in the interpretation of  
the Russian Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has upheld the majority of 
the amendments made to legislation restricting the right to freedom of assembly 
in 2012 and 2014. However, it has also provided some meaningful analysis and 
clarifications lacking in the very vaguely drafted legislation.  
                                                                          
1044  Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 65-fz (n 1024).  
1045  More than three violations within 180 days.  
1046  Amnesty International, ‘Russian Federation: Constitutional Court ruling – an oppor-
tunity to annul criminalisation of “unauthorised” peaceful protest’ (23 January 2017) 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur46/5542/2017/en/> accessed on 19 December 
2017. 
1047  Ibid.  
1048  See Section 7.2 of this study.  
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In its judgment of 12 May 2012 the Constitutional Court analysed the con-
stitutionality of several provisions of the Code of Administrative Infringements 
and the Law on Public Assemblies enacting new obligations for the organizers 
of public events. Russian citizen S.A. Katkov, an organizer of a public event in 
Tula, was fined for breach of the established procedure for holding public events 
as he allowed 300 people to participate instead of 150, which he proposed in the 
notification submitted to the administration of the city of Tula in accordance 
with the requirements of the Law on Public Assemblies. Referring to the aims 
of establishing civil peace and consent proclaimed in the preamble to the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitutional Court stressed that as 
public events can touch upon the rights of a broad spectrum of persons, state 
protection is guaranteed only to holding peaceful public gatherings and this 
right may be restricted by federal law in accordance with criteria predetermined 
by the requirements of Article 17 (part 3), 19 (part 1 and 2) and 55 (part 3) of 
the Constitution, on the basis of the principle of legal equality and the principle 
of proportionality, i.e. to the extent that this is necessary in order to protect the 
fundamentals of the constitutional order, morality, health, the rights and lawful 
interests of others, national defence and state security.1049 The court held that the 
contested provisions were in accordance with the Constitution as the non-
concordance of the actual number of participants with the number initially 
proposed can be a ground for the administrative liability of the organizer only 
when non-concordance arising through the fault of the organiser constituted a 
real threat to public order and/or public safety and to the security of participants 
and non-participants as well as damage to the property of individuals or 
corporate entities.1050 However, the Court did not explain what the real threat 
was in the current case. 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge V.G. Yaroslavtsev argued that whereas the 
organiser of a public event undoubtedly must thoughtfully and in a balanced 
manner determine the potential number of participants, despite all the con-
scientious efforts of the organiser, the number of participants may still increase 
due to various factors, including ill-considered actions and careless statements 
by state authorities.1051 Moreover, he stressed that the mere fact that the pro-
posed number of participants is exceeded does not in itself constitute a real 
threat to lives, health or property, when public authorities take adequate measures 
for the public event to take place and do not counteract. Judge Yaroslavtsev 
argued: “Otherwise, we would have to conclude that the people, the country’s 
citizens peacefully participating in a public event, are themselves a real threat to 
the State and society”. According to Yaroslavtsev’s position, the contested pro-
visions from the outset place organisers and participants in the position of guilty 
                                                                          
1049  Russian Constitutioal Court, No. 12-P/2012 (12 May 2012) Section 2.  
1050  Ibid, Section 1 of the resolutive part.  
1051  Dissenting opinion of Judge V.G. Yaroslavtsev to the judgment of the Constitutional 
Court No. 12-P/2012 (12 May 2012).  
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party, which violates citizens’ constitutional right to legal protection (Article 46 
paragraph 1 of the Russian Constitution) and is unconstitutional.1052 The words 
of Judge Yaroslavtsev were in many ways prophetic, as during the past few 
years there has been a wave of arrests and convictions of peaceful protesters, as 
they have been considered a threat to the state and society. 
Another case was brought to the Constitutional Court by a group of deputies 
of the Russian State Duma who challenged the constitutionality of Federal Law 
no. 65-FZ of 8 June 2012 due to flaws in its adoption procedure, such as vio-
lations of established timeframes and other substantial infringements1053 as well 
as due to the unconstitutional content of several provisions. The deputies argued 
that a number of provisions were unconstitutional as they provided for extreme 
increases in the amounts of administrative fines for infringing the established 
procedure for organising and holding public events; enacted extremely lengthy 
administrative punishments in the form of compulsory community work; pro-
vide for imposing on the organiser of a public event obligations that are impos-
sible to fulfil in practice (taking measures to prevent the anticipated number of 
participants announced in the notice of holding of the event from being 
exceeded) and for the organiser’s liability for not fulfilling this obligation, the 
establishment of which furthermore entails the danger that the announced number 
of participants in a public event may be exceeded as a result of provocation by 
those opposing the holding of the event; make the organiser of a public event 
liable for damage caused by participants, essentially shifting onto that person the 
entire responsibility for any excesses during the holding of the public event 
without taking account of the fact that upholding order during assemblies, rallies, 
demonstrations, marches and picketing requires the special/specific knowledge, 
skills and powers intrinsic to police work; establish a ban on organising public 
events on an individual who has been prosecuted in a court on two or more 
occasions for administrative infringements related to organising and holding 
public events.1054 
In its judgment The Constitutional Court extensively referred to the case law 
of the ECtHR emphasizing freedom of assembly as a fundamental right and a 
                                                                          
1052  Ibid.  
1053  The deputies argued that the draft law was not sent for comment to the legislative/ 
representative and highest executive authorities of Russian Federation constituent entities; 
the bill passed at its first reading, underwent a fundamental revision at its second reading; 
the procedure for examining the draft was violated as during the second reading the period of 
speaking time for the authors of amendments was shortened twice and at its third reading the 
draft law was adopted without presenting the final text to deputies. Due to violations of 
established timeframes the entire legislative procedure in the State Duma took 26 days 
instead of the set minimum of 112 days. See further: Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P 
(14 February 2013), Section 1.1.  
1054  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 1.1.  
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basis of a democratic society1055, explaining the state’s obligation to refrain from 
arbitrary measures capable of interfering with the right to assemble peace-
fully1056 and the need to express tolerance towards public assemblies even when 
they cause disturbances such as traffic problems “since the freedom of assembly 
would otherwise be made devoid of substance”.1057 The Constitutional Court 
expressed that interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly violated 
article 11 of the ECHR unless it was prescribed by law, had one or more 
legitimate aims and was necessary in a democratic society. The Court also noted 
that states have positive obligations to secure effective enjoyment of the right to 
freedom of assembly.1058 Referring to the ECtHR1059 the Court emphasized that 
the special importance of the right to participate at peaceful public assemblies 
implies that participants may not be punished, even in the mildest form, for 
participating in a public event that was not banned, provided that they 
themselves did not commit any culpable actions. The Constitutional Court also 
highlighted the principle of inadmissibility of engaging the liability of orga-
nisers of public events for the actions of participants, which is enacted in the 
OSCE/ODIHR – Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly.1060  
The Constitutional Court also stressed that although exercising the right to 
freedom of assembly is linked with various risks, which are likely to materialize 
when organisers of public events fail to fulfil their obligations, due to the 
                                                                          
1055  See: Kokkinakis v Greece (App 14307/88) ECtHR 25 May 1993; Djavit An v Turkey 
(App 20652/92) ECtHR 20 February 2003; Kuznetsov v Russia (App 10877/04) ECtHR 23 
October 2008. 
1056  Barankevich v Russia (App 10519/03) ECtHR 26 July 2007. 
1057  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 2. Referring to: 
Galstyan v Armenia (App 26986/03) ECtHR 15 November 2007; Akgöl and Göl v Turkey 
(Apps 28495/06, 28516/06) ECtHR 17 May 2011; Berladir and others v Russia (App 
34202/06) ECtHR 10 July 2012.  
1058  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 2. Referring to: Wilson, 
National Union of Journalists and others v The United Kingdom (Apps 30668/96, 30671/96, 
30678/96) ECtHR 2 July 2002; Ouranio Toxo and others v Greece (App 74989/01) ECtHR 
20 October 2005; Alekseyev v Russia (Apps 4916/07, 25924/08, 14599/09) ECtHR 21 
October 2010 
1059  Ezelin v France (App 11800/85) ECtHR 26 April 1991; Kuznetsov v Russia (App 
10877/04) ECtHR 23 October 2008. 
1060  According to the Guidelines (see: Venice Commission (n 1017) the organisers should 
not be liable for the actions of individual participants or for the actions of non-participants or 
agents provocateurs. Instead, there should be individual liability for any individual who 
personally commits an offence (para 5.7); organisers should not be liable for the actions of 
individual participants or of stewards, who must bear individual liability if they commit an 
offence or fail to carry out the lawful directions of lawenforcement officials (para 197); if an 
assembly degenerates into serious public disorder it is the responsibility of the State – not the 
organisers or event stewards – to limit the damage caused. In no circumstances should the 
organisers of a lawful and peaceful assembly be held liable for disruption caused to others 
(para 198). 
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fundamental importance of freedom of assembly, the state must refrain from 
introducing sanctions against the organisers obliging them to bear civil liability 
for damage caused by other participants of a public event regardless of the 
presence (or absence) of the organiser’s guilt in causing such damage. 1061 It can 
be seen from the judgment that in its judgment the Russian Constitutional Court 
the Court extensively referred to the standards established by the ECtHR. 
However, despite mentioning the case law of the ECtHR, these references had 
no influence on the Court’s argumentation in analysing whether the contested 
provisions were in accordance with the Constitution.  
The Court held that banning individuals prosecuted in an administrative court 
on two or more occasions for administrative infringements – during a period 
when that person was subject to administrative punishment from organizing 
public events – was in accordance with the Constitution. In the Court’s opinion 
“it does not prevent such persons from requesting other citizens, political parties 
and public associations to organise such events and does not deprive them of the 
possibility of participating in public events”.1062 While analysing the 14 Feb-
ruary 2013 judgment of the Constitutional Court, the Venice Commission noted 
that organizing public assemblies constituted an important part of the right to 
assemble peacefully and as a result, depriving a person of the right to organize 
public events must be justified by “compelling reasons”.1063 In the assessment of 
the Venice Commission, considering breaches of administrative provisions as a 
ground for such a blanket ban is a disproportionate restriction of the right of 
freedom of assembly. In their opinion, the reasoning of the Constitutional Court 
does not meet the requirements of Article 55(3) of the Russian Constitution as 
no distinction is made between severe and minor offences.1064 The Venice 
Commission concluded that such a blanket ban is not a legitimate restriction 
under the terms of article 11(2) ECHR.1065 
The Constitutional Court also held that that the provision banning pro-
motion1066 of a public event from the time of submitting notice until the time of 
                                                                          
1061  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 2.4.  
1062  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 1 of the resolutive part.  
1063  Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 65-fz (n 1024) para 11.  
1064  Ibid, para 16–18.  
1065  Ibid, para 19.  
1066  The Court draws a line between “informing” and “promoting”. Promoting was inter-
peted by the Constitutional Court in Judgment no. 15-P of 30 October 2003 as pursuing the 
aim of inciting citizens and their associations to take part in a public event. Informing is 
interpreted as enabling organisers “to provide timely information to potential public event 
participants on a planned rally, demonstration, march or picketing and also, where necessary, 
on the process of its agreement. In providing such early warning, the organiser of a public 
event is entitled to disseminate information through any means on the aims, form and 
announced place and time of the event, the anticipated number of participants and other 
details of the public event; however, that information must not contain invitations or 
incitements to take part in it”. 
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reaching an agreement with the authorities regarding the place and/or time for 
holding the public event, does not contravene the Constitution as it does not 
introduce an authorisation procedure for organising public events, nor does it 
prevent informing potential participants of the “proposed aims, form, place, 
time and other conditions relating to the holding of it prior to agreement on the 
place and/or time for holding the event”1067. The Venice Commission has held 
that this interpretation is problematic, as enabling promotion only after agree-
ment is reached with the authorities enables the authorities to hamper the cam-
paigning and organizing process by delaying its decision and it is possible that 
in many cases there is not sufficient time to promote the assembly effectively1068 
Moreover, the distinction between informing and promoting is not defined in 
the law and such vagueness may lead to arbitrary decisions limiting the capacity 
of organisers to advertise their events. 1069According to the Venice Commission 
the “notice” procedure is in substance a request for authorisation or permission 
giving the authorities wide discretion to restrict public events.1070 
In the assessment of the Constitutional Court, obliging the organiser of a 
public event to take measures in order to prevent exceeding the number of 
participants initially announced, when exceeding that number creates a threat to 
public order and/or public safety, the safety of the participants or other persons 
or a risk of damage to property, and establish the liability of the organiser for 
the failure to do so1071 were in accordance with the Constitution. According to 
the Court’s explanation, these provisions assume that the organiser of a public 
event uses all the means available to ensure that the number of participants in 
the public event corresponds to the number of participants announced in the 
notice of holding the event and that the organiser can be held liable only when 
exceeding the number of participants initially announced and the creation 
thereby of a threat to public safety and order were caused directly by the orga-
niser’s actions or failure to act 1072.  
The Venice Commission considers it unrealistic to assume that an organiser 
could foresee the number of participants and finds that it is disproportionate to 
require the organiser to take measures, especially when it is unclear what 
measures, to prevent exceeding the proposed number of participants or to 
punish the organizer for failing to do so. Liability should only follow when the 
organizer intentionally provided false information when estimating the possible 
number of participants or impeded the authorities from taking measures “in 
order to keep the number of participants within the holding capacity of the place 
                                                                          
1067  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 2 of the resolutive 
part.  
1068  Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 65-fz (n 1024) para 34.  
1069  Ibid, para 35.  
1070  Ibid, para 36, 37.  
1071  Law amending the law on public assemblies (n 1034) Article 1, para 7; Article 1, para 2 в.  
1072  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 3 of the resolutive part.  
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of the assembly during the event and that this caused a threat to public 
order.”1073 The Venice Commission recommended excluding responsibility of the 
organiser for the number of participants at a public event.1074 
Obliging one-person picketers to have a minimum of fifty metres distance 
between them and establishing a possibility to declare individual picketing 
actions “united by a single concept and overall organization” by a court ruling 
as a public event1075 were also declared constitutional. The Court found that 
such regulations “are intended to prevent abuses of the right not to notify the 
public authorities of the holding of a one-person picket, they do not rebut the 
presumption of lawfulness of the actions of a citizen observing the established 
procedure for holding a one-person picket, and they intend the sum total of 
individual pickets to be declared as one public event only on the basis of a court 
decision and only where it is established by the court that these pickets were 
from the outset united by a single concept and overall organisation and do not 
amount to a coincidental coming together of actions of individual pickets”.1076 
The Venice Commission criticized that conclusion, because when a person is 
conducting a single-person picket, he or she cannot possibly assess whether 
their a priori lawful conduct (picketing without prior notice) amounts to an 
administrative offence in the assessment of the court. In the assessment of the 
Venice Commission, the interpretation of the Constitutional Court is incom-
patible with the requirement of legality of interference with fundamental rights 
and freedoms.1077 
The Constitutional Court also held that the provisions establishing administ-
rative liability for violating the procedure for organising or holding a public 
event, when it results in a breach of public order and damage, were consti-
tutional.1078 The Court explained that these provisions imply that administrative 
liability is incurred only where there is a causal link between the unlawful 
actions or failure to act by the organiser of a public event or other mass event 
resulting in a breach of public order and damage.1079 However, these conclu-
sions are problematic for several reasons. The Venice Commission noted that it 
is inevitable that a mass presence of people entails some consequences, such as 
harm to green spaces or disturbing the traffic or the movement of pedestrians. 
                                                                          
1073  Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 65-fz (n 1024) para 24.  
1074  Ibid, final recommendations.  
1075  Law amending the law on public assemblies (n 1034) Article 7 para. 1.  
1076  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 5 of the resolutive 
part. 
1077  Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 65-fz (n 1024) para 31.  
1078  Law amending the law on public assemblies (n 1034)), Article 1, para 7 and 8. Examples 
of these events are sport events, concerts, flash mobs. See also: Venice Commission, Opinion 
on federal law no. 65-fz (n 1024) para 56.  
1079  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 10 of the resolutive 
part.  
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Sanctioning organization of a public event which results in some harm to green 
spaces or that disturbs traffic is a disproportionate interference with the right to 
freedom of assembly and deters people from organizing activities in matters of 
public interest.1080 
Establishing administrative fines of up to three hundred thousand roubles for 
citizens and up to six hundred thousand roubles for officials for the adminis-
trative infringements1081 were held as conforming to the Constitution. However, 
provisions establishing the minimum amount of fines for administrative infrin-
gements at ten thousand roubles for citizens and fifty thousand roubles for offi-
cials were declared unconstitutional, as such a minimum in many cases exceeds 
the average monthly wage and the provisions “do not make it possible to take 
the fullest account of the nature of the infringement committed or the material 
circumstances of the offender, as well as other circumstances of essence to the 
individualisation of liability and thereby to guarantee the imposition of fair and 
commensurate punishment.”1082 The Venice Commission noted that the Court 
should have clearly demanded lowering the minimum and maximum amounts 
substantially.1083 Whereas states have the right to require authorization of public 
assemblies and they may sanction those who do not comply with the require-
ments, the sanctions must be foreseen by the law, and be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.1084 Dramatically increased fines can severely affect the 
revenue of the individual concerned, as the average income in 2011 was of RUR 
20 702,721 and the new maximum fines correspond to 14,5 and 29 times the 
average monthly income respectively, as noted by the Venice Commission.  
The Constitutional Court also declared some other provisions of the Law on 
Public Assemblies unconstitutional. The Court held that making the organizer 
of a public event liable for damage caused by participants was unconstitutional as 
this provision implied that the organiser of a public event incurred civil liability 
for damage caused by participants irrespective of demonstrating due care for 
upholding public order and irrespective of lack of fault. An obligation to 
indemnify damage even when the organiser’s actions or failure to act was not 
linked to causing the damage is not in accordance with constitutional principles 
of legal liability, including fairness, adequacy and proportionality and it could 
have a deterrent effect on exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly.”1085 The Venice Commission notes that the organizer of any public 
                                                                          
1080  Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law8no. 65-fz (n 1024) para 57.  
1081  Law amending the law on public assemblies (n 1034) Article 1, paras 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.  
1082  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 7 of the resolutive part. 
1083  Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 65-fz (n 1024) para 49. 
1084  Ibid, paras 50, 54. See also: Berladir and others v Russia (App 34202/06) ECtHR 10 July 
2012, para 41; Ziliberberg v Moldova (App 61821/00) ECtHR 1 May 2005; Rai and Evans v 
the United Kingdom (Apps 26258/07, 26255/07) ECtHR 17 November 2009, paras 50, 54. 
1085  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 2.4 and Section 4 of 
the resolutive part.  
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event has limited powers and cannot be required to exercise police power. 
Ensuring public order is primarily the duty of law enforcement bodies, not the 
duty of an organizer, who can only be expected to exercise due care.1086 
Additionally, allowing the executive to define specially designated sites for 
holding public events was held unconstitutional as it does not “establish sta-
tutory criteria guaranteeing observance of equal legal conditions for citizens’ 
exercise of their right to freedom of peaceful assembly…giving rise to the possi-
bility of differing interpretations and, consequently, arbitrary application”.1087 
Considering such specially designated sites in principle permissible, the Court 
advised that “when determining specially designated sites for the holding of 
public events, the executive authorities of a Russian Federation constituent 
entity must take as a premise the necessity for such sites in at least every urban 
district and municipal district”.1088 According to the reasoning of the Consti-
tutional Court, the provision was unconstitutional because it failed to establish 
clear statutory criteria for the executive authorities in determining such sites. 
The Venice Commission has assessed that such designated places are acceptable 
only when they facilitate the exercise of freedom of assembly, when they 
clearly provide an additional option for holding public events, not the only 
option for holding public assemblies.1089 In the current case, other venues for 
holding public events are exceptions requiring special justification and such 
regulation effectively “removes the autonomy of the organiser to choose the 
location of the public event”.1090  
Another noteworthy case pertaining to the right to freedom of assembly is 
the case of Ildar Dadin, a Russian civil society activist, who was the first person 
convicted of participating at public protests. Dadin participated at various rallies 
and was arrested and fined five times from August 2014 to January 2015. In 
December 2015 Ildar Dadin was prosecuted and convicted under Article 212.1 
of the Criminal Code and sentenced to three years of imprisonment for partici-
pating in four unauthorised public assemblies. Later the appellate court reduced 
the sentence to two-and-a-half years. Dadin was accused of repeatedly breaching 
the laws regulating the organisation and conduct of gatherings, rallies, demon-
strations, marches and pickets. In September 2016 Dadin’s lawyers submitted a 
complaint to the Constitutional Court. They claimed that Article 212.1 of the 
Criminal Code violated the constitutional right to peaceful assembly and 
freedom of expression. On 10 February 2017 the Constitutional Court issued its 
ruling and held that Article 212.1 was in accordance with the Constitution; 
however, implementation of this provision should be specified and limited. The 
                                                                          
1086  Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 65-fz (n 1024) para 26.  
1087  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 4-P (14 February 2013) Section 6 of the resolutive part.  
1088  Ibid.  
1089  Venice Commission, Opinion on federal law no. 65-fz (n 1024) para 39.  
1090  Ibid, para 40. 
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Court ordered that the criminal case against Dadin be dismissed, and that he be 
released and granted him the right to compensation.1091 
The Constitutional Court explained that public authorities have to react to the 
organization and holding of various assemblies in a neutral way and to provide 
conditions for realizing the right to peaceful assembly “irrespective of the 
political views of their organizers and participants.”1092 Legislative, administra-
tive, organizational and other efforts have to be aimed at creating conditions for 
lawful exercise of rights and “must not lead to excessive control over the 
activity of organizers and participants of public events”.1093 Restricting the right 
to freedom of assembly may not “encroach upon the very essence of this consti-
tutional right” and may not “hinder open and free expression of citizens’ views, 
opinions and demands”, as noted by the Constitutional Court.1094 Moreover, the 
federal legislator “must avoid excessive use of criminal-law repression”.1095 The 
Court referred to the practice of the ECtHR, explaining that an unlawful situation 
does not necessarily justify use of punitive measures by the authorities and that 
peaceful demonstrations in principle do not fall under the threat of criminal 
sanction. Even when the actions of participants or organisers of public assemblies 
are formally unlawful, measures applied to them “must not pursue the object of 
averting the wider public from visiting assemblies and demonstrations and 
thereby from open political discussion.”1096 
However, the Court found that introducing criminal liability for multiple 
breaches of the established order or organizing or holding public assemblies “if 
equivalent to the character and degree of public danger of an action falling 
under it” does not constitute excessive criminal coercion and does not overstep 
the discretionary powers of the federal legislator.1097  
Thus, in the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, Article 212(1) of the 
Criminal Code does not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
Although the Constitutional Court found that Article 212.1 of the Criminal Code 
is not unconstitutional, it stressed that breaching the established order for orga-
nizing or holding a public assembly and having been punished administratively 
at least three times during one hundred and eighty days is not sufficient ground 
for criminal liability under Article 212.1 of the Criminal Code. A person can be 
convicted under Article 212.1 only when violations cause “damage to citizens’ 
                                                                          
1091  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 2-P (10 February 2017).  
1092  Ibid Section 2.  
1093  Ibid.  
1094  Ibid.  
1095  Ibid Section 4.1.  
1096  Ibid Section 5. Referring to Pekaslan and others v Turkey (Apps 4572/06, 5684/06) 
ECtHR 20 March 2012; Yilmaz Yildiz and others v Turkey (App 4524/06) ECtHR 14 Octo-
ber 2014; Kudrēvičius and others v Lithuania (App 37553/05) ECtHR 15 October 2015; 
Kasparov and others v Russia (No. 2) (App 51988/07) ECtHR 13 December 2016. 
1097  Russian Constitutional Court, No. 2-P (10 February 2017) Section 5.  
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health, property of natural or legal persons, environment, public order, public 
safety, and other constitutionally guarded values or contained a real threat of 
causing it.” A violation that does not cause a threat or harm to constitutionally 
protected values also does not represent a criminal public danger so that 
criminal liability in this case would contradict Articles 17 (1) and (3), 19 (1) and 
(2), 31 and 55 (3) of the Constitution, the Court explained.1098 Moreover, the 
Constitutional Court also noted that there must be a deliberate intention to 
commit an offence.  
Hence, as explained by the Constitutional Court, imposing criminal liability 
under Article 212.1 requires at least three administrative offences falling under 
the scope of Article 212.1; the violations must have caused damage to health, 
property, the environment, public order or public safety. Moreover, there must 
be a deliberate intention to commit an offence.  
 
 
7.4. The right to freedom of assembly in Russia  
as interpreted by the ECtHR 
The ECtHR has stated that the mere existence of a risk is insufficient for 
banning a peaceful assembly: the authorities must produce concrete estimates of 
the potential scale of disturbance in order to evaluate the resources necessary for 
neutralising the threat of violent clashes.1099 Several people convicted of partici-
pating in the mass disorders at Bolotnaya square have turned to the ECtHR, 
which delivered its first judgment in a case related to the Bolotnaya demon-
stration on 15 September 2015 in the case of Kovyazin and Others v. Russia.1100 
The case concerned the arrest and pre-trial detention of three applicants: Leonid 
Kovyazin, Artem Savelov, and Ilya Gushchin following their participation in a 
demonstration on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow against the 
allegedly rigged presidential elections. All three applicants were charged with 
participation in mass disorders, the second and third applicants were also 
charged with having committed violent acts against police officers. According 
to the facts of the case, the march (“March of millions”) followed by a meeting 
at Bolotnaya Square was registered with the local authorities. However, the 
police closed off the meeting and several clashes occurred between participants 
and police. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened cri-
minal proceedings to investigate the mass disorders and violent acts against the 
police.1101 The applicants contested the violent nature of their behaviour, denied 
                                                                          
1098  Ibid.  
1099  Barankevich v. Russia, Application No. 10519/03, 26 July 2007, para. 33. 
1100  Kovyazin and others v Russia (Apps 13008/13, 60882/12, 53390/13) ECtHR 17 Sep-
tember 2015. 
1101  Article 212 para 1 and 2 and Article 318 para 1 of the criminal code.  
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characterizing the demonstration as mass disorders and considered the charges 
against them political rather than criminal. 
The domestic courts, relying on the gravity of the charges and the likelihood 
that the applicants would abscond or tamper with witnesses, interfere with the 
administration of justice and considering certain dangerous features of the appli-
cants’ personalities revealed by the very nature of their offences established 
very lengthy pre-trial detention periods:1102 one year and three months, one year 
and six months and one year and eight months. The applicants complained that 
their detention was not based on a reasonable suspicion of having committed an 
offence as required by Article 5(1) of the ECHR, that holding them in custody 
for such lengthy periods had not been justified by relevant and sufficient reasons 
and that while refusing all their requests for alternative preventive measures the 
Russian courts had failed to take into account various important facts, such as 
that the applicants had had no criminal record, had permanent places of resi-
dence and stable family backgrounds. The ECtHR emphasized that considering 
such extended periods of detention “the Russian authorities were required to put 
forward very weighty reasons”1103 and that continued detention is justified only 
if there are “actual indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, 
notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for 
individual liberty laid down in Article 5 of the Convention.”1104  
The ECtHR was not convinced by the “gravity argument” and assessed that 
despite the domestic classification, the behaviour imputed to the applicants 
during the investigation such as shouting political slogans, breaking through a 
police cordon or upsetting portable lavatories was not of a kind usually con-
sidered so serious as in itself to justify pre-trial detention.1105 The ECtHR held 
that while extending the detention periods, the Russian courts ignored relevant 
facts such as clean criminal record, permanent place of residence and numerous 
positive references and personal guarantees. There was no evidence of influen-
cing witnesses or intention to abscond and the courts failed to give reasons for 
dismissing the applicants’ requests for an alternative preventive measure.1106 
The ECtHR held that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the 
Convention as regards each applicant.1107As noted by the ECtHR:  
 
The domestic courts inferred the risks of absconding, reoffending or interfering 
with the proceedings essentially from the gravity of the charge against the 
applicants. By failing to address specific facts underpinning the existence of 
such risks or consider alternative preventive measures and by relying essentially 
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1105  Ibid, para 84. 
1106  Ibid, para 91. 
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on the gravity of the charges, the courts extended the applicants’ detention on 
grounds, which cannot be regarded as relevant and sufficient in order to justify 
the length of the detention; these omissions only aggravated as the proceedings 
progressed.1108 
 
The ECtHR has examined similar problems with the courts’ reasoning on nume-
rous previous occasions. The ECtHR observed that while examining previous 
applications against Russia pertaining to infringements of Article 5(3) of the 
ECHR the Court has each time noted the failure of Russian courts to provide 
“sufficient and relevant grounds for applicants’ detention”1109. The Court 
referred to several deficiencies in the arguments used by the Russian courts to 
authorise keeping an applicant in custody, such as: 
Reliance on the seriousness of the charges as the primary source to justify 
the risk of the applicant absconding; reference to the applicant’s travel passport, 
financial resources and the fact that his alleged accomplices are on the run as 
the basis for the assumption that he would follow suit; a suspicion, in the 
absence of any evidence, that he would interfere with witnesses or use his con-
nections in state bodies to obstruct justice; and a failure to thoroughly examine 
the possibility of applying another, less rigid preventive measure, such as 
release on bail.1110 
Despite numerous violations of Article 5 § 3 in similar cases, the Russian 
courts still continue to use a similar pattern of reasoning and still put people in 
custody without sufficient and relevant grounds. This refers to the reluctance of 
the courts to follow the standards set by the ECtHR. It is likely that these prob-
lems are related to the lack of independence of Russian courts, discussed in 
Section 2.2 of this study. The majority of the judgments of the Constitutional 
Court that I have analysed in this study seem to follow the underlying logic of 
the state institutions, in turn raising strong doubts about the independence of the 
judiciary. These factors also contribute to lack of trust in the Russian court 
system and prevailing legal nihilism discussed in Section 4.2.2 of this study.  
When in Kovyazin and Others v. Russia the ECtHR did not focus on freedom 
of assembly (as the case focused on Article 5 of the ECHR), the Court analysed 
the aspects directly related to the right to freedom of assembly in the case of 
Frumkin v Russia of 5 January 2016.1111 Applicant Frumkin alleged a violation 
of his rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and liberty and the right 
to a fair hearing. Frumkin was arrested on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square in 
Moscow and sentenced to fifteen days’ administrative detention. Frumkin was 
arrested as arguably he was obstructing the traffic and had disregarded a police 
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order to leave the premises. Frumkin argued that he had peacefully participated 
in an authorised public assembly and was arrested during the hours of the 
authorized assembly without any warnings or orders by the police that he could 
have disobeyed. He claimed that he had been arrested merely for his presence at 
the site in order to discourage him and others from participating in opposition 
rallies and complained that the Russian courts had ignored all his arguments and 
evidence. He considered his arrest as unlawful, lacking a legitimate aim and not 
necessary in a democratic society, thus in violation of Article 11 of the ECHR.1112 
Frumkin claimed that he heard police orders issued through a megaphone to 
vacate the venue, but he was unable to do so due to general confusion and as he 
was not aware that the meeting was terminated, he remained in the area until 
7 p.m., when the meeting was supposed to end. He also claimed that at the time 
of his arrest there was no traffic at Bolotnaya Square, as traffic was suspended 
due to the demonstration. The applicant was taken to the Krasnoselskiy District 
police station in Moscow and on 7 May 2012 the applicant was taken to court, 
but his case was not examined and he was taken back to Krasnoselskiy District. 
A new order for the applicant’s administrative detention was issued. On 8 May 
2012 Frumkin was found guilty of disobeying lawful police orders, and was 
sentenced to fifteen days’ administrative detention. On 11 May 2012 the 
Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined Frumkin’s appeal and 
examined a witness testifying that at the time when Frumkin had been arrested 
the premises had been cordoned off but traffic was suspended. The court 
rejected Frumkin’s claims that the time of his arrest was incorrectly marked as 
well as other materials presented by the applicant and upheld the first-instance 
judgment. The judgment was also upheld by the Moscow City Court on 
11 January 2013. 
Applicant Frumkin complained that crowd-control measures taken by the 
police and altering the original meeting layout without informing the organisers 
or the public had caused unnecessary tensions between the protestors and the 
police and that these measures were not aimed at ensuring the peaceful conduct 
of the assembly, but at limiting and suppressing it. He also argued that the 
authorities failed to facilitate peaceful co-operation with the organizers and that 
rising tensions were used as a pretext to terminate the meeting and to disperse it 
without clearly informing participants of the termination of the event. He also 
referred to domestic law requiring the police to suspend the assembly first and 
to give the organisers time to remedy any breach prior to termination.1113 
Security measures on the one hand restrict exercise of the right to freedom of 
assembly, but on the other hand the authorities have positive obligations that 
include ensuring the peaceful conduct of the assembly and the safety of all 
citizens. The duty to communicate with assembly organisers is an essential part 
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of the authorities’ positive obligations, as stressed by the ECtHR.1114 The Court 
referred to the Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly 
recommending negotiation or mediated dialogue in order to resolve disputes 
during the course of an assembly.1115 In the case at hand the police authorities 
did not provide for a reliable channel of communication with the organisers 
before the assembly and failed to respond to real-time developments in a const-
ructive manner. 1116 According to the Court’s assessment “the authorities made 
insufficient effort to communicate with the assembly organisers to resolve the 
tension caused by the confusion about the venue layout. Failure to take simple 
and obvious steps at the first signs of conflict allowed it to escalate, leading to 
disruption of a previously peaceful assembly.”1117 The ECtHR held that as not 
even the minimum requirements for ensuring safe and peaceful assembly were 
complied with by the authorities, the authorities did not follow their positive 
obligation and Article 11 was violated.1118 
While discussing the applicant’s arrest, pre-trial detention and administrative 
penalty imposed, the ECtHR reasoned that “the severity of the measures applied 
against the applicant is entirely devoid of any justification” as the measures 
were grossly disproportionate to the aim pursued. The applicant was not accused 
of violent behaviour, and there was no pressing social need to arrest him and 
sentence to a prison term.1119 The Court also noted that such severe measures 
deter people from participating in protest rallies and in open political debate and 
engaging in opposition politics in general, especially as they were taken against 
a large number of people.1120 The ECtHR also held that there had been a vio-
lation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as no explicit reasons were given by 
the authorities for detaining the applicant for thirty-six-hours pending the 
hearing of his case by a Justice of the Peace, making the detention unjustified 
and arbitrary.1121 
Again, in the case of Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia of 4 October 2016 the 
ECtHR held that Russia violated its obligations under Article 11 of the ECHR 
and other Articles of the ECHR. Yaroslav Belousov participated at the 6 May 
2012 demonstration in Bolotnaya Square, was arrested and found guilty of 
failure to obey lawful police orders. Belousov claimed that he did not partici-
pate in any disorder or clashes with the police, although he threw a small yellow 
object in the direction of the police. On 18 June 2012 charges were brought 
against Belousov under Articles 212 § 2 (participation in mass disorder) and 
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318 § 1 (violence against a public official) of the Criminal Code. Belousov was 
kept in pre-trial detention for more than twenty months and subsequently 
sentenced to a prison term of two years and three months. Belousov was 
released on 8 September 2014 after serving his prison term.1122  
According to the ECtHR there was no “pressing social need” to sentence 
Belousov to a prison term of two years and three months. Such severe punish-
ments can have a chilling effect on civil society as they discourage the Russian 
people from attending demonstrations and from participating in open political 
debate, as emphasized by the Court. The chilling effect can be especially great 
when the case is widely covered in the media, which was the case with Belousov 
v. Russia.1123 The ECtHR concluded that the severe sanction imposed on 
Belousov was “grossly disproportionate to the legitimate aims of preventing 
disorder and crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and 
it was therefore not necessary in a democratic society”1124 
Despite the rulings of the ECtHR that found several violations by the 
Russian state in ensuring the right to peaceful assembly, trials against Bolotnaya 
protestors and other protestors are ongoing. In December 2015 the Zamoskvo-
retsky District Court of Moscow sentenced another protestor, Ivan Nepom-
nyashchikh, to two and half years in prison. He was found guilty of partici-
pation in mass riots in Bolotnaya and using force against police officers. On 26 
April 2016 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment.1125 
 
 
7.5. Analysis and conclusions  
This chapter examined how the right to freedom of assembly is incorporated in 
the Russian legal order and implemented in practice and what are the impli-
cations of the relevant legislative amendments for civil society.  
It derives from my analysis that legislation establishing strict rules and admi-
nistrative and criminal punishments for organising and participating in public 
assemblies is not in accordance with the standards of the ECHR. The right to 
freedom of assembly is not effectively incorporated in the Russian legal order. 
The legislative amendments have further discouraged Russians from partici-
pating in open political debate and from demanding their rights. As a result of 
these legislative amendments, Russians are deprived of one important possi-
bility to influence the Russian authorities and to foster peaceful dialogue between 
civil society and the state. The political rhetoric used to justify these legislative 
amendments frames protesting as unpatriotic and dangerous behaviour that 
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should be avoided. Such an atmosphere of fear and humiliation contributes to 
self-censorship and further weakens civil society in Russia.  
The legislative amendments strictly limiting exercise of the right to freedom 
of assembly in Russia are obstacles hindering effective compliance with the 
ECHR and do not provide Russian civil society with basic means to protect 
their rights, which is another obstacle for effective compliance with the ECHR.  
On the one hand, practising the constitutional right to freedom of assembly 
has played an important role in the development of civil society in Russia. 
Perhaps the most notable advocate of freedom of assembly has been a spon-
taneous civic movement called Strategy 311126, holding protest meetings on 
Triumphalnaya square in Moscow in the course of many years to support the 
right to freedom of assembly enshrined in article 31 of the Russian Constitution. 
However, these peaceful assemblies have been obstructed by the authorities in 
various ways.1127  
Amendments introduced to Russian legislation regulating the right to freedom 
of assembly in 2012 and 2014 have significantly restricted the opportunities of 
Russian people to exercise the right to freedom of assembly in practice. The 
amendments are not in accordance with international standards of freedom of 
assembly and they hinder rather than facilitate exercise of the right to freedom 
of assembly. The law on public assemblies confers too broad a discretion on the 
executive authorities to restrict assemblies and does not sufficiently safeguard 
against the potential risks of excessive use of discretionary power, arbitrariness 
or abuse, as assessed by the Venice Commission. The law violates the essential 
principles of “presumption in favour of holding assemblies”, “proportionality” 
and “non-discrimination”.1128 
As a result, the constitutional right to freedom of assembly cannot be freely 
exercised in Russia.  
A vast number of people have been punished for failure to comply with the 
requirements on public assemblies. Although the amendments to the legislation 
pertaining to peaceful public assemblies have been challenged in the Consti-
tutional Court on numerous occasions, the Court has upheld the majority of the 
contested provisions. As noted by Judge Yaroslavtsev in his dissenting opinion 
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to the Constitutional Court judgment of 12 May 2012, there is a threat that the 
regulation on public assemblies treats people peacefully participating at public 
events as a threat to the state and society, as guilty from the start1129. In my view 
these words describe quite accurately the implications of the legislative amend-
ments analysed. During recent years there has been a wave of arrests and con-
victions of peaceful protesters who indeed are considered by the authorities and 
in most cases also by the court system to be a threat to the state and to society.  
However, some positive aspects can be seen in the judgment of the Con-
stitutional Court of 10 February 2017. Although the Court did not declare 
Article 212.1 of the Criminal Code unconstitutional, the Court ordered that the 
criminal case against Ildar Dadin be dismissed, that he be released and granted 
him a right to compensation. The Court explained that criminal punishment for 
protesting is not acceptable and is also unconstitutional when there is no proven 
threat or harm to constitutionally protected values and when the administrative 
punishments were not in force at the time of criminal proceedings. Although 
during recent years the Constitutional Court has in some cases been highly 
critical towards the positions of the ECtHR and has denied that enforcement of 
its judgments is compulsory for Russia, in this case the Constitutional Court 
extensively referred to the case law of the ECtHR and used the positions of the 
ECtHR to strengthen their own argumentation. Thus, the case law of the ECtHR 
still has an impact on judgments of the Constitutional Court and on the 
construal of rights and freedoms in Russia.  
Overall, the legislation restricting the right to freedom of assembly has had a 
devastating effect on civil society in Russia. Since in Russia civil rights and 
freedoms have historically been strictly limited, expressing one’s views and 
defending one’s rights in public assemblies, demonstrations and pickets has never 
been commonplace in Russia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian 
people began slowly to discover the power they can have on the policies of the 
state and the path along which the Russian Federation is evolving. In 2012 
leading Russian sociologists considered the protest movement to be ground-
breaking and argued that Russian society is moving towards freedom and 
modernization.  
The Moscow protests of the past year have been an intermediate result of 
phenomenal changes that have been under way since the end of the Soviet 
Communist system in the part of Russian society that is capable of modernizing. 
Never before in their history have all Russians been as free and, at the same 
time, as affluent as in the past decade” argued renowned social scientists Dmitri 
Trenin, Maria Lipman and others.1130 
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However, people feeling “free and affluent” were considered a serious threat 
by the authorities and, as a result of the protest movement, legislators rushed to 
draft laws to limit exercise of the right to freedom of assembly and to demand 
changes in the country. The legislative amendments limiting the right to pea-
ceful assemblies and the practice of authorities and courts have “quashed any 
willingness and readiness to take to the streets”.1131 Increasingly strict admi-
nistrative and criminal punishments related to public assemblies have created an 
atmosphere of fear among ordinary Russians. Civil society is very wafer-thin in 
Russia and as a result of tighter control and strict punishments people are 
increasingly afraid to subject themselves to risk, thus endangering the develop-
ment of civil society even further.  
“Within a system which denies the existence of basic human rights, fear 
tends to be the order of the day. Fear of imprisonment, fear of torture, fear of 
death, fear of losing friends, family, property or means of livelihood, fear of 
poverty, fear of isolation, fear of failure.”1132 
Another important aspect is that protesting or defending one’s rights in any 
other form is framed as unpatriotic and dangerous behaviour in Russia. Such 
rhetoric is used by the authorities and is disseminated in the state-controlled 
media, decreasing the popularity of defending civil rights and contesting the 
policies and actions of the authorities even further. Such an atmosphere of fear 
and humiliation creates self-censorship and, as a form of self-defence, people 
start to praise self-censorship as wise and condemn un-censored behaviour. As 
explained by Aung San Suu Kyi, in many cases fear “masquerades as common 
sense or even wisdom, condemning as foolish, reckless, insignificant or futile 
the small, daily acts of courage which help to preserve man’s self-respect and 
inherent human dignity.”1133  
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this study I scrutinized how the factors facilitating or hindering compliance 
with the ECHR are manifested in the Russian legal order, aiming to determine 
the major obstacles that underlie Russia’s complex relationship with the CoE 
and its standards. I have referred to the metaphor of the taming of the shrew 
when characterizing Russia’s interaction with the normative system of the CoE 
and the ECtHR. The guiding idea of this research was to find out how the 
strategy of the CoE to “tame” Russia into compliance with its norms and stan-
dards has worked in practice, what have been the main obstacles hindering 
compliance and what conclusions can be drawn about the future interaction of 
the CoE and Russia. My central conclusion is that “that the taming of the 
shrew” has not proved overly successful after twenty years of membership in 
the CoE because of various legal, political and social factors which hamper 
compliance with the ECHR.  
I began my research with analysing the mechanisms and limits of the CoE to 
facilitate compliance with and implementation of human rights law in its 
member states, which was my first research question. Based on the theories and 
studies analysed, I found that the ability of the CoE to influence compliance is 
limited and three main preconditions underlie successful implementation of 
human rights treaties on the domestic level. Firstly, domestic institutions – 
dedicated, endowed with power, able and willing to implement human rights on 
the domestic level predictably and impartially – are of key importance for 
human rights implementation. Secondly, it is of crucial importance whether 
international human rights norms are effectively incorporated into the national 
legal order. The third important factor is construal of human rights and their 
place in the social and political context of a country.  
The rest of my research focused on analysing these factors in the context of 
Russia. As a response to my second research question (How does Russia’s insti-
tutional framework influence compliance with international human rights 
treaties?) I found that the first central obstacle hindering effective compliance 
with the ECHR is that Russian domestic institutions do not support compliance 
with international human rights law. One of the central ideas of this study is that 
that the CoE can have a meaningful influence on compliance with the ECHR 
and its other instruments only when domestic circumstances support compliance 
with international human rights law. One of such pivotal domestic circum-
stances is a functioning institutional framework, particularly an enforceable 
constitution, independent courts and other institutions having the power and 
legitimacy to ensure that the constitution is adhered to. Although the Russian 
Constitution establishes a formal framework for a liberal rule-of-law state, in 
practice Russian executive power is almost unlimited and other institutions, 
most importantly the court system, lack the power, ability and will to implement 
human rights predictably and impartially. The autonomy and the independence 
of the Russian court system and individual judges has been substantially 
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reduced and the opportunities of the executive power to influene the court 
system have increased, thus hindering the court system’s role in securing 
compliance with international human rights treaties.  
While analysing my third research question (How is international human 
rights law incorporated in the Russian legal order?), I found that the second key 
obstacle hindering Russia’s compliance with the ECHR is that the ECHR is not 
effectively incorporated into the Russian legal order. I observed that the inter-
pretation concerning the interplay between the Russian Constitution and the 
ECHR has changed considerably during past twenty years. Whereas the ECHR 
and the case law of the ECtHR has had a profound impact on Russian legal 
system and state practice, currently Russian legislation and the practice of the 
Constitutional Court no longer acknowledge the binding force of ECtHR 
judgments. The legislation amending the law on the Constitutional Court and 
the refusal of the Constitutional Court to enforce judgments of the ECtHR has 
demonstrated Russia’s outright rejection of the standards imposed by the 
ECHR, which contradicts the previous positions of the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court as well as is in conflict with international obligations that 
Russia has undertaken. These tendencies inevitably further complicate the 
interaction between the CoE and Russia. Currently the status of the ECHR in 
the Russian domestic legal hierarchy is low and the Constitutional Court does 
not interpret central civil rights and freedoms in the light of the case law of the 
ECtHR, particularly in politically sensitive cases.  
The Constitutional Court does not function only under the constitutional 
framework, but is very much influenced by the political landscape: the expec-
tations and interests of the government, which inevitably has an impact on the 
judgments they make. As a result, enforcing the ECHR in Russia is clearly 
limited and to a great extent depends on the political sensitivity of the case. 
Whereas the cooperation between Russian courts and the ECtHR is ongoing and 
many cases still are in accordance with the standards of the ECHR, politically 
significant cases discussed at the Constitutional Court have an important 
signalling function to the lower courts and to the legal landscape in general and 
it is increasingly difficult for independent judges to defend the status of the 
ECHR in the Russian legal order. Moreover, the legislation analysed in chapters 
5, 6 and 7 demonstrates that the central rights of the ECHR: freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of association and freedom of assembly are not effectively incor-
porated into Russian legal order. The legislation and the judgments of the Con-
stitutional Court that have upheld the laws are not in accordance with the ECHR 
and he case law of the ECtHR. In the circumstances, where the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR are not effectively incorporated into 
national legal order, compliance with the standards of the ECHR is impossible.  
While discussing the features characterizing construal and the role of human 
rights in the Russian political and social context (my fourth research question), I 
found that the third major obstacle obstructing compliance with the ECHR is 
that the value system cultivated by the Russian government and approved by the 
practice of the Constitutional Court and other influential actors, such as the 
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Russian Orthodox Church, is not supportive of human rights. Human rights are 
not high in the political agenda of the government. Instead, traditional values and 
interests such as Russian sovereignty, state security and patriotism, are 
emphasized in Russian legislation, various official state documents, speeches 
and writings of Russian government officials. Russia’s political coalition is 
currently not committed to compliance with the constituent values of the CoE. 
Reluctance by the state authorities to acknowledge the value of human rights is 
a clear obstacle to effective compliance with the ECHR. Furthermore, I argue 
that the notion of human rights has remained alien to the majority of the Russian 
people. In Russia, construal of human rights and their underlying values is 
strongly influenced by the Russian cultural and historical context, including the 
Russian Orthodox Church, which rejects the idea of inherent human dignity and 
criticizes human rights and freedoms as sinful and amoral. Moreover, in most 
cases Russian people do not trust the court system and are not used to defending 
their rights in courts. Although there is a diversity of opinions in Russian 
society and there are scholars, human rights NGOs, lawyers and other activists 
who defend human rights in courts, in universities and other fora, their impact 
on the overall attitudes and state policies remains low.  
Finally I assessed, how core civil and political rights – particularly the right 
to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of assembly and the right to 
freedom of association – are implemented in Russia and what influence do these 
processes have on Russian civil society (fifth research question). I found that 
the legislation adopted in these spheres in the time period between 2011 to 
2017: the law on blacklists, the law on arbitrary blocking of extremist materials, 
the law on bloggers, the law on protection of the feelings of believers, anti-
homosexual propaganda law, the law prohibiting public calls to action aimed at 
violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, the law against 
rehabilitation of Nazism, Yarovaya legislation, the law on foreign agents, the 
law on undesirable organisations and amendments made into the legislation on 
public assemblies are in conflict with the standards of the ECHR and have 
rigidly restricted the exercise of civil and political rights in Russia and the 
impact of the ECHR in Russia.  
These legislative amendments have placed Russian sovereignty, security, 
patriotism and Russian orthodox values in the apex of values, at the same time 
downplaying the value of individual rights and freedoms. They have targeted 
politically active Russians who take part in protests, raise critical issues in the 
media or through their work in NGOs. As a result, the legislation has deterred 
Russians from speaking up, posing questions and demanding changes in their 
country, thus further weakening civil society’s means and motives to demand 
compliance with international human rights treaties. Russian people have 
historically had little experience with human rights and when the legislators and 
the court system send very clear signals, that exercising one’s rights and freedoms 
can be strictly punished and that values like patriotism, security and Russian 
orthodox values are more important than individual rights and freedoms, this 
further decreases the motives and the means of the civil society to mobilize. 
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However, when the civil society is not active in demanding compliance with 
human rights from their government an when the legislative framework has 
made it nearly impossible to participate in public discussions without the risk of 
strict punishments, effective compliance with the standards of the ECHR is 
unlikely.  
Thus, Russian domestic institutions do not support compliance with the 
ECHR; the ECHR is not effectively incorporated into the Russian legal order; 
human rights are not valued and respected in Russia’s political and social 
mainstream; and legislative amendments in the sphere of civil and political 
rights have hindered the opportunities of Russians to protect and demand their 
rights guaranteed under the ECHR. As a result, rights deriving from the ECHR 
cannot be properly implemented in Russia. This threatens the effectiveness of 
the CoE and creates an even greater stumbling block to dialogue between the 
CoE and Russia. I argue that unless these conditions change, Russia’s effective 
compliance with the normative system of the CoE is unrealistic.  
To sum up the main points in this study: it is my view that international frame-
works do not have transformative power when a country (the government) does 
not want to belong to the international “club”, to follow its rules and to reform 
its legal order accordingly. Compliance cannot be enforced from the outside when 
the idea of human rights is not entrenched in a country, particularly in its legal 
and political institutions.  
The enlargement process of the CoE followed logic or normative theories 
proposing that educating, empowering and mobilizing local communities and 
persuading decision makers to “change their minds” are the mechanisms that 
eventually lead to compliance with human rights law in domestic arenas. When 
post-Soviet countries started to ratify human rights treaties and reform their 
legal orders, it seemed that normative theories indeed worked and that all states 
would gradually internalize and implement human rights norms. However, it is 
now clear that not all states have been “good students” as initially hoped and 
they have not “changed their minds”. Russia has not become a democratic, law-
bound state adhering to human rights. Formal commitment to international 
human rights treaties or membership in international organisations have led to 
uniform implementation of international norms but human rights are not univer-
sally upheld close to many homes in the member states of the CoE. So what 
went wrong? 
In my opinion, the inclusive approach of the CoE to facilitate compliance 
with human rights law in Russia has undermined the limits of external actors to 
influence the behaviour of states and has undermined specific circumstances, 
especially the domestic political and social contexts that can facilitate or inhibit 
implementation of human rights. Norms of the ECHR are not self-executive, 
they need to be implemented on the national level and the CoE can only have a 
“back-up” role in the process. Primarily, states have the obligation and the means 
to ensure compliance with the ECHR. When countries are already in the system 
but fail to comply, the toolbox of the CoE is very limited. In the CoE, the main 
mechanism for punishment is “naming and shaming”, but when states do not 
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consider the damage to their reputation high enough, naming and shaming will 
not work. For Russia the mechanisms of naming and shaming clearly have not 
been enough to influence Russia into compliance.  
Another misinterpretation of normative theories has been their mantra of the 
universality of international human rights and the premise that all countries can 
be persuaded to change their practices in accordance with the idea of universal 
human rights. Theories based on the logic of appropriateness assume that all 
countries want to identify themselves with these values, want to belong to the 
club of “civilized nations”. They presume that the idea of human rights is a uni-
versal, globally appropriate idea, so that states are motivated to reform their 
legislation and institutions and change their human rights practices. As derived 
from my analysis in Chapter I, the premise of global appropriateness of human 
rights is not universally accepted by all states, including Russia. Inevitably, 
when states do not recognize the value and universality of human rights, they 
have little incentive to comply with international human rights treaties.  
Moreover, the role of several non-Western states in construing and shaping 
the international legal order in the light of their (legal) culture, civilization and 
national interests is steadily increasing, whereas Western liberal democracies 
have ceased to be the yardstick of desirable and civilized countries. If one wants 
to understand how international human rights law works in practice, it is 
counterproductive to ignore these regional and culture-specific factors that 
inevitably and increasingly influence the global normative order and it is also 
counterproductive to ignore that Western liberal democracies do not occupy the 
role of authoritative teachers for several non-Western states.  
In my view, rational choice models arguing that compliance with inter-
national human rights treaties is likely when domestic actors expect to win more 
than they lose from the process and when certain preconditions are met, is a 
more plausible approach to explaining compliance with the ECHR than nor-
mative models. Rational models claim that the requirements of the ECHR can 
be quite “uncomfortable” for states. Making reforms and other efforts such as 
enforcing the judgments of the ECtHR can be politically costly for governments 
because the aims and interests of governments can be very different. This is 
particularly the case when a government is inclined to authoritarian practices 
and advocates anti-liberal and populist ideologies. Rational approaches to 
human rights have also indicated that domestic institutions are the crucial factor 
determining the success or failure of compliance with international human 
rights law. It matters whether the domestic institutional framework is embedded 
in the principle of the rule of law, whether there are checks and balances 
ensuring that no branch of government can act arbitrarily and whether, in 
particular, the court system has the independence and the means to protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Moreover, implementation of international 
human rights law can be effective only when international human rights norms 
are incorporated into the national legal order by domestic institutions. Another 
key issue is how international human rights norms and judgments of inter-
national courts are situated within the larger political and social context: 
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whether there is a reform-minded political climate respecting human rights and 
enabling citizens to demand their rights and whether the prevalent value-system 
in society is in accordance with the underlying values of human rights treaties. I 
applied this theoretical framework to Russia, but it could be used to explain 
patterns of implementation and compliance with the ECHR in any of the 
member states of the CoE.  
In Chapter II of the study I found that although the Russian Constitution 
establishes a formal framework for a liberal rule-of-law state, Russia has not 
become a liberal rule-of-law state. There is a great discrepancy between the 
“law on the books” and “law in action”. Various paraconstitutional institutions 
and informal networks have further marginalized the already weak checks and 
balances in the Constitution. Weak constraints on executive power predict à la 
carte compliance with the judgments of the ECtHR, which is also the case with 
Russia. Russia’n government and the Constitutional Court, influenced by the 
political motives, have decided to cherry-pick which judgments of the ECtHR 
are suitable to them and has decided to refuse to enforce those that are too 
politically costly to enforce.  
The principle of rule of law is intimately connected to the separation of 
powers and the independence of the judiciary. As derives from my above 
analysis, reform of the Russian court system has substantially reduced its auto-
nomy as an institution as well as undermining the independence of individual 
judges, whereas the role of the president in the appointment of judges has 
increased. As a result, the courts are not free from external pressures and are not 
able to provide a safeguard against abuses of power. Inevitably, in these con-
ditions citizens cannot rely on the court system to defend their rights and 
freedoms deriving from the ECHR, particularly in politically sensitive cases.  
It was revealed from my analysis in Chapter III that whereas formally the 
ECHR has been incorporated into the Russian legal order and the Constitution 
highlights protection of rights and freedoms as the highest value, Russian state 
practice in the form of legislation as well as court practice has moved in quite a 
different direction. Amending the law on the Constitutional Court and 
empowering the Constitutional Court to refuse to enforce judgments of the 
ECtHR demonstrates that the ECHR has been rejected outright in the Russian 
legal order. Thus, when legislation and court practice are aimed at undermining 
the ECHR, it cannot be expected that Russia effectively complies with the 
ECHR.  
In Russia, state interests and international law are enmeshed and the doctrine 
of international law follows Russia’s official position. My research shows that 
in high-profile cases the practice of the Constitutional Court also clearly reflects 
the political field lines and is used to further legitimize them for the internal 
audience as well as to demonstrate Russia’s intention to isolate herself from 
external influences that might challenge her political choices. As the indepen-
dence of the Russian court system has been greatly reduced, the executive power 
has increasing options to influence the courts to comply with state interests. In 
all recent Constitutional Court cases that have been politically important, the 
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interpretation of the Court has directly mirrored the official Russian position, 
which raises very serious doubts about the independence of the Constitutional 
Court.  
Chapter IV focused on the role and construal of human rights in the Russian 
political and social context. The collapse of the Soviet Union obliged Russia to 
redefine its ideological roots. Initially, Russia opened up to European human 
rights law. However, this did not last long. In contemporary Russia the official 
rhetoric construes human rights as a negative Western influence causing 
disastrous effects in Russian society. The political rhetoric of the ruling elite as 
well as mainstream Russian scholarship support the idea that the task of the 
individual is to adhere to the dictates of the state. Accordingly, rights should be 
granted to people who are loyal to the state and its core underlying values: 
patriotism and traditional values. In the interpretation of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, only rights that are in accordance with the inner morality of Russian 
society and other needs of the Russian state, such as national sovereignty, 
should be respected, whereas others should be neglected.  
While in many ways the Russian people are very liberal, overall, the idea of 
human rights has remained largely alien to a majority of Russian people. On the 
basis of the material analysed in Chapter IV, three distinct factors can be distin-
guished. Firstly, Russian society is characterized by legal nihilism resulting 
from centuries-long abuse of power. The majority of Russians have little trust 
towards the judicial system, they underestimate the importance of rule of law 
and are influenced by the doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church, which 
considers defending one’s rights and freedoms as a sign of avoiding moral 
responsibility towards society. Russians are not used to demanding their rights, 
to pick up the torch and to challenge the government, because the political 
climate has always been so restrictive and institutional support has been lacking, 
that it has been safer to stay at home and discuss worries at the kitchen table.  
Secondly, in Russia the underlying values of human rights, particularly the 
concept of human dignity, are interpreted very differently. Moreover, this inter-
pretation is greatly influenced by the doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
In the interpretation of the Russian Orthodox Church, dignity is not inherent but 
can be acquired as a result of proper conduct. Accordingly, people whose activi-
ties and viewpoints are not in conformity of the moral standards of the Orthodox 
Church have not acquired dignity. In line with this approach, not all humans and 
not all human rights deserve to be protected, but only those that fit into the 
morality framework of the Orthodox Church. The Russian Orthodox Church has 
skilfully tied its concept of morality to the paramount value in Russian political 
rhetoric: the Church has equated protecting the values of Russian society with 
protecting Russian (spiritual) sovereignty. As the Orthodox Church is a very 
powerful institution in Russia, the messages it conveys are widely distributed 
and greatly influence the mindset of the Russian people.  
Thirdly, on the political level human rights are construed as a dangerous 
influence from the immoral and decadent West and thus unsuitable for the 
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Russian state and Russian society. In my view, as a result of this “translation” 
process the majority of Russians view freedom as an element of threat.  
However, although human rights have remained alien to the majority in 
Russian society so far, this does not necessarily mean that it will always remain 
like this. One of the aims of the political elite has been to convince the Russian 
people of the existence of fundamental differences between Russia and the 
West, especially regarding the values these societies adhere to. However, value-
based civilizational differences between Russia and the West are not objective 
facts. The thesis that Russian society is somehow more righteous than the liberal 
West, which has been regularly exploited by the Russian political, legal and 
religious elite, has little proof. In my view, the incompatibility of the Russian 
value system with Western liberalism is at least to some extent a social con-
struction that could be changed when the social and political milieu in Russia 
changes. However, as long as the Russian political coalition does not support 
the idea of human rights, but actively contests it with all means available, little 
change can be expected.  
Chapters V, VI and VII focused on implementation of the right to freedom of 
expression, the right to freedom of assembly and the right to freedom of asso-
ciation. I found that Russian legislators as well as the court system view the 
rights to freedom of expression, to freedom of assembly and to freedom of asso-
ciation as essentially harmful phenomena that should be limited on as many 
grounds as possible. The restrictions have had a particularly chilling effect on 
Russian civil society, discouraging them from exercising their rights guaranteed 
under the ECHR.  
The legislation analysed in these three chapters had certain characteristics in 
common. Firstly, the key terms of the laws are very vaguely defined and they 
are not sufficiently clear to enable individuals to regulate their conduct in con-
formity with the law. Such unclarity has led to arbitrary application – for 
example, websites of opposition-minded people are blocked and people sharing 
articles on their social media on politically sensitive issues such as the status of 
the Crimea are punished for disseminating “extremist” materials. When laws are 
not clear enough to allow people to regulate their conduct, this can also easily 
lead to self-censorship. When no one knows what kind of speech is punishable, 
it is safer not to express oneself at all. On that basis, pluralism, already lacking 
in Russia and one of the building blocks of a democratic society, stands no 
chance. Secondly, undermining the role of the courts and providing very wide 
discretion to government agencies and to the General Prosecutor’s Office to 
interpret and enforce vaguely defined provisions characterize legislative amend-
ments. Another common feature is that laws restricting core civil and political 
rights do not meet the proportionality test established by the ECtHR, which is 
very similar to the proportionality test deployed by the Russian courts. Whereas 
officially all the restrictions have legitimate aims, the restrictions established do 
not correspond to the needs they should correspond to; they are not proportio-
nate responses to those needs and are not supported by relevant and sufficient 
reasoning. In none of the cases have the legislators provided legitimate 
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arguments to demonstrate that the mechanisms used really help to achieve those 
aims (e.g. protection of children’s health) and that the restrictions imposed are 
necessary in a democratic society.  
In accordance with rational approach models to human rights implemen-
tation, I argue that implementing civil and political rights can be very costly, 
particularly for authoritarian governments and as a result, such governments 
tend to impose strict limitations on the exercise of civil and political rights. The 
wave of restricting legislation in Russia, which started in 2011, was a reaction 
to the protest movement threatening the ruling elite. The government under-
stood that freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of 
assembly are powerful tools in the hands of Russia’s developing civil society. 
The protest movement demonstrated that free speech can threaten the Russian 
political arrangement, where power is consolidated in the hands of a very few. 
Accordingly, the need to secure the position of official Kremlin-controlled infor-
mation space and systemic order was an important incentive to limit the oppor-
tunities of opposition-minded people to spread their ideas and to pursue their 
agendas. I am of the opinion that if Russia continues on an authoritarian course, 
effective implementation of civil and political rights is unlikely, as it would 
pose too high a risk for the government and potentially undermine its rule.  
In line with rational choice approaches to compliance with human rights, I 
am of the position that Russia’s participation in the CoE is based on cost-benefit 
analysis and as long as there are more benefits than costs, Russia will participate 
in the CoE, but only on its own terms. This means that when some obligations 
are too costly to comply with, Russia refuses to comply. So far it seems that the 
benefits outweigh the costs. The CoE is an important international forum for 
Russia, which is motivated to influence processes in the CoE.  
One of the underlying tensions in this study consists of the fact that the 
ECtHR and the current Russian political-legal elite have profound dis-
agreements on the role of human rights, what they mean and how far they reach 
in the context of state interests and sovereignty. The traditional legal view says 
that when Russia does not implement a judgment of the ECtHR or does not 
follow the spirit of the ECHR in certain parts of its legislation, this may not as 
such even be a “legally” significant problem. In these cases, Russia simply vio-
lates international law, its legal obligations under European human rights law. 
This is not the view taken in this study. If a country of the size and influence of 
Russia takes a different view from Strasbourg on what human rights mean, it 
can become a major legal-political problem. Moreover, Russia has not just taken 
a different view, but the amendments to the law on the Constitutional Court 
rejecting enforcement of ECtHR judgments and the twofold blanket refusal to 
implement the judgments of the ECtHR by the Russian Constitutional Court are 
unprecedented in the CoE. These steps clearly pose a threat to the effectiveness 
of the ECtHR and to the normative framework of the ECHR. It is increasingly 
difficult for the CoE to defend its core principles when some member states are 
in fundamental opposition and in my view the CoE has been overly diplomatic 
in refusing to criticize Russia too much.  
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In the absence of international police and enforcement mechanisms by force, 
compliance with international human rights law is still based on the good will of 
the actors, and their willingness to implement their international legal obli-
gations in good faith. When willingness to implement human rights obligations 
diminishes even to the point of not executing ECtHR judgments, it can become 
a systemic problem that cannot be done away just by qualifying it as a violation 
of international law (without visible consequences). 
My thesis that the “taming of the shrew” has not proved overly successful 
after twenty years may strike the reader as utterly pessimistic or even partly 
hopeless. Of course, compliance with human rights obligations comes in shades 
and is not entirely black or white – for example, even when in many areas Russia 
is not in compliance with the ECHR, today’s Russia’s human rights perfor-
mance is still much better in most areas than it was in the USSR or in other 
periods of Russian history. However, this was never the standard of the CoE 
and the ECHR; and it should not be the standard now. Therefore, it will become 
necessary to work out further mechanisms ensuring that European human rights 
law and institutions do not become complicit in actual human rights backsliding 
in CoE member states.  
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Tõrksa taltsutus: Euroopa Nõukogu inimõiguste standardite mõju 
Euroopa inimõiguste ja põhivabaduste kaitse konventsiooni 
rakendamisele Venemaal 
Külma sõja järgses maailmas omistati inimõigustele võtmeroll inimkonna eda-
sise arengu ja rahu tagamisel. Francis Fukuyama väitis, et inimkond on tunnis-
tamas liberalismi lõplikku võitu, pidades liberalismi inimkonna ideoloogilise 
arengu lõpp-punktiks ning ennustades, et läänelikust liberaalsest demokraatiast 
saab universaalne valitsemisviis kõigis maailma riikides.1134 Lääne riigid ei 
pidanud Venemaad enam oluliseks ohuks. Eeldati, et ideoloogiline võitlus on 
jäänud minevikku; et Venemaa on pöördunud tagasi läänelike väärtuste ja nor-
mide juurde ning on motiveeritud õppima demokraatiat, inimõigusi ja õigusriigi 
põhimõtet ning neid oma riigis rakendama.  
Euroopa Nõukogu keskseks ideeks on olnud rahu ja ühtsuse tagamine Euroo-
pas, tuginedes koostööle sarnaseid põhimõtteid, eelkõige õigusriigi põhimõtet, 
demokraatiat ja inimõiguste kaitset, jagavate riikide vahel.1135 Perestroika aas-
tatel sai Euroopa Nõukogust oluline foorum poliitiliseks dialoogiks „Lääne maa-
ilma” ning „Nõukogude maailma” vahel. Nõukogude Liidu lagunemise järgselt 
kujunes Euroopa Nõukogust „uks Euroopasse” ning liikmelisus Euroopa Nõu-
kogus sai taasiseseisvunud Kesk-ja Ida-Euroopa riikide jaoks keskseks poliiti-
liseks eesmärgiks.1136  
Politoloogid ja õigusteadlased väitsid 1990ndatel suure enesekindlusega, et 
inimõigused on rahvusvaheliselt aktsepteeritud standardid ning kui riigid soovi-
vad omada rahvusvahelisel areenil kõrget reputatsiooni, kui nad tahavad kuu-
luda liberaalsete riikide klubisse, on nad ka motiveeritud rahvusvahelisi inim-
õiguste standardeid järgima ning vajalikke reforme läbi viima.1137 Ka Euroopa 
Nõukogu tugines normatiivsele, idealistlikule lähenemisele, mille kohaselt riigid 
muudavad oma käitumist, kui neid veenda, et teatud normid või tegevused on 
õiged ja väärtuslikud.1138  
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28. veebruaril 1996 ühines Venemaa Euroopa Nõukogu Statuudiga ning rati-
fitseeris Euroopa inimõiguste ja põhivabaduste kaitse konventsiooni1139 (EIÕK) 
20. märtsil 1998, mis jõustus Venemaa suhtes 1. novembril 1998. Kõigi eelduste 
kohaselt pidi ka Venemaa järk-järgult lääneliku demokraatia ja inimõigused 
omaks võtma.1140 
Venemaa liikmelisust Euroopa Nõukogus on alati iseloomustanud sügavad 
vastuolud.1141 Vaieldamatult on liikmelisus Euroopa Nõukogus ning EIÕK rati-
fitseerimine avaldanud olulist mõju Venemaa seadusandlusele ning kohtusüs-
teemile. Samas iseloomustab tänast Venemaad kodaniku-ja poliitiliste õiguste 
laialdane piiramine, mis on päädinud sellega, et sisukas poliitiline dialoog ning 
arvamuste paljusus avalikus sfääris on peaaegu olematu.1142 2015. aastal oli 
Venemaa rahvusvahelises ajakirjandusvabaduse edetabelis koos Etioopia ja 
Saudi Araabiaga 180. kohal 199st.1143 Venemaal on tõsiseid probleeme Euroopa 
Inimõiguste Kohtu (EIK) otsuste täitmisega. Venemaa on üks kümnest Euroopa 
Nõukogu liikmesriigist, kes eristuvad täitmata otsuste suure arvu poolest. Prob-
leemid EIK otsuste täitmisega peegeldavad omakorda tõsiseid struktuurseid 
probleeme Euroopa Nõukogu liikmesriikide õigussüsteemides.1144 2016. aasta 
lõpu seisuga oli Venemaal lõpuni viimata 1573 EIK otsuse täitmisprotsess.1145 
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Keskmiselt võtab Venemaal EIK otsuste täitmine aega 7,9 aastat.1146 Mõningate 
EIK otsuste täitmine on Venemaale osutunud poliitiliselt sedavõrd keeruliseks, 
et Venemaa konstitutsioonikohus on otsustanud, et EIK otsuseid kohtuasjades 
Anchugov ja Gladkov v Venemaa1147 ning OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya YUKOS 
v Venemaa1148 ei ole Venemaal võimalik täita,1149 keeldudes seega tunnustamast 
EIK otsuste siduvust Venemaale. 1990ndate aastate nn mesinädalate perioodil 
sellist stsenaariumi paljud poliitilised liidrid ega teised autoriteedid ei oodanud. 
Soovisin oma doktoritöös otsida vastust küsimusele, miks asjaolud on selliseks 
kujunenud ning miks ei ole Euroopa Nõukogul õnnestunud Venemaad „taltsu-
tada” Euroopa Nõukogu standardeid järgima.  
 
 
Eesmärk ning uurimisküsimused  
Minu doktoritöö keskseks eesmärgiks oli selgitada välja peamised tegurid, mis 
takistavad Venemaal EIÕK efektiivset rakendamist. Selle eesmärgi saavuta-
miseks uurisin esmalt oma töö teoreetilises osas, kas ja millistel tingimustel 
saab Euroopa Nõukogu mõjutada EIÕK ja teiste rahvusvaheliste inimõigusalaste 
konventsioonide rakendamist oma liikmesriikides. Tuginedes varasematele asja-
kohastele uurimustele, selgitasin välja tegurid, mis hõlbustavad või takistavad 
rahvusvaheliste inimõigusalaste konventsioonide rakendamist. Seejärel kasu-
taksin seda teoreetilist raamistikku, analüüsimaks EIÕK rakendamist Venemaal. 
Ma uurisin, kuidas mõjutab EIÕK rakendamist Venemaa institutsiooniline 
raamistik, keskendudes eelkõige õigusriigi ning Venemaa kohtute iseseisvuse 
küsimusele ning analüüsides EIÕK integreerimist Venemaa õiguskorda. Järg-
misena käsitlesin ma inimõiguste rolli ja tõlgendusi Venemaa poliitilises ja 
sotsiaalses kontekstis ning Venemaa õigusaktides, mis reguleerivad sõnavaba-
duse, ühinemisvabaduse ja kogunemisvabaduse rakendamist.  
Püstitasin hüpoteesi, et Euroopa Nõukogu saab mõjutada EIÕK ja muude 
välislepingute rakendamist oma liikmesriikides ainult siis, kui riigi sisesed 
tegurid ja protsessid seda toetavad, vastasel juhul jääb mõju väga piiratuks. 
Täpsemalt väitsin, et kui Venemaa riiklikud institutsioonid ei toeta rahvus-
vaheliste inimõigusalaste lepingute täitmist; kui EIÕK ei ole Vene õiguskorda 
tõhusalt integreeritud; kui Venemaa poliitilises ja sotsiaalses kontekstis inim-
õigusi ei väärtustata ning; kui Venemaa õigusaktid takistavad inimestel EIÕKst 
tulenevate õiguste realiseerimist, jääb Euroopa Nõukogu mõju EIÕK rakenda-
misele Venemaal piiratuks ning EIÕK tõhus täitmine Venemaal on vähetõe-
näoline.  
                                                                          
1146  Ibid.  
1147  Anchugov and Gladkov v Venemaa (Apps 11157/04 and 15162/05) EIK, 4. juuli 2013  
1148  OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya YUKOS v Venemaa (App 14902/04) EIK, 20. september 
2011 ning 31. juuli 2014.  
1149 Venemaa konstitutsioonikohtu otsus nr. 12-P/2016 (19. aprill 2016) ning Venemaa 
konstitutsioonikohtu otsus nr. 1-P/2017 (19.jaanuar 2017).  
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Minu doktoritöös oli viis uurimisküsimust:  
1) Millised on Euroopa Nõukogu mehhanismid ja piirangud inimõigusalaste 
konventsioonide täitmise hõlbustamiseks oma liikmesriikides? 
2)  Kuidas mõjutab Venemaa institutsiooniline raamistik rahvusvaheliste inim-
õigusalaste konventsioonide rakendamist?  
3) Kuidas on EIÕK Venemaa õiguskorda integreeritud?  
4) Millised tegurid iseloomustavad inimõiguste tõlgendamist ja rolli Venemaa 
poliitilises ja sotsiaalses kontekstis? 
5) Kuidas rakendatakse Venemaal keskseid EIÕKst tulenevaid kodaniku- ja 
poliitilisi õigusi ja vabadusi, eelkõige sõnavabadust, kogunemisvabadust ja 
ühinemisvabadust; ning milline on nende mõju Venemaa kodanikuühis-
konnale?  
 
 
Metoodika  
Minu doktoritöö on interdistsiplinaarse lähenemisega, käsitledes rahvusvaheliste 
inimõiguste valdkonda ning selle seoseid Venemaa konstitutsiooniõiguse ning 
rahvusvaheliste suhete teooriatega. Uurimismeetodite osas kasutan nii välist 
(external) kui sisemist (internal) perspektiivi1150 rahvusvaheliste inimõiguste 
rakendamisele Venemaa õiguskorras. Väline perspektiiv väljendub sotsiaaltea-
duslike, eelkõige rahvusvaheliste suhete valdkonna teooriate kasutamises rah-
vusvaheliste inimõiguste mõju selgitamiseks, millele keskendun oma töö esi-
meses peatükis. Minu doktoriöös tõstatatud uurimisküsimustele vastamiseks on 
paratamatult vajalik uurida inimõigusalaste konventsioonide toimimist poliiti-
lises kontekstis; analüüsida inimõigusalaste konventsioonide eduka täitmise eel-
tingimusi ning seda takistavaid tegureid. Lisaks, mõistmaks üksikjuhtumite rolli 
Euroopa Nõukogu kontekstis ning analüüsimaks Euroopa Nõukogu toimimist 
täna ja tulevikus, samuti väline perspektiiv Euroopa Nõukogu konventsiooni-
dele vältimatult vajalik. Ainult väline perspektiiv võimaldab hinnata, kui edu-
kalt on Euroopa Nõukogu inimõiguste instrumendid praktikas toiminud ning 
selline hinnang ei ole võimalik ainult traditsiooniliselt õigusteaduses kasutata-
vate meetodite, näiteks õigusdogmaatika, abil.  
Rahvusvaheliste suhete teooriatest on minu doktoritöö enim mõjutatud rat-
sionaalse valiku teooriatest (rational choice approaches), mis väidavad, et 
rahvusvahelisi konventsioone ratifitseerides ning rakendades lähtuvad riigid eel-
kõige kulu-tulu analüüsist. Kui ratifitseerimise või konventsiooni rakendamisega 
seotud poliitilised, sotsiaalsed või majanduslikud tulud on suuremad kui kulud, 
siis on riigid motiveeritud selliseid samme astuma. Kui aga kulud ületavad tulud, 
                                                                          
1150  Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart eristas välimist (external) ning sisemist (internal) pers-
pektiivi oma teoses “The Concept of Law”. Vt: Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, The Concept 
of Law (Oxford University Press 2012, 3rd ed. 1st ed. published in 1961). Vt samuti: Douglas 
E. Litowitz, ‘Internal versus External Perspectives on Law: Toward Mediation’ (1998) 26(1) 
Florida State University Law Review 127–150. 
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on tulemus vastupidine. Ratsionaalsel valikul põhinevad teooriad toovad välja 
ka erinevaid konkreetseid eeldusi, mis konventsioonide rakendamist hõlbus-
tavad või takistavad.1151 
Kasutan doktoritöös ka klassikalisi õigusteaduse uurimismeetodeid, eelkõige 
analüütilist meetodit, vähemal määral ka võrdlevat ja ajaloolist meetodit. Ana-
lüüsin õigusriigi põhimõtte tähendust ja rakendamist Venemaa õiguskorras ning 
käsitlen seda, kuidas on rahvusvaheline õigus, eriti just rahvusvahelised inim-
õigusalased konventsioonid, integreeritud Venemaa õiguskorda. Kohtupraktikast 
kasutan enda töös peamiselt EIK otsuseid ning Vene konstitutsioonikohtu lahen-
deid. Selgitamaks seda, kuidas Venemaal kodaniku-ja poliitilisi õigus raken-
datakse, on vajalik analüüsida asjakohast seadusandlust ja kohtupraktikast nii 
õiguslikus, poliitilises kui ideoloogilises kontekstis. Keskendun oma doktoritöös 
Venemaa seadusandlusele sõnavabaduse, kogunemisvabaduse ja ühinemisvaba-
duse valdkonnas peamiselt ajaperioodil 2011–2017 ning konstitutsioonikohtu 
praktikale samast ajaperioodist.  
 
 
Doktoritöö struktuur ning lühiülevaade sisu peatükkidest  
Doktoritöö struktuur lähtub püstitatud uurimisküsimustest. Esimese uurimis-
küsimusega tegelen ma oma töö esimeses peatükis, kus kasutan erinevaid rah-
vusvaheliste suhete valdkonnast pärinevaid teoreetilisi lähenemisi rahvusvahe-
liste inimõigusalaste konventsioonide, eriti Euroopa Nõukogu instrumentide mõju 
selgitamiseks riikide õiguskorrale ja praktikatele. Selgitan välja, millised tegurid 
hõlbustavad ja takistavad inimõigusalaste konventsioonide rakendamist ning 
analüüsin, kuivõrd edukalt erinevad teoreetilised lähenemised selgitavad inim-
õigusalaste konventsioonide rakendamist ning sellega seotud probleeme täna-
päeva maailmas. Keskendun ka küsimusele, milline on olnud Euroopa Nõukogu 
strateegia inimõigusalaste konventsioonide rakendamise hõlbustamiseks oma 
liikmesriikides ning kas see on end õigustanud.  
Töö järgmistes peatükkides analüüsin teooria peatükis selgitatud tegureid 
Venemaa kontekstis. Teine peatükk keskendub Venemaa institutsioonilisele raa-
mistikule. Alustan õigusriigi põhimõtte analüüsimisega ning selgitan, kas Vene-
maa põhiseadus loob õigusriigi põhimõtte rakendamiseks vajaliku õigusliku 
raamistiku ning kuidas seda õiguslikku raamistikku praktikas järgitakse. Õigus-
riigi põhimõte on tihedalt seotud võimude lahususega ning väga olulist rolli 
mängib kohtute sõltumatus. Kohtute sõltumatus on vältimatu eeltingimus EIÕK 
õiguste ja vabaduste rakendamiseks praktikas. Seega keskendub teise peatüki 
teine osa Venemaa kohtute sõltumatusele. Peatüki lõpus analüüsin, millised on 
õigusriigi põhimõtte ning kohtute sõltumatusega seotud probleemide tagajärjed 
EIÕK rakendamisele Venemaal. Allikatest tuginen teises peatükis peamiselt 
Venemaa asjakohastele õigusaktidele, nii vene kui teiste riikide teadlaste uurimis-
                                                                          
1151 Vaata täpsemalt doktoritöö I peatükki.  
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töödele kui Euroopa Nõukogu ja teiste autoriteetsete institutsioonide aru-
annetele ja uurimustele.  
III peatükis selgitan välja, milline on rahvusvaheliste inimõigusalaste konvent-
sioonide positsioon Venemaa õiguskorras. Tuginedes Venemaa seadusandlusele 
ning selle tõlgendustele Venemaa konstitutsioonikohtu ning õigusteadlaste poolt, 
analüüsin ma EIÕK ja Venemaa põhiseaduse vastastikmõju, keskendudes EIK 
ja EIÕK otsuste positsioonile Venemaa põhiseaduse ja teiste seaduste kontekstis. 
Muuhulgas analüüsin, kuidas on EIÕK roll ja tõlgendamine Venemaal viimase 
20 aasta jooksul muutunud.  
Seejärel uurin ma inimõiguste tõlgendamist Venemaa sotsiaal-poliitilises 
kontekstis (IV peatükk). Inimõigusalaseid konventsioone täidetakse edukalt riiki-
des, kus poliitiline ja sotsiaalne kontekst toetab inimõigusi ning keskseid väärtusi, 
millel inimõigused põhinevad. Rahvusvahelised inimõiguste konventsioonid 
põhinevad inimväärikuse, võrdõiguslikkuse ja mittediskrimineerimise põhi-
mõtetel. Kõik inimesed sünnivad vabade ja võrdsetena oma väärikuselt ja õigus-
telt, sätestab ÜRO inimõiguste ülddeklaratsiooni (UDHR) artikkel 1. Igaühel 
peavad olema kõik UDHRga välja kuulutatud õigused ja vabadused (UDHR 
artikkel 2). IV peatükis keskendun sellele, kuidas tõlgendatakse inimõigusi ja 
nende alusväärtusi Venemaa poliitilises retoorikas kui ühiskonnas laiemalt.  
V, VI ja VII peatükid keskenduvad sõnavabaduse, ühinemisvabaduse ja 
kogunemisvabaduse rakendamisele Venemaal. Otsustades, kas inimõigusalaste 
konventsioonide rakendamine on olnud edukas või mitte, on määravaks teguriks 
see, kas ja mil määral on rahvusvahelised standardid sisse viidud riigi õigus-
aktidesse ning mil määral neid praktikas rakendatakse. Seega analüüsin nendes 
peatükkides Venemaa asjakohaseid seadusi ning konstitutsioonikohtu tõlgen-
dusi, keskendudes eelkõige arvukatele seadusemuudatustele aastatel 2011 kuni 
2017.  
 
 
Olulisemad järeldused  
Euroopa Nõukogu laienemisprotsess tugines normatiivsele lähenemisele, mille 
kohaselt õpetamine, poliitiliste liidrite veenmine ning kodanikuühiskonna mobi-
liseerimine on peamised mehhanismid, mis toovad kaasa inimõigusalaste kon-
ventsioonide eduka rakendamise. Kõik Euroopa Nõukogu liikmesriigid, seal-
hulgas Venemaa, ei ole siiski osutunud „headeks ja motiveeritud õpilasteks”. 
Venemaa ei ole muutunud demokraatlikuks, inimõigusi järgivaks õigusriigiks. 
Inimõigusalaste konventsioonide ratifitseerimine ei ole toonud kaasa sealsete 
standardite ühetaolist rakendamist.  
Olen seisukohal, et normatiivsed teooriad ei ole suutnud seletada, miks osad 
riigid oma inimõigusalastest konventsioonidest tulenevaid kohustusi täidavad 
ning miks osad riigid seda ei tee. Normatiivsed teooriad on ignoreerinud erine-
vaid piiranguid, mis mõjutavad konventsioonide rakendamist praktikas. EIÕK 
norme rakendatakse riiklikul tasandil, riikidel on kohustus ning ka toimivad 
mehhanismid EIÕK rakendamiseks, kusjuures Euroopa Nõukogul saab olla vaid 
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toetav roll. Kui Euroopa Nõukogu liikmesriigid võetud kohustusi ei täida, on 
Euroopa Nõukogu „tööriistakast” riikide mõjutamiseks väga piiratud. Euroopa 
Nõukogul on teatud hoovad riikide karistamiseks, mis suuremalt jaolt piirduvad 
poliitilise surve avaldamise ja avaliku häbistamisega. Kuigi ka Venemaa korrale 
kutsumiseks on kasutatud erinevaid mehhanisme, sh hääletusõiguse peatamine 
Parlamentaarses Assamblees, ei ole need motiveerinud Venemaad oma kohustusi 
täitma.  
Normatiivsed teooriad on ekslikult eeldanud, et inimõiguste universaalsuse 
idee on rahvusvaheliselt aktsepteeritud ning et riigid on sellest lähtuvalt moti-
veeritud reformima oma õigusakte ja institutsioone ning muutma harjumus-
pärased praktikaid. Paljud mõjukad riigid, sealhulgas Venemaa, ei aktsepteeri 
inimõiguste universaalsuse ideed ning neil on vähe stiimuleid täitmaks rahvus-
vahelisi inimõigusalaseid lepinguid, mis sellele eeldusele tuginevad. Lääne libe-
raalsed demokraatiad ei ole enam autoriteetsete õpetajate rollis ning inimõiguste 
tõlgendamist ja rakendamist mõjutavad üha enam erinevad kultuurilised ja 
regionaalsed tegurid.  
Rahvusvaheliste inimõigusalaste konventsioonide täitmine, sealhulgas EIÕK 
täitmine, on riikide jaoks mitmetel põhjustel keeruline. Seaduste ja institutsioo-
nide reformimine ning EIK otsuste täitmine võib valitsuste jaoks olla poliiti-
liselt väga kulukas, sest valitsuste eesmärgid ja huvid võivad Euroopa Nõukogu 
standarditest ja ootustest oluliselt erineda. Seda eriti juhul, kui tegemist on 
autoritaarse riigiga, mille valitsus pooldab anti-liberaalseid ja populistlikke 
ideoloogiaid.  
Minu doktoritöö keskne järeldus on, et Venemaa „taltsutamine” Euroopa Nõu-
kogu normatiivse süsteemi poolt ei ole osutunud edukaks erinevate Venemaa 
õiguskorrast tulenevate ning poliitiliste ja sotsiaalsete tegurite tõttu, mis takis-
tavad EIÕK efektiivset rakendamist Venemaal. Esimene takistus seisneb selles, 
et Venemaa institutsioonid ei toeta EIÕK ega teiste rahvusvaheliste inimõigus-
alaste konventsioonide täitmist. Kuigi Venemaa põhiseadus kehtestab õigusriigi 
põhimõtte ning õigusriigi põhimõttest lähtuva institutsioonilise ülesehituse, on 
praktikas Venemaa täidesaatev võim peaaegu piiramatu ja teistel institutsioo-
nidel, eelkõige kohtusüsteemil, puudub võimekus ja sõltumatus inimõiguste 
rakendamiseks. Kohtusüsteemi autonoomiat on oluliselt piiratud ning täitev-
võim omab olulist mõju nii Konstitutsioonikohtu kui teiste kohtute praktikale.  
Teine peamine takistus on see, et EIÕK ei ole Venemaa õiguskorda tõhusalt 
integreeritud. Konstitutsioonikohtu praktika ning Venemaa konstitutsioonikohtu 
seaduse muudatused, mis võimaldavad keelduda EIK otsuste täitmisest, on 
otseses vastuolus EIÕK artikliga 46, mis sätestab EIK otsuste siduvuse liikmes-
riikidele. Konstitutsioonikohtu seaduse muudatus ning samasisuline lähenemine 
konstitutsioonikohtu poolt raskendab EIÕK täitmist Venemaal. Venemaa on 
ainuke Euroopa Nõukogu liikmesriik, kes on sellise sammu astunud ning see 
paratamatult raskendab veelgi Euroopa Nõukogu ja Venemaa koostööd.  
Kolmas peamine takistus seisneb selles, et Venemaa ametlik poliitiline 
retoorika ning Venemaa ühiskondlik arvamus ei toeta inimõigusi ning väärtusi, 
millel inimõigused baseeruvad. Valitsev poliitiline retoorika rõhutab kõrgeimate 
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väärtustena suveräänsust, riigi julgeolekut, patriotismi ning Venemaa tradit-
sioonilisi (õigeusklikke) väärtusi, mis peaksid konflikti korral prevaleerima 
inimõiguste kaitse üle. Venemaa poliitiline ladvik ei ole motiveeritud Euroopa 
Nõukogu standardeid järgima, mis peegeldub otsustes keelduda täitmast teatud 
EIK lahendeid, seadusandlikes muudatustes, aga ka erinevates muudes poliiti-
listes dokumendites, poliitikute kõnedes ja muudes arvamusavaldustes. Inim-
õigusi tõlgendatakse kui dekadentliku Lääne amoraalseid leiutisi, mis on Vene-
maa konteksti sobimatud. Lisaks on inimõiguste idee jäänud võõraks ka suurele 
osale vene ühiskonnast. Venemaa ühiskonda iseloomustab õiguslik nihilism, 
usaldamatus õigussüsteemi ning ka kohtusüsteemi suhtes ja vähene ajalooline 
kogemus inimõiguste vallas. Vene õigeusu kirik oma spetsiifiliste tõlgendustega 
inimväärikusest ning inimõigustest laiemalt omab olulist rolli inimõiguste 
tõlgendamisel vene ühiskonnas.  
Neljandaks oluliseks takistuseks on seadusandlikud muudatused sõnavaba-
duse, kogunemisvabaduse ja ühinemisvabaduse valdkonnas, mis samuti näitavad, 
et EIÕK ei ole Venemaa õiguskorda tõhusalt integreeritud. Seadusemuudatused 
on oluliselt piiranud EIÕK rakendamist Venemaal ning vähendanud veelgi 
kodanikuühiskonna rolli ning võimekust aidata kaasa EIÕK tõhusale rakenda-
misele Venemaal.  
Seega, Venemaa institutsioonid, eelkõige kohtud, ei ole sõltumatud ega piisa-
valt võimekad, et tagada inimõiguste rakendamine kohalikul tasandil. Venemaa 
seadused: nii õigusaktid konstitutsiooniõiguse kui sõnavabaduse, kogunemis-
vabaduse ja ühinemisvabaduse valdkonnas on suunatud EIÕK mõju vähenda-
misele Venemaal ning suveräänsuse, riikliku julgeoleku, patriotismi ning tradit-
siooniliste väärtuste rõhutamisele. Venemaa seadusandlus ning ka valitsuse 
retoorika keskenduvad inimõiguste pisendamisele, eitamisele ja inimõigustega 
tegelevate väheste aktivistide ning organisatsioonide õiguste piiramisele ning 
nende diskrediteerimisele ühiskonna silmis. Sellistes õiguslikes, poliitilistes ja 
sotsiaalsetes tingimustes ei saa EIÕK tõhusalt rakendada ning Euroopa Nõu-
kogu mõju arengutele Venemaal jääb väga piiratuks.  
Kokkuvõttes leian, et Euroopa Nõukogu ega ükski teine organisatsioon ei saa 
omada olulist mõju protsessidele riiklikul tasandil, kui riik (eelkõige valitsus) ei 
ole motiveeritud rahvusvahelisi standardeid järgima ning vastavaid reforme ellu 
viima. Euroopa Nõukogul puuduvad efektiivsed mehhanismid tagamaks EIÕK 
täitmist oma liikmesriikides ning EIÕK rakendamine sõltub riikide tahtest ja 
valmisolekust endale võetud kohustusi täita. Kui selline valmisolek väheneb või 
sootuks kaob, ohustab see kogu süsteemi efektiivsust ja tõsiseltvõetavust. Seega 
on oluline rakendada olemasolevaid ning arendada välja täiendavaid mehha-
nisme, mis aitaksid tagada, et Euroopa Nõukogu ei oleks „kaasosaline” inim-
õiguste taandarengus oma liikmesriikides.  
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